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ABSTRACT 
 
VOTING FOR VICTORY: THE IMPACT OF ELECTIONS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS 
Krishan Douglas Malhotra 
Avery Goldstein 
What role do elections play during counterinsurgency wars? Prompted by the recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, two broad empirical trends also underlay the posing of this 
research question. In the modern era, the number of electoral regimes in the international 
system has expanded dramatically. And in this same period, the fortunes of governments 
combatting asymmetric internal threats has reversed, with incumbents being defeated by their 
‘weaker’ opponents one third of the time, and securing outright victory for themselves only to 
an equal extent. But while the grievances expounded by insurgents vary across conflicts, the 
inclusivity of access to the institutions of power and the right to shape policy is a constant facet 
of every political system. Endogenous Mobilization Theory, argues that elections and their 
associated institutions provide both a proxy measure for a state’s willingness to accede to the 
desires of a broader swathe of its domestic populace than their non-elected counterparts, as 
well as serve as the mechanism which binds political regime elites to the aspirations of their 
masses across a myriad host of salient political cleavages.  
The theory is evaluated cross-nationally using a dataset of all modern counterinsurgency 
wars fought since the end of World War II. Controlling for a wide variety of factors, and 
employing both categorical as well as duration modelling approaches, the results support that 
elected governments indeed enjoy vastly better war prospects and face a considerably reduced 
hazard of suffering an outright defeat. These findings are sustained across a series of tests 
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employed to address potential concerns with respect to endogeneity bias, including an 
application of the instrumental variables technique utilizing two-stage least squares. Further 
quantitative testing, at the sub-national level, examines the 2003 War in Iraq. The results 
support that the precipitous decline in violence during the surge period, is strongly associated 
with the political realignment of Sunnis following the reintroduction of electoral institutions in 
2005, which promoted a shift in domestic political opportunity structures, and created access 
points within the new status quo regime for more moderate members/supporters of the 
erstwhile nationalist Sunni based insurgency.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Rising Trend in Strong Actor Defeat & The Proliferation of Electoral 
States 
 
What role do elections play, if any, during counterinsurgency wars? The recent US led 
campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have generated a considerable debate over the 
potential advisability and impact of holding elections during the course of a counterinsurgency 
war. The push to do so has been a major component of both the Bush and Obama 
administrations’ foreign policies. Yet the role of elections is barely mentioned in the recently 
rewritten US field manual on the subject (Petraeus and Amos 2007).1 This issue bears upon a 
crucial decision which faces all democratic regimes conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations, of whether or not to maintain or suspend the regular political process. In India for 
example, the central government suspended local elections and instituted direct rule by the 
central government in Punjab province for nearly a decade while combatting the Sikh 
insurgency, before reversing this position in 1992.2  
Furthermore, the election decision is not the sole purview of democracies. Between 
1946 and 2000 “there have been 867 legislative and 294 presidential elections under democracy 
compared to 737 legislative and 300 presidential elections under authoritarian rule”(Golder 
2005, 105). The trend amongst autocracies, and anocracies, has been towards an ever greater 
adoption of electoral institutions as a central pillar of governance within their regimes. In “the 
                                                           
1 Direct references to elections appears only three times throughout the document.  
2 President’s rule under Article 356 was imposed from October 1983-February 1992, except for the period 
September 1985-May 1987 (Telford 2001).  
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1990s electoral autocracies have become the most prevalent form of dictatorships—by 2000, 
62% of the autocracies in the world were holding multiparty elections. Thus, the end of the Cold 
War is unquestionably associated with an explosion of competitive elections around the world” 
(Magaloni 2010, 753).  
As well, notorious insurgent practitioners have also theorized as to the potential 
influence of elections. “Where a government has come into power through some form of 
popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, 
the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not 
yet been exhausted” (Guevara 1985, 2). Empirically, insurgents have often vigorously opposed 
the electoral process. During the January 2005 Iraqi elections insurgents shot off the ‘purple 
fingers’ of several voters and attacked a polling station in an attempt to steal the ballot boxes 
("Can They Cut off Eight Million Fingers?”-Institute for War and Peace Reporting - P215). And in 
the run up to the April 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters launched 
numerous suicide attacks in Kabul in a failed attempt to disrupt the country’s first democratic 
transfer of power in decades, even assaulting the election commission headquarters (Harooni 
and Donati 2014) and destroying truckloads of ballots after the vote  (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty 2014).  
Yet despite the prominence the issue has received in the public discourse, the scholarly 
literature on counterinsurgency has focused more heavily on the impact of elections on the 
onset (Carey 2007; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013; Collier 2009), duration (Metternich 
2011), and resurgence (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; 
Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Flores and Nooruddin 2012) of subnational violence, and 
less so on their potential implication for the outcome of a war itself. This is perhaps surprising. 
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Since World War II, there has been both a rapid expansion of democratic states in the 
international system and electoral political institutions more generally. By the year 2000 there 
were only eight countries that had not held some form of legislative or presidential election at 
some point in their history (Golder 2005, 105).3 This same period also witnessed a marked 
decline in the rate of government victory against insurgents. In the post 1945 period (1945-
2005) incumbent regimes defeated insurgents only 33% of the time compared to a victory rate 
of nearly 71% in wars fought between 1800 and 1944.4  
 Yet a number of potential relationships have been proffered. Elections have been cited 
as a means of legitimizing the incumbent regime (Hammes 2005), fomenting anxiety amongst 
the opposition (Hammes 2005; Weitz 1986), and as a mechanism for incorporating antagonistic 
elements into the prevailing political structure (Hashim 2005; Sharma 2004). In Nepal elections 
provided Maoist insurgents the motivation to form a parallel political front, and actually become 
the third largest party in parliament in 1991 (Sharma 2004, 5). Similarly, in Iraq it has been 
argued that Sunni Arab groups retrospectively viewed their boycott of the 2005 elections as a 
strategic error, and have since sought to participate more directly within the formal political 
arena (Hashim 2005, 51; Lynch 2011, 54). And a handful of studies have also advanced the 
argument that states can infer the distribution of support for the incumbent regime from 
electoral returns directly, and leverage this information towards targeting their opposition’s 
supporters (Balcells 2011; Steele 2011).   
                                                           
3 These are Bhutan, Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Specifically, the comment pertains to direct national elections.  
4 N=285. Difference is significant at the p=0.001 level using a two sample test of proportions. Data from 
Lyall and Wilson (2009).  
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 Yet in direct contrast to these claims, it has also been suggested that elections may be 
detrimental to the state’s war efforts (Cordesman, Davies, and Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 2008).5 For example, Sendero Luminoso launched a violent revolutionary 
bid for control over the Peruvian state precisely in response to its democratic transition, fearing 
that its organization would be marginalized in the new electoral political arena (Ron 2001).6 And 
in many cases, legal political parties have been utilized by insurgencies for propaganda 
purposes, so as to proselytize their message, as well as to undermine the inner workings of the 
state from within the regime.7 But for the most part holding elections has been considered to be 
an end goal in itself, rather than as a means of influencing the direction of an ongoing war (Ford 
2005; Rogers 2006); and while one of the most prominent theoretical traditions in the study of 
counterinsurgency has indeed focused on the impact of electoral politics, the locus of interest 
has been the domestic public of a foreign occupying power rather than in the locale of the 
conflict itself (Getmansky 2012; Lyall 2010; Mack 1975; Merom 2003).  
 A number of existing studies have offered general explanations for the rise in strong 
actor defeat in the modern era (Arreguín-Toft 2001, 2006; Lyall 2010; Lyall and Wilson III 2009; 
MacDonald 2013; Mack 1975). But these perspectives have focused only on the electoral 
process in democratic countries, and in the post 1945 period a clear preponderance (98 out of 
132) of conflicts have occurred in regimes that fall well below the conventional threshold of 
democratic status according to the Polity scale.8 While these studies are important 
contributions, their potential impact is accordingly constrained owing to their focus upon 
                                                           
5 The authors point out that the December 2005 elections in Iraq prompted a short term increase in 
targeted kidnappings and assassinations of political candidates.  
6 Though they were ultimately defeated by the Peruvian state.  
7 Several examples in include the IRA, Mahdi Army in Iraq, and FMLN in El Salvador.  
8 Operationalized here as scoring a 6 or lower.  
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mechanisms which are theoretically bounded to a minority of the historical cases. To date, there 
has been no systematic treatment or general theory advanced on the role of electoral politics 
and the institutions they produce in the context of ongoing counterinsurgency wars. This study 
proposes to fill this gap.  
 
The Argument: Endogenous Mobilization Theory  
 
 Perhaps the most oft repeated analogy of insurgency is Mao Zedong’s widely cited 
characterization of the relationship between insurgents and the people of a state, as being akin 
to a fish swimming in the sea. As a technology of warfare, insurgency is expressly designed to 
redress the material imbalance between the state and its opposition. It is a conflict of gradual 
progression. And the ultimate success of the movement, its ability to expand and overwhelm 
the status quo regime, depends chiefly upon the success of its political efforts, to persuade ever 
larger segments of the population to abandon their attachments’ to the state and pledge their 
loyalty and support to the revolutionary movement.  
 For the outcomes of such wars, the implications of elections is dualistic. Historically, 
they have been associated with supporting the wartime efforts of states, but also providing 
pathways for opposition forces to exploit in challenging the status quo. Broader, more 
encompassing governance institutions, can facilitate the incorporation of the mass population 
into the regime and give the median citizen in a polity a vested interest in its continued 
existence. However, such openings can also create vulnerabilities for the state, by providing a 
medium which disaffected actors can leverage to advance their challenges. As a measure, the 
presence or absence of national elections in effect proxies for two competing concepts: one of 
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which privileges their function as the basis of establishing and re-producing nationally elected 
institutions, and the other of which emphasizes their catalyzing role as a discrete political event. 
A concise descriptive account of the conflicting mechanism emphasized by these two opposed 
traditions, Institutionalization & Collective Action, is reported in the table below.  
Figure 1-1: Competing Mechanisms and their Predicted Effects of Elections on COIN Wars  
Institutionalization Collective Action 
• Beneficial for Incumbent Regime 
COIN War Efforts 
• Pacifies moderate segments of the 
populace with partial concessions 
absent the personal expense and risk 
intrinsic with revolution  
• Provides them with an invested 
interest in perpetuating the status 
quo and a credible commitment to 
sustain future value transfers  
• Denies insurgents the labor supply, 
recruits, and resources to escalate 
the war to a point of decision  
• Detrimental for Incumbent Regime 
COIN War Efforts 
• Creates an institutional pathway for 
opposition forces to exploit in 
organizing support against status quo 
political institutions 
• Precludes the state from undertaking 
security counter measures that 
moderate political voices may find 
politically untenable  
• Provides a platform for insurgent 
sympathizers to undermine 
governing institutions from within 
 
 The arguments supporting these contradictory expectations are developed in greater 
length throughout the project. But the principal empirical prediction which is advocated, and 
evaluated, is that incumbent regimes facing a mobilized insurgent threat will fare far better in 
their ultimate war prospects if they maintain nationally elected institutions as a basis of 
governance. Relative to their non-electoral counterparts, incumbent regimes whom maintain 
nationally elected institutions are far better positioned to recognize and satisfy a host of diverse 
interests held by the masses, and provide them sufficient voice within the status quo to deter 
their aspirations for exit. Within and between wars, the demands of opposition forces and their 
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supporters vary across a host of issues, from economic inequality to the proper relationship 
between religion and the state, from limited claims for partial independence to total ambitions 
aimed at capturing an entire country.  
  However, motivating people to take up arms and engage in revolutionary violence is no 
easy task. The personal costs are considerable and concentrated, while the prospect of a payoff 
is uncertain and diffuse. If a state can tie the interests of enough of its population to the survival 
of the regime, and give them an adequate investment in the perpetuation of status quo 
institutions, then they can outcompete the insurgency at the margins and secure enough of a 
popular base to maintain power. The argument proposed by Endogenous Mobilization Theory, is 
that elections and their associated institutions provide both a proxy measure for a state’s 
willingness to accede to the desires of a broader swathe of its domestic populace than their 
non-elected counterparts, as well as serve as the mechanism which binds political regime elites 
to the aspirations of their masses across a myriad host of salient political cleavages.  
Though the grievances expounded by insurgents vary across conflicts, the inclusivity of 
access to the institutions of power and the right to shape policy is a constant facet of every 
political system. And it is this quality, uniquely and succinctly captured by a state’s electoral 
status that has provided these incumbents a net advantage in surviving the intensifying 
insurgent threat of the modern era. But paying off one’s population is of course not free. To 
provide the masses with the material & non-material concessions required to secure their 
adherence, necessitates that elites accordingly diminish their own surplus.  
States must balance the magnitude of the compromises they are willing to offer up to 
the polity in exchange for increasing the odds of securing their tenure, with the dual risks 
associated with both under and over institutionalizing. While pivoting to the center increases 
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your appeal to moderates, and reduces the labor supply available to insurgents for mobilization 
against the regime, incumbents face an opposing risk of losing support from within their own 
base; and after all, implementing and sustaining concessionary policies requires remaining in 
office to do so. Furthermore, unveiling an insufficient offer of concession is worse than never 
having made an offer at all, as a regime would effectively publicly signal their unwillingness to 
adequately concede to the very members of the polity whose acquiescence is required to 
sustain their tenure.  
These structural constraints facing the leaders of states are considerable, and not all 
regimes will opt to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy based around electoral concessions. But 
amongst those who choose to, the net implication of pursuing such a policy is anticipated to be 
overwhelmingly beneficial towards supporting the state’s overall counterinsurgency war efforts. 
Rational incumbents will recognize that a minimal compromise of their ideal policy position will 
most likely curry the favor of very few additional adherents, and that maximal concessions will 
carry extreme costs for buying off the loyalty of a limited opposing radical fringe.  
States which pursue electoral political concessions will balance the guaranteed costs of 
broadening their ruling institutions with the corresponding risk of not having done so to a 
sufficient extent, and opt to extend an olive branch to the masses of yet immobilized 
moderates, pitching an offer of inclusion in exchange for obedience and reforms absent the 
tremendous inherent risks with revolution. Such generous but limited compromises of an 
incumbent regime’s ideal policy position will not always prove to be sufficient to tip the scales of 
war in the state’s favor. But all other things being equal, the larger the subset of the population 
whose loyalty can be acquired for the incumbent, the smaller the remainder left to be mobilized 
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by the insurgents, and the lower the probability that this residual base of support can provide 
enough of a foundation to propel them to victory.  
 
Outline of the Project 
 
 Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literatures, so as to establish the context for 
the rest of the project. At the heart of classic doctrine governing the proper conduct of 
insurgency is a privileging of the political struggle as the center of gravity. The central tenets of 
both Mao’s doctrine of People’s War and Regis Debray’s theory of the Foco, which was 
practiced by Ernesto Che Guevara, are presented and contrasted to both historic and 
contemporary thinking on counterinsurgency strategy. The chapter then turns to several brief 
descriptions of counterinsurgency wars fought in the modern era, as a means of highlighting the 
pivotal, and under-appreciated role, that electoral politics have played. The conclusion of the 
literature review provides a short introduction to the modern scholarship on electoral 
authoritarianism, to clarify that elections are an institutional characteristic which is not specific 
to democratic states alone.  
 Chapter 3 presents Endogenous Mobilization Theory, both informally and formally, a 
summary of which was discussed in the immediately preceding section. The principal objective 
of this chapter is to reconcile the competing predictions yielded by two theoretical traditions, 
Institutionalization & Collective Action, and in so doing establish a theory of the impact elections 
have on counterinsurgency war outcomes. The first of these two perspectives emphasizes the 
role which domestic institutions can play in stabilizing the foundation of a regime. Broader 
support within the domestic population provides a deeper foundation for the polity to rest 
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upon; motivating a greater segment of the population to invest in its survival, a regime can 
reduce the domestic labor supply available to insurgent entrepreneurs and impede their 
prospects of achieving success.  
In stark contrast the collective action problem focuses attention on the perverse risk 
that elections may actually assist aspiring insurgents in overcoming the ‘Rebels Dilemma’; 
implying that defeated electoral states may be indirectly complicit in their own demise. To 
reconcile these contradictory expectations, a formal proof is presented which models an 
idealization of the calculus incumbent regimes undertake when contemplating the magnitude of 
the concessions they are willing to offer up to the polity in the hopes of buying off enough of 
their allegiance to sustain their own incumbency, the structure of which is inspired by the spatial 
voting model associated with the median voter theorem. The comparative statics generated by 
the formal theory yield unambiguous support for the perspective that elections and their 
associated institutions on balance confer a tremendous advantage for the counterinsurgency 
war efforts of incumbent political regimes.  
 In the first half of Chapter 4, four hypotheses are proposed governing the predicted 
relationship between elections and both counterinsurgency war outcomes and duration. The 
primary hypothesis (A) identifies several mechanisms linking electoral institutions to 
counterinsurgency war dynamics through their relation to the problems of private information 
and credible commitments, the two rationalist explanations for the causes of war (Fearon 1995). 
But winning over the loyalty of a sufficient subset of the general population requires making an 
offer which is acceptably attractive to the civilian pivot player in the polity. In contrast then, the 
alternative hypothesis (B) entertains the case emphasized by the collective action tradition, 
namely that elections can exacerbate the insurgent threat facing a regime and even promote 
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the state’s own defeat, in line with prominent arguments made in the literatures on 
revolutionary protests and the stability of hybrid regimes. Two supplementary hypotheses (C & 
D) detail the implications of elections for both reducing war duration and facilitating negotiated 
settlements. Here again private information and commitment problems come to the fore; 
where the balance of popular support revealed by elections is anticipated to expedite the 
bargaining process of war, and the enhanced credibility of their institutions to assuage the 
security concerns thought to inhibit insurgents’ acceptance to laying down their arms (Jervis 
1978; Walter 1997).  
 In the second half of Chapter 4, the dataset used to evaluate the theory cross nationally, 
is described. The primary predictor variables are also defined, along with several other core 
control variables of theoretical interest as well as the econometric methods which are employed 
to assess both the war outcome and duration hypotheses. These sections are followed by a 
discussion of the endogeneity problem, both in general and more specifically as it applies to the 
present research question. In brief, because an incumbent regime controls the nature of its 
domestic ruling institutions it has the capability to condition them on the severity of the 
insurgent threat they face.  
The potential bias which might result, given that states can adjust their electoral status 
as a response to changing war conditions, would be considered a selection into treatment status 
problem predicated on unobservable confounders. The possible implications of this concern 
could be mild to non-existent or severe, and the substantive bias may be to either overstate or 
understate the magnitude of any estimated effects, even to the point (potentially) of a reversal 
in sign. Accordingly, in the final section of the chapter an identification strategy is proposed to 
address this concern, built around a combination of approaches including proxy variables, an 
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extension of the popular fixed effects approach to a cross sectional, non-repeat event context 
with a time invariant predictor, and a traditional two stage least squares approach using ‘lagged’ 
values of the key independent variables as instruments.  
 Chapter 5 evaluates the principal theoretical predictions generated by Endogenous 
Mobilization Theory. The initial results suggest both that Electoral States and Party/Democratic 
regimes (as defined by Geddes et al.) had considerably improved war prospects, even when 
controlling for a wide variety of additional factors. In the main results, the covariates of war 
outcomes are tested again, though now by an incumbent regime’s status of qualifying as a 
Competitive Electoral State. This refinement requires that non-party based regimes that held 
elections not dominate the polls with excessive supermajorities of the popular vote, which is 
taken as an indirect indication of participatory preclusion; the results of these tests again highly 
support the principle theoretical prediction, that incumbent regimes who maintain broader 
more encompassing regime structures are much harder for an insurgency to defeat. 
 This finding is confirmed again in subsequent multinomial logistic tests, which also lend 
considerable support to one of the two supplementary hypotheses. Not only are Competitive 
Electoral States advantaged in prevailing against insurgents, but they are additionally far better 
suited at forging negotiated settlements with them. In the war duration tests, Competitive 
Electoral States are found to enjoy a massive reduction in the hazard of being defeated, in some 
specifications by as much as a full order of magnitude or greater. This strong relationship does 
not however carry over to conflicts which ended in either negotiated settlement or incumbent 
victory.  
While elections are strongly associated with an increase in these conflict outcomes 
occurring, their regime status does not seem to accelerate the termination process as had been 
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predicted. Surprisingly, there is modest evidence to support that if all three termination states 
are pooled, Competitive Electoral State status is actually predictive of a longer conflict, not a 
shorter. Finally, in the second half of the chapter the identification strategy for addressing 
potential endogeneity bias is implemented. The results reaffirm the robustness of the principle 
findings in the main tests, and lend support to the theorized expectation that incumbent 
regimes ‘select’ into Competitive Electoral status (to the extent that they do at all) when facing 
more potent insurgencies.  
 In Chapter 6, the principal claim advanced by Endogenous Mobilization Theory, that 
incumbent governments ruled by larger selectorate9 regimes are vastly more resilient against 
insurgent threats than states ruled through more shallow institutions, is evaluated in the case of 
the 2003 US War in Iraq. A connection is drawn with an existing accounting of the war, the 
synergy hypothesis, which argues that the inflection and precipitous decline in insurgent 
violence across the country was driven predominantly by the confluence of two distinct factors: 
The Awakening Movement and the Surge. In brief, the synergy argument posits that widespread 
Sunni political realignment, manifested by the Awaking Movement in Anbar governate and the 
spread of local militia forces that would come to be known as the Sons of Iraq, created an 
opportunity to split the previously monolithic Sunni resistance effort.  
This chapter argues that the reintroduction of electoral politics in 2005 promoted a shift 
in domestic political opportunity structures, and created access points within the new status 
quo regime for more moderate members/supporters of the Sunni based insurgency. This is not 
                                                           
9 Periodically throughout the project the term ‘selectorate’ is used. This is not intended as an invocation 
of selectorate theory more broadly (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The measure of a country’s 
selectorate size is itself proxied by the presence of an elected/unelected legislature. The term is 
referenced because of its familiarity to the discipline and close approximation to an aspect of the central 
argument in this project.  
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to say that Sunnis were enamored with their future political prospects within the new Iraqi 
state, but simply that the policy distance between their ideal preference and the new status quo 
was now shorter than that with respect to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, the rapidity of the 
decline in violence would not likely have occurred either without the support provided by the 
coalition to assist and protect the Sunni population from Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) reprisals. The 
contribution which Endogenous Mobilization Theory provides to the Synergy hypothesis, in the 
case of Iraq, is an explanation for the timing and subnational variation in the extent and relative 
magnitude of Sunni political realignment.  
This claim is evaluated quantitatively, examining the covariates of two dependent 
variables: the number of insurgent attacks leveled against coalition and Iraqi security personnel 
(SIGACTS) and the per capita expenditures associated with the Sons of Iraq program, a proxy for 
the program’s relative size in a given district. These tests control for a wide variety of factors 
including the strength of coalition forces, different varieties of reconstruction spending, the 
health of the local economy, and the predominant sectarian affiliation of the local population; 
the substantive result is that while the synergy hypothesis is not the only justification for the 
dramatic reversal in the war, it is unequivocally one of the leading explanatory factors, returning 
both statistically and substantively significant estimated effects consistently across a wide range 
of tests.  
In the final chapter, concluding remarks are offered acknowledging several limitations of 
the project and providing recommendations for their remedy in future research. These topics 
include the question of what determines a given state’s electoral (or competitive) status, the 
agency of insurgent organizations in opposing elected governments, and finally the rise of ISIS 
and the implications of electoral governance for the future of Iraq.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review - Dynamics of Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency  
 
 Throughout the remainder of the project, the central argument which is advanced, in 
brief, is that incumbent regimes facing a mobilized insurgent threat will fare far better in their 
ultimate war prospects if they maintain nationally elected institutions as a basis of governance. 
Principally, this is owing to their comparative advantage in incorporating, into the status quo 
regime, a multitude of diverse interests held by the masses within their polities. Across the 
material and ideational divide, access to the halls of power is a constant. And whatever the 
grievance may be, that an insurgency espouses to champion, the success or failure of their 
movement will in the end be determined in large measure by their effectiveness in expounding 
the message of their cause. But revolutionary violence is a high variance undertaking, and the 
value produced by its success is overwhelmingly in the form of a public good. If an incumbent 
government can bind the interests of enough of its people to the regime, and give them a 
sufficient invested stake in the continuation of status quo institutions, then it can outcompete 
the insurgency at the margins and retain enough of a popular base to sustain its incumbency.  
 Before turning to the presentation of Endogenous Mobilization Theory, and evaluation 
of its core empirical predictions, this chapter sets the foundation for the remainder of the 
project, by surveying several important areas within the intellectual history of 
counterinsurgency war doctrine. That the political struggle to expand one’s base of popular 
support is the paramount center of gravity in this class of warfare is made abundantly clear by 
the iconic originators of this technology of violence; and the first several sections of this chapter 
detail the core tenets of both Mao’s doctrine of People’s War and Regis Debray’s theory of the 
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Foco, which was practiced by Ernesto Che Guevara. After describing the highlights of insurgency 
war theory, the discussion will turn to the historic and contemporary arguments that comprise 
counterinsurgency doctrine. The chapter concludes by providing several cursory vignettes of 
counterinsurgency wars fought in the modern era. The inclusion of these summary discussions is 
not intended as a test of the argument, but rather serve to draw attention to the central, and 
under-appreciated role, that electoral politics have played. In the final section of the chapter, a 
short introduction to the modern literature on electoral authoritarianism is provided, to 
distinguish elections as being an institutional characteristic which is not coterminous with the 
traditional democratic/autocratic divide.  
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A: Classic Models of Insurgency  
 
 One of the most pervasive refrains in the counterinsurgency (COIN) literature is the 
emphasis placed upon characterizing the conflict as being a competition between insurgents 
and the state over winning popular support. There is a good reason for this. In both Mao 
Zedong’s strategy of People’s War and the doctrine of Focoism formulated by Regis Debray, and 
associated with Ernesto Che Guevara, the objective of building political support for the 
insurgency is considered paramount. “Because guerilla warfare basically derives from the 
masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their 
sympathies and cooperation” (Mao 1961, 44). In Mao’s organization charts of independent 
guerilla companies the political officer who heads a mobile propaganda unit is second only to 
the company commander (Mao 1961 Appendix). This structural pattern is true as well for higher 
order units, such as the battalion and regiment; and at the highest level of organization, the 
political officer is even equal in rank to the brigade or division commander. Additionally, the first 
of Che Guevara’s three fundamental lessons is that only popular forces (emphasis added) can 
win a war against a materially superior conventional army (Guevara 1985, 1). “It is important to 
emphasize that guerilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people” and “[g]uerilla 
warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller 
number of arms for use in defense against oppression” (Guevara 1985, 3).  
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Figure 2-1: Ideal Stages of Classic Insurgency Doctrine 
Two Idealized Models of Insurgency  
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
People’s War  Sporadic Terrorism 
(organization, 
consolidation, 
preservation) 
Sustained Guerilla 
War (progressive 
expansion) 
Conventional Civil War 
(decision)  
Focoism  Sporadic Terrorism Sustained Guerilla 
War 
Mass Urban Strike 
 
 The above figure briefly highlights three idealized stages in the process of a successful 
insurgency. The demarcations between stages should not be interpreted in a rigid sense. As Mao 
has noted the nature of the conflict is of progression, and the ongoing stage of operations will 
likely vary at any given time throughout different areas of the country. The purpose of 
distinguishing these components is to draw attention to the progressive nature of an 
insurgency, and the reliance that it's armed forces place upon an ever increasing mass base of 
support to successfully undergird an escalation of the war effort.10 
 
                                                           
10 A parallel dynamic has been argued with regards to social movements, and contentious politics more 
generally, in the resource mobilization school of thought (Della Porta and Diani 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1978).  
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B: Early Stage – The Identification Problem  
At their core, counterinsurgency wars pit a materially stronger incumbent government 
against a significantly weaker opposition force. This is acutely the case in the earlier stages of a 
conflict. Insurgents accordingly have aspired to overcome their material disadvantages by 
employing a technology of military conflict that has emphasized the utilization of guerilla tactics 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). They eschew large scale direct engagements, fighting instead as small 
lightly armed mobile units, and campaigns are often lengthy affairs of low intensity violence 
(Weinstein 2007, 29). The goal for any insurgency is to wrest effective political control of a 
territory from the status quo regime, though the extent of this aspiration varies with the 
secessionist or revolutionary ambitions of the insurgent movement.11 To achieve their objectives 
insurgents rely on the support of the civilian population to both sustain their operations and 
conceal themselves from the state security apparatus. And towards this end, they engage in 
intentional organized propaganda campaigns designed to win over popular support for their 
cause, often times maintaining parallel structures of public governance in territory under their 
control (Hoffman 2006, 35).  
The contemporary discourse has appropriately identified the center of gravity in these 
contests as a competition over the obedience and support of the civilian population (Condra and 
Shapiro 2012; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011). While the government actor begins the 
conflict with all the material advantages of incumbency, they nonetheless suffer from an inferior 
strategic position. Insurgents benefit from the ability to conceal both their form and disposition, 
swimming among the people as a fish swims among the sea (Mao 1961). They can concentrate 
                                                           
11 The distinction of course relating to the extent of the incumbent regime’s claimed sovereign territory 
that is being contested. Whereas revolutionary movements aspire to displace the state’s authority 
entirely, separatist seek only to do so in a geographically delimited sub-area.  
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their strength and strike against the state at the time and place of their choosing, bringing 
maximum force to bear at a point of minimal resistance. And this approach has proven to be 
impressively effective in redressing the disparity in material capacity between the two sets of 
actors. Recent scholarship has found that the prevalence of weak actor victory is on the rise 
(Arreguín-Toft 2001, 2006), and that the twentieth century has even marked a decline in the 
propensity of strong actor victory to less than fifty-percent of engagements (Lyall and Wilson III 
2009; MacDonald 2013).  
The core strategic disadvantage facing the incumbent force is the ‘identification 
problem’, the capability of reliably differentiating between insurgents, along with their 
supporters, and the general population (Kalyvas 2006). During the 2003 Iraq War for example, a 
February 2004 report by American military officers estimated “that 70-90 percent of the 
prisoners held at Abu Ghraib at the time were unconnected to the insurgency” (Kalyvas and 
Kocher 2007, 206). Misidentification of insurgents both strains government resources and 
inflames popular antagonisms against the regime. Not being able to discern insurgent 
combatants and supporters from the general population, the government is forced to disperse 
its strength throughout the state’s territory. Rural areas are often ineffectually policed and have 
traditionally become de facto strongholds for the opposition (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Staniland 
2010), and frustration from a sense of ineffectuality and vulnerability owing to their dispersion 
have often led members of the state’s security apparatus to implement repressive 
countermeasures aimed at controlling the civilian population (Beggan 2009; Fielding and 
Shortland 2010; Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Curtin 2007; Kuperman 2008; Wood 2010). 
Furthermore, these tactics have frequently been theorized as counterproductive to the state’s 
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war aims, promoting a sense of alienation among the people and fueling support for the 
insurgency.12  
Modern strategies for incumbent forces have stressed the need to persuade the civilian 
populace to voluntary lend their support to the state (Petraeus, and Amos 2007). The ultimate 
purpose though, of the various lines of operation which comprise contemporary COIN 
doctrine13, is to encourage non-combatants to provide the vital human intelligence that is 
needed for the state’s security forces to overcome the identification problem (Condra and 
Shapiro 2012; Shapiro and Weidmann 2015). However, the theorized requirements to 
establishing the necessary trust and support for the ruling government, through the provision of 
security to the population and the development of public infrastructure, has also been 
acknowledged as a protracted and manpower intensive exercise (Nagl 2009, 25) even under the 
best of circumstances, as well as potentially distracting the military from its primary function of 
preparing for major combat engagements (Gentile 2009).  
 
C: Terminal Stage – The Outcome of the War  
 While the identification problem is indeed a crucial component of the protean phases of 
an insurgency, it is insufficient to account for the terminal stages and ultimate outcome of a 
COIN war. The ability to hide amongst a supportive segment of the population may well be 
enough to prevent state security forces from eliminating an incipient insurgency, but it is not in 
                                                           
12 A notable exception to this view is Jason Lyall’s (2009) study of Russian security force operations in the 
Chechen conflict.  
13 FM 3-24 identifies five categories of operations: combat/civil security, home nation security force 
development, restoration of essential services, reestablishment of public governance, and revival of a 
functioning local economy.   
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itself a sufficient basis for overthrowing an incumbent regime. Activities undertaken in an early 
phase of an insurgency are only intended to provide a foundation for supporting a larger war 
effort. For example, members of Fidel Castro’s 26 July Movement kidnapped Formula One 
racing champion Juan Manuel Fangio in 1958 to embarrass the incumbent Batista regime and 
highlight its inability to track down and punish the perpetrators. But by itself, such an action is 
clearly not sufficient for overthrowing a state.  
 “A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerilla effort and that of 
the regular forces is essential…if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our 
regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing 
the decision” (Mao 1961, 56). And while the focoist practitioner does not rely upon a large 
conventional military force of their own to challenge the government, their need for broad 
based political support is equally imperative. When confronting the state for control over major 
cities, and ultimately the capital, the focoist relies upon urban civilian support in the form of a 
mass general strike. No less than Che Guevara himself, succinctly captured the relationship 
between the function of popular support in both the early and later stages of a successful 
insurgency.  
“This popular work should at first be aimed at securing secrecy; that is, each peasant, 
each member of the society in which action is taking place, will be asked not to mention 
what he sees and hears; later, help will be sought from inhabitants whose loyalty to the 
revolution offers greater guarantees; still later, use will be made of these persons in 
missions of contact, for transporting goods or arms, as guides in the zones familiar to 
them; still later, it is possible to arrive at organized mass action in the centers of work, 
of which the final result will be the general strike” (Guevara 1985, 7).  
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D: Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations – A Brief Historical Review  
  
As a technology for conducting warfare, insurgency is designed expressly as means for 
challenging a militarily superior sovereign force. And as was made clear in reviewing the 
highlights of both the People’s War and Focoist doctrines, winning the support of the initially 
non-aligned civilian population is embraced by insurgents as their paramount objective. 
Historically, by contrast, incumbent governments have pursued a wide variety of tactical 
approaches aimed at arresting the growth of insurgent challengers, only one of which (Winning 
Hearts & Minds) represents a direct response by governments to compete against insurgents in 
persuading the masses to lend them their allegiance. Insurgency is after all a strategy designed 
to redress a relative material disadvantage, and by extension the state possesses the material 
basis for pursuing a much broader array of tactics. A representative summary of the historical 
repertoire, adopted by COIN forces, is summarized below in figure 2-2.  
 
Figure 2-2: A Taxonomy of Ideal Type COIN Tactics  
Geographic Centric Population Centric Opposition Centric 
Search & Destroy 
Clear & Hold 
Topographic Dominance 
Winning Hearts & Minds 
Population Control/Repression 
Expulsion/Extermination 
Negotiated Settlement 
Undermining Morale 
Fragmentation/Cooptation 
  
 Geographic centric approaches primarily focus on addressing aspects of the physical 
space upon which the conflict takes place, with an emphasis on the size of the state, salient 
topographical features, and challenges in securing long porous borders. One of the simplest 
COIN tactics is search and destroy. The first goal of such an approach is to maintain a constant 
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and visible presence of government forces in contested areas, display the incumbent regime’s 
resolve to maintain control, and deny opposition fighters the luxury of operating unmolested. 
And the second objective is to initiate contact with insurgents by drawing fire and then 
counterattacking. Since the location and identity of opposition forces is often unknown, patrols 
can act as a bait to lure insurgents out into open engagements.  
The clear and hold, or oil spot method, is often lauded as a more effective alternative 
(Farley 2007; Krepinevich Jr 2005). A clear and hold strategy aims to constrict the opposition 
force’s ability to maneuver by progressively establishing larger government held safe havens 
(Petraeus and Amos 2007, 5–18). As the size of these zones is expanded insurgents will become 
funneled into increasingly smaller areas of operation. Eventually the government controlled 
zones will expand to include the entirety of the state and the insurgents will therefore be 
compelled to either take up and defend a fixed position, surrender, or abandon their cause. In 
their study of Russia’s North Caucuses, Duffy-Toft and Zhukov (2012) argue that a strategy of 
denial, using large scale cordon operations to isolate the conflict zone, was the most effective 
means of limiting the insurgency’s expansion.  
Topographic dominance refers to tactics which recognize that certain terrain features 
are thought to provide an advantage for insurgent fighters. These include mountains, 
forests/jungles, caves/tunnels, and large border areas, all of which provide more easily 
defensible safe havens. The goal for COIN forces accordingly is to secure the areas of land that 
are conducive to hiding opposition forces or which provide them with a tactical advantage. Such 
tactics include the burning (van Etten et al. 2008) and clearing (Arreguín-Toft 2006, 48–71) of 
forests, smoking out caves (Callwell 1903), closing borders (Record 2007), and laying siege to 
rural mountain strongholds (Kilcullen 2006). During the Algerian War of Independence for 
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example, the French “constructed a two hundred-mile barrier of double row electrified fencing, 
minefields, and blockhouses along the border of Tunisia” (Miller 2000, 65).  
 Population centric strategies instead adopt the perspective of the civilian populace itself 
as the center of gravity. As was discussed in the beginning of the chapter, insurgents cannot 
survive without a complicit or at least neutral noncombatant population to conceal their 
identities from the government’s security apparatus and to provide them with direct material 
support. The strategy of winning hearts and minds aims to break this linkage by convincing the 
noncombatant population to voluntarily support the efforts of the incumbent regime’s forces 
(Petraeus and Amos 2007, A-5), principally by providing actionable local intelligence on 
insurgent activities (Condra and Shapiro 2012). The state aspires to prevail in the competition 
over popular support by providing human security to civilians and addressing political, 
economic, and social concerns through robust civil affairs and infrastructure reconstruction 
programs. 
 Population control measures alternatively seek to deprive the insurgent forces of their 
support base, but attempt to do so not through persuasion but rather by means of physical 
isolation. Tactics include forcible relocation to secure camps [strategic hamlet program] 
(Sheehan et al. 1971), the searching of homes and personal property, and curfews (Petraeus and 
Amos 2007, 5–21). State repression is employed with the intention of instilling fear of the 
government throughout the population so that they acquiesce to the ruling regime and 
denounce the insurgency (Davenport 2007). Historical tactics to this end have included 
systematic rape, murder, torture, and the wanton destruction of private property. 
 Finally, states have also attempted to eliminate portions of their own polities that were 
considered to be either sympathetic to or actively involved in supporting insurgents by expelling 
or exterminating them. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay have found that mass killing of 
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civilian populations are often employed by government military forces as a calculated strategy 
owing to the difficulty involved in directly targeting guerilla fighters (2004). 
 Opposition centric strategies concentrate their focus on the adversary organization 
itself. Negotiated settlements attempt to separate the opposition’s ideology from its political 
demands. Insurgencies are often manifested symptoms of some underlying political, economic, 
or social grievance, and if their demands are both limited and tangible then they can be 
bargained with (Metz 2007; Valeriano and Bohannan 2006, 299). Undermining opposition 
morale refers to a concerted propaganda effort by government forces to dissuade members of 
an insurgent organization from continuing the pursuit of their cause (Valeriano and Bohannan 
2006). If a sufficient mass of its membership can be persuaded to capitulate the organization 
will be left without a foundation and will shortly collapse under its own weight. Tactics include 
propaganda aimed at exposing contradictions and inconsistencies between espoused opposition 
organization doctrine and actual behavior (especially of the movement’s leaders), amnesty and 
resettlement programs for opposition fighters, and publicized government initiated correction 
of alleged grievances. Finally, incumbents may also attempt to fragment their opposition and 
coopt moderates into the extant political system by driving a wedge between the supporters 
and active members of an insurgency whom hold positions that are reconcilable within the 
status quo political system, from those whose views are not (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009; K. G. 
Cunningham 2011; Driscoll 2012).14  
 
                                                           
14 Although fragmentation of an opposition force may inadvertently produce greater numbers of veto 
players, and by extension adversely impede the reaching of acceptable settlement terms (D. E. 
Cunningham 2006).   
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E: Counterinsurgency in the Modern Era  
 By comparison, the contemporary literature on counterinsurgency war outcomes can be 
broadly conceptualized along three idealized classes of explanation. In brief, these are a strong 
actor’s interest in successfully prosecuting a conflict, constraints on their ability to do so, and 
finally the suitability of their capabilities, both military and political, for the nature of COIN wars. 
This thematic categorization is not meant to impose a rigid distinction between the authors 
associated with each camp, but simply to highlight the similarities of their primary emphases, as 
well as the common objections which have been raised against them and the present balance of 
evidence.  
Interest-Asymmetric Motivation & Illegitimacy in Wars of Foreign Occupation:  
 Mack’s (1975) study of asymmetric conflict offers one of the earliest attempts at 
providing a systematic account of strong actor defeat. Being materially weaker, he argues that 
insurgents pursue victory through the attrition of a stronger actor’s domestic political will rather 
than face their superior military forces directly. The asymmetry in power between the parties is 
theorized to necessarily generate a proportional asymmetry in their respective political 
priorities. While the conflict is a total war of necessity for the weaker actor, it is simply a limited 
war of choice for the strong. Accordingly, as the costs of war begin to mount, the collective 
political will of the stronger will fragment and erode. “[A] war with no visible payoff against an 
opponent who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as battle casualties 
rise and economic costs escalate” (Mack 1975, 185).  
 Increasing costs of maintaining ownership coupled with an according diminishment in 
benefits is a theme echoed by MacDonald (2013), who argues that the prevalence of strong 
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actor defeat in the 20th century can be attributed to the erosion of former great powers’ colonial 
possessions. “[T]he decline in incumbent victory can be explained by a broader shift in the 
normative and material structure of the international system from one that favored colonial 
governance to one that opposed it” (MacDonald 2013, 255). As colonialism ceased to be 
accepted within the international community as a legitimate means of governance the economic 
and security benefits of maintaining colonial possessions declined precipitously. Local 
collaborators became increasingly difficult to come by as alternative sources of personal 
advancement become available, including superpower patronage during the Cold War. Finally, 
established colonial empires of the 20th century were compelled by a domino logic to respond 
aggressively to any affront by a possession, a constraint that was not applicable to emerging 
colonial empires of the 19th century, and this shift in turn motivated the undertaking of untimely 
interventions. According to Macdonald, these four mechanisms can account for the substantial 
increase, post 1918, in colonial incumbent losses, from 16% to 57%, and these losses 
significantly contribute to the general reversal in fortune which incumbents have encountered in 
the modern era.  
 Differing levels of resolve within conflicts fought over foreign occupation is also Robert 
Pape’s central explanatory factor for the increasing prevalence of suicide terrorist attacks (Pape 
2005; Pape 2003). “[E]very suicide campaign from 1980 to 2001 has had as a major objective-or 
as its central objective-coercing a foreign government that has military forces in what they see 
as their homeland to take those military forces out” (Pape 2003, 348). Pape argues that suicide 
attack methods have been particularly effective in compelling more powerful democratic 
adversaries to withdraw from foreign occupations owing in large part to the extreme costliness 
of undertaking such a tactical approach. And empirically, foreign occupation has indeed proven 
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to be one of the most statistically, as well as substantively, consistent predictors of strong actor 
defeat (Lyall 2010; Lyall and Wilson III 2009).  
Capability-Competing Capital Requirements of Conflict Effectiveness:  
Arreguin-Toft’s theory of asymmetric conflict is summarized by the figure depicted 
below.  
 Weak-Actor Strategic Approach 
 
Strong-Actor Strategic Approach 
 
Direct 
Indirect 
(Guerilla) 
Direct Strong actor Weak actor 
Indirect 
(Barbarism) 
Weak actor Strong actor 
 
 
Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (expected winners in 
cells) (Arreguín-Toft 2001)  
His argument centers on strategic interaction as a predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes, 
with same-approach interactions favoring the strong by allowing them to bring their full 
strength to bear, and opposite-approach interactions favoring the weak by allowing them to 
deflect the brunt of their more powerful adversary’s attacks. Strong actor strategies include 
direct attacks against an adversary’s armed forces and barbarism, which encompasses a range of 
repressive measures aimed against noncombatants; while weak actor strategies include direct 
defenses against military incursions and guerilla warfare, a crucial component of which is the 
avoidance of direct confrontation. The post-World War II trend toward strong actor defeat is 
accounted for by a divergence in military force planning in different regions of the world.  
 
 
30 
The primary existential threat which strong states face, comes from other strong states 
in the international system. Conversely, the primary source of threat for the weak comes also 
from the great powers. Accordingly, the established militaries of great powers are designed 
primarily to deal with like foes, while the militaries of the weak are calibrated precisely to deal 
with asymmetrically powerful opponents. “The blitzkrieg model emphasizes direct strategic 
approaches; the guerilla warfare model, indirect strategic approaches. When the two interact 
systematically, strong actors should lose more often” (Arreguín-Toft 2001, 106). This sentiment, 
that the mechanization of great powers’ militaries are to blame for their poor performance in 
guerilla wars, has been further echoed by Lyall & Wilson. “...modern militaries possess force 
structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates 
the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively 
applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population” (Lyall and Wilson III 
2009, 67).  
Prior to the shift towards mechanization after World War I, 19th century militaries were 
based around the principle of foraging. Pre-modern foraging militaries were compelled to 
interact extensively with local populations as a byproduct of needing to resupply themselves 
with local materiel. Such militaries also maintained a much higher percentage of infantry 
personnel than modern forces. Arguably, both of these features made them more appropriately 
suited for combatting insurgents. The alleged validity of this mechanism has sparked a 
considerable debate on the appropriate direction of modern force planning (Gentile 2009, 2013; 
Gentile et al. 2009; Nagl 2009). And in an often quoted exchange between members of the 
National Guard deploying to Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld infamously 
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remarked that “you go to war with the Army you have, not the army you might want or wish to 
have at a later time” (The New York Times: December 8, 2004).  
Constraint-Political Constraints Hindering Effective War Conduct:  
Finally, one of the most pervasive lines of argumentation in the counterinsurgency 
literature has been the purported impact of political regime type. “Democratic polyarchies are 
apparently most susceptible to internal opposition to external wars, while totalitarian ‘centrist’ 
states are less susceptible to such opposition” (Mack 1975, 192). One of the great puzzles with 
democratic states is thought to be their proclivity to select themselves into asymmetric wars of 
choice which they then proceed to prosecute in a severely ineffective manner. Caverley (2010) 
has argued that this apparent contradiction can indeed be reconciled within a rational actor 
framework. The median voter in democratic states prefers a capital over labor intensive military, 
one which relies more on weapons than personnel. They prefer such a configuration as they 
themselves are the ones most likely to bear the greater risk in a more labor intensive military, 
and by contrast the cost of capital is largely borne by the wealthier members of the state. “A 
capitalized military not only results in many voters doing less of the fighting themselves, but also 
allows someone else’s resources to fund the costs of war” (Caverley 2010, 129). Accordingly, the 
median voter will support fighting insurgents with a capital intensive approach, resulting in an 
onset of wars in which the military is ill suited to prevail.  
In addition to promoting the production of suboptimal military structures, democratic 
political institutions have been further theorized to inefficiently constrain the latitude of their 
militaries in conducting combat operations deemed as overly repressive. “…democracies fail in 
small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality 
to that which can secure victory. They are restricted by their domestic structure, and in 
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particular by the creed of some of their most articulate citizens and the opportunities their 
institutional makeup presents” (Merom 2003, 15). Merom argues that societal preferences of a 
vocal minority undermine those of state leaders when the tradeoff between balancing higher 
casualties on one’s own military forces with those of foreign noncombatants leads the military 
to resort towards employing increasingly brutal methods of conducting war. While this strategic 
shift is borne from a desire to reduce one’s own losses and maintain domestic support, it also 
necessarily threatens the democratic character of the incumbent state, which then provides the 
foundation that domestic opposition groups require to mobilize a counter coalition against 
continuing the conflict (Merom 2003, 23).  
The Balance of Theory & Evidence:  
 At a theoretical level, to provide a satisfying argument each school of thought needs to 
be able to account for both the puzzle of strong actor defeat and the temporal trend of its 
increasing prevalence in the modern era. For the asymmetric interest school of thought, the 
temporal dimension has been the primary basis of critique. Arreguin-Toft (2001) has argued that 
if power asymmetry is operationalized in constant terms then it becomes impossible to rely 
upon this lack of variation as a sound basis in accounting for the emerging trend toward weak 
actor victory. This criticism is however partially unfair. One of the primary components of 
Mack’s thesis is the contradiction between power and interest asymmetry, and indeed this 
cannot account for the time varying trend in the rate of strong actor defeat. However, Mack also 
argues that this vulnerability in the domestic politics of strong actors is exacerbated in more 
open political systems. This second aspect is indeed time varying and in fact has occurred in a 
manner correlated with a rise in the declining prospects of strong actors, as well as the broader 
shift in international norms towards colonial illegitimacy. More prevalent democratic regimes 
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are also those exclusively targeted by suicide campaigns according to Pape’s argument. Though 
empirically, support for several of the arguments within this camp have been somewhat 
underwhelming (Ashworth et al. 2008; Lyall 2010).  
 The capabilities view however has been most opposed from the opposite direction. 
MacDonald argues that 19th century militaries were similarly ill suited towards addressing 
insurgents as their 20th century counterparts, and that European military bureaucracies were 
highly conservative institutions also constructed primarily to engage with other ‘comparable’ 
nation’s militaries. Furthermore, heavy cavalry and artillery were as inappropriate for 
conducting counterinsurgencies then, as armored personnel carriers and helicopters are today. 
Finally, foraging was not the logistical panacea that Lyall & Wilson claim. Supplies often had to 
be maneuvered by wagon through heavy vegetation in locales within minimal road coverage 
and the susceptibility to local diseases was far greater (MacDonald 2013, 258). And from the 
reverse perspective it isn’t entirely clear that capital intensive militaries are always inherently at 
a disadvantage when pitted against asymmetric opponents. The ‘Afghan’ model of war has been 
advocated for as one possible basis by which capital intensive militaries might maximize the 
impact of their fourth generation assets, while diminishing the risk of exposure to protracted 
insurgency (Andres, Wills, and Griffith Jr. 2005; Biddle 2005).  
Finally, the validity of the constraint school of thought demands both that repressive 
counterinsurgency methods are more effective and that democratic states have less latitude in 
opting to employ them. The regime type component of this view would seem on solid grounds 
at first glance. Both the number and proportion of democratic states in the international system 
substantially expanded after the Second World War, which indeed coincides with the sharp 
decline in strong actor success. However, several multivariate econometric models of insurgency 
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war outcomes have not found political regime type to be a significant predictor. Neither 
MacDonald (2013), Lyall (2010), nor Getmansky (2012) find any significant evidence that 
democratic states systematically fair differently than their autocratic counterparts. Furthermore, 
some studies have found that democratic states are indeed less likely to engage in mass killing 
of civilians (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004), where others have found the opposite 
(Downes 2008; Downes 2006). While a considerable theoretical discourse has developed 
concerning the possible effects of democratic regimes, the recent evidence is inconclusive. And 
the reverse is the case with respect to the repressive component of the argument, where the 
ubiquitous assertion of repressions’ negative impact, in direct contradiction of the theorized 
effect advocated by the constraint school of thought, (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Kuperman 
2008) has been recently brought under scrutiny (Lyall 2009).  
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F: Illustrative Cases of Elections During COIN Wars  
 
In this section, several cases are briefly discussed purely for illustrative purpose, to bring 
attention to the central role that electoral politics have played. Collectively, they represent all 
three of the possible war outcome states, occurred in multiple different world regions, they 
began in different decades, both before and after the Cold War, and in each one elections were 
held that enjoyed both high popular turnouts and considerable multiparty competition. In each 
vignette, specific attention is focused on differences between the pre and post-election 
behavior of insurgents, as well as the election results, namely the vote shares of participating 
political parties, and in particular those whom represented the political positions of major 
insurgent organizations, or were in close proximity to their location along a univariate policy 
spectrum.  
For example, moderate Islamic parties15 did compete in the 1997 Algerian parliamentary 
elections, and in so doing provided an alternative avenue for political representation within the 
confines of status quo institutions, in contrast to the revolutionary aspirations of the GIA 
(Groupe Islamique Armé) insurgents. In this case, the existence of these ‘regular’ political parties 
may very well have been viewed by insurgents as a direct competitor within the contentious 
political space, and served to undermine their mobilization efforts. In stark contrast, the Awami 
league party in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) swept the 1970 general elections, 
winning both a plurality of the total popular vote (39.2%) and 288 of the 300 provincial assembly 
seats for East Pakistan. If in the case of Algeria, elections aided the incumbent regime by 
undermining the insurgency, then the suggested effect in Bangladesh would assuredly be the 
                                                           
15 Such as the ‘The National Rally for Democracy’, ‘Movement of Society for Peace’, and ‘Islamic 
Renaissance Movement’.  
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opposite, with the electoral political process effectively assisting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 
overcoming the collective action problem and providing him a vehicle through which to organize 
a mass movement aimed squarely toward achieving secession.    
 Finally, the cases of the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) in El 
Salvador and the Sikh separatists in the state of Punjab (India) provide examples of two elected 
governments that ended their insurgencies with negotiated settlements. And in both cases 
electoral institutions were reintroduced into the political process during the course of the 
conflict, after having been suspended for some period of time. They diverge however, with 
respect to how each insurgency responded to the shifting conflict dynamic produced by the 
states reintroduction of electoral politics. “El Salvador’s revolutionary coalition, the 
FMLN…responded to competition from other leftist individuals and groups in the 1980s with 
coalition building, not violence” (McClintock 1998, 59–60: Quoted in Ron 2001, 586).  
But whereas the FMLN was able to maintain the integrity of its organization, by 
successfully adapting to changing domestic political conditions, and remain as a viable 
contender even within a new medium of competition, the Akali Dal fractured, with more 
moderate politicians realigning towards the regime and the extremist faction leftover resorting 
to widespread violence (ineffectually) in response.  
“The strategic, as opposed to unequivocal, holding of democratic elections by the 
state…is often effective in prompting traditional ethnic elites to begin uniting, 
moderating, and consider re-entering more "normal" modes of politics. After all, 
traditional ethnic elites do not want to become permanently marginalized in the wider 
political process once even a semblance of "normalcy" appears to be re-emerging after 
a period of extended insurgency…This process, if it occurs, contributes to the decline of 
violent ethnonationalist movements and the eventual cementing of political "normalcy." 
(Chima 2010, 12) 
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Algerian Civil War 1/1/1992 – 1/1/2002: Outcome-Incumbent Victory  
 The Algerian Civil War was triggered by the December 1991 parliamentary elections, 
specifically by the military’s decision to abrogate the results after the first round in response to 
the far better than anticipated performance of the FIS (Front Islamique de Salut), an Islamist 
political party. The decision was made over the concern that with a two-thirds majority of 
parliamentary seats, the FIS would democratically possess the means of amending the 
constitution and forming an Islamic state run in accordance with Sharia law. During the course 
of the war, subsequent elections were also held for the presidency in 1995 and 1999, and for 
parliament again in 1997 and 2002. Of particular interest though, are the subsequent 1997 and 
2002 parliamentary elections. In each, not only did a considerable number of political parties 
run and win seats in the legislature, but the previous FIS voting bloc, which had been banned 
from running again, became effectively split between multiple new Islamic parties. 
As well, the period surrounding the 1997 elections was associated with a considerable 
rise in civilian massacres, which took place in areas that had previously supported the FIS in 
1991. “Highly publicized massacres of villagers have occurred, particularly in 1996 and 1997…the 
regions in which massacres took place had been highly supportive of the Islamists” (Miller 2000, 
68). These massacres are strongly suspected to have been perpetrated by insurgent splinter 
groups, such as the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), potentially as a means for sanctioning civilians 
who supported more moderate Islamic parties in the new elections. Stathis Kalyvas (1999) has 
argued that the selective locations of violence committed against non-combatants strongly 
implies a rationally based motivation, but concedes that a sound explanation for the timing of 
these massacres remains elusive. “In just three months, between 12 July and 12 October 1997, 
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1690 people reportedly lost their lives in these massacres. This amounts to 48% of the total 
massacre victims” (Kalyvas 1999, 256).  
Sanctioning moderate members of the electorate presents one possible candidate 
explanation, given that immediately preceding this period was the first parliamentary election 
held (June 5) since that of 1991 which initially ignited the conflict. The war terminated with the 
surrender, under conditions of amnesty, of the ISA (Islamic Salvation Army) in the summer of 
1999 (Kalyvas 1999, 255) and the disbandment of over 20,000 insurgents (Miller 2000) 
associated with this group. Upon reaching terms for this ceasefire, several of the ISA’s former 
leaders began to assist the state in targeting the remaining armed insurgent organizations and 
the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) was defeated militarily several years thereafter.   
 
Bangladesh Liberation War 3/26/1971-12/16/1971: Outcome-Incumbent Defeat  
In December of 1970, then President General of Pakistan Yahya Khan sought to 
reestablish democratic rule and ordered a general election. Participation was substantial, with a 
considerable popular turnout of 63.1% and the involvement of twenty-four political parties. Of 
the 300 seats in the National Assembly, the Awami League Party was able to secure a majority of 
160 with 39.2% of the popular vote, while the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came in second with 
only 81 seats and 18.6%. The results of the election however revealed a considerable bifurcation 
in political preferences between the citizens of the Western and Eastern regions of the country, 
with all the Awami League seats won in East Pakistan and all of the PPP’s in the West.  
This conflict thus began in a similar fashion to the war in Algeria, with a surprising 
landslide victory for the Awami League opposition party, whose leader had openly campaigned 
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on a platform sympathetic to independence for East Pakistan. And again, in a manner parallel to 
the Algerian case, the war was precipitated by Yahya Khan’s refusal to allow the 1970 
parliamentary electoral results to be implemented, as doing so would have given East Pakistan’s 
Awami League party control over the national legislature (of both East and West Pakistan). But 
in direct contrast to the 1997 parliamentary elections in Algeria, there was essentially no 
meaningful division of popular support across the parties competing for seats in East Pakistan’s 
assembly. The Awami League managed to secure 288 of these 300 provisional assembly seats 
despite the presence of multiple competing parties.  
The legal protection to publicly campaign prior to the elections allowed Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the Awami League party leader, to openly campaign on a platform just shy of openly 
advocating for secession. And the public revelation of widespread support for the Awami League 
policy position appears to have facilitated the insurgent’s capacity to mobilize broad based 
opposition to the West Pakistan military, which had to airlift reinforcements into theater given 
concerns within the military leadership over the prospect of impromptu disbandment of security 
personnel indigenously stationed in East Pakistan. “The army especially feared a mutiny of its 
Bengali units. Yahya had been advised in mid-February that a strong sentiment prevailed in the 
civilian as well as in the military and police services in East Pakistan in support of the Awami 
League, and that it would be difficult under the current circumstances for Bengali troops and 
police to fire on their own people” (Sisson and Rose 1990, 155). 
Bangladeshi resistance forces were able to coordinate their efforts throughout the 
entire country relatively shortly after the conflicts inception (History - Liberation War Museum), 
and this stands in contrast to conventional insurgency doctrine. Whereas the classic thinkers of 
insurgency emphasized the protracted character of such wars and the need to build broad based 
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popular support for the insurgent cause in the early stages of a conflict, these organizational 
preconditions had already largely been met prior to the onset of hostilities owing to the 
electoral campaigning efforts of the Awami League. An attempt by the military to isolate the 
conflict early on was largely precluded by the wide spread support for the Awami League, and 
the geographic distribution of the conflict’s major kinetic events suggests a highly diffuse 
battlefield dynamic. The insurgency also received considerable material support from India, 
though this actor’s overt direct military involvement was limited to the culminating period of the 
war [December 3-16 1971] (Sisson and Rose 1990).  
 
El Salvador v. FMLN 10/1/1979-1/1/1992: Outcome-Negotiated Settlement  
 By the end of 1980 in El Salvador, the FDR (Frente Democratico Revolucionario) and 
FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional), respectively representing the 
popular and guerilla movements, had consolidated a formal alliance (Ryan 1994, 38). This 
alliance even achieved some measure of diplomatic legitimacy, when both France and Mexico 
formally recognized the FDR-FMLN as being a “representative political force”. And militarily, the 
insurgency was sufficiently strong to mount a major offensive in January of 1981, during which 
attacks were carried out throughout the country. However, the initiative fell short of toppling 
the regime and the subsequent March 1982 constituent assembly elections, which enjoyed an 
estimated turnout rate of between 70 and 90 percent, appear to have prompted considerable 
internal division within the insurgency over the movement’s strategic direction.  
“The first election, as well as the failure of the ‘final offensive’, set off a fierce debate 
within the FMLN in the period leading up to the presidential election of 1984, the crux 
of which was the guerillas’ correct response to changing political conditions. So deep 
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were the divisions over this question that its ultimate resolution came only after the 
assassination and suicide of two of the most important guerilla commanders” (Ryan 
1994, 39).  
 
In 1984 the FDR-FMLN pronounced a revised strategic doctrine, a central component of 
which was a shift of the movement’s primary objective. Outright defeat of the incumbent 
regime’s military was replaced by a proposal for mutual concessions as a basis for negotiations. 
Over the next five years a series of dialogues took place between the combatants which 
generated relatively little progress towards resolving the conflict. In May 1989 attempts by the 
FMLN to boycott and disrupt the presidential elections largely failed, and the far-right ARENA 
(Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) candidate Alfredo Cristiani prevailed, while political parties 
allied with the insurgency garnered “an embarrassing 3.8 percent of the vote” (Shugart 1992, 
140).  
“Subsequently, a further shift in the rebel’s public position resulted. They claimed a 
willingness to accept the Cristiani government, and to form their own party to run in legislative 
elections” (Shugart 1992, 140). The FMLN did make a second attempt at seizing the capital of 
San Salvador in November 1989, but after this effort failed they announced their willingness to 
recognize the incumbent Cristiani government and form their own party to compete in future 
elections (Shugart 1992, 140). Subsequently, both parties consented to UN sponsored 
mediation, leading to mutually consented upon constitutional reforms in the following year. And 
on January 1, 1992 the conflict terminated in a formal negotiated settlement. More recently, the 
FMLN has become increasingly successful in competing for power democratically, even winning 
the executive office in the 2013 elections.  
 
 
 
42 
India v. Sikhs 1/1/1984-1/1/1994: Outcome-Negotiated Settlement  
As the brief discussion of the El Salvador case highlights, while insurgents may not be 
able to control changes in the domestic political process initiated by the state they are 
challenging, they do have considerable latitude in choosing how to respond. The begrudging 
evolution of the FMLN’s policy position and strategic direction in reaction to the reintroduction 
of electoral politics highlights this ability of a revolutionary organization to adapt and revise its 
posture to changing circumstances. But whereas the FMLN might be considered a successful 
case of a ‘learning organization’ (Senge 2006), the Akali Dal Sikh separatists in Punjab India failed 
to react to a similar shift in the political landscape and fragmented as a result.  
During the war, the national ruling Congress Party imposed a state of martial law from 
October 1983 until February 1992 (Telford 2001). And while India is considered a democratic 
state, the invocation of President’s rule legally permitted security forces to violate generally 
protected constitutional rights, including free speech, association, assembly, and even the right 
to life for a brief period.  For example, “Harish Puri et al report that 14,457 people were 
detained without trial in Punjab” (Telford 2001, 2).  
Flooding troubled areas with high numbers security personnel is a core component of 
Indian COIN policy, and “[a]t the height of Sikh militancy, there were approximately 250,000 
security forces in Punjab, a state of about 20 million people” (Telford 2001, 3). In conjunction 
with the influx of military personnel, the national government in Delhi reintroduced the 
electoral process into the state in 1992, which had previously been suspended for the majority 
of the war. And as was discussed in the introduction to this section, Akali extremists were 
unable to prevent more moderate representatives of the Sikh community from peeling off from 
the movement, abandoning the ambition of an independent state of Khalistan, and re-entering 
 
 
43 
the normal political process via the 1992 elections. “While the insurgency in Punjab developed 
slowly between 1978 and 1984, it crumbled quickly between 1992 and 1994” (Telford 2001, 1).  
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G: Elections in Non-Democracies 
 
Figure 2-3: Contemporary Classifications of Political Regime Types & Elections 
 Fraudulent Compromised Free and Fair 
Related 
Concepts 
- Closed 
authoritarian 
(Schedler 2002) 
- Full scale 
authoritarian 
(Levitsky and Way 
2002) 
- Electoral Authoritarian 
(Diamond 2002; Levitsky 
and Way 2002)  
- Competitive 
Authoritarian (Schedler 
2002)  
- Hybrid Regime 
(Brownlee 2009)  
- Electoral Democracy 
(Diamond 2002; 
Schedler 2002)  
Description - Manipulation of 
electoral results  
- Manipulation of 
electoral/political 
processes  
- Unmolested 
electoral/political 
processes  
Regime Types Military Civilian Dictator Democracy 
 
Existing research exploring the relationship between regime type and counterinsurgency 
outcomes have primarily focused on democratic states, and not electoral institutions more 
generally (Lyall 2010; Merom 2003). While Getmanksy (2012) goes beyond the Polity2 
operationalization of democracy, by also considering the size of the incumbent regime’s winning 
coalition and the extent of constraints on executive power, the focus is still squarely on the 
democratic/autocratic divide. However, in a post-1945 sample of insurgency wars, a clear 
preponderance (98 out of 132), approximately three-fourths, of cases occurred in states that 
would be considered either as autocratic or anocratic, scoring a 6 or lower on the polity scale. 
While certainly interesting, theories of counterinsurgency war outcomes focused solely on 
mechanisms unique to democracies are constrained in their ability to provide insights into the 
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implications of regime characteristics which do not conform to the conventional 
democratic/autocratic divide.   
Alternative classifications of political regimes have been used extensively in explaining 
the durability and policy proclivities of states (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 2003; 
Tsebelis 2002). The above figure outlines three broad categories of non-democracies that 
maintain electoral political institutions as defined by several leading frameworks in the 
comparative regimes literature (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). 
Of particular interest in this study is the category of ‘compromised elections’. In these regimes 
elections are held and some manner of competition is often tolerated, but democratic norms 
are both severely and systematically infringed upon by incumbents so as to provide themselves 
with a substantive advantage (Schedler 2002). Unlike fully or closed authoritarian regimes 
however, elections are held and formal democratic procedures are still nominally accepted as 
the sole legitimate means of obtaining power within the state.16 While elections are free from 
overt fraud, incumbents are able to solidify their hold on power through their capture of state 
resources that are in turn employed in pursuit of private political gain (Levitsky and Way 2002).  
 
“Although the electoral process may be characterized by large-scale abuses of state 
power, biased media coverage, (often violent) harassment of opposition candidates and 
activists, and an overall lack of transparency, elections are regularly held, competitive 
(in that major opposition parties and candidates usually participate), and generally free 
of massive fraud. In many cases, the presence of international observers or the 
existence of parallel vote-counting procedures limits the capacity of incumbents to 
engage in large-scale fraud” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 55)  
 
                                                           
16 In certain respects this distinction approaches a minimalist procedural definition of democracy or 
polyarchy (Dahl 1972). 
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 To be sure, there are further salient differences even between the various regime 
subtypes labeled in the figure above as having ‘compromised’ elections. On a conceptual level, 
Larry Diamond (2002) has argued that an important distinction separating hegemonic from 
competitive authoritarian regimes is the extent to which opposition groups can seriously 
threaten incumbents by working within the normal political process. And empirically, Jason 
Brownlee (2009) has found that competitive authoritarian states which undergo a democratic 
transition are indeed more likely to consolidate, but found no effect of hegemonic regime type 
on either transition or consolidation. The implication of drawing attention to the evolving 
schemas for classifying political regimes, for the present study, is to focus attention on the 
potential limitations of fixating exclusively on the traditional democratic/autocratic divide.  
As will be argued in the following chapters, the dichotomy between incumbent states 
which maintained electoral institutions and those that did not, as well as the competitive 
character (openness) of these contests, represents a far more compelling measure for assessing 
the accommodative nature of a regime’s posture towards its polity, at least in the context of an 
ongoing counterinsurgency war.17 Elections and their associated institutions proxy for a state’s 
willingness to accede to the desires of at least some segments of its domestic populace, the 
proportion of which will be argued is at a minimum greater than in their non-elected 
counterparts. But beyond simply serving as a mere proxy, electoral institutions provide the 
mechanism which binds political regime elites to the aspirations of their masses across a myriad 
host of salient cleavages. While such wars have been waged over a host of alleged grievances, 
from economics to identity, from Marxism to Islamism, from separatism to revolution; the 
institutional basis by which access to power and policy-making is regulated, and specifically 
                                                           
17 Definitions for the electoral and competitive electoral state variables can be found in Chapter 4: 
Hypotheses & Research Design.  
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whom is authorized to participate within the status quo arena, serves as a constant. And it is this 
characteristic, uniquely and succinctly captured by a state’s electoral status, that will be 
evaluated in the forthcoming chapters.  
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Chapter 3: Endogenous Mobilization Theory – Why Electoral 
Politics Matter for Counterinsurgency Wars  
 
 Elections have been associated with both undergirding the incumbency of political 
regimes, as well as facilitating their downfalls. They can serve as a mechanism for broadening 
status quo political institutions and accordingly provide a broader swathe of a polity’s 
population an invested stake in its perpetuation. But in contrast, they can also serve as a focal 
point around which dissidents can coalesce and ameliorate the very collective action problem 
which had inhibited them from successfully organizing against the state. As a measure, the 
presence or absence of national elections in effect proxies for two competing concepts: one of 
which privileges their function as the basis of establishing and re-producing nationally elected 
institutions, and the other of which emphasizes their catalyzing role as a discrete political event. 
The principal objective in this chapter is to reconcile the competing predictions yielded by these 
two theoretical traditions (Institutionalization & Collective Action), and in so doing establish a 
theory of the impact elections have on counterinsurgency war outcomes.  
Towards this end, a formal proof is presented that models an idealization of the calculus 
incumbent regimes undertake when contemplating the magnitude of the concessions they are 
willing to offer up to the polity in the hopes of buying off enough of their allegiance to sustain 
their own incumbency, albeit in a much diminished capacity. Electoral political institutions 
provide the mechanism through which such offers are presented, solidify, and sustain said 
concessions between regimes and their people. A total and unlimited capitulation of an 
incumbent’s own ideal position could theoretically assuage the demands of their entire 
population, and effectively inoculate the state against any insurgent threat. But doing so would 
carry the concomitant implication of effectively undermining the very purpose of combatting an 
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insurgent challenge in the first place, by entirely hollowing out the value associated with 
incumbency.  
Regime elites must therefore strike a delicate balance between expanding their appeal 
to the broadest swathe of the population that they can, but only up until the point before which 
the marginal value of winning the next citizen’s loyalty is exceeded by the cost associated with 
doing so. And while pivoting to the center will reduce the labor supply available to insurgents for 
mobilizing against the state, incumbents face an opposing risk of losing support from within 
their own base; and after all, implementing and sustaining concessionary policies requires 
remaining in office to do so. Furthermore, unveiling an insufficient offer of compromise is worse 
than never having made an offer at all, as an incumbent would effectively publicly signal their 
unwillingness to adequately concede to the very members of the polity whose acquiescence is 
required to sustain their tenure.  
Not all regimes will opt to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy based around electoral 
concessions, as a basis of undermining the escalatory ambitions of insurgents, in light of the 
guaranteed cost associated with doing so. But amongst those who choose to, the net 
implication of pursuing such a policy is anticipated to be overwhelmingly beneficial towards 
supporting the state’s total COIN efforts. Rational incumbents will recognize that a minimal 
compromise of the status quo ante will most likely curry the favor of very few additional 
adherents, and that maximal concessions will carry extreme costs for buying off the loyalty of a 
limited opposing radical fringe. Incumbent regimes who pursue electoral political concessions 
will balance the guaranteed costs of broadening their ruling institutions with the corresponding 
risk of not having done so to a sufficient extent, and opt to extend an olive branch to the masses 
of yet immobilized moderates, pitching an offer of inclusion in exchange for obedience and 
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reforms absent the tremendous inherent risks with revolution. Such generous but ‘limited’ 
offers are argued to reflect the frontier of rational play, and while these bids will not always be 
sufficient to bribe the pivot player in society writ large, they will meet or exceed this 
unknowable threshold a supermajority of the time.18  
 
A: Electoral Institutions & the Structure of Domestic Political 
Opportunities   
 
There is a striking disjuncture in the previous discussions between where theorists of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency have placed their respective emphases. This is not to say that 
either of the two camps is monolithic, and there are of course a number of substantive points of 
dispute which exist amongst each. But for all the theorists of insurgency considered, the need to 
build broad based political support for their cause was embraced as of paramount importance. 
The role of civilian support was viewed to be indispensable during both the early and later 
stages of conflict. By contrast, for each of the three contemporary schools of thought on 
counterinsurgency the focus has been squarely placed on characteristics of the incumbent. The 
state may be insufficiently interested in drawing on their material advantages (Interest), they 
may unable to employ those advantages in the most efficacious manner (Constraint), or there 
may be conflicting requirements between allocating their resource advantages between 
combatting symmetric and asymmetric threats (Capability). Even within the population centric 
tradition, which is the dominant modern perspective, the theoretical orientation is towards the 
                                                           
18 The empirical fact that states have discretion in selecting their own regime characteristics legitimately 
raises the concern that governments may select into, or out of, electoral status based on other covariates 
of counterinsurgency war outcomes. This problem of endogeneity owing to selection into treatment 
status is discussed at some length in the second half of the following chapter, along with a proposed 
research design for addressing it.  
 
 
51 
material resource advantages that an incumbent possesses as a basis for influencing the general 
public’s behavior. When ‘winning hearts and minds’ is placed into operational terms, it is often 
conceptualized as a bartering relationship where security and public goods are exchanged for 
local human intelligence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012). And as 
such the resultant policy recommendations have generally conceded the disadvantageous 
prospect of conducting long duration conflicts with labor intensive military organizations (Nagl 
2009).  
 This is not to argue that such approaches towards understanding the determinants of 
popular support and their implications for civil war dynamics are always inherently misguided. 
Stathis Kalyvas’s (2006) ‘control & collaboration’ framework is a prominent example of an 
endogenous model of territorial control and human intelligence provision which has been 
employed to great effect towards illuminating the processes of civilian victimization during 
intrastate conflicts. But in attempting to account for the outcomes of insurgency wars it is 
precisely the relative capacity to make effective political appeals to the civilian population not 
yet under insurgents’ territorial control which determines the ultimate success or failure 
(expansion or contraction) of a revolutionary movement. “The people must be inspired to 
cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual” (Mao 1961, 
82). When waves of Kuomintang troops defected to the communists during the Chinese Civil 
War and when the call for a general strike in Havana was answered by the masses taking to the 
streets, it was not because the insurgents already controlled these areas. Conversely the FMLN 
failed to spur a mass uprising in San Salvador on two occasions and the Tet Offensive was a 
military disaster for the exposed Vietcong network.  
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 One of the principal conceptual lenses that this project embraces towards exploring the 
influence of electoral politics on the outcomes of counterinsurgency wars is through the 
theoretical framework developed by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work on Political Order in 
Changing Societies (Huntington and Fukuyama 2006). Huntington argues that the increase in 
violent domestic military conflicts in the modern era, including a spike in guerrilla insurgencies, 
was due to “the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow 
development of political institutions” (Huntington and Fukuyama 2006, 6). Political instability is 
theorized as a function of the ratio between the expanding desires for political participation by 
the general populace and the relative development of extant political institutions for absorbing 
this emergent diversity of interests. And historically it has been precisely these unincorporated 
masses that insurgent political entrepreneurs have relied upon as the foundation of their 
movements. “We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerilla fighter is a social 
reformer” and that “the guerilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary” (Guevara 1985, 
4).  
Rural and agrarian support is the quintessential base of insurgent movements. And 
while part of this explanation may indeed be simply due to a state’s limited capacity to project 
its security forces to peripheral areas (Fearon and Laitin 2003), another key component may be 
the relative lack of existing political institutions to reach out into the countryside and effectively 
incorporate mass preferences into national political institutions. “…the key to political stability is 
the extent to which the rural masses are mobilized into politics within the existing political 
system rather than against the system” (Huntington and Fukuyama 2006, 74–75). But when a 
polity has failed to establish said institutions (at least to a sufficient extent) it has effectively 
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permitted the very basis of its own incumbency to lie beyond the purview of the status quo 
regime’s control.  
And in so doing a state undermines its paramount function of maintaining its monopoly 
on the legitimate exercise of force, by failing to integrate and align the objective material basis 
of its survival with an unequivocal interest in its perpetuity. When viewed from the context of an 
existential threat posed by an insurgency, aimed squarely at annihilating the domestic hierarchy 
of a given regime, the imagined bargaining relationship expounded by the modern ‘hearts & 
minds’ perspective appears particularly incomplete. The magnitude of side payments alone is 
never thought to provide a sufficient basis for sustaining cooperation in the absence of a 
centralized enforcement mechanism.19 Incumbents require a means for making credible their 
commitment to respect and uphold value transfers in the future, and incorporating the masses 
into the ruling structure of the regime via the conduit of elections presents a basis for doing 
so.20  
Conversely however, an alternative competing perspective is suggested by the research 
program studying the Collective Action Problem (Lichbach 1996; Lichbach 1995; Olson 2003), 
which supports the distinct possibility that elections may very well introduce an added 
impediment towards conducting successful counterinsurgency operations. As Roger Trinquier 
has noted, democratic institutions can provide legal cover for insurgent entrepreneurs to 
                                                           
19 While in an insurgency the centralized enforcement functions of the state are not wholly absent, the 
potential for their continued existence (at least in their present form) is in fact the very object of 
contestation in such a conflict and the ultimate basis by which a war’s outcome is decided.  
20 Other factors associated with promoting cooperation under conditions of anarchy include a sufficiently 
low discount factor for the strategic players and an indefinite time horizon of play (shadow of the future). 
The commitment function of electoral political institutions is emphasized here, and a more thorough 
engagement with the time horizon aspect appears in the following chapter associated with the primary 
hypothesis (A). The other issue (the peoples’ discount factor) does not seem to fundamentally differ in 
considering aligning with the incumbent or the insurgents.    
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disseminate their propaganda and cultivate a network of supporters out in the open under the 
guise of being a legitimate political party. “The period of preparation before the opening of 
hostilities generally takes place under cover of a legally established political party…Covered by 
legality, they will strive to create a climate favorable to their cause within the country and 
abroad and to establish on their own territory the essential elements of their warfare 
organization” (Trinquier 2006, 24). And historically, elections have been associated with one of 
the most dramatic episodes of regime collapse, precipitating the fall of the Soviet Union. In 
either case, if insurgents are to be understood as political entrepreneurs of revolution, then it 
seems apparent that the political environment in which they operate should have a significant 
influence on their relative ability to effectively promote their cause, and accordingly for the 
incumbent regime’s capacity to successfully prosecute a war against them.  
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B: The ‘Informal’ Model – Mobilization and Counter Mobilization of the 
Masses 
  
Figure 3-1: Endogenous Mobilization Theory (Informal Model)  
 
The Median voter theorem, and correspondingly the spatial voting model, provide an 
inspirational basis for the present theory (Black 1948; Black et al. 1958; Downs 1957; Romer and 
Rosenthal 1979). According to this framework, politicians competing in domestic elections will 
be motivated to present a campaign pitch towards the ideal policy position of the median voter 
within the electorate. When the complexity of the political space can be collapsed to a single 
left/right dimension (univariate political spectrum) and voters’ hold single-peak preferences, 
winning is effectively reduced to ensuring one’s appeal to the median elector, as winning their 
favor would by necessity ensure winning a simple majority of the overall electorate.  
The ‘informal’ model (above) depicts an idealized counterinsurgency campaign involving 
three actors; the state, the insurgents, and the people. War outcomes are conceived as being 
the product of a joint production function resulting from the opposing efforts of insurgents and 
the incumbent state competing to maximize their respective shares of popular support. In this 
depiction the people are conceptualized as being a commodity who possess a modicum of 
 
 
56 
agency. They function both as an object of contestation, as well as an independent actor (albeit 
in a more constrained sense) with the capacity to lend their support to either of the other two 
players. For insurgents, the ability to escalate the conflict is conditional on an expansion of the 
labor pool from which they draw both active members as well as more passive supporters; while 
for the state popular obedience is required both as a means of inhibiting escalation of the 
conflict and as a resource base for providing human intelligence, a widely cited requirement 
necessary to accurately identify the membership of a nascent insurgency. The outcome of the 
interaction is accordingly determined by the relative success of insurgents’ efforts at 
mobilization and the state’s efforts to counter them. 
This is not to argue that popular support is the only salient determinant of 
counterinsurgency war outcomes. Prior research has found that mountainous terrain and a 
weak state apparatus aid prospective insurgents at initially launching their campaigns (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). The provision of war materiel from a foreign benefactor would also 
considerably increases an insurgent organization’s combat effectiveness and at least partially 
redress some extent of the asymmetric disparity that defines this class of conflict (Record 2007). 
And labor oriented military structures may very well be more ideally suited towards conducting 
population security operations aimed at arresting an insurgency’s expanding coalition (Lyall and 
Wilson III 2009). The three thresholds (victory, settlement, and defeat) represented in the figure 
are intended to depict an ordinal scale, where their respective locations to one another, as well 
as to both endpoints of the political spectrum (the ideal policy positions of insurgents and 
incumbents), vary based on the totality of the structural features of any given conflict. 
Accordingly, various advantages and disadvantages for either the state or insurgents operate by 
altering the requisite volume of human capital which each player respectively requires to 
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successfully transcend a given cut-point and accordingly attain a more preferable result. For 
example, ceteris paribus an insurgency which receives material aid from a foreign benefactor 
will accordingly not require as considerable a basis of domestic popular support to overthrow an 
incumbent, relative to an organization that does not enjoy such an advantage.  
But while the requisite volume of popular support corresponding to each termination 
state will undoubtedly vary across conflicts, it nevertheless remains the case that within any 
given war more people must always be enlisted for an insurgency to further escalate hostilities. 
Accordingly, the second conceptual variable incorporated into the model is the shape of the 
popular support distribution function21, specifically in terms of its relative affinity with either the 
insurgent’s or the state’s preferred policy position22. In any given case an empirically accurate 
depiction would likely be best represented as a highly non-normal distribution; and require 
incorporating multiple local maximums associated with the political positions of relatively 
discrete demographic/ideologically adherent subsets of the population. The purpose of 
introducing this second dimension is simply to operationalize the relative availability of the labor 
supply for each of the other players in the game. And ultimately the framework is designed to 
illustrate a relatively basic and foundational question that each of the opposing strategic players 
face: how many people do I need to convince to support me, and how amenable are they 
towards doing so?  
Introducing elections and their associated institutions into a contested polity is 
theorized to impact the game in two principal and opposing manners. The first is by creating a 
                                                           
21 More formally the first four moments (mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis) of the probability mass 
function that corresponds to the true distribution of popular preferences held by each citizen of the state 
under contestation.  
22 The uniform depiction is intended for illustrative purposes only. The actual value of this function is 
further examined in detail in the formal proof of the theory.  
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regularized process for incorporating mass preferences into status quo political institutions 
(which is expected to principally promote incumbents’ war prospects). And the second is 
publicizing otherwise private information regarding the distribution of popular support across 
the political spectrum, with respect to both maintenance and revision of the status quo regime 
(which is anticipated to predominantly further the cause of insurgents); and more generally 
providing the impetus required to facilitate collective action towards mass engagement in 
domestic politics. Now while each of these mechanisms are anticipated to be equally operative 
in every case where elections are held, the relative weight of their impact on each of the 
players’ war prospects is expected to diverge owing to the asymmetrical character of their 
respective dispositions.  
For the incumbent state, the paramount objective is in maintaining the regime’s 
position of primacy on top of the domestic hierarchy by preventing its legitimate monopoly on 
violence from eroding. Conversely for rebel groups, the principal challenge towards achieving 
their foundational project is in overcoming the collective action problem, and inciting mass 
mobilization against the state. From the regime’s perspective a collective action problem serves 
only to impede any alterations to the status quo and accordingly undergirds their incumbency. 
“…dissident groups have their own Hobbesian problem of order. They face a Rebel’s 
Dilemma…No potential dissent will become an actual dissident; none will assist in either 
overturning the state or forcing the state to redress grievances. If dissidents are unable to band 
together and press the state for a redress of grievances, social order results” (Lichbach 1995, 
xii). And for insurgents, incorporation of the masses into existing governance institutions may 
very well impede their long term efforts towards ushering in a fundamental alteration in the 
domestic political system.  
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Figure 3-2: The Theorized Impact of Elections on Mobilization and Counter Mobilization 
Dynamics 
Actor  Objective Primary Operative Mechanism 
Incumbent Cooptation of the General Populace Institutional Incorporation 
Insurgents Overcoming Collective Action Problem  Public Information Provision 
 
 Another key facet of the model pertains to the distinction between the preferences of 
the populace being either public or private information, conditional on the presence or absence 
of electoral political institutions. While each individual citizen always accurately possesses 
information as to their own ‘type’23, this knowledge would remain their private information 
alone in the absence of some available mechanism for its credible public signaling. Certainly the 
dichotomization of an incumbent actor’s political system into those who held elections and 
those which did not is an obvious oversimplification of the nuances which exist between 
different varieties of electoral states. In a single party regime for example, the principal channel 
of communicating otherwise private preferences can be voiced only through participation in or 
abstention from the process. By contrast, under conditions of limited multiparty competition, 
and further still under democracy, the median voter would clearly have a considerably greater 
latitude in supporting a position closer to their own ideal preference.  
But in a scenario absent ongoing electoral politics the true balance of influence each 
combatant has over the median citizen is ultimately only revealed by the outcome of the war 
itself. Therefore, a significant potential implication for an election to exert a meaningful 
                                                           
23 The two broad types presently considered are pro insurgent and pro incumbent regime. In the formal 
theory types are operationalized along a continuum between these two broad dichotomous categories.  
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influence on the final outcome of an ongoing counterinsurgency war is in its capacity to publicly 
clarify the balance of civilian preferences prior to the actual termination of the conflict. But 
while the state possesses the sole authority to dictate both if elections will be held and what 
their character will be; at this point in the development of the theory neither state of affairs, the 
presence or absence of domestic elections, appears to categorically offer a decisive net 
advantage to either the government or an insurgency.  
An election might expose the identities of insurgent leaders to state security forces and 
undermine their efforts by revealing a relative dearth of popular support. For example, with 
respect to the March 1982 constituent assembly elections in El Salvador, “[t]he FDR and other 
small parties of the Left, believing they faced virtually certain extinction if they openly 
campaigned, opted for abstention” (Ryan 1994, 38). The elections proceeded however, and 
voter turnout reached 68%. Furthermore, such a vulnerability exists even if insurgents were to 
call for a boycott, as they face the prospect of public embarrassment if their order is not 
heeded.  
“The presidential elections in 1963 were probably the clearest indication that the 
Venezuelan revolutionaries were fighting a losing battle. Their call for a general strike in 
the days leading up to the election went largely unheeded, and turnout once again 
reached the 90 percent mark. As guerrilla leader Teodoro Petkoff put it later: ‘The 
general strike we called for November 19, 1963, ten days before the elections, was the 
swan song of the FALN .... One leftist politician said that the elections were ruined, but 
what was actually ruined was the FALN.’" (Ryan 1994, 32)  
 
But holding elections can equally backfire on the state by providing insurgent 
entrepreneurs with legal cover to publicly campaign for revolutionary causes. During the 1970 
Pakistani elections Sheik Mujib was effectively permitted to openly campaign on a platform of 
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secession for East Pakistan (Choudhury 1993). When Fidel Castro threatened to jail and execute 
any candidates participating in the 1958 Cuban presidential elections, his order was heeded and 
the Batista regime collapsed several months thereafter. And the political cover provided by 
ostensibly legitimate party politics was crucial for the FMLN build up to the November 1989 ‘To 
the Limit’ offensive, a major military strike against multiple El Salvadoran cities and military 
installations, principally of which was the nation’s capital of San Salvador.  
“This involved taking advantage of the more open political climate from 1987 onward to 
rebuild its political organization in the cities, as part of a “two-faced” strategy in which 
organizations with ostensibly legal, humanitarian, and advocacy purposes had varying 
degrees of linkage to the FMLN…Building on this base, the FMLN increased its 
operations in and around San Salvador fivefold between 1985 and 1988…Combatants 
then rode into town in civilian clothes on regular public buses, gathered at staged 
“social events” immediately prior to the offensive, and then collected their gear and 
began fighting” (Peceny and Stanley 2010, 82) 
 
Thus, while it appears eminently plausible that electoral politics play a significant role in 
influencing the outcomes of counterinsurgency wars, the net impact of that role is not yet fully 
clear. Both alternatives (to hold elections or to refrain) available to the state seem to carry the 
potential for significant benefits as well as severe repercussions.  
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C: Scope Limitations of the Theory – Extant Views on Insurgent 
Mobilization  
 
Herein, the theorized role of domestic electoral politics directly pertains to the 
mobilization and counter mobilization efforts of the insurgents and the incumbent regime, with 
respect to the people who reside within the state’s borders. As such two important limitations 
on its potential explanatory scope pertain to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
methods of recruitment, and domestic versus foreign labor supplies. The theorized role that 
elections play is therefore conceptually constrained to conflicts fought over voluntary popular 
mobilization of the populace residing within the state under contestation.  
This is the predominant basis by which revolutionary entrepreneurs have attempted to 
challenge sovereign states, and can encompass a variety of preexisting theoretical accountings 
of rebel group mobilization. For example, both activist and opportunist joiners within Jeremy 
Weinstein’s (2007) framework select into being either rebel group or state supporters on a 
voluntary basis. And the autocratic elections literature has argued that electoral institutions aid 
incumbents both in incorporating policy (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) and 
material interests (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2005, 2006) into status quo political 
institutions. Employing a provocation strategy is another tactic insurgents have resorted to in 
attempting to swell their own ranks; by inciting the state into employing indiscriminate 
repression (Kuperman 2008; Kydd and Walter 2006), they aim to increase the costs 
noncombatants incur for passively supporting the status quo and thus convince them to join the 
rebellion (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Within the framework of the present theory such a tactic 
would be captured as an attempt to promote a right skewed distribution in popular preferences, 
shifting the mass function of popular support towards the insurgent’s ideal position and 
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diminishing the policy distance they would need to concede to appeal to a broader swathe of 
the population.  
 However, the dynamics of conflicts that exhibit high levels of forced mobilization (i.e. 
child soldiering) fall outside of the framework addressed in this project. And while large scale 
forcible recruitment methods are admittedly an occurrence in a minority of historic 
insurgencies, there is some evidence of a recent trend towards the greater incorporation of 
children into rebel armies. Achvarina and Reich (2006) report that the civil wars in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia have experienced rates of child soldiers as combatants in excess of 25% and 50%, 
respectively (2006, 146). Forcible recruitment methods largely obviate the need to appeal to the 
population as a basis for rebel groups to expand their coalitions, which accordingly limits the 
direct applicability of the present argument.  
That said, the strategic soundness of forcible conscription as an approach to satisfying 
an insurgency’s human capital requirements is ambiguous. The attempted Communist 
insurgency in Greece provides a pertinent example. While the communist party grew in strength 
during the war against German occupation, it was unable to find sufficient support amongst the 
population to carry on its cause thereafter.  
“Using what forces they had at the end of the war [World War II], taking advantage of 
the difficult terrain, withdrawing into safe asylum across the satellites’ borders when 
necessary, the Communist insurgents were able to wage commando-type operations 
but not true guerrilla warfare; in fact, their infiltrating units had to hide from the 
population when they could not cow it, and their operations lasted generally as long as 
the supplies they carried with them. The ELAS was obliged to enlist partisans by force. 
Whenever the unwilling recruits found the political commissar behind their back less 
dangerous than the nationalist forces in front, they deserted” (Galula and Nagl 2006, 12) 
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On the other hand, while even Mao has cautioned against the reliability of forcibly conscripted 
insurgents, the case of the RUF in Sierra Leone seems to suggest otherwise. Despite the fact that 
Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was imprisoned for considerable portions of the war; former 
child soldiers, such as Issa Sesay, advanced to leadership positions and continued running the 
organization in his absence rather than disbanding as Mao might have predicted.  
The second major scope limitation of the present theory pertains to a rebel group’s 
potential employment of mercenaries, foreign fighters, and foreign state allies as resources for 
providing supplemental troops.  Foreign fighter networks have supplied the human capital 
necessary to bid up conflicts in several recent cases, including the wars in Iraq and Chechnya 
(Hegghammer 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Kramer 2004). Similarly, the ability for a relatively small 
indigenous movement to invoke the assistance of a powerful external ally could also largely 
preclude the need to expand the scope of domestic appeal (Posen 1993).  
An exogenous labor supply allows insurgents to augment their relative lack of local support 
and potentially escalate a conflict to a threshold which they would otherwise have been 
incapable of reaching. Furthermore, these additional fighters may be more experienced than 
domestic recruits in many instances, and therefore reduce even further still the total number of 
domestic personnel required to successfully challenge an incumbent regime. Conversely 
however, the need to seek external assistance may bode poorly for the prospects of an aspiring 
insurgency, precisely because it indicates a relative dearth of local appeal.  “Foreign help is no 
substitute for sound strategy, however. Soviet and Cuban backed insurgencies in Africa and 
Central America fared poorly because they could never gain sufficient political traction among 
indigenous populations” (Record 2007, 133).  
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While interesting questions in their own right, any further direct engagement with these 
two issues is left to future research. In the next section, a formalization of endogenous 
mobilization theory is presented, offering a reconciliation of the two competing mechanisms, 
political institutionalization and collective action, and yielding support for a clear empirical 
prediction: electoral states are vastly better situated to triumph against an insurgent uprising. 
The limit of rational play however, under both the alternative assumptions that incumbents are 
risk averse and risk acceptant, yields a non-zero residual probability which supports the 
competing collective action perspective. As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the 
intuition is that states try to strike a delicate balance between hedging against the prospect of 
being overthrown by diminishing the privileges flowing to regime elites, and redirecting them to 
the mainstream of the polity.  
But adopting such a strategy is not the only pathway to victory, and not every regime will 
elect to pursue such a policy to the same extent, or even at all. While insurgency has indeed 
presented as an increasingly potent threat to regime survival in the modern era, it is assuredly 
not the only existential challenge that a state faces. In contrast to threats such as insurgency, 
coups present a competing source of intrastate existential challenge; and where as an 
insurgency is protracted and asymmetric, coups are symmetric and rapid. And of course, regime 
leaders must calibrate their institutions to balance against not only domestic adversaries, but 
also those emanating from beyond their borders in the international anarchic system as well. A 
distinct possibility is that ‘not all good things go together’, meaning simply that optimizing one’s 
institutions to face one source of challenge may concomitantly disadvantage you in combatting 
 
 
66 
another, and as incumbent regimes contemplate how far they can pivot to the center of the 
political spectrum they must keep in mind the risk of losing their base.24  
                                                           
24 Here again a more complete and satisfying explanation for why some regime types opt to forgo 
adopting any sort of elected institutions is a question left to future research. The cursory account 
presented above would suggest that some regimes are constrained from compromising their status quo 
policy positions owing to alternative threat sources which may present a more immediate concern than 
an insurgency. A brief examination of the modern literature on coups however does not readily 
corroborate this account. The logic is that large selectorate regimes would shift away from selective 
incentive distribution to a greater emphasis on public goods provision, and concentrated status quo 
interests would rally to prevent the loss of their future rents. Greater institutionalization has however 
been linked to a reduction in coup risk (Frantz and Stein 2016), as well as in systems with greater political 
competition (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2013). Though in contrast democratic regimes have been linked to 
a reduced capacity to defend themselves against coup attempts (Bell 2016) and ongoing civil war to a 
greater propensity of experiencing a coup (Bell and Sudduth 2015). Research on the catalyzing effects of 
fraudulent elections for coup initiation (Johnson and Thyne 2016; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Wig and 
Rød 2016), is consistent with the Collective Action mechanism outlined in this chapter. Table 5-13 in 
chapter 5 presents evidence on the extent to which regime institutions are a reflection of war difficulty, 
finding that an incumbent’s electoral status is only minimally linked to the difficulty of their COIN war and 
is indeed mostly a product of other presently unknown factors.  
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D: The ‘Formal’ Model – Endogenous Mobilization Theory: The Marginal 
Effects of Elections on COIN War Outcomes  
 
Table 3-1: Semi-Formal Model: Overview Summary  
-Players • I – Incumbent Regime (Government)  
• C – Challenger (Insurgency)  
• CP – Civilian Pivot (Reservation Price Selected by Nature)  
 
-Possible 
Moves/Values25   
• I: |0-1|  
• C: |0-1| - c  
• CP: π (High and Low)  
 
-Outcome State 
Utilities26  
• Victory: πH-Premium 
• Settlement: πL-Premium  
• Defeat: 0  
 
 The empirical observation that interstate conflicts have overwhelmingly been 
terminated by some form of negotiated settlement, and not by the outright disarmament of one 
of the principal combatant parties by the other, has served as a principal undergirding facet 
supporting the application of economic bargaining models to the study of war (Goemans 2000; 
Wagner 2000). “Nearly all wars end not because the states that are fighting are incapable of 
further fighting but because they agree to stop”(Wagner 2000, 469). However, the simple 
descriptive reality of how intrastate conflicts have been predominantly concluded provides a 
stark contrast. In the nineteenth century incumbent states were able to outright defeat their 
                                                           
25 ‘C’ here refers to any surplus value transfer which would be required to cover the transaction cost 
associated with undertaking revisionist violence. The principal implication is simply that for incumbents 
this would be zero as a perpetuation of the status quo would not require any such cost. And by extension 
insurgents would need to do so by some non-zero amount so as to be able to match offers made by 
incumbents.  
26 ‘Premium’ means simply any disutility which results from overbidding. Any amount offered in excess of 
the unknown minimum threshold value which was required to meet either the high or low reservation 
price.  
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insurgent challengers over 80% of the time; and in the modern era insurgencies have been 
terminated through some form of settlement only one third of the time.  
Rather, in a majority of contemporary conflicts an insurgency has ended either by the 
outright overthrow of the incumbent regime or the wholesale elimination of the insurgent 
organization. From this perspective, insurgency in the modern era seems far more akin to 
Clausewitz’s understanding of absolute war, than to his characterization of real wars which 
comprise the predominant basis of interstate conflicts. “War [absolute] is nothing more than a 
duel on a larger scale…Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his 
immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance” 
(Wagner 2000, 472: Original in Clausewitz 1976, 75). In light of this distinction, the 
appropriateness of a rigid application of a ‘bargaining model of war’ framework to the case of 
insurgency appears to be at least partially misguided.  
 The extensive form representation (below) presents a stylized ‘moment’ in any 
counterinsurgency campaign. An ongoing war is always at risk of experiencing one of four 
possible transition states: victory for the incumbent regime, victory for the insurgents, 
achievement of terms constituting a negotiated settlement between them, or a continuation of 
the war which is then replayed according to the same structure. The war’s termination status 
depends upon the relative magnitude of the concessions offered by both incumbents and 
insurgents, and the extent to which they meet or exceed the reservation values of a sufficient 
subset of the population being contested, herein represented by π. The payoffs then for each 
player (and most importantly for the incumbent regime) are determined by both the extent to 
which the value of a successful bid is associated with meeting the minimum threshold of the 
pivot’s reservation price; minus the surplus concession offered to pay off subsets of the 
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population whose allegiance was not necessary to do so. In this simple depiction, offers are 
characterized as being sufficient to meet the high reservation price (SH), sufficient to meet the 
low (SL), or not sufficient to satisfy either (NS).   
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Figure 3-3: Endogenous Mobilization Theory: Extensive Form Representation 
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Table 3-2: Semi-Formal Model: Outcomes and Payoffs27  
1: Incumbent Government Victory  I |0-1| >= πH 
2: Negotiated Settlement  I |0-1| >= πL & C |0-1| >= πL 
3: War Continuation (Repeat Game)  I |0-1| >= πL & C |0-1| < πL 
4: Challenger (Insurgent) Victory  I |0-1| < πL & C |0-1| >= πH 
5: War Continuation (Repeat Game)  I |0-1| < πL & C |0-1| >= πL 
6: War Continuation (Repeat Game)  I |0-1| < πL & C |0-1| < πL 
 
Figure 3-4: Endogenous Mobilization Theory: Spatial Voting Inspired Representation 
                                                           
27 While it is always possible for an incumbent to offer and opening bid that is ‘sufficiently high’ (SH) two 
related principal impediments preclude the simple adoption of such a move. The first is the unknown 
value of the civilian pivot’s reservation price, and the second is the disutility suffered by incumbents 
associated with compromising their own ideal policy position. The interplay of these factors is more fully 
examined in the supporting calculations.  
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A useful analogy for explicating the strategic dynamic of the contest is that of a silent 
auction.28 The two strategic players, Incumbent Regimes and Insurgent Challengers, begin at 
opposing positions along a univariate policy spectrum, with the Civilian Pivot located between 
them. Nature moves first and determines the value of the Civilian Pivot’s reservation price. 
While this exact amount is unknown to either the Government or the Insurgents, the 
distribution of its expected value is public information. Given that the ‘standard’ logit normal is a 
symmetric distribution centered at y=1/2, the starting locations of the two strategic players is 
immaterial. As such Incumbents are assigned an initial ideal position of 0 and Insurgents a 
preference of 1.29  
While both players move simultaneously, the outcome of their strategic interaction is 
depicted solely as a function of the Incumbent’s choice set.30 The potential for overlapping ‘ties’ 
between the moves of both players is precluded owing to the transaction cost associated with 
revisionist violence. Insurgents are effectively constrained to plays within the policy spectrum 
not dominated by the choices of Incumbents, given that a utility maximizing Civilian Pivot would 
demand a premium to compensate for the transaction cost of overthrowing the status quo 
regime.31 To be sure, the argument here is not that insurgents are not strategic players in an 
absolute sense. The primary intention of the formalization presented herein is to reconcile the 
                                                           
28 In contrast to the format of an auction however the civilian pivot does not derive any surplus positive 
utility from receiving a bid in excess of its own reservation price. Overbidding in this present context 
means simply that the loyalty of some additional marginal subset of the populace is secured above and 
beyond the required threshold.  
29 The expected value of the civilian pivot’s reservation price serves a crucial role in the model as it 
provides the basis of constructing the benefit function. A formal derivation and defense of its functional 
form can be found in the following section, along with the other supporting calculations.  
30 In the proper sense then the model may be more accurately characterized as decision theoretic.  
31 An alternative justification might appeal to prospect theory – the distinction here between a 
government’s ability to shift status quo policy and an insurgents considerably more limited ability to only 
offer promises of future policy alterations post conflict.  
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conflicting theoretical expectations generated by the Institutionalization & Collective Action 
research traditions, as they apply to the issue of COIN war outcomes. Rather, it is in this limited 
context the argument is made that insurgents enter into the model as a relatively non-strategic 
player.  
States have discretion in terms of how much incumbency value they are willing to trade 
off in exchange for increasing their survival prospects, via the conduit of differing electoral 
policies. Two ideal types of incumbents are evaluated.32 Risk averse types attempt to limit their 
exposure to prospective defeat, and do so by continuing to expand their selectorates until the 
marginal cost of doing so begins to exceed the estimated marginal benefit. Risk acceptant types 
by contrast are willing to incur costs only up until the point of maximal return, defined by the 
maximum value obtained by the cumulative return to scale function. The ‘standard’ logit normal 
distribution defines the functional form of benefits for both types; though the probability 
density function (PDF) is utilized for the case of risk averse incumbents and the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) in the risk acceptant case.33 For both player types the equilibria are 
identified based on the marginal implications of competing strategy profiles, with risk averse 
types incurring cost up until the threshold of negative returns to scale and risk acceptant types 
until the limit of increasing marginal returns. After solving for the equilibria, the comparative 
statics for the games are computed using the values of y associated with the marginal results as 
the upper bound of integration. The resulting area under the density curve represents the 
                                                           
32 These ideal types are roughly approximated by two of the primary independent variables tested in the 
cross sectional statistical chapter. Electoral States correspond to those who opt for pursuing a higher 
variance strategy profile, while Competitive Electoral States more closely approximate risk averse players. 
Detailed definitions for the coding of these variables can be found in the following chapter.  
33 This distinction in the construction of the benefit functions is predicated on the competing interests and    
objectives of the two ideal types of incumbents under evaluation. The PDF measures the change in 
magnitude at each point along the distribution while the CDF provides a cumulative measure, or running 
total.  
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probability of capturing the Civilian Pivot under equilibrium play, and the final comparative 
static prediction of the game.  
 
Results: Risk Averse Incumbents34 
 
Figure 3-5: Cost and Benefit Functions 
Blue=Benefits, Red=Constant Cost, Orange=Continuous Growth Costs 
  
 The figure above contrasts the distribution of marginal benefits (PDF) with those of both 
marginal costs functions. The game is played at the margins, with the intersection of the 
functions representing the limit of rational play associated with a risk averse incumbent. A 
potentially useful analogy is that of the Riemann Sum definition of integration35, where the 
relative difference between the heights of the functions and the x axis at any given value of Y 
represent the sign and magnitude of the marginal return of the strategy profile at that exact 
point. The plot below represents the marginal return to scale functions directly, measured as 
                                                           
34 Details for the calculations of all values are contained in the accompanying appendix.  
35 Given that a density function of a random variable has no value at any point, only between any two, the 
Riemann Sum definition visualizes the area between any two points under a curve as the sum of the areas 
of an infinite number of rectangles, each with infinitely small widths. Accordingly, one may think of the 
change in the sign of the marginal return to scale as the difference between the heights of said rectangles. 
An alternative conceptualization would be vectors which range from the x axis to the point of intersection 
with each respective function, and the corresponding deltas between their magnitudes.  
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the differences between the benefit and cost functions at every point within the domain of the 
game [0, 1], with the green curve depicting constant costs and the purple continuous growth.  
 
Figure 3-6: Marginal Returns to Scale (MRS) 
Green=Constant Costs, Purple=Continuous Growth Costs 
  
The game is evaluated by calculating the absolute value of each MRS function, and then 
solving for the global minimum.36 The difference between the assumptions motivating the two 
alternative conceptions of cost are not overly significant for the game’s results. The approximate 
intersection under the assumption of unit costs is at y=0.825 as y approaches from the left; and 
at y=0.856 as y approaches from the left under the assumption of continuously accelerating 
costs.37 While the game is played at the level of marginal costs and benefits, its resulting statics 
and implications are calculated at the absolute level. The values of y, resulting from the marginal 
game, are used as the upper bounds of integration to compute the comparative statics, with the 
result being the probability of capturing the expected value of the ‘Civilian Pivot’. When the 
                                                           
36 The rationale being that the difference between marginal benefits and costs will be at parity when 
equal to zero. In the context of the original function’s absolute value, this lowest point will be that which 
is equal to zero.  
37 This function is defined as y^e. The motivation is that each additional marginal unit of policy comprise is 
experienced as a greater cost than the prior, the rate of which grows continuously as one moves further 
away from their ideal preference. A more detailed explanation can be found in the following section of 
supporting calculations.  
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game is played under the assumption of unit costs, the estimated result is a probability of 94%; 
and under the assumption of continuously growing cost the predicted probability is 96%.  
 
Results: Risk Acceptant Incumbents 
 
Figure 3-7: Cost and Benefit Functions 
Blue=Benefits, Red=Constant Cost, Orange=Continuous Growth Costs 
 
 By contrast, risk acceptant incumbents attempt to maximize their return on investment; 
not to minimize their exposure to risk. Accordingly, the value function (Blue) is represented by 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF), with both costs functions represented the same. As 
before, the second plot directly depicts the return to scale functions (cumulative), with the 
green curve representing constant costs and the purple continuous growth.  
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Figure 3-8: Cumulative Returns to Scale (CRS) 
Green=Constant Costs, Purple=Continuous Growth Costs 
  
In this setup of the game incumbents attempt to maximize their return on investment, 
and accordingly the equilibria are identified by a shift in the rate of cumulative returns to 
scale.38 To solve for the policy positions associated with these two points (values of y), one can 
take the first derivative of each function and calculate the points at which it is equal to 0.39 
Under the assumption of constant costs the equilibria play is estimated at y=0.7899, with an 
associated probability of capturing the ‘Civilian Pivot’ of 90%. Under the alternative continuous 
cost assumption, the approximate value of y is 0.6764, and yields an associated prediction of 
capturing the ‘Civilian Pivot’ of 77%.  
 
  
                                                           
38 In contrast to the risk averse type scenario, where a change in the sign of returns to scale was defined 
as a limiting threshold of play, risk acceptant incumbent types will cease further investment after 
achieving a zenith in the value of the cumulative return to scale function.  
39 The first derivative measures the instantaneous rate of change at every defined value of the function. 
Negative slope values would indicate a region of diminishing returns, and positive slopes those of 
increasing returns. A slope of 0 indicates a point of inflection where the sign of the rate of cumulative 
returns to scale inverts.  
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Table 3-3: Summary Implications of the Games’ Results:  
Risk Averse Types Limit of 
Rational 
Play 
Probability of 
Capturing the ‘Civilian 
Pivot’ 
Odds  Log Odds  
Constant Costs y=0.825 94%  15.6 2.74 
Continuous 
Growth Costs  
y=0.856 96% 24 3.17 
 
Risk Acceptant 
Types 
Limit of 
Rational 
Play 
Probability of 
Capturing the ‘Civilian 
Pivot’ 
Odds  Log Odds  
Constant Costs y=0.7899 90%  9 2.20 
Continuous 
Growth Costs  
y=0.6764 77% 2.33 0.84 
 
The tables listed above summarize the equilibria values and corresponding comparative 
statics associated with both ideal types of incumbents; along with the predicted probability of 
capturing the civilian pivot expressed in the forms of a percent, an odds, and as the natural log 
of the odds. Overall, the results definitively support an expectation that incumbents who 
expand the selectorates of their regimes will enjoy a considerable reduction in the prospect of 
being defeated by an insurgency. Nevertheless, equilibrium play is still associated with some 
positive probability of defeat, owing to the excessive opportunity costs associated with trying to 
capture extreme potential values of the civilian pivot random variable. The model’s results 
suggest that while both the institutional cooptation and collective action mechanisms are 
plausibly operative when governments opt to hold elections, their net effect empirically on the 
outcomes of counterinsurgency wars is anticipated to be overwhelmingly favorable towards the 
interests of incumbents. This resultant implication is all the more tenable when one considers 
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that incumbents possess complete agency in the decision itself, of whether or not to engage in 
electoral politics during a counterinsurgency war, and would therefore plausibly elect to only if 
doing so carried a positive expected utility.    
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E: The ‘Formal’ Model – Supporting Calculations  
 
Table 3-4: Summary of the Games Key Elements 
Structure • Single Shot Simultaneous Move  
Strategic Players  • I – Incumbent Regime  
• C – Insurgent Challenger  
Information • Both players know the density function describing the 
‘Civilian Pivot’ player’s location. Neither knows its exact 
reservation price.  
Cost  • Compromise of player’s ideal policy position  
• Univariate political spectrum ranging from 0 to 1  
• Value of cost y =  
o y^1 – constant cost to scale  
o y^e – continuous growth in cost to scale  
Benefit • MRS (Marginal Return to Scale) 
o PDF of the ‘Standard’ Logit Normal Distribution 
o Marginal change in probability of preferable war 
outcome  
• CRS (Cumulative Return to Scale) 
o CDF of the ‘Standard’ Logit Normal Distribution 
o Cumulative probability of preferable war outcome  
Non-Strategic Players  • The Civilian Pivot – The last marginal person within the 
population endogenous to the conflict each strategic 
player needs to capture to determine the game’s outcome  
• Nature – Chooses the value of the Civilian Pivot’s 
reservation price by drawing samples from a ‘standard’ 
logit-normal density 
Strategy Profiles • Risk Averse Player – PDF 
o Minimize Loss (Potential): Equality of marginal 
cost and benefit 
• Risk Acceptant Player – CDF 
o Maximize Gain (Expected Value): Optimal ROI 
Solution Concept • Bayesian Nash Equilibrium  
Comparative Static 
Result  
• Prospect of capturing the Civilian Pivot under equilibrium 
play 
• Resolution of the net impact between the competing 
institutional expansion and collective action mechanisms  
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Setting Up the Game 
The center of gravity in counterinsurgency wars may be conceptualized as the interaction of 
two latent variables. The first is the ‘popular support function’, a univariate probability density 
function (pdf) which represents the distribution of political preferences amongst the civilian 
population, arranged along a linear policy spectrum with the two opposing endpoints 
representing the ideal positions of the incumbent regime and the insurgent challenger, 
respectively. The second, ‘war difficulty’, is an index measure which aggregately reflects the net 
sum of all salient structural features of a conflict that either promote or impede the efforts of 
the strategic players. More casually, one may think of these two latent factors as representing 
the amount of popular support which an aspiring insurgent movement requires if it is to 
successfully overthrow an incumbent government, and the extent to which that requisite 
support is forthcoming. And by extension that same value equally defines the threshold of 
popular acquiescence to status quo political institutions a regime must maintain to preserve its 
incumbency. The result of these two interactive factors summarizes the proportion of the 
populace in any given conflict whose allegiance and support will dictate the outcome of the war; 
hereafter referenced as the ‘Civilian Pivot’.  
Proposition 1 (The Civilian Pivot): Let the interactive effect of the ‘popular support function’ 
and ‘war difficulty’ be represented by a single value, henceforth referred to as the ‘Civilian 
Pivot’; a random variable with continuous univariate support over the bounded unit interval 
(0 to 1), which defines the proportion of the population whose support is required by either 
strategic player (the incumbent government or insurgency) to determine the outcome of a 
counterinsurgency war.  
  
The ‘Civilian Pivot’ random variable can be usefully represented by a probability density 
function, representing the range of possible values it has taken across all cases of insurgency 
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wars. The plot of such a distribution is likely skewed in favor of the insurgents on account of 
their agency in initiating the onset of a conflict.40 However, while this underlying distribution is 
not fully known to either strategic player in any specific conflict, the distribution of its expected 
value can nevertheless be effectively represented pursuant to the properties of the central limit 
theorem and the law of large numbers. The resulting distribution of sample means can be 
further standardized according to a simple linear transformation of its values and be 
represented as standard normal.  
Proposition 2 (CLT & LLN): The underlying probability density function of the ‘Civilian Pivot’ 
random variable is unknown to both incumbents and insurgents. By invoking the asymptotic 
properties of the central limit theorem and the law of large numbers, one can represent the 
‘Civilian Pivot’s’ distribution of sample expected values as normal; and as the size of the 
sample mean and number of samples taken approaches ∞, the esamated mean and 
variance of the sample distribution will converge to a normal distribution with mean µ and 
standard deviation . A z transformation will yield a standard normal distribution, N~[0, 1], 
represented by the probability density function:  
StandardNormalPDF = 

√2  
 
A Standard Normal PDF 
                                                           
40 This is not to suggest that in observed instances of insurgency war the insurgents possess a net 
advantage over incumbent governments, they are of course significantly weaker. ‘Skew’ here refers to the 
more favorable conditions likely present in the subset of observed wars that took place, relative to 
country-years that did not experience an insurgent threat at all.  
4 2 2 4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 
 
83 
Accordingly, the density function of the resulting standard normal distribution can be used 
to represent the probability that the expected value of the ‘Civilian Pivot’ random variable is 
more or less favorable to either insurgents or incumbents in any given conflict. The strategic 
dynamic of the game is centered on the probability of either player capturing the ‘Civilian Pivot’, 
and the corresponding cost associated with doing so. Electoral political institutions here 
represent the mechanism by which incumbents implement their offer of concession. 
Furthermore, the relative net value of any given policy position can be represented by the 
marginal cost of compromise (corresponding to its location) and the marginal benefit, 
associated with the additional probability of having met the civilian pivot’s reservation price. 
Constant costs represent the assumption that the foregone value of policy compromise is 
invariant across the political spectrum. An accelerating cost function is alternatively entertained 
based on the assumption that the opportunity cost of political compromise increases with 
respect to the magnitude of its extent.  
Proposition 3 (Constant Cost): Let Y1 define the opportunity cost of policy compromise 
between a players actual and ideal policy positions, with y1 taking values between 0 and 1.  
Proposition 4 (Continuous Growth Cost): Let Y2 define the opportunity cost of policy 
compromise between a players actual and ideal policy positions, with ye taking values 
between 0 and 1.  
 
Unfortunately, given that the standard normal distribution supports all real values ranging 
from −∞ to +∞, it is not possible to directly map a discrete cost function to its range41. A 
truncated normal distribution permits one potential resolution to this issue by allowing for 
                                                           
41 At least not without fundamentally altering the functional form of the variable and according relation to 
the ‘Civilian Pivot’ distribution (ie, an inverse probit link function).  
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uniform reapportioning of the density function to lie within a discrete interval, where a and b 
represent the lower and upper bounds of truncation.  
Truncated	Normal	DistributionPDF  

√2
12$ Erf' (√2) 
12 Erf' *√2) 
 
Though, relying on the truncated standard normal would unfortunately introduce a 
considerable arbitrary assumption into the model. While the ‘excess’ probability values are 
appropriately redistributed over the new truncated discrete range, the resulting relationship 
between the distribution of value and that of cost would admittedly be driven to a considerable 
extent by the somewhat arbitrary choice of the interval [a,b]. To illustrate, the unbounded 
standard normal distribution is represented in beige and the truncated in blue, with truncation 
at the interval [-3, 3] standard deviations depicted on the left plot and [-1, 1] on the right.  
 
 
A preferable solution then is the use of the logistic function to map the values of the 
standard normal distribution back to the original range of possibility associated with the 
theorized underlying data generating process. The resulting “standard” logit-normal distribution 
serves to provide an appropriate representation of the ‘Civilian Pivot’ random variable’s density 
of expected value, within the bounded interval from 0 to 1, and can be transformed from and to 
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a standard normal distribution via application of the logistic function and its inverse (logit), 
respectively.  
LogisticTransform = 

1 +  LogitTransform =  Log[
-
1 − -].  
 
There are several methodologies available for transforming the density function of one 
random variable into that of another. For univariate cases, where each of the original underlying 
values of the initial distribution are mapped to distinct values in the subsequent, a one-to-one 
transformation can be performed.42 This approach involves an application of the inverse 
transformation function and the absolute value of the Jacobian of the transformation, with 
respect to the original density.  
Proposition 5 (Distribution of Benefits): Let the distribution of benefits, the expected value 
of the ‘Civilian Pivot’ random variable, be represented by a logistic transformation of the 
standard normal distribution and its resulting probability density function defined by the 
“standard” logit-normal. Accordingly, both the scale and value of the cost and benefit 
functions range from 0 to 1.  
-Let X be a random variable with density f(x) 
-Let Y be a random variable with density u(X), where u(X) denotes the Logistic 
Transformation of X 
-Therefore let the pdf of Y, g(y) = f(u-1(y)) |J|  
-Where x= u-1(y) is the inverse function of y=u(x) and J=du-1(y)/dy denotes the Jacobian  
/~1'0,1] = 


√2  
                                                           
42 The standard normal distribution is univariate. The logistic transformation does not map any distinct 
values of the standard normal distribution to the same point in the resulting logit-normal. An example of a 
link function that would violate this requirement is x2. Both negative and positive values in the original 
standard normal would map to the same point in the distribution resulting from the transformation.  
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-  4^  1(7) = Log[ 71 − 7] 
9  :'Log[ 71 − 7], 7] = 17 − 7 
;(7)  Log[ 71 − 7]| 17 − 7 | 
= >Standard> Logit − Normal = 
?
@AB[
C
?C]
√2(7 − 7) 
  
 
A ‘Standard’ Logit-Normal PDF 
 
The game models the relative returns associated with an expansion of the selectorate; 
the differential marginal costs and benefits of doing so across the range of the distribution. 
Playing one’s ideal position carries no cost and yields no benefit, while playing that of your 
opponent carries both a cost and benefit of 1. Given that the distribution is unimodal and 
symmetric about the mean (1/2), the marginal value of strategy profiles towards the center will 
yield a greater relative return than those towards either of the tails.  
Two different functions associated with the ‘standard’ logit normal distribution are used 
in constructing the return to scale functions for two different ideal types of incumbent (detailed 
further in the preceding section). The marginal returns to scale measure is constructed using the 
PDF while the cumulative returns to scale assesses value according to the CDF. Benefits and 
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costs are each evaluated at common values of y (ranging from 0 to 1), with their difference 
defining the density of each return to scale function. These alternative metrics for the function 
of benefits are used to estimate the differences in equilibrium play between more and less risk 
averse incumbent types, with risk averse players judging value at the margins and risk acceptant 
ones cumulatively.4344  
Proposition 6 (Returns to Scale): The functions ‘MRS’ and ‘CRS’, characterize the 
relative return of all strategy profiles associated with values of y ranging from 0 to 1, 
and are defined by the difference between the corresponding benefits and costs 
associated with each possible policy position. Based on the PDF, the MRS function 
evaluates the marginal returns to scale; whereas the CRS, based on the CDF, measures 
the cumulative returns to scale. For the MRS, let the positive return to scale strategy 
profiles be defined over the range of Y where the marginal increase in the probability of 
capturing the expected value of the ‘Civilian Pivot’ is greater than the marginal cost in 
policy compromise associated with doing so. For the CRS, let the positive return to scale 
strategy profiles be defined over the range of Y where the slope of the function, as 
evaluated by its first derivative, is positive. The range of negative return to scale 
strategy profiles is accordingly defined inversely.  
MRS(PDF) = 
?
@ABF
C
?CG

√2(7 − 7) − 7
?,H 
CRS(CDF) = 0.5  + 12 Erf[
Log[ 71 − 7]
√2 ] − 7
?,H  
 
  
                                                           
43 These two positions are roughly approximated by the Competitive Electoral State and Electoral State 
variables, respectively, in the cross sectional empirical analysis. They are explained in greater detail in the 
following chapter.  
44 Disutility, is measured by the remaining area under the curve that would not be captured by an 
incumbent’s concessions. The area of this sub-section represents the probability that the reservation price 
of the civilian pivot would not be met, and provides a value estimate for the risk of an incumbent 
adversely facilitating insurgent Collective Action against their own tenure.  
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F: Conclusion 
 
 In exploring the potential impact which elections may hold for the dynamics and 
outcomes of counterinsurgency wars two theoretical lenses were employed. The first 
emphasized the role which domestic institutions play in stabilizing the foundation of a regime. In 
brief, broader support within the domestic population provides a deeper foundation for the 
polity to rest upon. And by motivating a greater segment of the population to invest in its 
survival, a regime can reduce the domestic labor supply available to insurgent entrepreneurs 
and impede their prospects for success. In stark contrast however focusing on the collective 
action problem highlighted the perverse risk that elections may actually assist aspiring 
insurgents in overcoming the ‘Rebels Dilemma’; implying that defeated electoral states may be 
indirectly complicit in their own demise.  
 In the next chapter these two themes will continue to be explored, and their 
implications for both the outcomes and durations of counterinsurgency wars will be defined in 
explicit hypotheses. But the comparative statics generated by the formal theory yield 
unambiguous support for the perspective that elections and their associated institutions on 
balance confer a tremendous advantage for the counterinsurgency war efforts of incumbent 
political regimes. When facing an existential threat, a rational actor will weigh the guaranteed 
cost of compromising on their preferred policy position with the expected value of capturing the 
allegiance of a sufficient subset of the domestic population so as to ensure a continuation of 
their incumbent status. And electoral states, which maintain broader more encompassing ruling 
institutions, are therefore unequivocally better situated to successfully negotiate an insurgent 
challenge.  
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses & Research Design – The Impact of Elections 
on COIN Wars 
  
In the first half of this chapter four hypotheses are proposed on the predicted 
relationship between elections and both counterinsurgency war outcomes and duration. The 
primary hypothesis (A) identifies several mechanisms linking electoral institutions to 
counterinsurgency war dynamics through their relation to the problems of private information 
and credible commitments (Fearon 1995). But winning over the loyalty of a sufficient subset of 
the general population requires making an offer which is acceptably attractive to the pivot. In 
contrast then, the alternative hypothesis (B) entertains the case emphasized by the collective 
action tradition, namely that elections can exacerbate the insurgent threat facing a regime and 
even promote the state’s own defeat, in line with prominent arguments made in the literatures 
on revolutionary protests and hybrid regimes. Finally, hypotheses (C) and (D) detail the 
implications of elections for both reducing war duration and facilitating negotiated settlements. 
Here again private information and commitment problems come to the fore; where the balance 
of popular support revealed by elections is anticipated to expedite the bargaining process of 
war, and the enhanced credibility of their institutions to assuage the security concerns thought 
to inhibit insurgents’ acceptance to laying down their arms (Jervis 1978; Walter 1997).  
 In the second half of the chapter the dataset, containing all insurgencies fought since 
World War II, is introduced. The operationalization of the primary predictor variables is then 
defined along with several other core control variables of theoretical interest. A number of 
conventional econometric methods are briefly identified which are used to assess both the war 
outcome and duration hypotheses. These sections are followed by a discussion of the 
endogeneity problem, both in general and more specifically as it applies to the present research 
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design. In short, because an incumbent regime controls the nature of its domestic ruling 
institutions it has the capability to condition them on the severity of the insurgent threat they 
face. The potential bias which could result, given that states can adjust their electoral status as a 
response to changing war conditions, would be considered a selection into treatment status 
problem predicated on unobservable confounders. The implications of this concern could be 
mild to non-existent or severe, and the substantive bias may be to either overstate or 
understate the magnitude of any estimated effects, even to the point (potentially) of a reversal 
in sign. Accordingly, in the final section of the chapter an identification strategy is proposed to 
address this concern, built around a combination of approaches including proxy variables, an 
extension of the popular fixed effects approach to a cross sectional, non-repeat event context 
with a time invariant predictor, and a traditional two stage least squares approach using ‘lagged’ 
values of the key independent variables as instruments.  
 
Primary Hypothesis (A): Elections Promote Incumbent Victory  
 To reiterate, the primary argument is that the establishment and maintenance of 
electoral political institutions aids incumbent states in defeating their insurgent opponents, by 
integrating otherwise untapped mass preferences into national political institutions, denying 
emergent rebellions the human capital they desperately require to expand their movements 
and undergirding the material and human intelligence resource bases of the incumbent state. 
Insurgents rely upon popular support to survive in the early stages of a conflict, to expand their 
scope of operations, and ultimately to directly challenge the incumbent regime’s sovereignty. In 
the absence of domestic elections and representative political institutions the insurgency is 
essentially the only active ‘party’ campaigning for public support. Supporters of the status quo 
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may become de facto passive supporters of the insurgency and in the absence of a legalized 
opposition party, citizens with more moderate revisionist political demands may instead 
become inclined to cast their lot in support of the revolutionaries.  
 But the ability to politically mobilize the population for a revolutionary cause may prove 
far more challenging if the state has already undertaken measures to mobilize its citizens in its 
own favor. Electoral political institutions provide the broader public an invested stake in the 
perpetuation of the status quo regime, and may at least partially offset the necessity for what 
might otherwise have demanded a more expensive and expansive military counter-mobilization 
effort. If the government is able to co-opt a significant proportion of the populace through 
regularly held elections and routine party politics, then insurgents will likely face appreciably 
stiffer competition in attempting to accumulate the human capital which they require to 
escalate hostilities. The ability for the state to extend its reach into the countryside through the 
integration of the masses into national political parties, via the conduit of elections, and to 
maintain control over its urban population centers, will effectively preclude the insurgency from 
expanding its power base, and isolate them in their rural strongholds.  
 Case evidence from both Peru and Turkey suggest that the threat elections pose to a 
nascent insurgency span both ideological and identity conflict types. In Peru the Shining Path 
launched their armed struggle not during the era of military rule, but rather after the 1980 
parliamentary elections brought a civilian government to power. Ron (2001) argues that the 
introduction of electoral politics is tremendously threatening to smaller extremist groups who 
risk marginalization when pitted against more moderate political parties. “Paradoxically, radical 
fringe groups may spend more time attacking the social movement mainstream than the 
authorities, since the mainstream is drawing off valuable resources from the limited pool 
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available to the entire industry” (Ron 2001, 583). Tezcur (2010) has investigated a similar puzzle 
with the PKK, arguing that Turkey’s move towards EU integration and greater democratization 
effectively threatened their sole ownership over representing the Kurdish population and even 
prompted the re-ignition of armed conflict. “The AKP electorally outperformed the Kurdish DTP, 
which has close links to the PKK” and this “ability to capture the Kurdish vote undermined the 
PKK’s basic reason for existence: being the true representative of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey” 
(Tezcür 2010, 776).  
Furthermore, the presence of electoral institutions proxies for more than simply an 
accommodative stance by an incumbent regime towards its civilian population. A comparable 
transfer of material and non-material value in the form of side-payments, absent any associated 
institutional augmentation, would most likely fail to attract the support of the civilian pivot 
player in the same manner. Rather, the characteristic function which binds their own interests 
with that of perpetuating the current regime structure is their very inclusion within it. Providing 
the civilian pivot a channel for institutional access to the status quo regime, empowers 
incumbents in meeting their reservation price in the present as well as credibly committing to 
doing so in the future; a concession which insurgents cannot readily match either in the 
magnitude of its extent or the nature of its form.  
In Acemoglu and Robinson’s (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006) theory of democratic 
transition and consolidation, democratic institutions provide the mechanism which binds 
together the political economic fates of elites and the masses. Placating the demands of the 
poor for redistribution necessitates institutional alterations to make credible the commitment 
to future progressive resource re-allocation, and accordingly avoid the transaction costs of a 
violent and uncertain attempt at mass revolution and counter-suppression. “In practice, political 
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institutions play a much more fundamental role than being a simple intermediating variable: 
they regulate the future allocation of political power between various social groups…individuals 
care not only about policies today but also about policies tomorrow” (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006, 23). And in international politics promoting cooperation under a condition of anarchy, in 
the absence of a centralized enforcement mechanism which is able to maintain an indisputable 
legitimate monopoly of violence governing the enforcement of contracts, an arena for 
regularized interaction and an indefinite time horizon are considered two integral preconditions 
for promoting sustained cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).45  
The counter mobilization of the noncombatant labor supply may not only serve to arrest 
a rebel organization’s escalatory efforts, but also aid states in isolating and eliminating pockets 
of insurgent resistance. At least two major tactical implications would result for insurgent 
military operations. Insurgents have sought to employ a guerilla style technology of warfare as a 
basis of ameliorating their conventional weaknesses. “[D]efeat is the invariable outcome where 
native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on the latter’s terms” 
(Quoting Mao Tse Tung: Mack 1975, 176: emphasis in original). Accordingly, insurgents have 
attempted to avoid inevitable defeat through attrition in direct engagements by relying upon 
tactics of maneuver warfare.46  
  
                                                           
45 Sustaining cooperation often requires a continuous opportunity for repeated interaction over an 
indefinite period of time. The longevity of parties and opportunities to participate in future elections 
should increase the future value civilians assign to sustaining electoral regimes. Indeed the durability of 
party/legislature based states is a well-established empirical finding in the autocratic institutions 
literature (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999, 
2003).   
46 The use of the term ‘maneuver’ here is with respect to its contrasting role to ‘attrition’. In the present 
context it is not used as a synonym for blitzkrieg specifically.  
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“In guerilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking 
from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw…the enemy’s rear, 
flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, 
attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated” (Mao, quoted in Arreguín-Toft 2001, 
104) 
 
But the breadth of terrain over which a rebel group can maneuver is constrained by the 
scope of its popular support. An insurgent cannot take refuge in hostile territory after a battle, 
as they would risk denouncement. And to the extent that the state is successful in coopting the 
masses into status quo political institutions, the proverbial ‘sea’ in which insurgents can swim 
will accordingly be that much smaller. The second significant tactical implication of a 
compromised labor supply pertains to the sustainability of recruitment. Even an armed 
movement operating at a lower scale of violence will require a steady supply of human 
resources to replace its losses. And if the depth of this resource base is compromised, then an 
armed movement’s ability to sustain a sufficient level of ongoing violence to even constitute a 
war is accordingly threatened.     
Beyond their impeding effects on insurgent’s efforts, electoral institutions additionally 
carry a number of positive externalities which can more directly promote counterinsurgency 
operations. The capability for the state to prevent urban uprisings and elicit human intelligence 
from their civilian populace, so as to more precisely target insurgents, is directly related to its 
own basis of popular support. Furthermore, irrespective of private preferences, a given civilian’s 
willingness to cooperate with either the state or the insurgency is likely conditional on their 
perception of the risk of reprisals against their person for non-compliance, based in part on their 
estimation of their peer’s attitudes towards the same decision (Kalyvas 2006). Elections may 
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accordingly serve to influence this behavior by publicly disseminating credible information as to 
the distribution of political support for the incumbent regime.  
“At the end of 1952, a European was expelled from Hainan Island, where he had lived 
for many years. On reaching Hong Kong, he reported that the peasants “hated” the 
regime, and he gave much convincing evidence of it. He mentioned later that the 
Nationalists had twice attempted to drop agents in his area from Taiwan. In each case, 
the militia on duty at night heard the planes, saw the parachutes coming down, gave the 
alert, and the Nationalist agents were cornered and captured by several hundred armed 
villagers. The European was challenged on this: “Isn’t there a contradiction between 
your statement concerning the feelings of the peasants toward the regime and the 
attitude of the militiamen, who, after all, are peasants too? Why didn’t they keep 
silent?” “Put yourself in the place of one of these militiamen,” he explained. “How does 
he know whether the other members of the militia won’t give the alert? If they do and 
he hasn’t, he will be in great trouble when the Communist cadres make their usual post-
mortem investigations.” (Galula and Nagl 2006, 18)  
 
 Election results can serve as a credible heuristic to otherwise uninformed civilians as to 
their neighbors’ true preferences, and thereby promote the provision of credible human 
intelligence, by lowering their self-perception of the risk in doing so. Finally, the literature has 
also entertained the prospect that the election returns themselves might directly communicate 
the extent and distribution of insurgent influence throughout the territory of the state. During 
the Punjab insurgency, for example, the ruling Congress government decided to rescind martial 
law and hold state elections (Telford 2001). Militant groups strongly opposed the reinstitution of 
elections in the territory, fearing that more moderate representatives of their cause would gain 
favor, and attempted to derail the process, with extremists even going as far as assassinating 
their own moderate leader. In general they succeeded, with an overall turnout of only 21.6%. 
This result however was not uniform throughout the state. “In the twelve urban constituencies, 
the turnout was 38.3 percent, but in the 70 rural constituencies, where the militants held 
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greater sway, the turnout was an abysmal 15.1 percent. In one constituency, the turnout was 
less than 1 percent” (Telford 2001, 5). 
 Recall that the crux of the identification problem is the limited ability of the incumbent 
regime to accurately differentiate the extent of support for the insurgency throughout the 
civilian population. Crucially this means not simply ascertaining the proportion of opposition 
support, but also its distribution across the territory of the state. Direct inference drawn from 
electoral return results offers another possible means by which the state can begin to ‘fix’ 
(Rosenbach and Peritz 2011) insurgents to a particular locale. Polling districts which suffer from 
conspicuously low turnout may signal an area of regime weakness and insurgent strength and 
the identification of such zones could empower the regime to differentially redeploy their 
security personnel to the areas of greatest need and economize their expenditure of scarce 
resources. Furthermore, knowledge of a locale’s political leanings could also be leveraged to 
calibrate the extent of repressive countermeasures. The provision of public goods may be most 
easily accomplished in areas of government control, but most needed and potentially effective 
in zones of contestation. Furthermore, such efforts may be entirely wasted in areas dominated 
by insurgents and their supporters, where more heavy handed approaches may be more 
efficacious. Therefore, being able to differentiate areas of insurgent and government control 
from those under contestation can empower the state to address each subpopulation with a 
more appropriately tailored set of tactics.  
There is some case evidence which argues that governments have indeed historically 
leveraged information gleaned from voting patterns to target specific subpopulations within the 
state. In Colombia, Steele argues that the government selectively displaced civilians in certain 
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territories based upon information derived from electoral voting patterns; intentionally 
targeting areas of strong opposition support.  
“Although information about civilian preferences is difficult to obtain in the context of civil wars, 
elections conducted before or during a violent conflict are one way that armed groups can 
identify local cleavages. When and where civilians vote for an insurgent affiliated political party, 
counterinsurgents infer that they are disloyal and target them for displacement” (2011, 424)  
 
Similarly, Balcells (2011) has argued that during the Spanish Civil War areas of strong prewar 
electoral support for an adversary’s political party were disproportionally targeted for aerial 
bombardment. In both of these studies combatants were able to mitigate the severity of the 
‘identification problem’ through the employment of information gleaned from voting results.47  
Hypothesis A: Electoral political institutions increase the propensity of incumbent victory 
in counterinsurgency wars.  
 
Alternative Hypothesis (B): Elections Promote Incumbent Defeat  
Another branch of research in the rationalist tradition focusing on the dynamics of 
revolutions might suggest a very different prediction for the effects of holding elections on 
counterinsurgency war outcomes. For incumbent regimes, particularly those which are non-
democratic, one of the greatest assets they possess may be precisely their ability to effectively 
conceal information about the extent and distribution of opposition support, both from active 
                                                           
47 While it is possible that the public information mechanism might also directly improve the state’s 
prospects in combatting insurgents, its theoretical impact is considerably weaker. The need for the state 
to elicit local human intelligence from their civilian populace, so as to more precisely target insurgents, is 
frequently cited as a necessary prerequisite towards conducting effective COIN operations (Condra and 
Shapiro 2012); and is directly related to its basis of popular support. But this logic would imply that this 
vital information would be most forthcoming in territories where the state already enjoys considerable 
support, which is of course also the areas where it is the least needed. A more detailed engagement with 
this alternative perspective is contained in the concluding chapter. For discussions of alternative tactics in 
acquiring human intelligence see (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Lyall 2010a).  
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members of the insurgency and the non-combatant population more generally. One of the 
greatest challenges which rebel group leaders face is convincing members of the general 
population to support their cause. Rational individuals will recognize that a successful regime 
transition will yield predominantly public goods; and that their own marginal contribution will 
do little to increase the likelihood of precipitating such an event (Tullock 1971).  
 The series of protests across Eastern Europe which ushered in the demise of the Soviet 
Union also spurred a cottage industry of research attempting to explain the sudden and 
unexpected collapse of one of the world’s two superpowers. “…seemingly unshakeable regimes 
saw public sentiment turn against them with astonishing rapidity, as tiny oppositions 
mushroomed into crushing majorities” (Kuran 1991, 13). Kuran offers an explanation 
highlighting the distinction between a person’s true private preferences and the public positions 
which they choose to demonstrate. Individuals opposed to the incumbent regime may prefer to 
voice this position publicly, but opt not to out of fear of reprisal from state security forces and 
pro regime informants.  
 However the potential risk of being sanctioned by the regime is not constant, but 
mutually conditioned by the aggregate decisions of the entire populace (Kuran 1991, 18). The 
greater the proportion who publicly voice their support for the opposition, the smaller the 
remainder left supporting the regime who can sanction them. Ironically then, one of the 
greatest assets that the incumbent possesses may be precisely its ability to obfuscate 
information regarding the true preferences of the polity. “By falsifying their preferences and 
helping to discipline dissenters, citizens jointly sustained a system that many considered 
abominable” (Kuran 1991, 29).  
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Lohmann (1994) expands upon Kuran’s cascade model by explicitly incorporating an 
information transmission component, which private citizens employ to mitigate the effects of 
pervasive pluralistic ignorance. In her model, citizens on the sidelines of politics are able to 
indirectly infer the true types of those engaged in mass public demonstrations. While the 
general public might anticipate extremists to protest, a higher than anticipated aggregate 
turnout suggests that a portion of the protesters may hold more moderate political preferences. 
A perception that demonstrations are being driven by extremists carries little additional 
signaling value as extremists are by definition assumed to be agitators. But a perception that 
protesters hold more mainstream political views conveys important information to those on the 
sidelines: support for the regime is indeed thin and the attendant risk of being denounced is 
more minimal than they had previously calculated. As such, “the individual participation 
decisions may depend on changes in aggregate turnout over time because people extract 
benefit-cost information from turnout numbers” (Lohmann 1994, 91).  
 Any institutional pathway that offers a public platform through which the regime can be 
criticized accordingly presents a serious potential risk to its stability. In contrast to the 
comparative regime scholarship discussed previously on electoral-authoritarian resilience, 
another strand of recent work has argued precisely the opposite, that the presence of nominally 
democratic institutions within non-democratic states provides a source of perpetual 
vulnerability and inherent risk. “[t]he coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods 
aimed at keeping incumbents in power creates an inherent source of instability. The presence of 
elections, legislatures, courts, and an independent media creates periodic opportunities for 
challenges by opposition forces” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 59). There is some disagreement over 
whether regimes with hybrid political institutions are empirically more vulnerable to domestic 
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challenges than those which are fully authoritarian (Brownlee 2009). But in instances where 
such incumbents have indeed been successfully challenged, extant evidence does suggest that 
popular mobilizations against the state have been catalyzed by the electoral process. For 
example, in post-Cold War Eastern Europe and Eurasia Bunce and Wolchik (2009) have found 
that instances of successful opposition challenges were characterized by coordinated 
mobilization efforts to contest the incumbent party during elections. 
 Voter apathy may also pose a threat. During the 1989 local council elections in East 
Germany, which in part precipitated the Leipzig demonstrations, the unanticipated decline of 
popular participation prompted the regime to falsify the results. “For the first time a relatively 
large number of people abstained or invalidated their ballots…Apparently the SED leadership 
felt sufficiently threatened by the signaling value of abstentions and invalidated ballots that it 
was willing to take the political risk of engaging in electoral fraud” (Lohmann 1994, 63). A visible 
public challenge to the regime’s authority may create pressure on elites to consider a repressive 
response and perhaps the most widely held conjecture within COIN theory is the alleged 
detrimental impact of state repression. Accordingly, this perspective predicts that for a regime 
facing an insurgent opposition an election may be one of the least advisable policy options.  
“In principle, pluralistic ignorance can be mitigated through polls that accord individuals 
anonymity. But it is easier to offer people anonymity than to convince them that the 
preferences they reveal will remain anonymous and never be used against them. In any 
case, an outwardly popular government that knows preference falsification to be 
pervasive has no interest in publicizing the implied fragility of its support, because this 
might inspire the disaffected to bring their antigovernment feelings into the open” 
(Kuran 1991, 20–21) 
 
Hypothesis B: Electoral political institutions increase the propensity of incumbent defeat 
in counterinsurgency wars.  
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Supplementary Hypothesis (C): Elections Reduce War Duration  
Both practitioners and scholars have identified the duration of insurgencies as a central 
strategic dynamic. On Protracted War, is the very title of the series of speeches given by Mao in 
1938 during the War of Resistance Against the Japanese. The potential for divisive domestic 
conflict over sustaining a foreign counterinsurgency effort, central to Mack’s (1975) theory of 
asymmetric wars, is exacerbated as a conflict drags on. And Arreguin-Toft’s theory also identifies 
opposite-approach interactions, which favor weaker actors, as being of a prolonged nature. He 
finds that “[s]ame-approach interactions lasted 2.69 years on average” and “opposite-approach 
interactions lasted an average of 4.86 years” (2001, 112). Admittedly, some recent work has not 
found empirical support for longstanding assumptions about the duration of insurgencies (see 
Lyall 2010). Nonetheless, if elections as hypothesized are indeed associated with a greater 
propensity of either incumbent victory or defeat, then it is plausible that they may also hasten 
the onset of such outcomes.48  
For Filson and Werner (2002) both fighting and negotiating play a vital function in 
shaping each players perception of their opponents true strength. Wars occur when the 
disputants disagree over the distribution of benefits to which each party is reasonably entitled 
given their estimation of one another’s relative power. The fighting process itself plays a vital 
role towards achieving peace by refining each party’s estimation of the others capability and 
resolve. In counterinsurgency one might think of this disagreement arising over each faction’s 
estimation of its popular support. Popular support is needed by the government to 
discriminately target insurgents, whom in turn require such support to conceal themselves from 
                                                           
48 Specifically, with respect to private information governing the balance of popular support and 
commitment problems.  
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the state. It stands to reason then, that any means by which such information can be made 
public to both parties, and in a credible way, may substantially further their respective abilities 
to revise their demands and concession to more appropriately reflect their true relative 
bargaining positions. 
Recall that within endogenous mobilization theory, one of the principle theorized 
functions of elections was with respect to their capacity to publicly reveal the median voter’s 
true preference during the course of an ongoing war. If an insurgency is indeed a competition 
over popular support for the right to rule the state, then an election presents an opportunity to 
assess the balance of influence prior to the war’s termination. Multiple iterations of costly 
conflict may be one manner by which combatants can clarify each other’s true type, but a public 
revelation of popular will may present a shortcut by credibly informing each party of their own, 
and their opponents, foundation of support. This clarification of relative position can promote a 
more expedient agreement on terms by circumventing each party’s strategic incentive to 
overstate their strength during negotiations. “If private information is an important explanation 
for why wars begin, one might then conclude that revelation of that information would be an 
important source for peace” (Filson and Werner 2002, 819).  
Both democratic and (some) autocratic states have also been identified as holding 
advantages in credibly signaling their policy intentions in the audience costs literature (Fearon 
1994, 1997; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008). If electoral states are indeed capable of issuing more 
credible public statements, this would facilitate offers of settlement as well as underscore 
threats of resolve. And the credibility of concessions offered to the people may be more 
believable still given that incumbent regime elites may face real consequences from within their 
ruling coalition for reneging. Moderates within an insurgent’s organization, or any of their 
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affiliated political wings, may also feel pressured to realign with the state as elections approach, 
fearing that a failure to do so may leave them isolated outside of the normal political process, 
which they may prefer to work within. The logic here is reminiscent of Stedman’s (1997) 
‘departing train’ strategy for dealing with ‘total spoilers’; opposition elements with interests 
orthogonal to achieving peace.  
“The departing train strategy combines a judgement that the spoiler’s demands and 
behavior are illegitimate with the assertion that the peace process will go irrevocably 
forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not. In Cambodia the strategy was 
linked to the holding of an election, thereby setting a deadline for joining the process 
and promising a change in the status quo” (Stedman 1997, 14).  
  
Even more than private information though, the literature on civil war duration has 
identified commitment problems49 as the paramount impediment to concluding civil wars 
(Cunningham 2006; Kirschner 2010; Thyne 2012; Walter 1997). Thyne (2012) argues that 
incumbent regimes with secure stable executives are better suited to striking credible deals with 
their rivals, resulting in shorter conflicts. And to the extent that the presence of electoral 
institutions proxy for policy compromises by regime elites (as was argued in the formal theory) a 
more inclusive status quo regime should sap the resource base available to an insurgency; both 
reducing the incentives to continue the struggle amongst those whom would prefer to continue 
the fight and diminishing the capital available with which to do so. For example, 
Wucherpfenning et al (2012) argue that state’s with exclusionary ethno-nationalist policies will 
                                                           
49 The implications of commitment problems are discussed at greater length in the following hypothesis.  
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suffer the longest wars, as members of rebel groups opposing such regimes only expect 
compensation if they prevail and will therefore be incentivized to prolong their resistance.50   
Hypothesis C: Electoral political institutions reduce the duration of counterinsurgency 
wars.  
 
Supplementary Hypothesis (D): Elections Promote Negotiated 
Settlements  
 
As previously mentioned, information asymmetries are not the only impediment to 
intrastate conflict resolution. Insurgents seek to overcome their material deficiencies by 
employing a protracted strategy of guerrilla warfare and Powell (2006) has noted that one of the 
major limitations of information based explanations is precisely with respect to their accounting 
of prolonged conflicts. “[A]fter a few years of war, fighters on both sides of an insurgency 
typically develop accurate understandings of the other side’s capabilities, tactics, and resolve” 
(Fearon 2004, 90: Quoted in Powell 2006). Accordingly, commitment problems may present the 
more plausible explanation to the inefficiency puzzle. Such failures will occur when the value of 
side payments required to satisfy one of the parties would produce and endogenous shift in 
their relative bargaining power in subsequent rounds, leading them to renege on their original 
agreement and sue for better terms.  
For instance, in Dal Bo and Powell’s (2009) model of spoils politics rebel groups are 
prone to rejecting settlement offers by the government. This results owing to the lack of 
                                                           
50 In contrast however there are several theoretical reasons to expect that electoral state status may not 
be so beneficial. Larger numbers of veto players (Cunningham 2006) may make agreements that have 
been reached more credible, but also reduce the prospect of achieving a sufficiently attractive consensus 
in the first place. The potential non-competitiveness of some insurgent organizations in electoral politics 
may reinvigorate their incentive to resist (Metternich 2011). And less constrained executives may have 
greater latitude to grant concessions without the requirement to seek legislative validation (Thyne 2012).  
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transparency needed to fully verify the true extent of the spoils under contest coupled with the 
perception of the incumbent government’s strategic incentive to misrepresent this information. 
They further note that “sometimes the only bluff-proof way to reveal the spoils to the 
opposition may be by giving members of the opposing faction influential positions in the 
government” (Dal Bo and Powell 2009, 218).51 But the difficulty of the government to credibly 
assure insurgents that they will uphold the terms of a settlement post disarmament is a 
significant impediment to reaching terms in the first place (Walter 1997).  
Electoral political institutions may also play a role though in undergirding the credibility 
of power sharing institutions and thereby facilitate the achievement of negotiated settlements. 
Magaloni (2008) has presented a formal model describing the function of autocratic political 
parties and elections as mechanisms for making credible long term commitments by an 
incumbent regime to institute intertemporal power sharing arrangements.  
“…the dictator needs to commit to not abuse his ‘loyal friends’…One solution to this 
problem is that the dictator delegates control to the access-to-power positions and the 
state privileges to a parallel political organization…By giving up his absolute powers to 
select members of the ruling clique into government positions, the dictator can more 
credibly guarantee a share of power and the spoils of office over the long run to those 
who invest in the existing institutions rather than in subversive coalitions” (Magaloni 
2008, 716)  
Gandhi and Pzeworski (2007) have offered an alternative mechanism by which an opposition 
party in the legislature is allowed limited policy influence as a concession for their acquiescence.  
“Policy compromises require an institutional forum access to which can be controlled, 
where demands can be revealed without appearing as acts of resistance, where 
compromises can be hammered out without undue public scrutiny, and where the 
                                                           
51 However, the authors acknowledge that doing so may carry its own set of attendant risks, namely a 
commitment problem, as granting opposition members official positions of authority within the state may 
also empower them to threaten the regime with greater harm in the event that a conflict should arise 
anyway.  
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resulting agreements can be dressed in a legalistic form…and legislatures are ideally 
suited for these purposes” (14)  
 
Accordingly, elections and their concomitant public institutions may assist incumbent regimes in 
achieving negotiated settlements and improve the efficacy of amnesty and reintegration 
programs by means of ameliorating commitment problems. For instance, during the Malayan 
Emergency the inaugural government pledged amnesty for Communist Party members as a 
major component of their campaign platform during the run up to the nation’s first elections as 
an independent state (Thompson 1966, 45).  
Finally, elections and a legislative arena may also provide a pathway for moderates 
within the opposition to successfully pursue reconciliation with the regime while avoiding being 
outbid by extremists. Moderates are potentially positioned to deprive extremists of their 
popular legitimacy as well as to facilitate selective state violence against them (Chowdhury and 
Krebs 2009, 376). However spoilers often attempt to portray moderates as betraying the 
popular cause, who in turn face the threat of being outbid by extremists if they come to appear 
as unduly conciliatory towards the state (Kydd and Walter 2006). As such moderates must walk 
a fine line between maintaining their legitimacy with local constituents while distancing 
themselves from the violent tactics of extremists.  “Before moderates can be mobilized, they 
must emerge as legitimate and distinct political actors-credible representatives of their 
community, but also committed adherents to a politics of nonviolence-and a close relationship 
with the state undercuts this priority” (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009, 373).  
Electoral competition offers one means by which moderates can maintain the public 
perception that they are challenging the incumbent regime while effectively working within the 
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prevailing political structure. During the Punjab insurgency in India moderate leaders 
representing the Sikh community played an integral role in facilitating the transition back to a 
normalized political process. “…non-violent Akali leaders also knew that they had to either 
participate in institutionalized politics, as opposed to boycotting it, or that they would risk being 
permanently marginalized once the democratic political process deepened. This included not 
only traditionally moderate Akali leaders, but also more extreme ones who had previously acted 
as ‘political fronts’ for the insurgents” (Chima 2007, 624).52 
Hypothesis D: Electoral political institutions increase the propensity of negotiated 
settlements in counterinsurgency wars.  
 
  
                                                           
52 The potential relevance of Stedman’s (1997) departing train strategy is pertinent here to the prospect 
of a settlement for similar reasons as to how it pertained to the prior hypothesis regarding war duration.  
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Research Design – Large N Analysis: The Outcomes & Durations of 
COIN Wars  
 
A: The Data   
A significant contribution to the literature on the outcomes of counterinsurgency wars 
was made by Lyall and Wilson (2009), who evaluate a battery of previously under assessed 
theories using an original dataset of insurgencies which occurred from 1800-2005. They define 
insurgency as “a protracted violent struggle by nonstate actors to obtain their political 
objectives-often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities-against 
the current political authority (the incumbent)”(2009, 70). Conditions for inclusion require the 
conflict to produce a minimum of 1,000 battlefield deaths with at least 100 on each side, as well 
as that the opposition force employ a guerrilla style strategic approach in conducting their 
operations (small mobile groups, avoidance of direct battles, and an explicit attempt at 
garnering public support). The data is structured in a cross sectional format, with each conflict 
itself constituting the unit of analysis. The dependent variable is the outcome of the war, coded 
as a factor variable representing incumbent defeat, negotiated settlement, and victory.53  
                                                           
53 Two alternative datasets were considered. Johnston (2012) identifies 90 insurgencies from 1975-2003. 
In addition to an indicator for counterinsurgent victory ‘termination’ is also considered, which is 
operationalized as an ongoing conflict that dips below the annual fatality threshold in a given year. As 
well, two further outcomes are also incorporated; the total number of fatalities produced by a given 
terrorist organization and the number of incidents they initiated. The second alternative dataset is 
available from Getmanksy (2012). The data covers the period 1950-2007. The outcome coding provides a 
finer accounting of possible termination states than that of Lyall and Wilson (2009), and can take on five 
possible values. A significant limitation of the existing data though, is its exclusion of cases where 
governments intervened in foreign insurgencies, including high profile cases such as the US intervention in 
Vietnam and the French War in Algeria. The Lyall and Wilson data was selected for its comprehensiveness 
and due to its utilization by the most recent study of counterinsurgency war outcomes   (MacDonald 
2013).  
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The primary period of interest in the present study is the modern era, or post-World 
War II.54 Many large-n studies, though not all (Lyall 2010b; Lyall and Wilson III 2009; MacDonald 
2013), of subnational violence have elected to address this time period (Cederman and Girardin 
2007; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Fearon 2005; Fearon, Kasara, and 
Laitin 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Johnston 2012), which increases the comparability of the 
results. Separately however, a theoretical argument for the distinctive character of post-World 
War II insurgencies has been offered by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). The post 1945 era marks 
both a change in discursive rhetoric and empirical substance, as guerrilla warfare first became 
termed as insurgency and the propensity of strong actor victory declined precipitously 
(Arreguín-Toft 2006; Lyall and Wilson III 2009). Kalyvas and Balcells argue that Cold War era 
“robust insurgencies” enjoyed a number of significant advantages; including substantial 
international support from the opposing superpowers, an alternative comprehensive 
legitimating ideology in the form of the international communist movement, and a refined 
military doctrine informing the prosecution of a people’s war (2010, 420–21).  
Accordingly, this time period presents a unique opportunity for assessing the impact of 
elections on counterinsurgency war outcomes. In light of the proliferation of democratic and 
autocratic electoral states during the period, if elections are in fact associated with a greater 
propensity of incumbent state defeat then this finding may offer another explanation for the 
mechanism driving the increase in incumbent losses. Conversely if the evidence supports the 
alternative, that elections are positively associated with state victory, then this would provide a 
                                                           
54 The Lyall and Wilson (2009) data contain 135 observations after 1945. This should provide sufficient 
statistical power, even for specifications which include a substantial number of controls.  
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compelling contrast to the general trend of the era, as well as offering a potential explanation 
for the accelerated pace at which states throughout the international system have incorporated 
electoral political institutions into their regime structures.   
 
B: Variables  
 Three independent variables are used to evaluate the hypotheses. The first is assessed 
by an incumbent regime’s status as an Electoral State.55 It is coded as a binary variable, in the 
affirmative if the incumbent regime maintains some form of popularly elected public office at 
the national level of governance, the most common of which is an elected legislature. This is 
provided that the office in question is both produced through popular elections and maintained 
during the course of the conflict. The opportunity to incorporate growing aspirations for political 
involvement and consolidate them within a common set of national institutions requires 
sufficiently broad enfranchisement. Furthermore, this effectively precludes bodies that maintain 
a substantial percentage of reserved seats which are allocated by any parallel form of non-
electoral procedure. As well, if this body is disbanded during the conflict its potential impact on 
the war is clearly obviated. 56 Importantly, as the scope limitations of endogenous mobilization 
                                                           
55 The formal codebook definition is: An incumbent government which maintains a national office or body 
which is continually reproduced ‘wholly’ by elections, as a component of the regular political process, 
relying upon broad based general suffrage requirements, and which remains intact at the time of the 
war’s culmination.55 ‘Wholly’ requires that de jure exceptions to the electoral process are prohibited, such 
as legislative bodies where a substantial number of seats are determined by an alternative non-electoral 
appointment or reservation procedure. To qualify, the relevant election event must have been held during 
the war in question or within 5-6 years prior to its termination; and be not itself a term of the war’s 
settlement/resolution process. The incumbent regime must itself be a sovereign entity and the local 
population being contested must not be de jure precluded from seeking direct representation in its 
institutions.  
56Instances where elections are first held in the state as part of the conflict termination process are coded 
in the negative. This is to avoid mistakenly capturing cases where the election is itself a product of the 
conflict’s resolution.  
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theory delineated, the political system of interest pertains exclusively to elections being held in 
the country where the counterinsurgency itself is being conducted; which is distinct from prior 
theories which have focused on the domestic publics of foreign occupier states (Mack 1975; 
Pape 2003). The primary data source for coding this variable is drawn from a series of edited 
volumes on elections held since 1945 (Nohlen 2001, 2005, 2010; Nohlen, Krennerich, and 
Thibaut 1999). These sources have been cited in several recent cross national studies of 
elections (Bormann and Golder 2013; Golder 2005).  
 The second measure, provides an alternative means of evaluation. And while an ‘off the 
shelf’ coding schema cannot provide a comparable degree of precision, it’s comparative 
strength lies in contributing to the robustness of any substantive conclusions. Variations across 
the ruling institutions of authoritarian regimes, and the implications for their relativity 
durability’s, was first identified in the literature by Barbara Geddes (1999). In her original 
typology, non-democracies were subdivided into one of three ideal types: military, personalist, 
and single-party. One dimension which has been theorized to distinguish them is the breadth 
and scope of the ruling institutions they employ, with military regimes being the narrowest, 
single-parties the broadest, and personalist regimes falling in between. This distinction between 
varieties of autocracy, and subsequent variations of the typology, have proven a strong 
predictor of a state’s general survivability (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Hadenius and Teorell 
2007). 
 The second measure employed in the present study, GWF, is based on a more recent 
extension of the Geddes typology (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). A much larger number of 
ideal regime types are captured, and the coding schema further admits to hybrid variations 
(such as single-party/military for example). For present purposes, the GWF measure employed 
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herein is treated as a categorical variable which takes on three possible values, the purpose of 
which is to stratify political regimes across the breadth of their ruling institutions.5758 The highest 
value (2) is comprised of party based regimes and democracies, the second (1) of personalist 
states, and the baseline category (0) by military regimes, monarchies, oligarchies, and warlords. 
And if a hybrid regime was listed, such as military/personalist or personalist/party, the value 
recorded was always the higher one. For example, a personalist/party regime would be assigned 
a value of 2. This second measure is treated as continuous, and with the understanding that it 
should be positively correlated with the electoral state variable.59  
 The third and final variant of the principal independent variables, Competitive Electoral 
State, is the preferred measure, and is based in part on components of the prior two. It is a 
dichotomous variable coded in the affirmative if one of the two following conditions are 
satisfied. The first is if the incumbent regime qualifies as a party based or democratic state 
according to the Geddes et al autocratic regimes dataset. Alternatively, if a regime qualifies as 
an electoral state and in the most recent relevant qualifying election event the following two 
conditions are met: if for the executive, the winner must not receive greater than 3/4 of the 
popular vote, and if for the legislature, the winning party or list must not receive greater than 
2/3 of the popular vote.  
A number of theoretically compelling control variables are also included, drawn from 
the extant literature. Lyall and Wilson III (2009) argue that the capital intensive orientation of 
                                                           
57 Full definitions of all possible regime type values can be found in the authors’ original codebook. 
58 Five regimes had missing or undefined coding values assigned to them in their pertinent time periods. 
Rhodesia was coded as an oligarchy to remain consistent with the coding value of South Africa. Djibouti, 
Iran, and Syria were all considered party states, given that the incumbent regime party survived in power 
past the rule of any single leader. And Indonesia under Suharto was considered a personalist regime.   
59 And empirically it is, at approximately p=0.47.  
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modernized militaries have made them ill-suited for conducting labor intensive 
counterinsurgency operations. Such forces are accordingly less well-suited towards providing 
human security and interfacing with the local population, which furthermore diminishes 
opportunities for building relationships that facilitate the exchange of vital human intelligence. 
Accordingly, the subsequent tests control for two different proxies associated with capital 
intensive military institutions. Mechanization is a factor variable ranging from 1 to 4 that 
captures the ratio of military personnel relative to the number of motorized vehicles, with 
higher values representing a more greatly mechanized force structure. And the second proxy for 
a capital intensive military is assessed by the state’s use of helicopters. Helicopter is a 
dichotomous variable and equal to 1 if the incumbent regime’s military deployed 25 or more 
helicopters during the war. Paul McDonald (MacDonald 2013) has argued that the trend 
towards incumbent actor defeat in the modern era can be accounted for by the declining 
legitimacy and according rollback of colonial empires. Colonial War is an indicator that captures 
this characteristic of a conflict.  
Regime measures the polity2 score from the last year prior to the start of a war. More 
open political regimes are thought to be hamstrung by their domestic populations’ normative 
sensitivities, and accordingly constrained from successfully prosecuting a COIN war to the extent 
and duration needed to attain victory (Mack 1975). The lengthy time commitments and 
sometimes unsavory behavior which is widely thought to facilitate victory are considered 
distasteful by democratic publics, who vote against continuation of their state’s involvement in 
these conflicts (Kilcullen 2006; Merom 2003). External Support captures two different measures 
of assistance that insurgencies can receive from a foreign benefactor (Record 2007). If the 
insurgency is aided by both a foreign sanctuary and material assistance its value is 2, if the 
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insurgents receive only one of these possible forms of support its value is 1, and if they receive 
neither it is scored as 0. Occupy indicates conflicts where the incumbent regime is a foreign 
actor. Finally, the supposed advantages of rough terrain are estimated by the variable Elevation, 
which is constructed using the natural log of five elevation readings in the conflict area. The 
remaining control variables are summarized in the table below.  
 
Variable Name Description Source  
Trade Log of exports+imports as share of GDP Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
Power Natural log of COW cumulative power index Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
Energy Natural log of incumbent energy use / population  Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
Distance  Natural log of distance from incumbent’s capital to conflict 
area 
Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
Language Number of languages in conflict area  Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
Cold War Conflict occurrence 1949-1989 Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
New State War onset within two years of independence  Lyall & Wilson (2009) 
 
 
C: Methodology  
 Several conventional multiple regression econometric methodologies are employed in 
evaluating the large N hypotheses. With respect to the predictions regarding war outcomes, the 
principle means is through the application of both ordered and multinomial logistic regression, 
with the dependent variable in all specifications reflecting the three potential conflict outcome 
states: incumbent victory (2), negotiated settlement (1), and incumbent defeat (0). While an 
ordered approach does offer advantages of ease in presentation and interpretation of results, 
the multinomial approach has the ability to detect significant relationships which might exist 
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between certain predictors and some conflict outcomes that do not generally hold across all of 
the possible termination states.60 
Additionally, an event history analysis framework, utilizing both a cox proportional 
hazards (Cox 1975; David 1972) as well as multi-state competing risks approach (Fine and Gray 
1999), are utilized to evaluate the temporal hypotheses regarding war duration. Both 
approaches make somewhat different assumptions with respect to how right censored cases are 
included in the risk set (Wolbers et al. 2014). While the more conservative partial likelihood 
approach of the cox model essentially treats observations which have already experienced their 
observed termination state as a form of non-informative censoring (and accordingly removes 
them from the risk set and subsequent contribution to the likelihood function); the competing 
risks approach of Fine & Grey offers a greater capacity to incorporate both the consideration of 
time along with the possibility of multiple mutually exclusive outcomes, where cases that have 
experienced a termination event are carried forward in the risk set (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, 
and Joyce 2008; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Accordingly, both methods are 
implemented to enhance the robustness of the substantive findings.61 
For both the categorical (war outcomes) and event history (war duration) econometric 
approaches the end states of interest are the three mutually exclusive conflict outcomes of 
incumbent defeat, negotiated settlement, and incumbent victory. For all specifications 
asymptotic robust standard errors are reported, clustered on each conflict’s location country 
code. Statistical significance is reported at the conventional 0.10*, 0.05**, and 0.01*** levels. 
                                                           
60 Probit replications of all specifications are included in the associated appendix as a robustness check 
against mistaken functional form assumptions.  
61 With the main discussion of results presenting the Cox model estimations and the Fine & Gray 
alternative included in the appendix.  
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The full dataset includes 133 observations; one for each counterinsurgency conflict in the 
modern era (1945-2005).  
 
D: Endogeneity-Self Selection into Treatment Status or the Omitted 
Variable Bias of Latent War Difficulty  
 
The presence of elections may indeed be positively associated with incumbent regime 
victories and negotiated settlements, and negatively correlated with their prospect of defeat, 
but not because of the theorized mechanism of institutional incorporation that endogenous 
mobilization theory argues. If regime leaders are able to accurately judge the difficulty of an 
insurgent threat, and incorporate that assessment into their public policies concerning the very 
nature of their state’s institutional structure, then it is possible that any observed association in 
the econometric results is in reality nothing more than a spurious artifact of endogeneity bias. 
Specifically, in this instance the full charge of an epiphenomenal observed relationship would 
criticize (and appropriately so) the research design of the present study for measuring the key 
independent variable (Electoral State) during the occurrence of the conflict. Doing so naively 
would run the risk of violating the underlying orthogonality assumption embedded within many 
classical approaches to evaluating a multiple regression, including the aforementioned methods 
in the prior section, both of which employ the maximum likelihood estimator.62  
Satisfying the orthogonality condition requires that there be no correlation between any 
of the covariates in the specification and the residual, associated with the dependent variable. 
                                                           
62 General discussions of the underlying assumptions in classical regression techniques and a more formal 
definition of endogeneity bias can be located in any leading graduate level manual on econometric 
methodology. See for example (Baltagi 2013; Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Greene 2011a; Wooldridge 
2010).  
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For example, a given incumbent may determine that some insurgency poses a grave and 
existential threat to their continued sovereignty and accordingly opts to declare martial law so 
as to be maximally empowered to prosecute the defense of their regime to the fullest extent 
possible. Despite doing so they may find themselves defeated, but not owing to their lack of 
electoral institutions. Rather, the presence or absence of national elections would (in this 
hypothetical scenario) be itself a response to the myriad alternative factors that determine the 
relative ease or difficulty of any given counterinsurgency war. Omitted variables which proxy the 
latent difficulty of a COIN war would be the true underlying causal determinants then of both 
the coding status of a given case and its war outcome state.  
Self-selection into treatment status, conditional upon unobserved (by the social 
scientist) omitted covariates, is one of the most ubiquitous challenges in applied econometrics, 
as well as one of the most serious as it threatens the unbiasedness of the estimated partial 
correlations which are produced. Prominent instances highlighting such a concern have 
abounded in the literature, including the wages of working women (Heckman 1976, 1979), the 
marginal returns to pursuing an education (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2011), and the life 
outcomes of veterans (Angrist 1991; Angrist, Chen, and Song 2011). Engagement with the issue 
had been truly immense, spanning the same post World War II time period that serves as the 
basis of the present study, a testament both to its importance as well as the often 
incompleteness of the solutions which have been proposed. In particular, the range of remedies 
available to the applied researcher is especially highly circumscribed when analyzing 
observational data which could be characterized as: cross sectional, time to event with non-
repeat outcomes, or panel with a time invariant explanatory variable (Nichols 2007). Recent 
solutions have been proposed (Plümper and Troeger 2007, 2011) and challenged (Breusch et al. 
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2011; Greene 2011b), while old debates over the appropriateness of functional form 
assumptions (Angrist and Imbens 1994; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil 2006; Heckman and 
Vytlacil 1999, 2001, 2005; Imbens 2010) and tradeoffs between the internal validity of localized 
casual effects (Angrist and Imbens 1994; Imbens 2010; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) versus the 
utility of more generalizable estimations have continued to abound (Heckman and Vytlacil 2005; 
Heckman, Vytlacil, and Carneiro 2010). 
Furthermore, the concern over potential endogeneity bias might not only suggest that 
any observed positive correlation between electoral states and war outcomes is epiphenomenal 
(overestimated), but also the exact converse (underestimated). The theory of endogenous 
mobilization argues that electoral political institutions can provide insurance for incumbents 
against the prospect of being catastrophically overthrown, while acknowledging that doing so 
can come at a very high price as appealing to the civilian pivot demands a considerable 
compromise of an incumbent’s own ideal policy position. While the epiphenomenal critique 
would challenge any observed positive relationship as overstated, it is equally possible that bias 
due to the absence of pertinent covariates would artificially diminish estimates downward and 
away from their true effects. It is assuredly the case that regime elites making policy decisions 
are able to take into consideration a vastly larger array of concerns into their judgements than 
can be measured in hindsight, and as such be rightfully reluctant to pursue a costly insurance 
policy when opposed by a relatively weak insurgent challenger, effectively removing the 
incentive to either suspend extant electoral institutions or providing an impetus to establish 
them.63 And incumbents facing existential insurgent threats may rightfully select their regimes’ 
                                                           
63 A more exact converse logic, when compared to the epiphenomenal critique, would argue an incentive 
for incumbents to suspend electoral politics when facing a weak threat to their rule. This seems rather 
implausible. The critical counterpoint that the underestimated view would emphasize is that incumbents 
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into treatment status, but nonetheless fail to survive the challenge owing to their 
disadvantageous position, and find themselves defeated despite the positive benefits of having 
established/maintained electoral political institutions.  
Figure 4-1 Potential Endogeneity Bias: Two Contrasting Concerns   
 Incumbent Loss Incumbent Tie or Win 
Not Electoral 
State 
Overestimated- Unfavorable 
outcome due to being a ‘harder’ 
case  
 
Underestimated- ‘Easier’ case 
motivates incumbents to refrain from 
buying off the civilian pivot  
 
Electoral 
State 
Underestimated- ‘Harder’ case 
motivates incumbents to try and 
buy off the civilian pivot  
 
Overestimated- Favorable outcome 
due to being an ‘easier’ case  
 
 
-Epiphenomenal:  True effect is lower than estimated. Self-selection out of treatment 
status conditional on greater war difficulty.  
-Market for Lemons64:  True effect is greater than estimated. Self-selection into treatment 
status conditional on greater war difficulty.  
 
 While no infallible technique exists for fully resolving the potential for biased regression 
estimates owing to endogeneity, the identification strategy pursued herein will endeavor to at 
least bound the magnitude of its extent and reconcile the most probable direction of its sign. 
The first rebuttal challenges the concern articulated by the epiphenomenal charge, by pointing 
out that all insurgency wars are by definition characterized as conflicts between asymmetrically 
                                                           
select into treatment status in the harder cases, resulting in some non-electoral state cases experiencing 
‘easy’ wins and some electoral state cases nevertheless experiencing ‘hard’ defeats despite the positive 
benefits associated with elections.  
64 A reference to Ackerloff’s (1970) well known example of market failure.  
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endowed combatants. Insurgents are always inherently the weaker actor, because insurgency is 
after all a technology of violence designed to overcome a relative dearth in material strength.  
“The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents are weak relative to the governments 
they are fighting, at least at the start of operations. If government forces knew who the rebels 
were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured” (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, 79–80) 
 
This of course does not mean that the disparity in material strength between the state and the 
insurgency is invariant across conflicts. Nor is it to suggest that relative material strength alone 
is an appropriate proxy for estimating the severity of an insurgent threat: the motivating puzzle 
of the contemporary research program on insurgency war outcomes is after all the surprising 
upsurge in the propensity of strong actor defeat. But if the relative capacity of the two actors 
were even close to parity, and the government was faced with an immediate and clear challenge 
to its continued rule, the conflict simply wouldn’t qualify as being an instance of insurgency65, 
but would more likely be considered a civil war, a related but distinct form of intrastate conflict.  
 The empirical evidence also stands against the prospect of a perfect endogeneity bias 
(either upward or downward), as the correlation between the Competitive Electoral State and 
War Outcomes variables is strong but by no means collinear (p=0.4718). It is certainly the case 
then that there exists considerable variation in each vector that is determined beyond any 
mutual covariation between them. Admittedly this observation provides no guidance as to the 
direction, if any, of any bias which may be present in their observed covariance. Proxy 
measures, variables which attempt to represent the effects of omitted or latent covariates, is an 
                                                           
65 For example, in Arreguin-Toft’s (2001, 96) study of asymmetric warfare the power discrepancy between 
belligerents must be ≥5:1. Power is operationalized as “the halved product of a strong actor’s armed 
forces and population at the start of a conflict versus the simple product of the weak actor’s armed forces 
and population”.  
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easily implementable partial solution to unraveling selection effects problems. Well known 
examples include the use of ACT and ASVAB scores as well as parental income or educational 
attainment, as controls for unobserved latent ability in the returns to education literature (Card 
1993, 2001; Sianesi and Reenen 2003). In the present study categorical measures for both the 
geographic region of the conflict’s location and the decade in which it began are used as proxies 
for unobservable confounders.  
 And unfortunately one partial solution that is often resorted to would be both 
practically and theoretically limited in light of both the nature of the dataset as well as the 
strategic dynamic which underlies the theory. Coding the Electoral State variable based only 
upon the political institutions in place immediately prior to the outbreak of a war would 
eliminate any potential for incumbents to select into, or out of, treatment status during an 
ongoing conflict in response to the severity of the perceived threat. Many of the control 
variables, such as the polity measure for regime type, are coded in such a manner. And for a 
majority of the cases in the dataset the political regime in place during the war is unaltered from 
its status immediately prior, making the results functionally equivalent. 
But a practical constraint of doing so with respect to the Electoral State measure is that 
not all cases have an immediate pre-conflict political history, which includes insurgencies that 
occurred in newly established states and certain decolonization wars. The connective tissue 
(Caporaso 2009) between the coding values and final war outcomes would also be considerably 
stretched in long duration cases. The most fundamental objection however, is that measuring 
pre-conflict values would simply shift the locus of the endogeneity question. In place of a 
selection into treatment status problem, where incumbents opt in or out of electoral state 
status conditional on unobserved confounders, one would instead be faced with a very similar 
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set of challenges associated with sample selection, where insurgents opt in or out of initiating a 
conflict in response to the pre-war electoral status of incumbents. Accordingly, any significant 
findings produced by employing such an approach would not directly refute the endogeneity 
challenge but simply alter the manner in which it is articulated, raising the question of whether 
electoral or non-electoral states suffer from war onsets initiated by relatively ‘weaker’ or 
‘stronger’ insurgents, the full characterization of which would of course at least potentially be 
due in part to omitted covariates.   
 
E: A Non-Conventional Approach: Fixed Effects for Non-Repeat Events-A 
Proposed Extension of the Popular Identifying Assumption 
 
 One of the most widely employed econometric techniques for ameliorating the 
potential bias due to unobservable confounders is the fixed effects method (Allison 2009)66. It is 
traditionally implemented in panel datasets, with repeated observations recorded on the 
outcome for each case, the identifying assumption posits that if latent/omitted confounders can 
be assumed invariant over time, then within panel partial covariation can be interpreted as 
unbiased. However, cross sectional and time to event datasets (with non-repeat events)67 are 
inherently un-amenable to implementing such an identification strategy owing to the single 
                                                           
66 In the context of the linear outcome ordinary least squares regression framework multiple functionally 
equivalent methods of implementation are available (i.e. first differencing, dummy variables, and 
demeaning). The range of approaches is more limited with non-linear parametric models owing to 
incidental parameter bias (Andersen 1970; Heckman 1981; Lancaster 2000, 200; Neyman and Scott 1948). 
In the case of a binary outcome Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional fixed effects estimator is available in 
modern statistical programs such as STATA, and recently an implementation has been extended to the 
multinomial context (Pforr 2014). And in the two period case an exact estimate of the bias can be 
estimated and corrected (Abrevaya 1997).  
67 Although solutions to the computational impediment which arises in single event panels with time 
varying predictors have existed since the case time control research design developed in the 1990s in 
epidemiology (Greenland 1996; Suissa 1995, 1998).  
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event nature of the issue under study. Practically, any predictor variable would be perfectly 
collinear with the ‘fixed effect’ indicator (as a proxy for unobservable confounders), and 
accordingly violate rank requirements. As well, random effects are essentially a non-alternative 
owing to their inherent assumption of orthogonality with respect to the observed regressors. 
 Two extensions of the traditional fixed effect approach are proposed as the basis of an 
identification strategy. In the first, ‘rolling fixed effects’, no prior assumptions are made with 
respect to the explanatory potential of the covariates in the specification. The strategic rationale 
is that one can implement indicators for each observation in a regression, just not all at once and 
at the same time. Accordingly, subsets of cases can be held fixed within a given specification, 
which can then be varied in a manner such that all cases will have been held fixed once in the 
aggregate across the multiple different regressions. For example, in the main results revolving 
panels of four are implemented. Observations are ordered according to the start dates of their 
wars and every fourth observation is assigned an indicator for itself (e.g. 1st, 5th, 9th, etc…), and 
the start point of the pattern is varied across four specifications (e.g. 2nd, 6th, 10th, etc…). In the 
second implementation, rather than holding every fourth observation constant on a revolving 
basis, quarter blocs of the dataset are held fixed in each of four specifications. The procedure 
provides an indirect test of the potential bias due to omitted variables, by challenging the 
robustness of the main results and the extent to which they are ‘potentially’ sensitive to omitted 
explanatory factors. The table below provides a rough illustration of the manner in which the 
concept is implemented.68  
  
                                                           
68 ‘Gray’ observations reflect those which are assigned case indicators.  
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Figure 4-2: Conceptual Illustration of Rolling Fixed Effects 
 
 
 In the second approach, ‘discordant fixed effects’, the identifying assumption leverages 
the empirical fact that the concern regarding confounding conditional on correlated 
unobservables is not uniformly distributed across the observations. The strategic rationale is 
that one does not need to hold every observation fixed, but only those which are most likely to be 
biased. In medical studies, the concept of concordance is used as means of assessing the 
predictive validity of a categorical outcome model (Lin 1989; Steichen and Cox 2002). After 
running a logistic regression on a dichotomous outcome, the estimates are then used to 
generated a predicted probability associated with each observation’s occurrence. A new dataset 
is generated, consisting of matched pairs of every case which experienced an event (outcome of 
1) in the original dataset with every case that did not experience an event (outcome of 0). 
Within each of the newly created strata, if the predicted probability associated with the event 
that did occur is higher than that associated with the one which did not, then the matched pair is 
considered to be concordant. However, if that criterion is not satisfied then the strata is 
considered to be discordant. The predictive value of the original regression results can 
accordingly be assessed by the proportion of concordant predictions, which provides a means of 
Observation Number X1 X2 … Observation Number X1 X2 …
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
Rolling Fixed Effects by Fours: Conceptual Illustration
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assessing the model’s ability to at least accurately differentiate between events and non-events 
under study.69   
 An extension of this concept is proposed as a basis for indirectly identifying the cases 
which are most likely contributing to any bias in the regression estimates. To illustrate, consider 
a logistic regression estimating the determinants of war outcomes which resulted in a loss for 
incumbents contrasted with those that did not (i.e. a tie or win). After producing the regression 
estimates and calculating the predicted probability of an event occurrence associated with each 
war, ‘discordant’ cases can be subsequently identified where the prediction deviates from a 
probability of one-half in the opposite direction of the case’s actual observed outcome state. 
Identifying the cases in the dataset which the model specification predicts as being more likely 
to have experienced the opposite outcome, than that which did actually occur, can then be used 
to assess the potential impact of endogeneity bias in two ways. Discordant cases can be held 
fixed (assigned an indicator) in a subsequent regression and the resultant changes in point 
estimates and standard errors can be accordingly interpreted. The discordant cases can also be 
stratified and compared on their values of the electoral state and war outcomes measures; 
providing an indirect means of inferring which of the two versions of endogeneity bias is the 
more prevalent in the sample.  
  
  
                                                           
69 In practice this raw information is used to construct summary measures such as Harrell’s C and Somers 
D.   
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Figure 4-3: Conceptual Illustration of Discordance Fixed Effects 
 
 
F: A Conventional Approach: Lagged Values of Regressors as 
Instrumental Variables  
 
 In a time-series application, the lagged values of suspected endogenous regressors can 
be used in place of those in the current period, or as an instrument, when endogeneity bias is 
suspected. Generally speaking, in such contexts it is often the case that both series run equally 
over the range of the period under observation, meaning that neither begins prior to the other. 
This situation raises the challenge of discerning the extent to which past observed variation may 
be equally suspect to an endogenous relationship with prior period values of the dependent 
variable.  
Fortunately, in the present application such concerns do not apply. While an incumbent 
regime’s terminal value for its electoral status may potentially be endogenous with the progress 
of the ongoing war, the same critique cannot be leveled against the regime’s value before the 
war began. Furthermore, ruling political institutions have often been recognized as highly 
resistant to change as elites whom benefit from the status quo labor to perpetuate it. Francis 
Fukuyama famously once referred to human institutions as being ‘sticky’ (Fukuyama 2011) and 
this predominate tendency towards resilience and the reproduction of status quo relations has 
Discordance Indication-Conceptual Illustration
Case # Predicted Probability War Outcome (0/1) Discordant Case
1 0.9 0 Yes
2 0.1 0 No
3 0.4 0 No
4 0.85 1 No
5 0.6 1 No
6 0.3 1 Yes
… … … …
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informed much of the historical institutionalist literature and one of its key concepts in 
particular, path dependency (Thelen 1999). These two facets of a lagged regime status, for each 
of the three proposed independent variables, makes for a potentially ideal instrument. A good 
instrument must satisfy two principal conditions. Exclusion, requires a persuasive casual account 
that the instrument has no direct effect on the ultimate outcome of interest and can therefore 
appropriately be omitted from a second stage structural equation. And relevance, demands a 
sufficiently high correlation between the instrument and suspected endogenous regressor.  
Satisfaction of the relevance condition is easily achieved by the lagged measure in this 
case. The bivariate correlation between the electoral state measure and its lagged value is 0.62, 
between that of the GWF score and its lag is 0.72, and with respect to the competitiveness of 
elections is 0.71. And in the following chapter of results first stage F statistics are reported which 
confirm that the conventional threshold for the relevance condition is indeed met. 
Unfortunately, the exclusion condition cannot be demonstrated empirically. But in this case it 
seems non-controversial that the only effect on ultimate war outcomes that the lagged 
measures would have is indirectly through its association with the status of a regime at the 
culmination of a war. Given the apparent suitability of a lagged instrument, the results of this 
more traditional approach to untangling endogeneity are used to undergird the robustness of 
the overall identification strategy.  
The ‘lagged’ measures for each of the three proposed independent variables are coded 
according to the same definitions and using the same sources as those for the primary values. In 
instances where the identity of the incumbent regime in the year the war began is the same as 
that in the year prior, then the prior year’s regime status is recorded. In some cases, an 
exogenous regime transition (a coup event or democratization for example) immediately 
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precedes the onset of insurgency. In such instances the incumbent regime at the onset of the 
war is entirely different from the incumbent in the prior year, making a lagged value based on 
that status inappropriate. In these cases, instead the lagged value is based on the regime in 
place in the year the war began.70 
 
  
                                                           
70 Plus, a one-year grace period.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In the first half of the chapter four hypotheses relating elections to counterinsurgency 
wars were identified. The primary (A) and alternative (B) hypotheses respectively made the 
cases that elections should be associated with incumbent regime victories and defeats. While 
the two supplementary predictions (C & D) argued that electoral states should experience 
shorter wars and a greater prospect of attaining negotiated settlements. Throughout, the 
relationship between electoral institutions and the rationalist explanations for the causes of war 
were emphasized, namely the strategic incentive to misrepresent private information71 and the 
credibility of commitments in the absence of a centralized enforcement mechanism.  
 In the second half of the chapter the data set was introduced and the primary 
independent variables (Electoral State, GWF, and Competitive Electoral State) were defined. 
Several additional theoretically compelling control variables, proposed in the recent literature, 
were also identified along with a brief discussion of the econometric modeling approaches that 
are employed. Endogeneity bias represents a pivotal concern, as it threatens the unbiasedness 
of the estimates produced by the proposed statistical tests. After describing the general 
challenge, and its particular application to the question at hand, an identification strategy was 
proposed resting on the combination of proxy variables, an extension of the fixed effects 
approach to a cross sectional context, and the use of lagged values in a traditional instrumental 
variables framework. The predictions discussed in this chapter, and the research design 
proposed for doing so, will be empirically evaluated in the next.  
                                                           
71 Information problems would include the incentives of the state and insurgents to overstate the extent 
of their popular support; but also the ‘identification’ problem incumbents face in differentiating 
insurgents and their supporters from the rest of the population.  
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Chapter 5: War Outcomes & Duration – Large N Statistical Results  
 
 This chapter evaluates the principal theoretical predictions generated by Endogenous 
Mobilization theory. Three variations on the independent variable are examined. Preliminary 
results suggest both that Electoral States and Party/Democratic regimes (as defined by Geddes 
et al) had considerably improved war prospects, even when controlling for a wide variety of 
additional factors. In the main results war outcomes are again tested, though now by an 
incumbent regime’s status of qualifying as a Competitive Electoral State. This refinement 
requires that non-party based regimes that held elections not dominate the polls with excessive 
supermajorities of the popular vote, an indirect indication of participatory preclusion with 
respect to status quo political institutions. The results of these tests again highly support the 
principle theoretical prediction, that incumbent regimes who maintain broader more 
encompassing regime structures are much harder for an insurgency to defeat.  
 This finding is confirmed again in subsequent multinomial logistic tests, which also lend 
considerable support to one of the two supplementary hypotheses. Not only are Competitive 
Electoral States advantaged in prevailing against insurgents, but they are additionally far better 
suited at forging negotiated settlements with them. Having demonstrated the robust 
relationship to war outcomes, the subsequent regressions turn to evaluating the temporal 
dimension of counterinsurgency war. Competitive Electoral States are found to enjoy a massive 
reduction in the hazard of being defeated, in some tests by as much as a full order of magnitude 
or greater. This strong relationship does not however carry over to conflicts which ended in 
either negotiated settlement or incumbent victory. While elections are strongly associated with 
an increase in these conflict outcomes occurring, their regime status does not seem to 
accelerate the termination process as had been predicted, quite the opposite in fact. Modest 
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evidence even suggests that if all three termination states are pooled, Competitive Electoral 
State status is actually predictive of a longer conflict, not a shorter.  
 In the second half of the chapter, the research design outlined in the prior is applied to 
address the question of potential endogeneity bias. Both the ‘rolling fixed effects’ and 
‘discordant fixed effects’ procedures are applied separately to the principle empirical findings 
with respect to war outcomes and the duration of conflicts terminating in an incumbent defeat. 
This section is then followed by an application of the lagged values as omitted instruments in a 
two-stage least squares procedure. The results of these techniques consistently confirm the 
substantive conclusions produced by the traditional testing methods in the first half of the 
chapter. Competitive Electoral States are vastly more likely to conclude their insurgency wars in 
a negotiated settlement or outright victory, and are associated with an extremely low hazard of 
being defeated. A brief monte carlo simulation is used to test and affirm the robustness of the 
instrumental variables findings, as well as highlight the risks of solely relying on this approach as 
the basis of an identification strategy, specifically when one has only weaker instruments 
available. The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the findings, with particular 
emphasis on the extent to which the empirical results support or refute the four hypotheses 
previously identified.   
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Table 5-1: Summary of Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
     
War Outcome 132 0.977 0.824 0 2 
Electoral State 132 0.598 0.492 0 1 
GWF 131 1.008 0.837 0 2 
Competitive 
Electoral State 
132 0.515 0.502 0 1 
Colonial War 132 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Helicopters 132 0.242 0.430 0 1 
Mechanization 132 2.553 1.155 1 4 
Occupation 132 0.242 0.430 0 1 
External Support 132 1.008 0.843 0 2 
Polity 132 -0.417 7.026 -10 10 
Democracy 132 0.258 0.439 0 1 
Cold War 132 0.689 0.465 0 1 
Power 132 -1.154 1.955 -4.756 2.898 
Great Power 132 0.159 0.367 0 1 
# Languages 132 8.106 7.443 1 30 
New State 132 0.167 0.374 0 1 
% Energy Per 
Capita 
132 -1.292 2.375 -8.066 2.784 
% Trade GDP 132 -3.655 1.206 -9.284 -0.465 
% Distance 132 4.207 3.482 0 9.536 
Rough Terrain 132 6.000 1.351 0 8.497 
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War Outcomes-Win, Lose, or Draw   
Throughout the sixty-year period under analysis (1945-2005), the distribution of war 
outcomes across each of its three possible termination states (win, lose, draw) was nearly 
uniform. Of the total 132 conflicts fought throughout the sixty-year period, forty-six ended in a 
loss for the incumbent, forty-three in a win, and forty-three in some form of negotiated 
settlement.72  
Figure 5-1: Summary of War Outcome States 
 
 
 The descriptive trend was somewhat less symmetric when one stratifies the cases 
across time. When measured by the decade in which each conflict began, the number of wars 
ending in losses or wins is still highly correlated. By contrast, the frequency of settlement 
outcomes has varied independently to a considerable extent, with a jump from being the least 
                                                           
72 The original dataset was modified by consolidating three conflicts which had duplicative observations. 
These include the French colonial war in Madagascar, the Rhodesian conflict in Zimbabwe, and the 
Vietnam war. For further information, see the associated codebook.  
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to the most prevalent outcome state for insurgencies that began after 1975. By and large the 
distribution of outcomes is also highly similar across regions, though sub-Saharan African wars 
clearly over contributed towards the overall number of losses, while conflicts occurring in North 
Africa and the Middle East did so with respect to wins and ties.  
 Figure 5-2: Summary of COIN War Outcome Trends Over Time 
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Figure 5-3: Summary of COIN War Outcomes by Region   
 
 
 The first set of statistical tests estimates an incumbent’s war prospects with wins, ties, 
and losses treated as an ordered categorical outcome arranged in increasing rank of desirability 
(from the incumbent regime’s perspective), with loss as the base value. The Electoral State 
indicator variable remains highly statistically significant across all specifications of the model. By 
contrast most of the other controls receive limited, inconsistent, or no support as being 
statistically related to counterinsurgency war outcomes. Two clear exceptions however are 
Helicopters (an indicator for incumbents with highly capitalized military organizations) and 
External Support (which measures whether the insurgents enjoyed physical sanctuary across an 
international border and/or material aid)73. For all three variables the signs on their coefficients 
point in the theoretically anticipated directions. Governments which maintain nationally elected 
bodies & institutions are considerably more likely to resolve their insurgency conflicts in the 
form of either a settlement or outright victory. Conversely those with highly capitalized military 
                                                           
73 If an insurgency receives either form of support the variable takes on the value of 1, if it receives both 
then 2.  
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organizations are far more likely to settle or be outright defeated, as are those incumbents 
combatting externally supported insurgent movements.  
 As well, the Polity measure of incumbent regime type provides statistical support to the 
traditional wisdom that more democratic countries fare poorly in combatting insurgents owing 
to the structural disadvantages of leaders facing greater public war fighting constraints from 
their domestic publics. However, the non-significant indicator for democracy (a polity score 
equal to six or higher) somewhat undermines that interpretation.74 The number of spoken 
languages, a proxy for both the fragmentation of identity categories and the logistic 
impediments involved with simple communication between COIN forces and the civilian 
population, receives no support, though the direction of the coefficients is consistent with the 
expected effect.75 The control for Rough Terrain, a measure supposed to capture the effects of 
mountainous topography, receives moderate statistical support; however the sign of the 
coefficient is contrary to theoretical expectation. Challenging terrain conditions should be 
associated with an increased difficulty to conducting counterinsurgency operations. By contrast, 
the estimated effects of the elevation measure suggests that rough terrain conditions are 
actually associated with ‘better’ war outcomes for incumbents.  
A legitimate possibility is that these estimated effects are spurious as a result of 
measurement error, and that the measure inappropriately captures the latent concept of ‘rough 
terrain’. However topographic features more generally are most likely considerably correlated 
with the region fixed effect dummy variables, and as such these should control for random noise 
along this dimension. Two direct interpretations seem possible. The first is that mountainous 
                                                           
74 The polity relationship is likely being driven by anocracies.  
75 The estimated change in log odds reflected in the coefficient is associated with a one-unit difference in 
the number of languages, which ranges from one to thirty with an average of approximately 8.  
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terrain conditions promote the incidence of a selection effect with respect to the ‘type’ of 
insurgencies which begin in different locales. Because of the force multiplying effect that rough 
terrain provides, as being an impediment to COIN operations, insurgent movements with a 
lower probability of ever ultimately succeeding can arise more readily in remote regions that in 
other countries, would lack a minimum requisite of popular support to ever constitute an ‘onset’ 
in the first place. This potential advantage would not however extend past the subnational 
region in which the topographic feature exists. More casually, at some point the insurgents have 
to come down out of the mountains to assault the capital and win the war, and when they 
attempt to do so the terrain advantage they had enjoyed during the earlier stages of the conflict 
will diminish considerably, at least. A second possible causal interpretation of the elevation 
finding is that rough terrain makes force projection especially difficult. While this would 
advantage insurgents early on in a war, at later stages of conflict such difficulties would equally 
apply to them as they expand the scope and scale of their own operations.76  
In the second half of the preliminary tests, the specifications are repeated with the 
Geddes (GWF) regime type variable used in replace of Electoral State. Though slightly less robust 
than the Electoral State measure, the same general relationship is evident.77 Incumbent regimes 
that rule through broader, more encompassing domestic institutions fare far better in facing 
insurgents. The indicators for a war’s colonial or occupier status receives no consistent support. 
Neither does the measure of Mechanization. Though as before, states which deployed large 
numbers of helicopters and externally supported insurgents are both clearly associated with a 
                                                           
76 Because of the relative weakness and limited scope of potential insurgent operations associated with 
these types of challengers, governments may also choose simply to ignore any offers of negotiated 
settlement initiated from them.  
77 GWF is a categorical variable which takes on three possible values. Party based regimes and 
democracies are assigned a score of two, personalist regimes a value of one, and the baseline of zero is 
comprised of militaries, monarchies, oligarchies, and warlord states.  
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greater prospect of incumbent defeat. The Polity and Democracy covariates return similar 
estimates, but the Power measure now appears related to better war prospects for incumbents. 
And the previously unexpected relationship returned by the rough terrain proxy drops out, 
though the somewhat surprising positive coefficient estimate remains.  
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Table 5-2 Preliminary Results: Ordered Logistic Regression on War Outcomes (Win/Draw/Loss) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                      
Electoral State 1.361*** 1.612*** 1.339*** 2.089*** 1.976***      
 (0.395) (0.457) (0.503) (0.525) (0.573)      
GWF      0.778*** 0.740*** 0.602** 0.802*** 0.702** 
      (0.188) (0.260) (0.260) (0.266) (0.282) 
Colonial War   -1.301 -0.764 -2.037* -1.932*  -1.767* -1.076 -1.774 -1.771 
  (0.960) (0.929) (1.128) (1.112)  (0.984) (0.941) (1.141) (1.143) 
Helicopters  -1.880***  -1.861***   -1.822***  -1.894***  
  (0.467)  (0.515)   (0.458)  (0.543)  
Mechanization   -0.232  -0.310   -0.206  -0.239 
   (0.161)  (0.198)   (0.167)  (0.192) 
Occupation  -0.730 -0.557 -0.979 -0.619  -0.202 -0.135 -0.652 -0.402 
  (0.856) (0.851) (0.907) (0.854)  (0.821) (0.929) (0.903) (0.887) 
External Support  -0.765*** -0.703*** -0.745*** -0.656***  -0.818*** -0.747*** -0.839*** -0.668*** 
  (0.208) (0.189) (0.263) (0.235)  (0.200) (0.190) (0.269) (0.232) 
Polity   -0.0726***  -0.0851**   -0.0814***  -0.0954**  
  (0.0252)  (0.0417)   (0.0260)  (0.0471)  
Democracy   -0.638  -0.819   -0.647  -0.721 
   (0.422)  (0.532)   (0.420)  (0.529) 
Cold War   0.741** 0.617 1.106* 0.928  0.387 0.358 0.724 0.399 
  (0.362) (0.384) (0.652) (0.670)  (0.380) (0.399) (0.665) (0.589) 
Power   0.345**  0.274   0.457***  0.531**  
  (0.160)  (0.241)   (0.157)  (0.238)  
Great Power   0.246  -0.865   0.251  -0.590 
   (0.568)  (0.782)   (0.505)  (0.706) 
# Languages   -0.0404 -0.0383 -0.0522 -0.0540  -0.0434 -0.0399 -0.0411 -0.0392 
  (0.0300) (0.0278) (0.0335) (0.0342)  (0.0292) (0.0272) (0.0322) (0.0337) 
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New State   -0.223 -0.202 -0.525 -0.758  0.0658 -0.0275 -0.152 -0.460 
  (0.517) (0.565) (0.637) (0.665)  (0.558) (0.592) (0.700) (0.740) 
% Energy Per Capita  -0.0152 0.00390 0.151 0.233  -0.111 -0.0614 -0.102 0.0564 
  (0.0951) (0.102) (0.147) (0.149)  (0.0899) (0.0995) (0.159) (0.144) 
% Trade / GDP   0.206 0.0163 0.282 0.0621  0.343 0.0428 0.518* 0.135 
  (0.221) (0.233) (0.233) (0.225)  (0.237) (0.222) (0.274) (0.252) 
% Distance   0.0648 0.0707 0.0431 0.0623  0.0200 0.0429 0.00158 0.0378 
  (0.0755) (0.0618) (0.0886) (0.0726)  (0.0718) (0.0608) (0.0865) (0.0673) 
Rough Terrain  0.344** 0.273* 0.387** 0.303**  0.288* 0.204 0.294 0.182 
  (0.142) (0.143) (0.152) (0.155)  (0.168) (0.140) (0.182) (0.142) 
Region FE78    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Decade FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 131 131 131 131 131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The second table lists the main war outcomes results, with the dependent variable again treated as a categorical variable and 
evaluated by means of ordered logistic regression. The primary independent variable tested, Competitive Electoral State, is consistently 
highly both statistically and substantively associated with preferable war outcomes for incumbent regimes.79 As a reminder this variable 
is constructed from both a state’s electoral state status and Geddes regime type, as well as the distribution of the popular vote in the 
relevant elections. It is a categorical measure, coded as one if an incumbent regime was considered either a democracy or party state by 
                                                          
78 Fixed effects were implemented as indicator variables.  
79 Odds ratios are reported in table three and predicted probabilities towards the end of the first half of the chapter.  
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the Geddes coding; or qualifies as an electoral state. Electoral state status here however, requires not only that a qualifying election 
event was held, but that it was not dominated by the incumbent, which is considered an indirect indicator of more narrow domestic 
ruling institutions. Therefore, to be considered as competitive, a qualifying executive election cannot be won by more than three-fourths 
of the popular vote and a legislative election by more than two-thirds.80  
 A war’s status as a colonial conflict received no support. Helicopters are once again associated with a considerable decline in the 
war prospects of incumbents; though once again there is no support for the alternative Mechanization measure. Occupation has no 
relationship with war outcomes too. While External Support and the Polity measure for regime type are strongly and consistently 
associated with a reduction in a state’s chances. And while the Democracy indicator is still not significant in most tests, it’s sign is in the 
expected theoretical direction. The Cold War doesn’t seem to have had an impact, while powerful states may have actually done better 
                                                          
80 Very few cases pool near either of the cutoffs (examples are Algeria, Indonesia, and Liberia). In general, non-competitive cases were won by 
executives who garnered 99% or greater of the vote and those which were competitive with no more than in the 50% range. As well, changing the 
thresholds to be the same, at either two-thirds or three-fourths would impact the coding decision of only a handful of cases. In executive elections, 
because fewer candidates are generally fielded a higher cut-off value was preferred as it is easier for a winner to garner a larger percentage of the 
vote, even in a competitive context. By contrast in competitive legislative elections the winning party or list often does not even exceed 50% of the 
popular vote and so a lower threshold for competitive status was established. The other motivation for the slight difference in cut-off values was so as 
to avoid cases with a contradictory coding, where the most recent legislative and executive elections would suggest conflicting coding decisions for 
the case’s competitive status.  
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in spite of insurgency being a technology of violence designed expressly for the purpose of redressing material imbalances between 
combatant parties. Finally, the Rough Terrain measure once again returns the same surprising, though only modestly strong, estimate.  
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Table 5-3 Main Results: Ordered Logistic Regression on War Outcomes (Win/Draw/Loss) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                    
Competitive Electoral State 1.951*** 1.920*** 1.786*** 1.872*** 1.785*** 2.236*** 1.931*** 2.602*** 2.610*** 
 (0.348) (0.456) (0.441) (0.449) (0.462) (0.542) (0.480) (0.603) (0.614) 
Colonial War   -0.762 -0.574 -1.145 -0.622 -1.404 -0.667 -1.930 -1.734 
  (0.968) (0.973) (0.970) (0.889) (1.057) (0.886) (1.297) (1.171) 
Helicopters  -1.083***  -1.579***  -1.753***  -1.744***  
  (0.386)  (0.455)  (0.486)  (0.628)  
Mechanization   -0.196  -0.183  -0.200  -0.284 
   (0.144)  (0.158)  (0.173)  (0.214) 
Occupation  0.0699 -0.0514 -0.394 -0.0494 -0.0775 0.0310 -0.520 -0.128 
  (0.809) (0.807) (1.018) (0.868) (0.991) (0.873) (1.083) (0.790) 
External Support   -0.951*** -0.829*** -0.835*** -0.790*** -0.893*** -0.805*** -0.878*** -0.756*** 
  (0.227) (0.226) (0.220) (0.223) (0.246) (0.222) (0.307) (0.266) 
Polity   -0.0672***  -0.0811***  -0.0991***  -0.107**  
  (0.0260)  (0.0277)  (0.0295)  (0.0465)  
Democracy   -0.607  -0.702  -0.762*  -0.950 
   (0.424)  (0.435)  (0.442)  (0.593) 
Cold War     0.550 0.396 0.424 0.383 0.482 0.139 
    (0.345) (0.374) (0.365) (0.374) (0.717) (0.642) 
Power     0.300***  0.459***  0.430*  
    (0.114)  (0.142)  (0.242)  
Great Power      0.0601  -0.00819  -1.213 
     (0.478)  (0.595)  (0.833) 
# Languages     -0.0260 -0.0296 -0.0359 -0.0378 -0.0433 -0.0526 
    (0.0302) (0.0288) (0.0304) (0.0295) (0.0342) (0.0391) 
New State     -0.109 -0.182 -0.207 -0.322 -0.529 -0.995 
    (0.515) (0.517) (0.502) (0.532) (0.651) (0.681) 
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% Energy Per Capita      -0.0925 -0.0387 0.0212 0.171 
      (0.102) (0.103) (0.170) (0.158) 
% Trade / GDP       0.341 0.0194 0.447* 0.129 
      (0.217) (0.206) (0.249) (0.205) 
% Distance       0.0209 0.0441 0.00280 0.0243 
      (0.0745) (0.0621) (0.0908) (0.0713) 
Rough Terrain       0.329** 0.243* 0.304* 0.230 
      (0.164) (0.147) (0.178) (0.148) 
Region FE         Yes Yes 
Decade FE        Yes Yes 
          
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The third table of results redisplays some of the specifications from the main table above, but with odds ratios listed in place of 
coefficients. The ordered logistic model returns estimated coefficient values in the form of log odds, the purpose of which being that 
doing so transforms an otherwise binary/categorical outcome into one that is unbounded on the left hand side (in contrast to a linear 
probability model). An exponential transformation of the coefficients (conversion to odds ratios) provides a much more readily 
interpretable result for evaluating the estimated magnitudes of each covariates’ impact. Accordingly, competitive electoral states are 
estimated to achieve higher ranked outcomes than their non-competitive counterparts at an odds of over 6 to 1 in most specifications 
without fixed effects, and well over 10 to 1 in those with these added proxies for unobservable confounders. For Helicopters, the 
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negative coefficient estimate translates to an odds between 0 and 1. A non-mechanized incumbent has an odds of 3 to 1 of achieving a 
higher outcome state than a mechanized incumbent, and under estimation with fixed effects that ratio increases to 6 to 1. Similarly, the 
provisions of External Support to insurgents reduces the prospect of an incumbent’s outcome by roughly half for a one unit change in 
the variable. And finally, adverse terrain is associated with an improvement in an incumbent’s odds of a higher war outcome by a factor 
of approximately 1.6 to 1. The average marginal effects plot (AME), based on the estimated results from specification 4, provides each 
variable’s point estimate and 95% confidence interval with respect to its conditional impact on the probability of the war ending in a 
higher or lower valued outcome state. 
Table 5-4 Main Results (Odds Ratios): Ordered Logistic Regression on War Outcomes (Win/Draw/Loss) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                
Competitive Electoral State 7.038*** 6.824*** 5.965*** 9.355*** 6.899*** 13.49*** 13.59*** 
 (2.450) (3.112) (2.629) (5.070) (3.311) (8.138) (8.351) 
Colonial War   0.467 0.563 0.246 0.513 0.145 0.177 
  (0.452) (0.548) (0.259) (0.455) (0.188) (0.207) 
Helicopters  0.338***  0.173***  0.175***  
  (0.131)  (0.0841)  (0.110)  
Mechanization   0.822  0.819  0.753 
   (0.119)  (0.142)  (0.161) 
Occupation  1.072 0.950 0.925 1.031 0.594 0.880 
  (0.867) (0.766) (0.917) (0.900) (0.644) (0.695) 
External Support   0.386*** 0.436*** 0.410*** 0.447*** 0.416*** 0.470*** 
  (0.0877) (0.0988) (0.101) (0.0992) (0.127) (0.125) 
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Polity   0.935***  0.906***  0.898**  
  (0.0243)  (0.0267)  (0.0418)  
Democracy   0.545  0.467*  0.387 
   (0.231)  (0.206)  (0.229) 
Cold War     1.528 1.466 1.619 1.149 
    (0.557) (0.549) (1.161) (0.737) 
Power     1.582***  1.537*  
    (0.224)  (0.371)  
Great Power      0.992  0.297 
     (0.590)  (0.248) 
# Languages     0.965 0.963 0.958 0.949 
    (0.0293) (0.0284) (0.0328) (0.0371) 
New State     0.813 0.725 0.589 0.370 
    (0.408) (0.386) (0.384) (0.252) 
% Energy Per Capita     0.912 0.962 1.021 1.186 
    (0.0928) (0.0996) (0.173) (0.187) 
% Trade / GDP     1.407 1.020 1.564* 1.138 
    (0.305) (0.210) (0.390) (0.233) 
% Distance     1.021 1.045 1.003 1.025 
    (0.0760) (0.0649) (0.0910) (0.0730) 
Rough Terrain     1.389** 1.275* 1.355* 1.258 
    (0.228) (0.187) (0.242) (0.186) 
Region FE       Yes Yes 
Decade FE      Yes Yes 
        
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5-4: Average Marginal Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals  
 
 
While the assumption of an ordered outcome certainly increases the ease of reporting 
estimated effects, by returning a single value for each covariate, doing so also carries a potential 
risk of obfuscating relationships that exist between some outcome states and not others as they 
are essentially averaged out. The opposite risk is also present, that an exceptionally strong 
relationship that is specific to certain dyadic outcome pairings may mistakenly suggest a general 
relationship across all of the outcome states, which the underlying data do not truly support. 
One way of evaluating the proportional odds assumption of the ordered model is through a 
comparison of its results with those of a multinomial logistic regression. For each of the 
multinomial logistic regression specifications, the omitted baseline category is a war loss 
compared to ties and wins separately (though the likelihood function is maximized 
simultaneously), with estimated coefficients reported. 
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Table 5-5 Supplementary Results: Multinomial Logistic Regression on War Outcomes (Win/Draw/Loss) 
  (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) 
War Outcomes Loss v. Tie Loss v. Win Loss v. Tie Loss v. Win Loss v. Tie Loss v. Win Loss v. Tie Loss v. Win Loss v. Tie Loss v. Win 
                      
Competitive 
Electoral State 2.554*** 2.667*** 3.276*** 3.575*** 2.966*** 3.115*** 4.496*** 5.484*** 3.963*** 4.782*** 
 (0.624) (0.491) (0.857) (0.894) (0.758) (0.765) (1.063) (1.195) (0.980) (1.161) 
Colonial War   -1.427 -1.714 -0.00394 -0.567 -0.474 -3.053* -0.332 -2.643* 
   (1.713) (1.181) (1.346) (0.948) (2.305) (1.671) (1.786) (1.520) 
Helicopters   -1.030 -3.357***   -1.362 -4.827***   
   (0.822) (1.074)   (1.151) (1.437)   
Mechanization     0.275 -0.231   0.0794 -0.361 
     (0.364) (0.292)   (0.475) (0.441) 
Occupation   -1.924 -1.413 -1.983 -0.551 -4.078** -3.019** -2.466* -1.162 
   (1.744) (1.308) (1.222) (0.817) (1.798) (1.478) (1.374) (1.004) 
External Support   -0.643 -1.153*** -0.546 -1.103*** -0.570 -1.353** -0.318 -0.906** 
   (0.397) (0.419) (0.343) (0.366) (0.463) (0.549) (0.427) (0.452) 
Polity   -0.0377 -0.131**   -0.0444 -0.221**   
   (0.0727) (0.0595)   (0.107) (0.0861)   
Democracy     1.259 -0.269   0.511 -1.254 
     (1.147) (0.963)   (1.142) (1.125) 
Cold War    0.519 0.958 0.239 0.658 3.028** 2.264* 1.232 0.872 
   (0.694) (0.651) (0.641) (0.601) (1.394) (1.273) (1.103) (0.987) 
Power   0.308 0.744***   0.940*** 1.312***   
   (0.256) (0.266)   (0.348) (0.453)   
Great Power     -2.256 -0.839   -3.512** -2.835** 
     (1.402) (1.035)   (1.762) (1.358) 
# Languages    -0.0371 -0.0815* -0.0221 -0.0580 -0.0785* -0.128** -0.0470 -0.102* 
   (0.0335) (0.0471) (0.0345) (0.0463) (0.0457) (0.0539) (0.0471) (0.0558) 
New State   -1.996* -0.515 -2.050* -0.919 -0.833 -1.021 -2.324** -2.120** 
 
 
149 
   (1.108) (0.832) (1.070) (0.778) (1.040) (1.029) (1.159) (1.015) 
% Energy Per Capita   0.159 -0.0301 0.132 -0.00591 -0.264 -0.0876 0.224 0.395 
   (0.147) (0.149) (0.136) (0.137) (0.280) (0.317) (0.215) (0.240) 
% Trade / GDP   0.893*** 0.654** 0.597** 0.0741 0.786* 0.917** 0.484 0.218 
   (0.241) (0.320) (0.273) (0.240) (0.408) (0.372) (0.350) (0.255) 
% Distance   0.214* 0.158 0.213** 0.142 0.337** 0.216 0.401*** 0.254* 
   (0.122) (0.132) (0.102) (0.100) (0.155) (0.166) (0.138) (0.130) 
Rough Terrain   0.0688 0.433 -0.0592 0.267 -0.0332 0.566 0.0219 0.353 
   (0.290) (0.337) (0.230) (0.225) (0.346) (0.429) (0.221) (0.237) 
Region FE       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade FE       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While the estimated magnitudes of the Competitive Electoral State variable do slightly differ between the ‘loss-tie’ and ‘loss-win’ 
pairings, the statistical significance is consistent and the magnitudes of the effects are still all quite considerable throughout the 
specifications. This is not the case for the Helicopters measure. While the difference between losses and wins is the same as that 
suggested by the ordered model, the distinction between losses and ties does not achieve significance at any level in any specification. 
Interestingly, under this change of modeling assumption the Occupation variable now achieves statistical significance, at least in the 
fixed effect specifications. The direction and magnitude of the estimated effect is consistent with prior empirical work and theory, that 
occupier incumbents are considerably less likely to end their wars in a tie or win than those prosecuted by non-occupiers. Evidence in 
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favor of the External Support variable is much weaker, and displays a similar pattern to that of the Helicopters predictor; and similar as 
well to the Polity measure of regime type. It’s not clear if the Cold War had any impact, and the contradiction between the Power and 
Great Power results is somewhat odd. While more powerful incumbents fared better, this estimated relation is actually reversed for the 
most powerful among them. State’s that are new or have many Languages don’t seem to do quite as well, while those farther away 
actually might perform slightly better. Finally, the Rough Terrain relationship drops out completely, even to the point of returning 
inconsistent signs.  
The final graph displays the predicted probability of each outcome state’s occurrence, while holding all of the other known 
covariates at their observed values (not including region and time dummies). Average predicted probabilities for each outcome state are 
constructed by treating all cases in the data set as either a competitively elected state, or not, and then estimating the prospect of each 
outcome class using the multiple regression results. For example, the model predicts that if every observation was treated as not 
competitively elected approximately 54% of the cases would have ended in an incumbent loss. By contrast, if every case were to be 
treated as having had a competitively elected government, the according prospect of a loss would less than 18%. Clearly the estimated 
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probability of a non-competitively elected incumbent decisively prevailing over an insurgency are extremely poor; while the predicted 
probability for those whose regimes’ are, of suffering an outright loss, is dramatically diminished.81  
 Figure 5-5: Predicted Marginal Probability of War Outcome by Comp. Electoral State Status 
 
  
                                                          
81 Estimates generated using STATA version 13.1 margins command.  
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War Duration-The Hazard of Defeat  
 While the number of conflicts associated with each termination state is nearly uniformly distributed; their associated war years 
were considerably more skewed. Counterinsurgency wars ending in incumbent victories contributed the least to the total time at risk 
(1153 total war years), while those ending in negotiated settlements did so to the greatest extent, with insurgent victories falling in 
between. This is somewhat surprising given the theoretical emphasis that has been placed on the protracted nature of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency by both practitioners and scholars. Of the 46 conflicts which ended in an incumbent defeat the longest lasted 25 
years (Indonesia v. Fretilin), while that associated with the 43 incumbent wins was 20 (Peru v. Sendero Luminoso, Philippines v. the 
MLNF). By contrast the longest duration war in the history of modern insurgency resulted in a settlement after 47 years (Kachin and 
Karen in Myanmar). The typical ‘win’ conflict for incumbents lasted just over 6 years while that for insurgents slightly more than 7.5, 
with conflicts ending in ‘ties’ taking considerably longer with an average duration of over 12 years. Insurgencies may very well be more 
protracted than other varieties of war, but excess protraction is by no means a recipe for success for either party in such conflicts.  
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Figure 5-6: Distribution of War Years by Outcome State  
 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate provides a non-parametric descriptive depiction of the survival curve as a step function, with 
separate plots indicating the survival rates for competitively elected and non-competitively elected states. The figure clearly suggests a 
considerable difference between the two groups, with the risk of a war termination ending in a loss being substantially greater for 
incumbents lacking competitive electoral institutions. This apparent trend is confirmed by the Cox proportional hazards multiple 
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regression results. Across all of the specifications, the Competitive Electoral State variable consistently achieves high levels of statistical 
and substantive significance. The hazard ratios reported in the table of regression results can be easily interpreted in a manner similar to 
that of odds or relative risk ratio. The instantaneous risk of a war ending in a loss for an incumbent is at least eight times greater for 
those absent competitively elected institutions, and as suggested by the fixed effect models perhaps even more than a full order of 
magnitude. Relatively few of the other covariates receives much in the way of statistical support.  
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Figure 5-7: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for War’s Ending in an Incumbent Loss  
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The Occupation measure receives support in some of the more fully specified tests, although not in those with region and 
decade fixed effects, with occupier status incumbents at a considerably greater risk of a war loss event occurring with an estimated rate 
around 3 to 1. That the Cold War measure might be susceptible to the inclusion of time dummies is understandable, with some 
estimates suggesting that proxy wars fought between the superpowers were at a lower risk of regime collapse, likely due to otherwise 
failing state’s being propped up by their patrons. The Rough Terrain variable does not seem to matter nearly as much in the time to 
event context as it had in the previous outcome tests. That said, the distance measure does receive some support, with greater 
distances being associated with a modest reduction in the hazard of a loss. A cursory interpretation of this estimate might suggest an 
explanation based on incumbent resolve. Only stronger incumbents will possess the means to project power over great distances, and to 
bother doing so given the seemingly peripheral nature of such a threat would imply a relatively high willingness to exercise that power. 
Accordingly, such an incumbent may be far more reluctant to concede defeat. The results between the Power and Great Power 
covariates is once again mixed, as is the same for the Polity regime measure and the Democracy indicator. The most interesting 
differences however pertain to the Helicopters proxy for capitalized military force structures and External Support. Both covariates were 
strongly associated with an increased prospect of incumbent defeat in the prior war outcomes tests. Here however it is clear these 
associations do not carry over when incorporating the temporal dimension of war. The graph of hazard ratios is similar to the one 
previously described based upon the Kaplan-Meier estimator; though it controls for other covariates, and the plot of coefficients 
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displays the point estimate associated with each predictor along with its 95% confidence interval. Both figures are based on specification 
4 in the table of results.   
Table 5-6 Loss Hazard: Cox Regression on War Loss Event 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
War Duration Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss 
                
Competitive Electoral State 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.144*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.0628*** 0.0589*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0718) (0.0737) (0.0623) (0.0585) (0.0412) (0.0352) 
Colonial War   0.736 0.869 1.102 0.973 0.576 1.348 
  (0.339) (0.366) (0.475) (0.377) (0.489) (0.875) 
Helicopters  0.548*  0.900  0.832  
  (0.179)  (0.387)  (0.430)  
Mechanization   0.949  0.873  1.361 
   (0.151)  (0.181)  (0.390) 
Occupation  1.671 1.670 2.694** 2.711** 3.065 1.979 
  (0.814) (0.890) (1.217) (1.282) (2.266) (1.247) 
External Support  1.214 1.207 1.094 1.028 1.010 0.864 
  (0.211) (0.208) (0.226) (0.235) (0.242) (0.241) 
Polity   1.037*  1.060**  1.070*  
  (0.0225)  (0.0274)  (0.0401)  
Democracy   1.290  0.880  0.904 
   (0.521)  (0.415)  (0.691) 
Cold War     0.357*** 0.339*** 0.793 0.924 
    (0.131) (0.102) (0.578) (0.484) 
Power    0.739*  0.753  
    (0.116)  (0.183)  
Great Power      2.536  6.626** 
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     (1.567)  (6.141) 
# Languages     1.020 1.018 1.033 1.035 
    (0.0158) (0.0187) (0.0251) (0.0271) 
New State     1.031 1.628 0.832 3.018 
    (0.400) (0.705) (0.558) (2.162) 
% Energy Per Capita    1.088 1.024 1.159 0.885 
    (0.0847) (0.0872) (0.156) (0.118) 
% Trade / GDP    0.689** 0.917 0.800 1.011 
    (0.101) (0.113) (0.120) (0.157) 
% Distance    0.900* 0.836*** 0.908 0.829** 
    (0.0486) (0.0518) (0.0719) (0.0669) 
Rough Terrain    0.762 0.901 0.857 0.859 
    (0.167) (0.204) (0.270) (0.244) 
Region FE      Yes Yes 
Decade FE      Yes Yes 
        
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5-8: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals-Cox Loss Hazard 
 
Figure 5-9: Survival Curve by Comp. Electoral State Status-Cox Loss Hazard 
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The Cox Proportional-Hazard Regression estimates with respect to the tie and win 
outcome states was decidedly less supportive for the Competitive Electoral State measure. The 
associated Kaplan-Meier graphs are included below and the full tables of results for the Cox 
models can be found in the appendix. While there is some evidence in favor of an increased 
‘risk’ of a win event occurrence the estimated effect is nowhere near as pronounced as it is with 
respect to the loss outcome. This relative weakness of the relationship is further evidenced by 
the Competitive Electoral State variable only achieving conventional levels of statistical 
significance in the bivariate specification. However, the substantive implications of both the 
Kaplan-Meier and Cox models with respect to the ‘tie’ outcome variable are relatively 
unambiguous; Competitive Electoral States and non-Competitive Electoral States were 
statistically indistinguishable. More detailed interpretations of the other covariates in these 
models are located in the associated appendix.   
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Figure 5-10: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Incumbent Victory 
 
Figure 5-11: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Negotiated Settlement 
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 The final set of statistical results, with respect to war duration, assesses all of the 
possible termination states simultaneously.  This set of results most directly evaluates 
hypothesis C, that elections should be associated with shorter wars. Though not nearly as 
robust, the Competitive Electoral State measure does reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance in every specification. Critically however the estimated coefficient is directly the 
opposite of its anticipated sign. Competitive Elections are actually associated with a reduced 
hazard of war termination, implying that their presence is in fact correlated with longer 
conflicts. While unexpected, this relation is perhaps not too surprising. Competitive elections 
are associated strongly with wars ending in victories and settlements, but not defeats, and 
settlements contributed the greatest number of conflict years to the risk set. Nonetheless it is 
quite anomalous that the same factor is associated with a very considerable improvement in an 
incumbent regime’s war prospects, that will also take longer to achieve. The public nature of 
competitive elections makes them unamenable to strategic misrepresentation. In fact, this was 
one the principle theoretical justifications argued at the outset. As such it is a puzzle that they 
do not hasten the resolution of wars as anticipated, but rather are even somewhat predictive of 
their prolongment.  
 The Helicopters and External Support variables are both associated with longer wars. 
External assistance would clearly assist insurgents in sustaining a conflict and stronger states are 
those equipped with helicopters, who plausibly should be more capable of sustaining their war 
efforts. Occupiers tend to have shorter conflicts, though this relationship is not particularly 
robust. Cold War era conflicts may have been longer too, again owing to the sustaining 
implications of superpower support. The only other predictor with supporting evidence is that 
for conflicts fought over great distances from an incumbent regime’s capital. This result is likely 
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being driven by foreign wars undertaken by the most powerful countries in the international 
system; including decolonization wars, the US conflicts in Vietnam and Somalia, and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. And the strongest incumbents would also be those ablest to support 
sustaining longer war efforts. 
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Table 5-7 War Termination Hazard: Cox Regression on War Termination (All Outcome States) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
War Duration 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
All 
Outcomes 
                
Competitive Electoral State 0.694** 0.633*** 0.732** 0.653** 0.723* 0.611*** 0.662** 
 (0.115) (0.102) (0.109) (0.119) (0.125) (0.114) (0.129) 
Colonial War   0.615 0.992 0.933 1.309 0.691 0.808 
  (0.189) (0.362) (0.265) (0.429) (0.300) (0.357) 
Helicopters  0.469***  0.560**  0.530**  
  (0.107)  (0.151)  (0.136)  
Mechanization   1.008  1.023  1.032 
   (0.0821)  (0.113)  (0.106) 
Occupation  1.636** 1.335 1.808** 1.573 1.307 1.266 
  (0.377) (0.422) (0.473) (0.467) (0.377) (0.382) 
External Support   0.725** 0.747** 0.682*** 0.682*** 0.610*** 0.613*** 
  (0.0917) (0.105) (0.0833) (0.0783) (0.0855) (0.0820) 
Polity   0.983  0.991  0.983  
  (0.0151)  (0.0171)  (0.0183)  
Democracy   0.654*  0.635  0.612* 
   (0.160)  (0.180)  (0.176) 
Cold War     0.524*** 0.508*** 1.001 1.107 
    (0.121) (0.115) (0.324) (0.308) 
Power    0.918  0.966  
    (0.0828)  (0.104)  
Great Power      1.343  1.260 
     (0.506)  (0.535) 
# Languages     0.995 0.987 0.994 0.990 
    (0.0112) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0125) 
New State     0.984 1.231 0.889 1.085 
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    (0.217) (0.261) (0.246) (0.267) 
% Energy Per Capita    0.996 0.950 1.103 1.039 
    (0.0402) (0.0442) (0.0703) (0.0585) 
% Trade / GDP     0.961 1.045 1.028 1.066 
    (0.0762) (0.0723) (0.0820) (0.0819) 
% Distance    0.951* 0.920*** 0.923** 0.920*** 
    (0.0285) (0.0247) (0.0320) (0.0281) 
Rough Terrain    0.987 0.968 0.999 0.957 
    (0.0868) (0.0756) (0.0880) (0.0815) 
Region FE      Yes Yes 
Decade FE      Yes Yes 
        
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5-12: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for War Termination in Any Outcome State  
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Dealing with (Potential) Endogeneity – Econometric Methodology  
 
Partial/Selective Fixed Effects-Two Extensions to a Time Invariant, Single Outcome Context  
 
 As described previously, rolling fixed effects represents one possible extension of the traditional fixed effects identification 
strategy in a cross sectional context. To reiterate the principle identifying assumption which it is predicated upon: while it is not possible 
to control for all invariant aspects of a case in a single regression, it is possible to do so in the aggregate across multiple specifications. 
The first table of results explores the implications of applying this approach to the primary findings, the covariates of counterinsurgency 
war outcomes. The first and second specifications replicate the bivariate and full control specifications using an ordered logistic 
regression, again with war outcomes as the dependent variable. Specifications three through ten collectively summarize the implications 
of holding constant one fourth of the dataset at any given time, according to the following pattern:82  
• Specification # 3: Observations 1, 5, 9,… 
• Specification # 4: Observations 2, 6, 10,… 
• Specification # 5: Observations 3, 7, 11,… 
• Specification # 6: Observations 4, 8, 12,… 
• Specification # 7: Observations 1st quarter  
• Specification #8: Observations 2nd quarter  
• Specification # 9: Observations 3rd quarter  
                                                          
82 Cases were first sorted in ascending order, by start date of the conflict’s onset.  
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• Specification #10: Observations 4th quarter  
 
The identification strategy implemented here attempts to proxy for the effects if correlated omitted variables were to be 
introduced into the regression model. Across all eight of the specifications the measure of Competitive Electoral State is highly 
statistically and substantively significant. Furthermore, most of the eight point estimates are greater in magnitude than the simple 
baseline bivariate specification, and several of the eight are greater than the second specification, with a full battery of controls but 
absent any fixed effects. Collectively the results strongly support the primary substantive finding; insurgency wars fought in states 
maintaining electoral political institutions were much more likely to end in either a settlement or outright victory for the incumbent 
regime. The Helicopters finding was equally robust, as was that associated with External support. The Polity control was also quite 
resilient. Also, it seems that more powerful states may indeed fare better. And the somewhat curious positive relationship with the 
rough terrain came close. The substantive, theoretical implication of this test suggests that counterinsurgency war outcomes can be 
best accounted for by three variables: the balance of popular support (competitive electoral state), the suitability of incumbent 
regime militaries to conduct labor intensive population security operations (helicopters), and the availability of external support to 
assist insurgents in correcting for their relative disparity in material strength (external support). More democratic countries appear 
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to do worse, but this relationship is being driven by democratic regimes conducting foreign conflicts; and not by democracies 
conducting COIN operations in their own countries. And predictably, the more powerful perform better.  
Table 5-8 Rolling Fixed Effects by Fours: Ordered Logistic Regression on War Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                      
Competitive Electoral State 1.951*** 2.236*** 2.475*** 2.212*** 2.956*** 2.561*** 2.564*** 2.501*** 3.413*** 1.933*** 
 (0.348) (0.542) (0.777) (0.724) (0.795) (0.656) (0.710) (0.695) (0.823) (0.693) 
Colonial War  -1.404 -1.735 -1.311 -2.991* -0.245 -16.70*** -0.907 -1.697 -1.523 
  (1.057) (1.165) (1.362) (1.743) (1.408) (1.456) (1.345) (1.431) (1.423) 
Helicopters  -1.753*** -1.370** -2.377*** -2.124*** -2.228*** -1.382** -2.004*** -2.195*** -1.783*** 
  (0.486) (0.658) (0.729) (0.731) (0.599) (0.703) (0.677) (0.586) (0.670) 
Occupation  -0.0775 0.225 -0.509 0.628 -0.752 -1.029 0.567 -0.00454 -0.633 
  (0.991) (1.290) (1.406) (1.546) (1.102) (1.360) (1.282) (1.453) (1.229) 
External Support  -0.893*** -0.962*** -0.850*** -1.307*** -0.882*** -0.637** -1.000*** -1.319*** -0.908*** 
  (0.246) (0.317) (0.303) (0.453) (0.318) (0.310) (0.338) (0.382) (0.280) 
Polity  -0.0991*** -0.107*** -0.0957** -0.151*** -0.100*** -0.0865** -0.142*** -0.147*** -0.0836** 
  (0.0295) (0.0404) (0.0395) (0.0512) (0.0363) (0.0423) (0.0469) (0.0483) (0.0425) 
Cold War  0.424 0.0222 0.438 1.036* 0.382 0.609 0.255 0.482 0.380 
  (0.365) (0.448) (0.470) (0.559) (0.502) (0.461) (0.474) (0.573) (0.791) 
Power  0.459*** 0.453** 0.640*** 0.623** 0.485*** 0.445* 0.520*** 0.621*** 0.326 
  (0.142) (0.179) (0.191) (0.266) (0.173) (0.237) (0.163) (0.200) (0.321) 
New State  -0.207 -0.337 -0.589 -0.283 0.244 0.651 -0.225 -0.338 -0.338 
  (0.502) (0.654) (0.538) (0.773) (0.731) (0.859) (0.627) (0.736) (0.683) 
# Languages  -0.0359 -0.0583** -0.0236 -0.00464 -0.0549 -0.0704 -0.0249 -0.0235 -0.0607 
  (0.0304) (0.0288) (0.0377) (0.0437) (0.0409) (0.0430) (0.0304) (0.0476) (0.0590) 
% Energy Per Capita  -0.0925 -0.199 -0.140 -0.0585 -0.00588 -0.0351 -0.218 -0.145 -0.0299 
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  (0.102) (0.141) (0.115) (0.164) (0.138) (0.142) (0.135) (0.169) (0.120) 
% Trade / GDP  0.341 0.548* 0.200 0.536 0.301 0.738*** 0.456* 0.397* 0.163 
  (0.217) (0.286) (0.251) (0.377) (0.233) (0.261) (0.260) (0.236) (0.384) 
% Distance  0.0209 0.0209 -0.0671 0.0301 0.0923 -0.00287 0.0309 0.0922 0.0839 
  (0.0745) (0.0916) (0.0850) (0.116) (0.102) (0.0832) (0.0808) (0.117) (0.136) 
Rough Terrain  0.329** 0.317 0.363 0.544*** 0.365* 0.383** 0.297 0.406* 0.407* 
  (0.164) (0.193) (0.323) (0.198) (0.199) (0.167) (0.226) (0.238) (0.217) 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 The second table of results implements the rolling fixed effects technique in the same manner as the war outcomes models, but 
now with respect to the hazard of a war terminating in a loss for the incumbent regime. Once again the results strongly undergird the 
robustness of the relationship with the Competitive Electoral State predictor. The association is highly significant across all 
specifications, and the estimated hazard is even lower than the baseline model in many. The Colonial War and Helicopters measures 
receive virtually no support. Occupiers however do seem to be at a greater risk of experiencing a defeat. While being an occupier 
incumbent did not appear to carry any implication for the final outcome of a war, the evidence here does suggest that the instantaneous 
risk of experiencing a loss is likely greater. External Support, the third clearly significant covariate in the prior test, also appears to have 
no discernible relation to the hazard of a conflict loss occurring.  
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Interestingly, Cold War era insurgencies were far less at risk of an incumbent experiencing a rapid defeat, likely due to the 
considerable external assistance that regimes received from the superpowers of the period. The finding that incumbents conducting 
wars farther away from their capitals also holds up moderately well. In contrast to a loss of strength gradient prediction (Boulding 1962), 
that the ability to project force diminishes positively with distance, the reduction in hazard ratio would suggest that state’s that select 
themselves into fighting wars against insurgencies over great distances are reluctant to concede quickly. Alternatively, weaker insurgent 
groups are the most likely to initiate hostilities farther from the capital strongholds of the state’s they are challenging, reducing the 
immediate risk of overthrow from below both due to the distance of the fighting and the weaker nature of the opposition force (Buhaug 
2010). Finally, the Rough Terrain finding receives mixed support, but continues to suggest that incumbents may actually be at a lower 
risk of being defeated in mountainous states. The principle result across the two applications of the rolling fixed effects procedure is 
firmly in favor of supporting the primary empirical prediction of endogenous mobilization theory; that institutional incorporation of the 
masses into the status quo political regime strongly undergirds the resiliency of the state towards surviving an insurgent aggression.  
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Table 5-9 Rolling Fixed Effects by Fours: Cox Regression-War Loss Hazard  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
War Duration Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss 
                      
Competitive Electoral State 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.137*** 0.0819*** 0.0387*** 0.153*** 0.126*** 0.108*** 0.0850*** 0.0573*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0623) (0.0927) (0.0562) (0.0346) (0.0952) (0.0879) (0.0699) (0.0551) (0.0539) 
Colonial War   1.102 1.247 0.714 0.732 1.165 0.689 0.782 0.734 1.380 
  (0.475) (0.656) (0.301) (0.712) (1.063) (1.049) (0.501) (0.424) (0.774) 
Helicopters  0.900 0.597 1.372 0.544 0.664 0.598 1.025 0.708 0.369* 
  (0.387) (0.244) (0.820) (0.437) (0.437) (0.531) (0.556) (0.450) (0.199) 
Occupation  2.694** 2.590 2.649* 11.96 3.817*** 5.181* 2.711* 7.763** 2.132 
  (1.217) (1.529) (1.456) (24.40) (1.737) (4.414) (1.550) (6.572) (1.285) 
External Support  1.094 1.083 0.988 0.805 1.195 1.181 1.351 0.823 0.968 
  (0.226) (0.213) (0.289) (0.249) (0.273) (0.335) (0.348) (0.216) (0.275) 
Polity   1.060** 1.074** 1.056 1.134* 1.056 1.065 1.086 1.087** 1.075* 
  (0.0274) (0.0330) (0.0399) (0.0760) (0.0538) (0.0947) (0.0596) (0.0388) (0.0419) 
Cold War   0.357*** 0.478* 0.207*** 0.286* 0.300** 0.138*** 0.348** 0.353** 1.086 
  (0.131) (0.185) (0.0973) (0.199) (0.162) (0.0998) (0.181) (0.159) (0.630) 
Power  0.739* 0.767* 0.541*** 0.643 0.700 0.739 0.730 0.626** 1.043 
  (0.116) (0.120) (0.115) (0.191) (0.170) (0.240) (0.148) (0.127) (0.244) 
New State  1.031 1.017 1.082 1.226 0.954 0.858 1.211 0.860 1.119 
  (0.400) (0.406) (0.574) (1.585) (0.546) (0.503) (0.659) (0.420) (0.666) 
# Languages   1.020 1.017 0.962 1.062*** 1.061** 1.041 1.027 1.013 1.038 
  (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0310) (0.0227) (0.0259) (0.0272) (0.0253) (0.0228) (0.0244) 
% Energy Per Capita  1.088 1.081 1.144 1.035 1.080 1.105 1.252* 1.156 0.946 
  (0.0847) (0.0908) (0.145) (0.182) (0.102) (0.123) (0.166) (0.148) (0.0818) 
% Trade / GDP   0.689** 0.559*** 0.778 0.627 0.662* 0.538** 0.663** 0.679** 0.707 
  (0.101) (0.108) (0.119) (0.286) (0.140) (0.133) (0.114) (0.107) (0.185) 
% Distance   0.900* 0.921 1.036 0.761** 0.833*** 0.915 0.907 0.797*** 0.865** 
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  (0.0486) (0.0509) (0.0837) (0.101) (0.0531) (0.0603) (0.0651) (0.0694) (0.0535) 
Rough Terrain  0.762 0.775 0.722 0.541** 0.780 0.676 0.876 0.575** 0.749 
  (0.167) (0.173) (0.234) (0.165) (0.284) (0.212) (0.300) (0.125) (0.222) 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 The third and fourth tables explore the empirical implications of the second approach proposed for extending the fixed effects 
identification strategy to a cross sectional or single outcome context. The assumption underlying this technique is that while it is not 
possible to hold fixed all of the observations in a single regression, it is also not necessary as one can hold fixed just the subset of the 
cases which suffer the greatest from bias due to omitted confounders.83 Once again, the first set of results reports the estimates 
corresponding to war outcomes while the second does so for the hazard of a loss. With respect to war outcomes, the first four 
specifications evaluate a dichotomous dependent variable contrasting incumbent losses with both victories and settlements, with the 
                                                          
83 A more thorough description is located in the Research Design section of the prior chapter. In brief, the most evidently biased cases are those where 
an inferential model (e.g. logit) subsequently assigns a greater predicted probability to an outcome state which did not occur, than to one which did. 
These ‘discordant’ cases can then be either dropped from the dataset entirely or held fixed in a subsequent regression by interacting their unique 
identification number with an indicator for discordant status, and including this new factor variable as a regressor in a subsequent test.  
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first two specifications run as logistic models and the third and fourth both approximated as a linear probability (LPM).84 And the fifth 
and sixth columns are run according to the ordered logistic specification, with the final two sets of estimates again approximated by a 
linear model.  
In the first stage, all of the covariates are regressed on war outcomes (results 1 and 5). The resulting estimates are then used to 
predict the outcome probability associated with each case, which are then identified as being discordant if the predicted probability of a 
non-event is greater than that of the actual outcome which occurred. In the context of the binary logistic model, this simply means that 
the absolute value of the difference between any given case’s observed and predicted outcome should be less than one half.85 This 
procedure is modified slightly for the ordered models; if the predicted probability of one of the two outcome states which did not occur 
exceeds that of the one that did, then the observation is subsequently coded as discordant. In both contexts, a new dichotomous 
variable is created to identify the discordant cases (assigned a value of 1) in contrast to the concordant ones (assigned a value of 0). This 
new variable is then interacted with each conflict’s unique war identification number, so that each discordant case can be held constant 
in a subsequent regression; effectively permitting the cases that are the most poorly accounted for by the matrix of covariates to be held 
                                                          
84 The principle purpose of including the LPM specifications are to deal with the potential issue of incidental parameter bias in the logistic model with 
respect to the second stage of the process, potential functional form misspecification of the logistic cdf, and for ease of replicating results as the fully 
parametric approaches both require specialized software that presently exists only in the R statistical computing environment.  
85 For example, an outcome of 1 with a corresponding predicted probability of .8 would be coded subsequently as concordant (1-.8=.2). Had the 
predicted probability been .3 however, that case would be subsequently coded as discordant (1-.3=.7).  
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fixed relative to the concordant cases, those which are better explained. The odd specifications (1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th) report baseline 
results while the even (2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th) do so including the discordance indicators (DI).868788 Asymptotic robust standard errors are 
clustered on conflict country location code for all tests, except the second and fifth. Including the generated indicators for discordance 
induces a condition of separation in the resulting maximum likelihood estimates and results in a failure of non-convergence (see 
                                                          
86 The first and fifth specifications are used to generate the indicators for discordance in the both the logistic (2 and 6) and LPM (4 and 8) second stage 
tests.  
87 Again, discordance indicator here simply refers to a new factor variable that is generated by identifying discordant cases. It identifies a particular 
observation as having a misleading predicted probability associated with it, based on the results of a prior, initial baseline multiple regression. 
Discordant status indirectly implies a bias due to omitted covariates, which is manifested observationally in the misleading predicted probability 
associated with a given event.  
88 The ‘LogistF’ (Heinze 1999; Heinze and Ploner 2003; Heinze and Schemper 2002) and ‘BPOLR’ (Kosmidis 2014) commands associated with the 
second and fifth specifications execute a penalized maximum likelihood estimator (PMLR) for the binary and ordered logistic regression models, 
respectively. While the ‘FIRTHLOGIT’ user written command for Stata offers some comparable functionality to that of the LogistF package, it is not 
really possible to implement profile likelihood standard errors with it, and there is nothing comparable for the ordered logistic model. A PMLR 
estimator is needed due to the procedure resulting in a problem of monotonic separation in the likelihood function, which arises when attempting to 
implement a traditional maximum likelihood estimator. The iterative estimates will fail to converge (King and Zeng 2001; Zorn 2005) when either a 
single or set of regressors perfectly differentiate between outcome states. The PMLR estimator was designed originally to reduce the problem of finite 
sample bias, as a competing approach to exact methods (Firth 1993; Hirji 1992; Hirji, Mehta, and Patel 1987; Hirji, Tsiatis, and Mehta 1989). It was 
subsequently recognized by George Heinze as a solution to the problem of separation in the context of the maximum likelihood estimator. PMLR 
involves adding a penalty function to the maximum likelihood estimator, specifically Jeffrey’s invariant prior. The LogistF package is available for use in 
R directly from CRAN. The BPOLR command had not yet been released for public use, but can be found within the supplemental materials in Kosmidis 
(2014).  
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footnote 16). Instead, a penalized maximum likelihood estimator is resorted to for estimating these parametric specifications and 
accordingly the recommended practice is followed of estimating profile likelihood standard errors.89  
 Substantively, controlling for discordant cases yields unambiguous support to the supposition that incumbents select themselves 
into treatment (competitive electoral state status) when facing stronger insurgencies, and that accordingly the uncorrected baseline 
estimates are understated. This conclusion holds across both the second stage logistic and linear probability models. Holding fixed the 
most problematic observations (those with the largest unaccounted variance) consistently results in an increase in the magnitude of the 
point estimate of the Competitive Electoral State variable, with all four second stage results highly statistically significant. The 
Helicopters measure also returns a comparable result, but in the opposite direction, suggesting that the negative implications of 
conducting a COIN war with a capital intensive military structure are even more severe than suggested by the uncorrected baseline 
estimation. Again, a similar story emerges for External Support and Polity score. And more powerful incumbents may indeed perform 
better, as well as more open economies. There appears to be minimal support for the remaining control variables.  
  
                                                          
89 One of the advantages of profile likelihood errors are their ability to accommodate non-symmetric confidence intervals as well as that they do not 
rely on asymptotic assumptions as a basis for their validity (Royston 2007; Venzon and Moolgavkar 1988).  
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Table 5-10 War Outcomes: Discordance Indication  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Covariates Logit LogistF-R OLS OLS-DI Ordered Logit BPOLR-R OLS OLS-DI 
                  
Competitive Electoral State 3.499*** 7.401*** 0.450*** 0.503*** 2.236*** 6.008*** 0.700*** 1.018*** 
 (0.866) (1.901) (0.0837) (0.0875) (0.542) (1.153) (0.139) (0.137) 
Colonial War -1.577 -3.285 -0.168 -0.196 -1.404 -5.22** -0.332 -0.362** 
 (1.253) (1.988) (0.161) (0.145) (1.057) (2.194) (0.235) (0.141) 
Helicopters -1.789** -2.545* -0.184** -0.214*** -1.753*** -4.72*** -0.521*** -0.582*** 
 (0.773) (1.272) (0.0775) (0.0645) (0.486) (1.186) (0.139) (0.131) 
Occupation -1.366 -0.001 -0.152 -0.0846 -0.0775 1.337 -0.0872 0.116 
 (1.416) (1.850) (0.175) (0.149) (0.991) (1.491) (0.253) (0.215) 
External Support -0.903*** -2.377*** -0.126*** -0.164*** -0.893*** -2.575*** -0.242*** -0.335*** 
 (0.342) (0.799) (0.0383) (0.0371) (0.246) (0.633) (0.0644) (0.0598) 
Polity  -0.0854 -0.316*** -0.00996* -0.0156*** -0.0991*** -0.287*** -0.0251*** -0.0309*** 
 (0.0639) (0.116) (0.00566) (0.00520) (0.0295) (0.077) (0.00880) (0.00684) 
Cold War  0.580 1.737 0.0376 0.0292 0.424 1.012 0.130 0.0694 
 (0.632) (1.136) (0.0764) (0.0718) (0.365) (0.851) (0.116) (0.132) 
Power 0.520** 1.059** 0.0535* 0.0590** 0.459*** 1.253*** 0.128*** 0.159*** 
 (0.227) (0.454) (0.0273) (0.0271) (0.142) (0.386) (0.0478) (0.0481) 
New State  -1.319* -1.922 -0.150* -0.140* -0.207 -1.767 -0.0622 -0.0970 
 (0.796) (1.697) (0.0826) (0.0764) (0.502) (1.219) (0.142) (0.119) 
# Languages  -0.0514 -0.062 -0.00449 -0.00450 -0.0359 -0.066 -0.0107 -0.0141* 
 (0.0320) (0.056) (0.00418) (0.00376) (0.0304) (0.059) (0.00903) (0.00732) 
% Energy Per Capita 0.0304 0.049 -7.10e-05 -0.00339 -0.0925 -0.32* -0.0265 -0.0430* 
 (0.131) (0.250) (0.0152) (0.0123) (0.102) (0.188) (0.0289) (0.0241) 
% Trade / GDP  0.725*** 1.923*** 0.0904*** 0.117*** 0.341 1.162** 0.103* 0.113** 
 (0.258) (0.620) (0.0341) (0.0360) (0.217) (0.464) (0.0596) (0.0452) 
% Distance 0.161 0.262 0.0120 0.00937 0.0209 0.077 0.00885 -0.0112 
 (0.107) (0.204) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0745) (0.138) (0.0229) (0.0193) 
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Rough Terrain 0.254 0.872* 0.0165 0.0168 0.329** 0.67** 0.0723 0.0713 
 (0.303) (0.425) (0.0273) (0.0259) (0.164) (0.291) (0.0487) (0.0562) 
         
Observations 132   132 132 132   132 132 
R-squared     0.461 0.731     0.434 0.901 
 
Implementation of discordant fixed effects requires a slightly modified setup procedure when applied to a Cox proportional 
hazards model.90 The dataset was expanded based on the number of war years contributed by each conflict, effectively converting its 
original cross sectional structure into one of unbalanced panels.91 Within each conflict panel, all of the observations associated with the 
dependent variable were modified to zero, to reflect a baseline category of ‘ongoing war’, with the exception of the final year, which 
was altered to reflect the three possible termination stages.92 A multinomial logistic regression was run on the full specification, 
simultaneously testing the relative risk of experiencing a loss, tie, or win; compared to remaining in an ongoing war. The baseline results 
associated with this initial stage are reported in the first six specifications, with relative risk ratios listed (exponentiated coefficients). The 
values are highly comparable to those of the hazard ratios estimated by a Cox proportional hazards model. In this context, and similar to 
                                                          
90 A first stage cox regression would be possible, and theoretically somewhat more satisfying, provided that an option was available post regression to 
generate something analogous to a predicted probability. Stata offers numerous post regression estimation commands for the cox regression model, 
and this option should be explored in future research.  
91 Clustering standard errors on conflict location country code corrects for the resulting increase in the number of observations and any risk of 
artificially inflating the statistical power of the tests.  
92 Each outcome state was increased by one (0->1, 1->2, 2->3).  
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that of the ordered logistic regression on war outcomes, discordant cases are identified if the predicted probability of one of the non-
event outcome states exceeds that associated with the actual observed value.93 Once identified, this new variable was once again 
interacted with each observation’s unique conflict code. In the second stage regression a Cox proportional hazards model was run with 
respect to the risk of experiencing a loss, with the discordant factor variable now included as a regressor.94  
 The first six specifications report the results of the first stage multinomial logistic regression, with relative risk ratios listed. The 
latter three do so with respect to the Cox hazard results; with the seventh simply listing the baseline results and the eighth and ninth 
including the fixed effect controls for discordant cases. Substantively, the results once again strongly support the underestimated 
endogeneity point of view. An incumbent’s hazard of being outright defeated by insurgents declines precipitously if they maintained 
competitive electoral political institutions, with the associated hazard further reduced by more than a full order of magnitude when 
controlling for discordant observations. Because of this extremely strong association, the Competitive Electoral State variable was 
accordingly omitted from the regressors in the final specification, to explore any ‘dominating’ effects it may have that might obscure 
                                                          
93 The highest predicted probability was predictably associated with zero, the status of remaining in an ongoing war. This occurrence was disregarded 
in identifying discordant cases.  
94 The second stage regression was implemented here with the stcox command in STATA. An analogous problem of complete/quasi separation in the 
likelihood, resulting in a convergence failure, is indeed also possible in the context of a cox proportional hazards model. This issue however did not 
arise here as it had in the prior tests regarding war outcomes however, presumably due to the manner by which cases exit the risk set or because of 
the alternative multinomial logistic parametric approach utilized in the first stage to identify discordant cases. In the instance that such a problem 
were to occur, a similar solution employing penalized maximum likelihood is available as an R package from CRAN; also written and created by George 
Heinze (Heinze 1999; Heinze and Dunkler 2008; Heinze and Schemper 2001). The package in R is titled ‘coxphf’.  
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potentially interesting relationships amongst the other covariates. The Occupation variable for example, increases in statistical 
significance when the Competitive Electoral State variable is removed, as does the measure of state Power. By contrast the strength of 
the open economy relationship diminishes and those pertaining to distant conflicts and rough terrain drop out entirely. And two of the 
strongest predictors of defeat, Helicopters and External Support, again appear to have no relationship to the temporal dimension of 
asymmetric war.  
 
Table 5-11 War Duration: Discordance Indication (Cox Regression) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Covariates Loss-RRR Tie-RRR Win-RRR Loss-RRR Tie-RRR Win-RRR Cox-Loss Cox-Loss DI Cox-Loss DI 
                    
Competitive Electoral State 0.123*** 1.577 1.765* 0.136*** 1.295 1.499 0.115*** 0.00769***  
 (0.0507) (0.652) (0.594) (0.0583) (0.456) (0.675) (0.0623) (0.0117)  
Colonial War     1.137 0.657 0.541 1.102 0.786 2.172 
    (0.406) (0.710) (0.439) (0.475) (0.448) (1.160) 
Helicopters    1.130 1.194 0.142*** 0.900 0.334 0.963 
    (0.368) (0.340) (0.0927) (0.387) (0.300) (0.454) 
Occupation    2.723** 0.932 2.017 2.694** 6.523** 6.182*** 
    (1.203) (0.812) (1.290) (1.217) (5.399) (3.387) 
External Support    1.138 0.805 0.458*** 1.094 0.785 1.365 
    (0.186) (0.178) (0.0968) (0.226) (0.221) (0.353) 
Polity     1.051* 1.027 0.926*** 1.060** 1.097*** 1.100*** 
    (0.0267) (0.0285) (0.0247) (0.0274) (0.0372) (0.0361) 
Cold War     0.450*** 0.514** 0.862 0.357*** 0.859 0.610 
    (0.136) (0.153) (0.351) (0.131) (0.493) (0.305) 
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Power    0.745** 0.823 1.236* 0.739* 0.570** 0.582*** 
    (0.104) (0.101) (0.144) (0.116) (0.157) (0.114) 
New State    1.162 0.308* 1.189 1.031 0.601 0.890 
    (0.381) (0.207) (0.485) (0.400) (0.254) (0.445) 
# Languages    1.019 0.998 0.985 1.020 1.015 1.009 
    (0.0135) (0.0233) (0.0318) (0.0158) (0.0209) (0.0242) 
% Energy Per Capita    1.045 1.090 0.904 1.088 1.506*** 1.216** 
    (0.0674) (0.0750) (0.0612) (0.0847) (0.183) (0.119) 
% Trade / GDP    0.719*** 1.271 1.131 0.689** 0.434*** 0.609** 
    (0.0908) (0.205) (0.137) (0.101) (0.0874) (0.131) 
% Distance    0.902** 0.995 0.932 0.900* 0.789** 0.892 
    (0.0454) (0.0449) (0.0648) (0.0486) (0.0757) (0.0892) 
Rough Terrain    0.798 0.845** 1.189 0.762 0.575** 0.890 
    (0.161) (0.0626) (0.130) (0.167) (0.140) (0.226) 
          
Observations 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country 
Statistical significance reported at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Lagged Instruments-Two Stage Least Squares & Bounding the Potential Influence of Selection Bias 
 
 As discussed in the research design, lagged values of the suspected endogenous regressor can be used in a two-stage least 
squares selection model to address potential problems of endogeneity bias. By predicting the values of the competitive electoral state 
variable with its own lag, a regime’s institutional value at the onset of a COIN war can be used to predict its status at the point of the 
war’s culmination. And importantly, doing so effectively removes the potential bias from incumbent regimes altering their ruling 
institutions in response to their evolving prospects in prosecuting the war. In the table below, results are reported for the competitive 
electoral state measure, with corresponding tests included in the appendix for the other two core predictors. In all regressions the 
dependent variable is the three value categorical measure recording a war’s outcome as an incumbent loss (0), negotiated settlement 
(1), or incumbent victory (2).  
The first five specifications are included to establish a baseline of comparison using a linear probability model parametric form. 
Specifications six through ten replicate the baseline tests using the two stage least squares procedure and the lagged measure of the 
competitive electoral state variable as the omitted instrument. The results are stable and yield a consistent substantive conclusion, 
relative to each comparable uncorrected baseline specification, the 2sls replication suggests that the relationship remains highly 
statistically significant and that the true magnitude of the effect associated with competitive electoral state status is somewhat greater 
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than in the baseline tests which do not correct for endogeneity. And this conclusion holds in a simple bivariate specification, when 
including a large number of known controls, and in the presence of proxy variable for unobservables.  
Table 5-12 Instrumental Variables Linear Regression: Two Staged Least Squares (2sls)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D.V. War Outcome LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
                      
Comp. Electoral State 0.775*** 0.700*** 0.690*** 0.758*** 0.803*** 0.926*** 0.787*** 0.733*** 0.868*** 0.914*** 
 (0.119) (0.139) (0.145) (0.138) (0.143) (0.154) (0.151) (0.169) (0.141) (0.156) 
Colonial War  -0.332 -0.143 -0.456 -0.448  -0.307 -0.128 -0.435 -0.421 
  (0.235) (0.225) (0.318) (0.301)  (0.216) (0.212) (0.284) (0.262) 
Helicopters  -0.521***  -0.465***   -0.521***  -0.464***  
  (0.139)  (0.148)   (0.133)  (0.137)  
Mechanization   -0.0760  -0.0824   -0.0758  -0.0817 
   (0.0597)  (0.0690)   (0.0560)  (0.0622) 
Occupation  -0.0872 -0.0411 -0.208 -0.103  -0.0472 -0.0203 -0.162 -0.0548 
  (0.253) (0.274) (0.272) (0.258)  (0.246) (0.257) (0.250) (0.235) 
External Support  -0.242*** -0.250*** -0.211*** -0.197***  -0.239*** -0.249*** -0.206*** -0.193*** 
  (0.0644) (0.0679) (0.0737) (0.0731)  (0.0600) (0.0640) (0.0649) (0.0658) 
Polity  -0.0251***  -0.0247**   -0.0255***  -0.0249**  
  (0.00880)  (0.0117)   (0.00830)  (0.0106)  
Democracy   -0.217  -0.266   -0.221  -0.277 
   (0.144)  (0.186)   (0.136)  (0.171) 
Cold War   0.130 0.115 0.0836 0.0485  0.124 0.113 0.0547 0.0239 
  (0.116) (0.126) (0.227) (0.224)  (0.110) (0.118) (0.204) (0.204) 
Power  0.128***  0.107   0.129***  0.105*  
  (0.0478)  (0.0695)   (0.0444)  (0.0630)  
Great Power   -0.0474  -0.363*   -0.0543  -0.386* 
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   (0.193)  (0.215)   (0.187)  (0.204) 
# Languages  -0.0107 -0.0127 -0.0105 -0.0140  -0.0103 -0.0125 -0.0101 -0.0138 
  (0.00903) (0.0105) (0.00957) (0.0112)  (0.00854) (0.00992) (0.00878) (0.0101) 
New State  -0.0622 -0.138 -0.146 -0.309  -0.0811 -0.149 -0.176 -0.342** 
  (0.142) (0.161) (0.184) (0.190)  (0.132) (0.151) (0.168) (0.173) 
% Energy Per Capita  -0.0265 -0.00951 0.00145 0.0496  -0.0279 -0.0100 0.00134 0.0501 
  (0.0289) (0.0354) (0.0451) (0.0456)  (0.0267) (0.0331) (0.0413) (0.0418) 
% Trade / GDP  0.103* 0.0162 0.124* 0.0387  0.109** 0.0181 0.130** 0.0446 
  (0.0596) (0.0681) (0.0635) (0.0576)  (0.0530) (0.0625) (0.0541) (0.0486) 
% Distance  0.00885 0.0222 0.00641 0.0204  0.00795 0.0220 0.00576 0.0200 
  (0.0229) (0.0217) (0.0260) (0.0238)  (0.0216) (0.0204) (0.0233) (0.0214) 
Rough Terrain  0.0723 0.0719 0.0631 0.0633  0.0768 0.0742 0.0677 0.0683 
  (0.0487) (0.0520) (0.0471) (0.0477)  (0.0469) (0.0485) (0.0432) (0.0429) 
Region FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Decade FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
First Stage F      131.94 85.48 86.17 92.7 88.48 
R-squared 0.223 0.434 0.348 0.475 0.437 0.214 0.432 0.347 0.472 0.434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 It is perhaps somewhat surprising that given such a strong relationship exists between the competitive electoral state measure 
and COIN war outcomes, the estimated magnitude of endogeneity bias is quite modest. Given that incumbent regimes are facing an 
existential threat to their continued survival, one might rightfully expect regime transitions during wars to be more pervasive. But as was 
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suggested in the discussion of the theory, governments simultaneously face existential threats from more than one direction, and status 
quo elites with entrenched interests may be quite reluctant to alter the ruling institutions which currently benefit them. The table below 
tries to demonstrate this relatively small endogenous effect by estimating the regression of each independent variable on its own lagged 
value as well as the outcome of each war, which is used here as a perfect proxy for the latent difficulty of each conflict.  
For both the Electoral State and GWF measures the statistical significance of war outcomes nearly drops out of conventional 
levels when directly tested against the lagged value of the regime. But the more interesting story is the extent of explained variation in 
the suspected endogenous regressor, as reflected in the pseudo-r squared measures. For all three predictors the sole effect of the 
lagged measure accounts for a much larger proportion of the variation than the outcome of the war. But more interesting still is the 
rather large amount of observed variation which still remains unaccounted for. For the Electoral State and GWF measures this quantity is 
approximately two-thirds, and for the Competitive Electoral State predictor it’s more than one half. While institutional inertia has a 
much greater explanatory role in influencing the character of a political regime than counterinsurgency war difficulty, their combined 
effect isn’t even half the story. And these results reaffirm that the character of an incumbent regime is not simply an endogenous 
reflection of the difficulty of the war it finds itself in.  
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Table 5-13 Logistic/Ordered Logistic Regression: Estimation of Potential Selection Into Treatment  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
D.V. 
Electoral 
State 
Electoral 
State 
Electoral 
State GWF GWF GWF 
Comp. 
Electoral State 
Comp. 
Electoral State 
Comp. 
Electoral State 
                  
W/D/L 0.892***  0.600*       
 (0.263)  (0.309)       
Lag Electoral 
State  2.948*** 2.765***       
  (0.475) (0.459)       
W/D/L    0.782***  0.358*    
    (0.187)  (0.199)    
Lag GWF     2.640*** 2.552***    
     (0.458) (0.464)    
W/D/L       1.311***  1.055*** 
       (0.239)  (0.328) 
Lag Comp. 
Electoral State        3.631*** 3.396*** 
        (0.525) (0.549) 
          
Observations 132 132 132 131 131 131 132 132 132 
Pseudo R2 0.0862 0.3027 0.3276 0.0524 0.3436 0.3508 0.171 0.4082 0.4656 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Simulated Instrumental Variables-If I Only Had a Vector (or 10,000)  
 
“For better or worse…the formal discipline of econometrics is not much concerned with the ‘finding instruments problem’; this is 
a job left to the imagination of empirical researchers. This division of responsibility reminds me a little of Steve Martin’s old joke 
about ‘how to make a million dollars and never pay taxes.’ First, Martin blandly suggests, ‘get a million dollars’..” (Angrist 2001, 2) 
 
 While instrumental variable techniques offer perhaps the more traditional and desirable solution to the general problem of 
endogeneity bias relative to fixed effects methods95, they are arguably employed most effectively in the context of a clear, theoretically 
compelling natural experiment. Notable examples include rainfall as an instrument for agricultural economic production during civil wars 
(Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), susceptibility to malaria for predicting historical patterns of 
institutional establishment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000), and quarter of birth to induce exogenous variation in a person’s 
educational attainment and associated earning power (Angrist 1991; Angrist and Krueger 1991, 1992). But skepticism has been raised as 
to the wisdom of pursuing such an identification strategy in a purely cross national context (Dunning 2008; Mankiw, Phelps, and Romer 
1995; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009, 114–15). In particular, the approach has been criticized for accomplishing little more than 
simply exchanging one set of essentially unverifiable assumptions for another.  
                                                          
95 This is owing to the inherent inefficiency of estimates produced via fixed effects applications.  
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“…in observational research, the use of instrumental variables methods replaces the unverifiable assumption of no unmeasured 
confounding for the treatment effect with other unverifiable assumptions such as ‘no unmeasured confounding for the effect of 
the instrument’ and ‘no direct effect of the instrument’. Hence, the fundamental problem of casual inference from observational 
data-the reliance of assumptions that cannot be empirically verified-is not solved but simply shifted to another realm” (Hernan 
and Robins 2006, 364)  
 
Different exclusion restrictions can often produce highly variable substantive implications, and there may be little to guide a researcher 
in adjudicating between them (LaLonde 1986). And while it is technically possible to achieve identification without appealing to a valid 
exclusion restriction, by exploiting functional form assumptions in the context of a binary endogenous regressor, the theoretical basis for 
doing so is highly tenuous at best (Angrist 1991).96 Lastly, the availability of such techniques in the context of duration modeling are still 
an ongoing topic of development and as yet are not widely seen in usage (MacKenzie et al. 2014).  
 The ‘lagged’ measures of the suspected endogenous regressors used herein appear to be an ideal candidate for serving as an 
excluded instrument. Empirically, the bivariate correlation between the Competitive Electoral State measure and its lag is 0.71, and the 
high reported first stage F statistics reaffirm that the relevance condition is satisfied. As well, a separate direct effect of the lagged 
                                                          
96 This point applies in particular to generated regressors. In the context of generated instruments and control function approaches such a critique is 
accordingly somewhat muted. But the associated ‘casual’ interpretation is still ambiguous in the absence of a theoretically valid exclusion restriction. 
For further discussion see: (Murtazashvili and Wooldridge 2015; Wooldridge 2010, 2015). 
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measure on war outcomes seems highly dubious. It remains theoretically possible however that another valid instrument might have 
produced a very different substantive result. The purpose of the following brief simulation is to explore and ultimately reject such a 
concern.  
 As before, the first table ignores the categorical nature of both the reduced form and structural stage equations, treating each as 
a linear probability model (LPM) (Angrist 1991). In the first eight specifications a single simulated instrument is constructed and tested; 
with the associated point estimate, standard error, and first stage F statistic reported. The final two specifications combine the 
previously generated instruments using the generalized method of moments estimator (Hansen 1982); with the ninth specification using 
the simulated vectors constructed for tests one through four and the tenth using those from five through eight. Across the rows the 
target correlation of the simulated instrument is varied to reflect a range of possible strengths in meeting the relevance condition. 
Motivating the theoretical validity of the exclusion restriction is of course not possible given that the instrument vectors are 
transformations of the results produced from a random number generating process. Each simulated instrument was constructed from 
the standardized competitive electoral state variable and an independent standard normal variable, applying the following formula: 
where X1 is the standardized transformation of competitive electoral state, X2 is an standard normal variable, and rho is the target 
correlation that is desired with respect to the final transformed instrument vector (sitmo | Generating Correlated Random Numbers).  
=?  L/? +  M1 − L /   
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Table 5-14 IVRegress with Simulated Instruments-War Outcomes    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls GMM GMM 
                      
Comp. Electoral State 
(p=0.80) 
0.7004*** 0.8527*** 0.8076*** 0.7589*** 0.8717*** 0.6481*** 0.6887*** 0.6748*** 0.8077*** 0.732*** 
(0.1639) (0.1374) (0.1554) (0.1792) (0.1406) (0.1550) (0.1549) (0.1284) (0.1262) (0.1148) 
           
First Stage F 913.56 424.74 701.93 383.19 453.1 676.6 374.18 344.86 360.5 263.65 
           
Comp. Electoral State 
(p=0.60) 
0.6466*** 0.922*** 0.8358*** 0.7461*** 0.9484*** 0.5642*** 0.6137*** 0.5865*** 0.8112*** 0.6825*** 
(0.2181) (0.1936) (0.2204) (0.2509) (0.2080) (0.1968) (0.2331) (0.1821) (0.1481) (0.1307) 
           
First Stage F 227.79 103.69 190.55 152.1 92.44 187.75 74.12 92.55 192.77 103.78 
           
Comp. Electoral State 
(p=0.40) 
0.5649* 1.057*** 0.888** 0.7241* 1.0769*** 0.4479* 0.4718 0.4164 0.8121*** 0.6109*** 
(0.3115) (0.3458) (0.3623) (0.3860) (0.3549) (0.2674) (0.4106) (0.3365) (0.1974) (0.1709) 
           
First Stage F 43.79 20.82 34.96 27.23 20.34 58.31 16.14 19.49 74.68 35.02 
           
Comp. Electoral State 
(p=0.20) 
0.3773 1.6543 1.0847 0.6572 1.4432 0.2213 -0.097 -0.3079 0.7726** 0.4705 
(0.5473) (1.3338) (0.9351) (0.8119) (0.8849) (0.4336) (1.277) (1.3802) (0.3750) (0.3016) 
           
First Stage F 8.54 1.83 3.63 3.29 3.52 17.38 1.89 1.8 6.39 5.86 
           
Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Robust standard errors clustered on country        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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 With strong instruments, the results are highly stable, though the same cannot be said for the two sets of weaker ones. Given 
the sample size, these preliminary results suggest that a bivariate correlation greater than 0.6 is needed to be confident that substantive 
conclusions would not differ across multiple equally valid instruments. And fortunately, the ‘lagged’ measures used in the prior section 
all exceeded this threshold. But the simulated results run with weaker instruments highlights the potential risks of this identification 
strategy. In the absence of a compelling natural experiment to guide the projection of the instrument onto the suspected endogenous 
variable, an instrumental variables identification strategy breaks down entirely. The projection of the instrument(s) onto the 
endogenous vector is required to illuminate the variation within it which can be validly associated with the dependent variable in the 
structural stage equation. Arguing for a stronger instrument (higher correlation with y1) is tantamount to declaring that the extent of 
the endogeneity problem is more minimal, as it will simply project onto a greater segment of the span of the suspected endogenous 
regressor. Combining multiple instruments leads to the same resultant implication, just in several parts instead of one whole. More 
troubling potentially is the substantial variation in substantive conclusion, with respect to the endogeneity question, which is suggested 
across the different simulated draws of the weaker instruments; with the resulting implications running the gamut including a reversal of 
sign, loss of entire statistical significance, and increase in the magnitude of the estimated effect.  
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 However, such a small experiment can do little other than provide a suggestive result. Emergent properties may become 
apparent with a larger number of draws. And the trend amongst the ‘better’ vectors (higher first stage F values) may be different further 
still. Once again, for the weaker simulated instruments, this is not the case. The second table reports the results of a Monte Carlo 
simulation, with the same procedure implemented as previously described conducted at eight different target strengths for the 
instruments (with respect to relevance).97 After running each test 10,000 times the summary statistics were sorted and ranked by their 
first stage F values.98 Accordingly, the reported results reflect only the simulated vectors ranked in the top one-hundred from each 
respective run. Notice that even the lowest value from the weakest instruments (p=0.10) reaches the threshold of sixteen advocated in 
the literature as a reliability cutoff (Staiger and Stock 1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002). Despite the large number of simulated draws, 
and the selection of only the most potentially promising results, the substantive information which can be gleaned from weaker 
instruments in such a small sample as this seems to be entirely non-informative.  
This observation of course should not be interpreted as a general condemnation of the instrumental variables technique by any 
stretch of the imagination. But rather, the concern is simply that in the absence of a theoretically compelling natural experiment to 
                                                          
97 The seed for the random number generator was set to 54321 for all runs.  
98 Values reported include the mean, maximum, and minimum of the corresponding results from the highest one-hundred instrument vectors when 
ranked according to their first stage F statistics. ‘Direction’ records the proportion of results where the reported coefficient was greater than that of 
the simple bivariate regression.  
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provide the basis for the instrument vector, and which yields a sufficiently strong relationship in a large enough sample, the approach as 
an identification strategy simply breaks down and becomes almost entirely indeterminate. And more concerning still is the wild range of 
potentiality between competing possible instruments that look otherwise indistinguishable in terms of their correlation with the 
suspected endogenous regressor and whose first stage F statistics satisfy conventionally accepted thresholds. On a positive note 
however, the simulation does confirm that the substantive conclusions produced by stronger instruments (in the case of the present 
dataset a correlation greater than 0.6) are extremely stable. The principle conclusion then of the simulation exercise is simply to reaffirm 
the integrity of the estimates generated by the lagged instruments. But this exercise also highlights the value of resting the total 
identification strategy on multiple complementary approaches. Between the combination of results produced by proxy variable controls, 
rolling & discordant fixed effects methods, and two-stage least squares the substantive implications for the endogeneity question have 
remained stable, which strongly undermines the concern that the findings are an artifact of a selection into treatment problem.99 
                                                          
99 It seems possible that the identification assumption ungirding the discordant fixed effects procedure may be extended to the instrumental variable 
context as well. The core insight is that the exclusion restriction does not need to be motivated to a uniform extent across all of the observations. The 
prospect of it failing in the context of a concordant case (or a very small residual value) is very minimal. By contrast the chance of it doing so with 
respect to discordant cases (or those with very large residuals) is far greater. The argument then, would be that empirically satisfying the relevance 
condition and theoretically motivating the exclusion restriction, varies proportionately with respect to the magnitude of the residual. More casually, a 
highly correlated instrument with respect to the concordant cases seems both desirable and unproblematic, while the converse would accordingly be 
the case with respect to any discordant observations. A potentially simply guideline would result: the strength of the instrument should vary across the 
observations in the dataset, and be inversely correlated with the magnitude of the residuals (absolute values). Simply put, for the cases with extremely 
small residuals the strength of the instrument should be very high, to the point even of simply being equal to the original values of the suspect 
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regressor (or of course any linear transformation). And for the cases with very large residuals the strength of the instruments should be extremely 
weak, to the point even of being orthogonal to the original values.  
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Table 5-15 Simulated Instrumental Variables-Monte Carlo Results 
Instrument Strength  Mean Minimum Maximum 
      
p=0.80 Coefficient  0.7809 0.6052 1.0226 
 P Value  0 0 0.0002 
 F Statistic  940.85 855.14 1258.5 
 Direction  0.56 - - 
      
p=0.70 Coefficient  0.7824 0.5642 1.006 
 P Value  0 0 0.0025 
 F Statistic  613.48 550.35 826.5 
 Direction  0.52 - - 
      
p=0.60 Coefficient  0.7965 0.5312 1.0632 
 P Value  0.0002 0 0.008 
 F Statistic  394.6 347.78 554.9 
 Direction  0.57 - - 
      
p=0.50 Coefficient  0.7952 0.475 1.1434 
 P Value  0.0017 0 0.0454 
 F Statistic  241.98 206.16 359.11 
 Direction  0.61 - - 
      
p=0.40 Coefficient  0.7943 0.4068 1.2305 
 P Value  0.0065 0 0.1443 
 F Statistic  140.41 119.09 208.51 
 Direction  0.6 - - 
      
p=0.30 Coefficient  0.8185 0.3167 1.4302 
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 P Value  0.0204 0 0.3482 
 F Statistic  78.62 65.8192 122.66 
 Direction  0.63 - - 
      
p=0.20 Coefficient  0.8277 0.2938 1.6435 
 P Value  0.048 0 0.4253 
 F Statistic  41.87 34.12 66.44 
 Direction  0.6 - - 
      
p=0.10 Coefficient  0.8506 0.1223 2.0255 
 P Value  0.1188 0 0.8027 
 F Statistic  20.57 16.03 34.33 
 Direction  0.61 - - 
      
All five simulations were replicated 10,000 times each. Summary 
results reported only for top 100 (ranked by F statistic) 
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Discussion of Findings  
 
Figure 5-13 Discordant Cases: Competitive Electoral State Status & War Outcomes  
 Incumbent Loss Incumbent Tie or Win 
Not 
Competitive 
Electoral State 
(Overestimated) 
1. Bolivia v. MNR 
2. Cuba v. Movimiento 26 De 
Julio 
3. North Yemen Civil War 
4. UKG in Aden 
5. Indonesia v. Fretilin 
6. Nicaragua v. FSLN  
7. Yugoslavia v. Croatia, Kr 
(Underestimated) 
1. Madagascar  
2. Paraguay v. Febreristas, Libs, 
Comms 
3. Argentina v. ERP/Montoneros 
4. Israeli-Syria(Lebanon) 
5. Sudan v. SPLM 
6. First Intifada 
7. DRC v. RCD, RCD-ML, MLC 
Competitive 
Electoral State 
(Underestimated)  
1. Costa Rica v. NLA 
2. Laos v. Pathet Lao 
3. Afghanistan II 1980-1989 
4. Moldova v. Dniestr 
(Overestimated) 
1. [none] 
 
 The cases listed in the above table were identified as being discordant in a logistic 
regression. An ancillary benefit of the procedure is that in addition to being controlled out in a 
subsequent stage, they can be counted and stratified according to their values with respect to 
the suspected endogenous regressor (competitive electoral state) and the dependent variable of 
interest (war outcomes).100 Recall that in this context, a discordant case was defined as one in 
which its post regression predicted probability assigned a greater weight to the outcome event 
which did not occur than that which did. Of the 132 counterinsurgency wars in the modern era 
                                                           
100 In the context of a continuous or count outcome several options are available. The first might be to 
transform the dependent variable so that the exact same procedures could be applied. Such a 
transformation however may fundamentally alter the relationship intended to be studied. Alternatively, 
the distribution of the absolute values of the residual vector might be directly examined for subsets of 
outlying cases. Subsequent tests may then be conducted adjusting the bounds of acceptable tolerance 
with respect to the magnitudes of the estimated idiosyncratic proportions.  
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(1945-2005) only eighteen would therefore qualify as being discordant (approximately 13.6% of 
the sample).  
 Of considerably greater interest however is the manner in how they line up. Only seven 
of the eighteen are consistent with the criticism that the magnitude of the regression estimates 
is overinflated, resulting from incumbents self-selecting into (or out of) competitive electoral 
state status conditional on unobserved confounders. By contrast the majority of discordant 
cases populate the opposing diagonal; in support of the underestimated version of the 
endogeneity bias concern. There is certainly some evidence then, of a distortion in the 
parameter estimates. And there is indeed some evidence supporting the criticism that the 
estimated effects are at least in part spurious. But the indirect evidence suggests the possibility 
of a severe endogeneity bias (due to omitted variables) is rather limited, and the preponderance 
of it lends even greater support to the opposing view.  
The primary versus the alternative hypothesis: what is the net implication of elections, 
and their associated institutions, on counterinsurgency war outcomes? On balance the large N 
results consistently and strongly support the predictions affiliated with the primary hypothesis; 
incumbents defending an electoral or competitive electoral state are far more likely to end their 
wars achieving a negotiated settlement or outright victory. Across a battery of econometric 
tests, evaluating both the questions of ultimate war outcome and the instantaneous risk of 
experiencing a defeat, the evidence is resoundingly in favor of the principal prediction made by 
endogenous mobilization theory. Furthermore, the number of discordant cases associated with 
the full battery of regressors seems confined to a relatively small subset of the sample, the 
majority component of which even further suggests that the rather substantial estimated effects 
may be yet understated. This is consistent with the principle strategic tension explicated in the 
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formal model, that elections proxy for a credible commitment to increase the probability of 
meeting the civilian pivot’s reservation price. Accordingly, an incumbent will be reluctant to 
compromise their ideal policy position, and establish institutions to perpetuate this concession, 
unless they face an especially grave and existential threat to their continued sovereignty.  
Supplementary hypotheses: do elections reduce the duration of conflicts and/or facilitate 
the achievement of negotiated settlements. In stark contrast the supplementary predictions 
receive considerably more mixed empirical support. Elections actually have a weak positive 
correlation with war length (p=0.17), and in particular with the duration of wars which 
ultimately end in settlements (p=0.34).101 Recall that there were approximately an equal number 
of wars resulting in each outcome state and that the mean duration of conflicts ending in 
incumbent victories and defeats was roughly the same, with that of the typical war ending in a 
settlement being about twice as long as one ending in with an incumbent win. This is surprising 
given the clearly public nature of an election and its highly robust disassociation with incumbent 
defeat.  
The occurrence of such a visible and public event as an election should accordingly give 
insurgents considerable pause in continuing hostilities as their prospects of ever attaining 
victory would plummet. And again it seems curious that settlements take so long to achieve, in 
light of the clearly weak bargaining position insurgents find themselves in. Between cases with 
and without the presence of competitive elections the mean length of a war ending in a loss is 
surprisingly much less for those holding elections, typically lasting only 60% as long. 
Furthermore, incumbent state victories took nearly 50% longer to achieve, and settlements 
                                                           
101 The bivariate correlation between the electoral state variable and wars ending with an incumbent 
victory is 0.18.  
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more than 200% longer on average. It is plausible that the presence of additional unmeasured 
factors that advantage insurgents could account for both why incumbents select into 
competitive electoral state status and why insurgents nevertheless continue to struggle on 
despite this. But a more comprehensive and satisfying answer to the predictions laid out in the 
supplementary hypotheses will ultimately require further exploration in future research.  
 
Table 5-16 Summary: War Duration by Competitive Electoral State Status 
      
Incumbent Loss   Cases  Mean Shortest  Longest 
  All Wars  46 7.78 1 25 
  Non-Competitive Electoral State  39 8.25 1 25 
  Competitive Electoral State  7102 5.14 1 14 
        
Negotiated 
Settlement  Cases  Mean Shortest  Longest 
  All Wars  43 12.3 1 47 
  Non-Competitive Electoral State  13 7 1 22 
  Competitive Electoral State  30 14.6 2 47 
        
Incumbent Win  Cases  Mean Shortest  Longest 
  All Wars  43 6.18 1 20 
  Non-Competitive Electoral State  12 4.58 1 14 
  Competitive Electoral State  31 6.8 1 20 
 
 
                                                           
102 The seven competitive electoral states who lost are: Costa Rica v. NLA, Laos v. Pathet Lao, Bangladesh 
Independence War, Afghanistan II 1980-1989 (Soviet Invasion), Moldova v. Dniestr, Kosovo I (Serbs. KLA), 
and Congo v. Cobras, Ninjas. Of the seven, four qualify as being discordant (see table).  
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Supplementary: Case List 
Case # War 
Start 
Year 
End 
Year  
War 
Length 
Electoral 
State GWF 
Comp. 
Electoral 
State Outcome 
1 Indochinese 1945 1954 10 0 0 0 0 
2 Greek civil war 1945 1949 5 1 2 1 2 
3 Indonesian Independence 1945 1949 5 0 0 0 0 
4 Shifta Insurgency (Eritrea) 1945 1952 8 0 0 0 0 
5 UKG v. Zionist movement 1945 1948 4 0 0 0 0 
6 China v. PLA 1946 1949 4 1 0 0 0 
7 Madagascar 1946 1948 3 0 0 0 2 
8 Huk Rebellion 1946 1951 6 1 2 1 2 
9 
Forest Brothers (Estonia); 
LTS(p)A, LNJS, and LNPA 
(Latvia); BDPS (Lithuania) 1946 1956 11 1 2 1 2 
10 USSR v. UPA in Ukraine 1946 1953 8 1 2 1 2 
11 
China v. Taiwanese Insurgents 
(White Terror) 1947 1949 3 1 0 0 2 
12 
Paraguay v. Febreristas, Libs, 
Comms 1947 1947 1 1 1 0 2 
13 
Kachin and Karen (KNU) 
insurgencies in Burma, 1948-
1993 1948 1994 47 1 0 1 1 
14 Colombia during La Violencia 1948 1962 15 1 2 1 1 
15 Costa Rica v. NLA 1948 1948 1 0 2 1 0 
16 Yemen v. internal opp 1948 1948 1 0 0 0 2 
17 Sino-Tibetan 1950 1951 2 0 2 1 2 
18 
Malayan Insurgency against 
British, 1950-1960 1950 1960 11 1 2 1 2 
19 Bolivia v. MNR 1952 1952 1 0 0 0 0 
20 Tunisian Independence 1952 1954 3 0 0 0 0 
21 
Kenya/Mau Mau Emergency, 
1952-1956 1952 1956 5 0 0 0 2 
22 Moroccan Independence 1953 1956 4 0 0 0 0 
23 Indonesia v. Darul Islam 1953 1953 1 0 1 0 2 
24 Algerian 1954 1962 9 0 0 0 0 
25 British-Cypriot 1954 1959 6 0 0 0 1 
26 Cameroon Insurgency 1955 1960 6 0 0 0 0 
27 Naga Rebellion 1955 1964 10 1 2 1 1 
28 Rwandan Independence 1956 1962 7 0 0 0 0 
29 Tibetan 1956 1959 4 1 2 1 2 
30 Ifni War (Forgotten War) 1957 1958 2 0 0 0 1 
31 Cuba v. Movimiento 26 De Julio 1958 1959 2 1 1 0 0 
32 
Indonesia v. Darul Islam, PRRI, 
Permesta 1958 1960 3 0 1 0 2 
33 DRC v. Katanga 1960 1965 6 1 1 1 2 
34 Laos v. Pathet Lao 1960 1973 14 1 0 1 0 
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35 Kurdish 1961 1966 6 0 1 0 1 
36 Angola-Portugal 1961 1975 15 0 0 0 0 
37 Algeria v. CNDR(Kabylie) 1962 1964 3 1 2 1 2 
38 Dhofar Rebellion 1962 1975 14 0 0 0 2 
39 Guinea Bissau 1962 1974 13 0 0 0 0 
40 Mozambique 1962 1975 14 0 0 0 0 
41 North Yemen Civil War 1962 1969 8 0 1 0 0 
42 Rwanda (post-rev strife) 1963 1966 4 1 2 1 2 
43 Sudan v. Anya Nya 1963 1972 10 1 1 1 1 
44 UKG in Aden 1963 1967 5 0 0 0 0 
45 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacin 
Nacional 1963 1965 3 1 2 1 2 
46 Post-Independence War 1964 1964 1 1 1 1 2 
47 Kenya v. NFDLM 1964 1969 6 1 2 1 2 
48 Chad v. FROLINAT 1965 1979 15 0 0 0 0 
49 Colombia v. M-19/ELN 1965 1990 26 1 2 1 1 
50 Vietnam War 1960 1975 16 1 0 0 0 
51 
Thailand v. Thai Communist 
Party (CPT) 1965 1982 18 1 1 1 2 
52 Vietnam War 1965 1975 11 1 0 0 0 
53 Mizo Revolt(Assam) 1966 1986 21 1 2 1 1 
54 
Namibia war of independence, 
1966-1989 1966 1989 24 0 0 0 0 
55 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia War of 
Independence, 1966-1979 1966 1979 14 0 0 0 0 
56 Guatemala v. URNG 1966 1996 31 1 0 1 1 
57 India v. Naxalite I 1967 1971 5 1 2 1 2 
58 Philippines v. MNLF 1968 1987 20 1 1 1 2 
59 
Northern Ireland Secessionist 
campaign (The Troubles) 1968 1998 31 1 2 1 1 
60 Cambodia v. FUNK 1970 1975 6 1 1 0 0 
61 Jordan v. Fedeyeen/Syria 1970 1970 1 1 0 1 2 
62 Bangledesh 1971 1971 1 1 1 1 0 
63 Sri Lanka v. JVP 1971 1971 1 1 2 1 2 
64 Burundi v. Hutu Rebels 1972 1972 1 0 2 1 2 
65 Argentina v. ERP/Montoneros 1973 1977 5 0 0 0 2 
66 Pakistan v. Baluchistan 1973 1977 5 0 1 0 1 
67 EPRP, TPLF, EPDM, OLF 1974 1991 18 1 1 0 0 
68 Kurdish Autonomy 1974 1975 2 0 2 1 2 
69 Angola (MPLA) v. UNITA 1975 2002 28 0 2 1 1 
70 ChadianCivilWar 1975 1988 14 0 1 0 0 
71 Indonesia v. Fretilin 1975 1999 25 1 1 0 0 
72 Lebanon v. various militias 1975 1990 16 0 0 0 1 
73 Morocco v. Polisario 1975 1989 15 1 0 1 2 
74 
Bangladesh-ShantiBahini1976-
97 1976 1997 22 1 2 1 1 
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75 Indonesia v. GAM (Aceh) 1976 2005 30 1 2 1 1 
76 Mozambique v. RENAMO 1976 1992 17 1 2 1 1 
77 DRC v. FLNC 1977 1978 2 1 1 0 2 
78 Afghanistan I 1978 1979 2 0 1 0 0 
79 
Cambodia v. Khmer Rouge 
defectors, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF 1978 1992 15 0 2 1 1 
80 Nicaragua v. FSLN 1978 1979 2 1 1 0 0 
81 El Salvador v. FMLN 1979 1992 14 1 0 1 1 
82 
Iran v. Kurdish Democratic 
Party Iran 1979 1996 18 1 2 1 2 
83 Mujaheedin e Khalq 1979 2001 23 1 2 1 1 
84 Kurdish Rebellion 1980 1988 9 1 1 0 1 
85 Nigeria v. Maitatsine sect(Kano) 1980 1985 6 0 0 0 2 
86 Peru v Sendero Luminoso 1980 1999 20 1 1 1 2 
87 Afghanistan II 1980-1989 1980 1989 10 0 2 1 0 
88 Syria v. MB 1980 1982 3 1 2 1 2 
89 Nicaragua v. Contras 1981 1988 8 1 2 1 1 
90 Somalia v. SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs) 1981 1991 11 1 1 0 2 
91 Uganda v. NRA 1981 1987 7 0 0 0 0 
92 Israeli-Syria(Lebanon) 1982 1982 1 0 0 0 1 
93 South Africa v. ANC, PAC, Azapo 1983 1994 12 0 0 0 0 
94 Tamil Rebellion I (Eelam War I) 1983 1987 5 1 2 1 1 
95 Sudan v. SPLM 1983 2004 22 1 1 0 1 
96 Turkey v. PKK 1983 1999 17 1 2 1 1 
97 India-Sikh Insurgency 1984 1994 11 1 2 1 1 
98 
Yemen v. Faction of Socialist 
Party 1986 1987 2 1 2 1 2 
99 First Intifada 1987 1993 7 0 0 0 1 
100 
Tamil II, 1987-1989 (Eelam War 
II) 1987 1989 3 1 2 1 1 
101 
Papua New Guinea v. BRA 
(Bougainville) 1988 1998 11 1 2 1 1 
102 
Liberian Civil War (II): NPFL 
(Taylor), INPFL (Johnson) 1989 1997 9 0 0 0 1 
103 Mali v. Tuaregs 1989 1995 7 1 2 1 1 
104 Afar Insurgency 1991 1994 4 1 2 1 1 
105 Kurdish Rebellion II 1991 1991 1 1 1 0 1 
106 Shia rebellion 1991 1991 1 1 1 0 1 
107 Sierra Leone v. RUF, AFRC 1991 1999 9 1 2 1 2 
108 US v. Somali rebels 1991 1993 3 0 0 0 0 
109 Yugoslavia v. Croatia, Krajina 1991 1991 1 0 . 0 0 
110 Afghanistan v. Taliban 1992 1996 5 0 0 0 0 
111 
Algeria v. MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, 
GSPC 1992 2002 11 1 0 1 2 
112 
Azerbaijan v. Nagorno-
Karabagh 1992 1994 3 1 1 0 0 
113 Bosnia v. Rep. Srpska/Croats 1992 1995 4 1 0 1 2 
114 Croatia in Krajina 1992 1995 4 1 2 1 2 
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115 Abkhaz secessionist movement 1992 1994 3 1 1 0 0 
116 Moldova v. Dniestr 1992 1992 1 1 2 1 0 
117 Tajikistan v. UTO 1992 1997 6 1 1 1 2 
118 Burundian Civil War 1993 2005 13 0 1 0 0 
119 MQM-A:Sindhis v. Mohajirs 1993 1999 7 1 2 1 1 
120 
Central African Republic 
(Factional fighting) 1994 1997 4 1 2 1 1 
121 
Chad v. MDD (Lake Chad), FNT 
(East), CSNDP (southern 
Logone) 1994 1998 5 1 1 1 1 
122 DRC v. AFDL (Kabila) 1994 1997 4 0 1 0 0 
123 DRC v. RCD, RCD-ML, MLC 1998 2003 6 0 1 0 1 
124 Russo-Chechen I 1994 1996 3 1 1 1 1 
125 Rwanda v. RPF 1994 1994 1 0 1 0 0 
126 
Kagame Govt (RPF) v. 
ALiR/FDLR 1994 2000 7 0 2 1 1 
127 Kosovo I (Serbs v. KLA) 1994 1999 6 1 2 1 0 
128 Yemen v. South Yemen 1994 1994 1 1 1 1 2 
129 Congo v. Cobras, Ninjas 1997 1999 3 1 1 1 0 
130 
GB v. Military Junta for the 
Consolidation of Democracy 1998 1999 2 1 1 1 1 
131 Liberian Civil War (II) 1999 2003 5 1 1 0 0 
132 IC v. PMIC 2002 2005 4 1 1 1 1 
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Chapter 6: The War in Iraq – Single Case Statistical Results  
 The principal claim advanced by Endogenous Mobilization Theory is that incumbent 
governments ruled by larger selectorate regime types are vastly more resilient against insurgent 
threats than states ruled through more shallow institutions. In the previous chapter, the results 
of cross case statistical analysis strongly undergirded this claim. Competitive Electoral States, 
comprised of democratic and party-based regimes as well as electoral states which held 
‘competitive’ elections, were demonstrated to be far more likely to end their asymmetric 
intrastate conflicts with a negotiated settlement or outright victory. And their hazard of 
catastrophic defeat, the instantaneous risk of an insurgent overthrow, was estimated to be 
reduced by more than a full order of magnitude. This chapter turns to evaluating the core 
predictions generated by Endogenous Mobilization Theory at a subnational level, through an 
inquiry into an out of sample case, the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq.103  
 The chapter begins by laying out the core empirical predictions, associated with the 
primary hypothesis regarding war outcomes, at the subnational level with respect to intra-
conflict dynamics. In doing so a connection is drawn with an existing accounting of the war, the 
synergy hypothesis, which argues that the inflection and precipitous decline in insurgent 
violence across the country was driven predominantly by the confluence of two distinct factors: 
The Awakening Movement and the Surge. In brief, the synergy argument posits that widespread 
                                                           
103 This case is not included in the cross sectional data analyzed in the previous chapter, as it had not 
ended by 2005. The government of Iraq (GOI) would qualify as a competitive electoral state, and two 
observations would be recorded: one for the GOI and the other for the US backed coalition, which would 
be considered as a competitive electoral state as well in light of the status of forces agreement this actor 
maintained with the GOI. In 2011 the US observation would be considered a having terminated in an 
incumbent victory, with AQI listed as the primary opposition force. The observation for the GOI would be 
recorded the same, though with a new war beginning thereafter in 2014 with ISIS/ISIL listed as the 
principal insurgent organization. This subsequent conflict is ongoing.  
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Sunni political realignment, manifested by the Awaking Movement in Anbar governate and the 
spread of local militia forces that would come to be known as the Sons of Iraq, created an 
opportunity to split the previously monolithic Sunni resistance effort. By dividing the majority of 
the Sunni population, which held more nationalistic motivations for resistance, from their 
erstwhile Islamist allies, namely Al-Qaeda in Iraq, coalition forces were able to simultaneously 
deprive the now rump insurgency of the labor pool it needed to sustain and expand its efforts, 
as well as gain the support of a valuable local ally with indispensable knowledge of the human 
terrain. “Hence the surge without the Awakening would have improved security temporarily but 
would not have broken the insurgency, which would have survived and returned as the 
reinforcements went home” (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012, 23).  
 But the rapidity of the decline in violence would not likely have occurred either without 
the support provided by the coalition to assist and protect the Sunni population from AQI’s 
reprisals. “The experience of 2004-2006 sheds light on this counterfactual. During this period, 
Sunnis made at least four attempts to realign with coalition forces; none succeeded…none of 
these efforts received the kind of protection that the surge offered to the Anbar Awakening, and 
without this protection, none of these efforts proved able to survive and spread in the face of 
insurgent counterattacks” (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012, 18–19). While the level of 
insurgent violence did indeed begin to decline in some areas prior to the onset of the Surge 
policy, the rapidity of this shift only became pronounced once it had been implemented.104 
Therefore the contribution which Endogenous Mobilization Theory provides to the Synergy 
                                                           
104 As well, recall that in the cross case tests not only were competitive electoral states not quicker in 
ending their conflicts, but modest evidence suggested they may even take longer to do so.  
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hypothesis, in the case of Iraq, is an explanation for the timing and subnational variation in the 
extent and relative magnitude of Sunni political realignment.  
 This prediction is tested quantitatively, examining the covariates of two dependent 
variables: the number of insurgent attacks leveled against coalition and Iraqi security personnel 
(SIGACTS) and the per capita expenditures associated with the Sons of Iraq program, a proxy for 
the program’s relative size in a given district. These tests control for a wide variety of factors 
including the strength of coalition forces, different varieties of reconstruction spending, the 
health of the local economy, and the predominant sectarian affiliation of the local population. 
The substantive result is that while the synergy hypothesis is not the only justification for the 
dramatic reversal in the war, it is unequivocally one of the leading explanatory factors, returning 
both statistically and substantively significant estimated effects consistently across a wide range 
of tests. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on endogeneity bias and multicollinearity 
before reflecting on the findings and their more general implications for Endogenous 
Mobilization Theory and the outcomes of counterinsurgency wars.  
 
Endogenous Mobilization Theory-Microlevel Extensions  
 
Sendero Luminoso is responsible for more terrorist events than any other organization 
since 1970 (Global Terrorism Database). Its first armed attack occurred in 1980, one day prior to 
Peru’s first general elections since the 1968 military coup. “Five Sendero militants entered a 
voter registration office in the Ayacucho department, ‘subdued and tied up the registrar, then 
burned the registry and ballot boxes” (Gorriti Ellenbogen 1999, 18). Over thirty years later a 
similar attack took place in Afghanistan, launched by the Taliban insurgency against US and 
coalition forces, when several armed militants assaulted the Independent Electoral Commission 
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headquarters in Kabul less than a week prior to the 2014 presidential elections (Harooni and 
Donati 2014). During the Sikh separatist insurgency in India, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
temporarily reversed the policy of martial law and ordered state elections prior to forging a 
truce with the Akali Dal, a Sikh political party advancing a more moderate platform than the 
independent state of Khalistan which insurgents were demanding. In response, Sikh militants 
assassinated Singh Longowal, the party representative at the peace accords, less than a month 
after the ink on the armistice had dried. And in September of 2007 Al-Qaeda in Iraq assassinated 
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, one of the original leaders of the Anbar Awakening Council, which 
would eventually spawn the Sons of Iraq movement (Tyson and Wright 2007), which had 
emerged in the year after the reintroduction of domestic electoral politics in the country.  
 Violent extremists are existentially threatened by any potential move towards 
moderation in contentious political contexts. ‘Spoilers’ are a relatively prevalent concept in the 
literature on subnational violence (Greenhill and Major 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006; Kydd and 
Walter 2002; Stedman 1997, 2002). “Terrorists resort to a spoiling strategy when relations 
between two enemies are improving and a peace agreement threatens the terrorists’ more far 
reaching goals.” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 73). Extending this concept to the competition over 
popular support is one of the principle strategy dynamics proffered by Endogenous Mobilization 
Theory, and offers one potential basis for testing the broader theoretical argument at the 
subnational level. Insurgents are so intensely opposed to the introduction of electoral politics 
because doing so threatens to dry up the labor supply which they rely upon to advance their 
revolutionary agendas’. The leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzman, was fiercely opposed 
to the holding of elections in Peru, as well as elements of the leftist movement which supported 
them. “[E]lections have never given the working class or the people power”, the legal Marxist 
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left are “nothing more than opportunists, bourgeois agents infiltrated in the breast of the 
worker’s movement” (Gorriti Ellenbogen 1999, 58, 123: cited in Ron 2001). And when the 
moderate AKP party dominated the 2004 local elections in Turkey Abdullah Ocalan 
characterized their electoral victory as a “silent re-conquest of Kurdish provinces” (Tezcür 2010, 
781).  
 When one takes into consideration the nature of the aspirations that violent extremists 
pursue it becomes that much clearer why they are frequently so intensively opposed to 
electoral politics. Marxists in Peru wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, Islamists 
in Algeria wanted to install a regime in accordance with sharia law, and Sikhs in Punjab India 
desired to rule their own independent state of Khalistan; none of the organizations which take 
up arms to represent such total causes is interested in settling for a sufficient number of seats in 
a legislature to filibuster. And if the introduction of elections does indeed threaten to co-opt the 
labor supply insurgents require to win, into the status quo, then it is an instrumentally rational 
reaction for them to resort to violence as a means of attempting to neutralize this threat. By 
1996 Sendero Luminoso had assassinated over 300 members of Peru’s legal left, including 
political office holders, candidates, and party leadership affiliated with the APRA (American 
Popular Revolutionary Alliance) and IU (United Left), Peru’s principal legal leftist parties (Ron 
2001, 573). “Some people surely refused to join Sendero for fear of government reprisal, 
but…others were already involved in rival left-wing groups. Much of Peru was not ‘virgin political 
soil’…but was instead occupied by strong, legal-left parties supporting parliamentarianism, 
including Marxist radicals” (Ron 2001, 578).  
 Likewise, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) condemned the reintroduction of elections and 
launched attacks throughout the country in an attempt to dissuade Sunni participation in them. 
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And in the January 2005 constitutional assembly election, the first held since the ouster of 
Saddam Hussein, Sunnis indeed overwhelmingly boycotted them. But the realization that a new 
political process was indeed moving forward, with or without them, motivated a sea change in 
strategic sentiment amongst Sunni political leaders.  
“Many Sunni Arabs acknowledge that it was a failure of historic proportions that they did not 
vote. Had they done so they would have diluted the power of the Kurds, who are not really 
interested in Iraq per se, and the Shi’a, who are split over the role of religion in the state. One 
crestfallen sheikh remarked after the elections: ‘We made a big mistake when we didn’t vote. 
Our votes were very important’” (Hashim 2005, 51)   
   
 In the October elections to ratify the constitution several Sunni insurgent groups 
coordinated a cease-fire on election day in an attempt to mobilize enough opposition support to 
reject its adoption.105 But after failing to do so, sentiment shifted overwhelmingly toward 
embracing the need to compete within the new status quo political institutions. In Anbar 
governate, the heartland of the Sunni resistance and home of the city of Fallujah, voter turnout 
skyrocketed by over 35,000%, the greatest change across Iraq’s eighteen governates.106 And 
while AQI launched numerous attacks at polling stations, other groups of masked gunmen 
claiming to represent the insurgency in Fallujah went so far as to turn out and provide 
protection for voters waiting in lines to vote (Knickmeyer and Finer 2005).  
The formation of the Anbar Salvation Council in 2006 is widely cited as a critical turning 
point in the war (Kilcullen 2007; Long 2008; Simon 2008). The ‘Awakening Movement’ heralded 
                                                           
105 Originally a term incorporated to satisfy the Kurds, ratification of the new constitution would fail if a 
supermajority voted against it in at least three of Iraq’s 18 governates. Sunni’s succeeded in reaching this 
threshold only in two, and accordingly the constitution successfully passed the referendum.  
106 From 2.42% in the January constitutional assembly elections to 86.37% in the December elections for 
the first parliament.  
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a massive decline in insurgent violence in Anbar province, even prior to the announcement of 
the surge policy in January of 2007, and would provide a template for local Sunni militias across 
Iraq. The benefits of this program, and critically the willingness of over 100,000 Sunnis to 
participate in it were legion. “The SOI provided intelligence on the location of insurgent groups 
and weapons caches, acted as a force multiplier by freeing U.S. and Iraqi forces to perform other 
operations; denied insurgent groups a recruitment pool; and, in some cases, began to cooperate 
with the Iraqi Security Forces” (Furbish et al. 2011, 5). AQI fought bitterly to derail this process, 
and by the Spring of 2008 attacks against the sons exceeded one-hundred a month with 
seventy-five killed, with its leadership being targeted in particular (2011, 6). When Sheikh Sattar, 
one of the Awakening Movement’s founding leaders, was killed in September 2007, his brother 
Ahmed stepped up to replace him and announced a desire to expand the political base of the 
movement beyond their tribe (Long 2008, 84). His success in pursing this endeavor is evidenced 
in the results of the 2009 governate elections, where his party the ‘Iraq Awakening and 
Independents National Alliance’ won a plurality of Anbar’s seats.  
The cause of the precipitous decline in violence across Iraq has been hotly debated, with 
competing arguments largely differing with regard to their respective emphases. This period of 
inflection in insurgent violence corresponds to a shift in Sunni sentiment associated with the 
Awakening movement (Hagan et al. 2013), a massive expansion of the SOI program (Biddle, 
Friedman, and Shapiro 2012), an alleged change in operating tactics to an emphasis on 
population security largely made possible by an increased deployment of coalition personnel 
(Gentile 2013; Petraeus 2008; Ricks 2009), an influx of local program spending on reconstruction 
which facilitated forging ties with community leaders and winning hearts & minds (Berman et al. 
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2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011), and the striking of a cease-fire with Moqtada al-Sadr 
(Hagan et al. 2013).  
A leading perspective, the synergy hypothesis, argues in favor of an interactive 
combination of the shift in Sunni political sentiment which was capitalized upon by the change 
in tactics associated with the surge (Biddle 2008b; Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Petraeus 
2007). The principal hypothesis articulated by Endogenous Mobilization Theory is that 
incumbent governments which maintain broader more encompassing political institutions will 
fare far better than their more narrowly founded counterparts, principally by sapping the labor 
supply required by an insurgency to successfully challenge the sovereignty of a state. In the 
previous chapter, a robust relationship was established between an incumbent regime’s 
institutional status and its war prospects. Specifically, it was demonstrated that Competitive 
Electoral States (as well as Electoral States and higher value regimes according to the GWF scale) 
were considerably better positioned to end their conflicts in either a negotiated settlement or 
outright victory, and faced an extremely low hazard of being defeated.  
It is this primary hypothesis that will be assessed subnationally in the case of the 2003 
War in Iraq.107 In support of the synergy thesis, the empirical prediction is that the reduction in 
rates of insurgent violence across Iraq’s 104 administrative districts, and expansion of the Sons 
of Iraq program, should be correlated with variation in the magnitude of Sunni political 
realignment. The phenomenon of Sunni political reorientation is proxied by the difference in 
popular turnout between the January and December elections held in 2005. Specifically, higher 
values according to this metric are expected to be negatively correlated with local trends in 
                                                           
107 Some remarks are offered with respect to the alternative and supplementary hypotheses in the 
chapter’s conclusion.  
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insurgent violence and positively so with rates of spending per capita on the SOI program, taken 
as an indicator for the number of militia being employed. And in keeping with the argument laid 
out according to the synergy hypothesis, these relationships are anticipated to manifest, most 
prominently, coinciding with the implementation of the surge.   
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Research Design: Data, Variables, & Methodology  
 
The primary variable used in the following econometric tests to evaluate the change in political opportunity structures facing 
Iraqis during the recent conflict is based on the election results from 2005. Iraqis went to the polls on three occasions in that year: first in 
January to elect a constitutional assembly, in October for a referendum on the new constitution created by that body, and finally in 
December to elect members for the new parliament. As previously mentioned, the stylized synopsis of Sunni political participation is 
that they boycotted the elections in January, attempted to turn out in large numbers in October to veto the proposed constitution, and 
finally reversed course in December recognizing the risk of being left out of what would come to be the new status quo political system.  
This account is supported by the difference in voter turnout recorded in the table below. Elections data was gathered directly 
from the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) and its predecessor agency, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 
(IHEC - Iraq).108 The original election reports (in Arabic) are posted in the associated appendix along with English language analogs 
published by the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE - International Mission for Iraqi Elections - Home). Unfortunately, 
disaggregated election data at the lower district level is not available as it was never calculated. Given the ongoing war it was believed 
that recording and publishing this information would have exposed districts to insurgent retaliation, and so for the sake of public 
                                                          
108 The IEC website is no longer operational. Its archived version was accessed using the WayBack Machine (Internet Archive: Wayback Machine). 
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protection the returns were only ever tallied and recorded at the more aggregate governate level (Cordesman and Baetjer 2005; 
Cordesman, Davies, and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 2008).  
The table below lists by Governate the popular turnout in the January and December elections, along with the difference 
between them. The Governates are sorted in descending order, starting with Anbar province, which experienced the greatest shift in 
popular participation. This information is then used to construct two different variables, both of which are logged so that they capture 
percent changes in their values.109 These include the natural log of the difference in turnout110 and the natural log of the province’s rank, 
based on the difference in turnout.111 The final column records the total number of reported SIGACTS, or significant acts, recorded by 
coalition forces during the war. This value is a count per 1,000 residents in a given administrative district of insurgent initiated events 
targeted against both coalition and Iraqi force personnel, as well as civilians and infrastructure. They are intended as a proxy for the 
overall level of insurgent activity, and were filtered to remove events in which insurgents fought each other or civilians that did not also 
                                                          
109 The logged value is preferred as the scale of the raw values is determined by the number of administrative districts in a given country at a particular 
time. A one-unit change in raw terms would be associated with a different interpretation if the total number of administrative districts were to change 
within a case or the measure was to be applied in another country. By contrast, a percent change basis would carry an interpretation that is invariant 
to such underlying differences in the absolute, raw scale. For robustness, the two main tables in this chapter, 6-7 & 6-8, are reproduced in the 
appendix using the non-logged values of the inverse turnout rank variable.  
110 Because the log of a negative value is undefined the lowest five ranked Governates are recorded as zero. The difference in turnout can be thought 
of as well as capturing the extent to which popular participation in the process increased between January and December. For the five provinces that 
experienced small marginal declines, this value would therefore appropriately be zero, or no increase.  
111 The rank value is inverted simply for ease of interpretation in the subsequent regression results.  
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involve state security forces. The data for this measure was compiled by the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) at Princeton 
University (Research Highlights | Empirical Studies of Conflict), and has been utilized in a number of recent publications (Berman et al. 
2011, 2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Shapiro and Weidmann 2015).  
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Table 6-1: Election Turnout In Iraq       
# Governate # Districts 
January 
2005 
December 
2005 
Diff. 
Turnout 
Log Diff. 
Turnout 
Turnout 
Rank 
(Inverse) 
Log Turnout 
Rank (Inverse) 
Total SIGACTS 
(per 1,000) 
1 Anbar 7 2.42 86.37 83.95 4.430 18 2.890 152.66 
2 Salah al-Din 7 29.25 98.43 69.18 4.237 17 2.833 158.11 
3 Ninewa 9 16.96 70.16 53.2 3.974 16 2.773 78.04 
4 Diyala 6 33.09 74.87 41.78 3.732 15 2.708 69.63 
5 Baghdad 9 51.49 70.06 18.57 2.922 14 2.639 170.02 
6 Tameem 4 70.01 86.1 16.09 2.778 13 2.565 26.1 
7 Missan 6 61.25 73.27 12.02 2.487 12 2.485 3.86 
8 Erbil 7 83.79 95.26 11.47 2.440 11 2.398 1.61 
9 Babylon 4 73.06 79.43 6.37 1.852 10 2.303 12.2 
10 Thi-Qar 5 68.84 71.85 3.01 1.102 9 2.197 2.44 
11 Sulaymaniyah 10 82.11 84.19 2.08 0.732 8 2.079 0.69 
12 Basrah 7 72.36 74.2 1.84 0.610 7 1.946 11.08 
13 Muthanna 4 64.79 66.07 1.28 0.247 6 1.792 2.06 
14 Dahuk 4 92.46 92 -0.46 0 5 1.609 0.79 
15 Najaf 3 75.25 72.76 -2.49 0 4 1.386 0.84 
16 Wassit 5 71.08 67.99 -3.09 0 3 1.099 2.57 
17 Kerbala 3 74.75 70.44 -4.31 0 2 0.693 2.61 
18 Qadissiya 4 70.73 64.67 -6.06 0 1 0 2.4 
  
Looking at the table, it immediately becomes apparent that the overwhelming majority of insurgent attacks over the course of 
the war occurred in just six of the eighteen governates (just under 94%). As well, it is also clear that these six regions are the highest 
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ranking in the difference in election turnout measure, and are located in the Sunni Triangle. At an aggregate level then, this would 
suggest that something with respect to these locations is both overwhelmingly responsible for the violence that occurred during the 
war, as well as why it ultimately reversed course and abated. The table and figure below summarizes the well documented temporal 
trend of the war. The conflict is divided into half year periods over the five-year time frame starting in 2004. Associated with each 
interval is the total number of SIGACTS occurring per thousand people. On the whole the war can be characterized as escalating prior to 
2007, and then abating thereafter. And at the aggregate level this dynamic appears to be most evident starting in the second half of 
2007. Examining the temporal trend within each of the six most violent governates however presents a somewhat more complicated 
picture, with some provinces (Anbar) reversing trajectory prior to the surge policy and others (such as Ninewa and Tameem) 
experiencing substantially higher levels of violence immediately thereafter, at least initially.  
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Figure 6-1: SIGACTS Per Capita Over Time 
SIGACTS (Total)   697.78 Per Thousand 
       
2004 First Half  20.32 Per Thousand 
2004 Second Half  45.9 Per Thousand 
2005 First Half  64.25 Per Thousand 
2005 Second Half  78.49 Per Thousand 
2006 First Half  79.65 Per Thousand 
2006 Second Half  125.88 Per Thousand 
2007 First Half  123.63 Per Thousand 
2007 Second Half  85.93 Per Thousand 
2008 First Half  44.46 Per Thousand 
2008 Second Half   29.23 Per Thousand 
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Figure 6-2: Trends in SIGACTS Over Time in Most Violent Governates  
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 Arguably the most contentious point of dispute regarding the reversal in insurgent violence pertains to the relative influences of 
the Surge policy and that of the Sons of Iraq program (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Hagan et al. 2013), with the ‘synergy’ 
explanation predicated on their joint contribution accomplishing more than either factor might have had individually. And while the role 
of the SOI program has been evaluated and debated in the existing literature, a direct disaggregated estimation of its district level 
effects on the number of SIGACTS, taking into account localized variation in the sizes of the program, has yet to be evaluated 
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systematically in a multiple regression framework. Furthermore, the scope of the program escalated dramatically as the war progressed 
with 98% of the total programs being administered in the last eighteen months of the conflict.112  
The rapid growth in the Sons of Iraq then might be not only an important explanation for the dramatic reduction in violence, but 
also a compelling object of explanation itself. For instance, while the SOI program was administered almost exclusively through CERP, it 
represents only 10% of the CERP projects which took place. And overall SOI expenditures amounted to a very small component of the 
coalition’s aggregate reconstruction efforts. A hearts and minds perspective would anticipate that CERP spending, and reconstruction 
efforts more generally, may have improved public sentiment for the state and facilitated local efforts to combat AQI. An emphasis on 
population security centric COIN might point to the greater number of troops present after the implementation of the Surge, as well as 
their new more forward operation posture. Greater protection could readily be expected to diminish one’s reservations for joining the 
SOI, as the risk of insurgent reprisal would be reduced. And a general popular realignment, itself a reaction to changing domestic 
political opportunity structures, may also provide some accounting for the increased willingness to join community militias. As such, in 
addition to the number of SIGACTS a second dependent variable will be evaluated, the per capita spending on the SOI program (within 
each district half year), which is intended as a proxy for the relative size of the program in a given locale.  
                                                          
112That the rapid diminishment in the time series measuring SIGACTS inflects prior to the expansion in the SOI program challenges the causal 
interpretation as to the direction of the relationship. An alternative approach examining both series with finer disaggregated data employing a 
research design based on Granger Causality should be explored in future research.  
 
 
223 
 Table 6-2 Summary: Sons of Iraq and CERP Projects  
District Half Year  
          
# of Projects Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % Total 
All 1040 57.27 156.68 0 2194   
SOI 1040 3.10 15.65 0 214 9.8% 
CERP 1040 28.72 84.42 0 1677 76.4% 
CERP (Not SOI) 1040 25.63 78.74 0 1643 74.9% 
SOI (Not CERP) 1040 0.01 0.12 0 2 0.1% 
         
War Total        
# of Projects Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % Total 
All 1040 - - - 59557   
SOI 1040 - - - 3223 5.4% 
CERP 1040 - - - 29868 50.2% 
CERP (Not SOI) 1040 - - - 26659 44.8% 
SOI (Not CERP) 1040 - - - 14 0.0% 
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Figure 6-3: Trends in the Number of SOI Programs Over the War  
 
 
 The table below lists all of the variables used in the following statistical tests. The predominate source is the Empirical Studies of 
Conflict Project (ESOC), and in particular the replication data files used in two recently published articles based on that collection effort 
(Berman et al. 2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). The second dependent variable, the amount of SOI spending per capita in a 
given district half year, is constructed from the full ESOC dataset according to the provided instructions.113 And the values for the two 
independent variables are recorded based on the published election turnout results from official sources as mentioned previously. The 
                                                          
113 Contained in a STATA .do file.  
2004
H1
2004
H2
2005
H1
2005
H2
2006
H1
2006
H2
2007
H1
2007
H2
2008
H1
2008
H2
# of SOI Programs 0 12 1 7 1 18 27 759 1305 1093
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
T
o
ta
l #
 S
O
I 
P
ro
g
ra
m
s
SOI Programs
 
 
225 
dataset is organized in a panel structure with a district half year as the unit of analysis. Iraq’s 18 governates are collectively comprised of 
104 districts, and the five-year period from 2004-2008 is divided into the first and second halves of each year, resulting in 1,040 total 
observations.114  
 Complete descriptions of all the variables and their respective original data sources can be found in the ESOC I V.3 replication 
data codebook. As mentioned, the two dependent variables examined are the number of SIGACTS per 1,000 and SOI spending per 
capita. The primary hypothesis of Endogenous Mobilization Theory argues that elected governments, which maintain broader more 
encompassing ruling institutions, will tether a larger swathe of their domestic population to the survival of the incumbent regime. 
Concomitantly, in doing so such states will effectively siphon off the labor supply sought after by their insurgent opponents. The net 
result being that they will effectively reduce their probability of being defeated, by depriving a rebellion of the human resources 
necessary to do so. In the context of the recent war in Iraq, the Synergy hypothesis has argued that the unexpected precipitous decline 
in violence can be attributed to the combined factors of the Sunni Awakening and the implementation of the Surge. Appropriately, this 
interactive effect is measured by an interactive term, combining the difference in voter turnout in 2005 as a proxy for the extent of 
                                                          
114 104 districts X 10 half year periods.  
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political realignment with an indicator variable for the Surge (years 2007 & 2008). The theoretical expectation is that this term should be 
associated with a decrease in the number of SIGACTS occurring and an increase in per capita spending on the SOI program.  
 Sectarian affiliation of a district and coalition force presence are included in every specification as core controls. Sectarian 
affiliation is a major facet of Iraqi political life and the basis of considerable violence that occurred between Sunni and Shiite militias 
during the war (Weidmann and Salehyan 2013). And more generally, research into the role of identity based grievances has been one of 
the most prominent in the contemporary study of intrastate conflict dynamics (Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009; Cederman and 
Girardin 2007; Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). A governate (and by extension all of its districts) are considered to fall into one identity 
category or another if greater than two-thirds of the popular vote in the December 2005 election was cast in support of an overtly 
sectarian political party.115 Sunnis are coded as the omitted reference category, with Shiite, Kurdish and Mixed encompassing the others. 
The Troop Strength variable records the average number of coalition maneuver battalions operating in a district.116 Along with its lagged 
value this variable should assist in correcting for omitted variable bias. A SIGACT had to involve coalition or Iraqi forces, and to the extent 
that troops were more present in a given area this would create a possibility for a reporting bias as well as legitimately increase the 
number of insurgent attacks by simply presenting more targets of opportunity. By contrast however, insurgents may simply shift their 
                                                          
115 Two alternative constructions of a sectarian identity control variable are tested in the appendix.  
116 The original source of the data was compiled by Lindsay Carrie-Lee (Lee 2015).  
 
 
227 
efforts to less heavily patrolled areas, which would temporarily manifest as lower violence levels in heavily patrolled districts (Ricks 
2009). Including a direct control for this measure should help alleviate such concerns.  
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams were run out of the State Department and were comprised of diplomats, military officers, and 
policy experts on international development drawn from agencies across the federal bureaucracy. “…the strategic purpose of these civil-
military field teams is both political and economic. By building provincial governments' ability to deliver essential services and other key 
development projects to local Iraqis, PRTs help to extend the reach of the Iraqi government to all corners of the country and help build 
the stability necessary to complete the transition to full-Iraqi control” (Department Of State. The Office of Website Management 2007). 
The presence or absence of such a unit is measured as a categorical variable, and the theoretical expectation is that their deployment 
should be associated with a reduction in the number of SIGACTS (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009; Perito 2007a, 2007b). The anticipated 
relationship that these two proxies of coalition force presence should have with respect to SOI spending is somewhat less clear. Greater 
numbers of troops may be associated with larger SOI programs as their support would reduce the risk of membership in a militia. By 
contrast, if the militias were being used to supplement for US and Iraqi personnel, lower levels may be more highly correlated. And 
provincial reconstruction teams were not principally tasked with raising local militia soldiers, though their reconstruction and community 
building operations more generally may very well have engendered more positive public relations and facilitated the mustering of said 
forces.  
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 The remaining control variables vary by specification, based upon those tested in the extant literature (Berman et al. 2013; 
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). One of the principal arguments associated with a hearts & minds perspective has featured testing the 
effects of spending on reconstruction and aid. In Iraq, the commander’s emergency response program (CERP) was “explicitly designed to 
provide military commanders with resources to engage in small-scale projects that meet the needs of local communities with the aim of 
improving security and protecting forces” (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, 770). The expectation is that CERP spending should be 
negatively associated with SIGACTS, and this has indeed been demonstrated in prior work, and especially for smaller projects 
administered during the surge. If this spending was effective at improving public sentiment and forging ties with local community 
leaders, it may also have promoted the Awakening. And while disaggregation of spending along functional lines of operation 
(‘Reconstruction’) hasn’t generated any findings in prior work, its theoretically anticipated relationship at least would be the same.117  
 The final sets of controls proxy for two material factors widely debated in the civil wars literature, specifically those regarding 
greed and grievance motivations (Aspinall 2007; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005; Collier and World Bank 2003; Regan 2005; 
Ross 2004a). Loot-able natural resources can provide a means of funding a rebellion (Weinstein 2007), and predatory governments built 
                                                          
117 It is somewhat unusual that aggregate CERP spending (at least for smaller value projects) could be statistically significant while that of many 
specific areas of functional expenditures would not be. This would imply that some omitted area of public goods spending is responsible for driving 
the CERP result. Evidence presented later in this chapter supports that payments distributed as part of the Sons of Iraq program offer part of the 
explanation.  
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on natural resource extraction can more easily sustain themselves, and effectively alienate large segments of their domestic publics. But 
oil has also been recognized as a resource base for the state to employ in buying off opposition factions and developing a more robust 
security apparatus (Fjelde 2009; Smith 2004). At a subnational level however, the location of oil reserves in a district would likely provide 
an attractive target for insurgents and its high value would motivate state security forces to fight harder to protect such vital 
infrastructure (Lujala 2010). Two measures for the presence of oil reserves in a district are included to capture these effects. Greater 
natural resource presence is expected to increase the number of SIGACTS and potentially as well the amount of SOI spending, as a 
means of paying off potential competitors for control over crucial national resources.  
 And finally the economic controls assess prominent arguments regarding the influences of material inequality on the prospect of 
conflict. David Kilcullen’s (2009) accidental guerilla hypothesis would expect high rates of unemployment to increase the labor pool 
willing to join an insurgency. However, evidence of insurgent compensation and mortality rates suggests that AQI salaries were actually 
quite a bit lower than alternative occupations, casting doubt on monetary incentives providing an effective justification for insurgent 
group recruitment (Bahney et al. 2013). Compared to the relatively anemic $41 a month offered by AQI, the $300 per month payed to 
each Sons of Iraq fighter would present a far more attractive offer to an opportunistic joiner (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012, 18). 
One might then anticipate that the impact of unemployment may be mixed, with higher levels prior to the surge being associated with 
larger numbers of SIGACTS and fewer thereafter, as the SOI program would have then provided a more attractive alternative to 
 
 
230 
participation in AQI. Greater economic inequality, and in particular a reversal of expected fortunes, is central to deprived actor theories 
(Gurr 2011). Districts with larger concentrations of poor households, and especially those which are recently so, are expected to produce 
more SIGACTS. Though the presence of public services should tamp down such desires and again, the relative marginal value of SOI 
membership seems to be vastly greater than competing offers by AQI, suggesting that lower values across the economic measures 
would increase participation in the SOI program, and be associated therefore with a reduction in the volume of SIGACTS.  
 Statistical tests are conducted using OLS and in First Differences, which estimates changes in regressor values with changes in 
those of the dependent variable. All tests conducted in first differences include district-level fixed effects, which control for all time-
invariant confounders.118 Robust standard errors are clustered on district as well throughout, along with controls for the year of the war 
and a lagged value of the dependent variable. The dataset is organized in a panel format, with the unit of analysis being a district half-
year. And the inclusion/exclusion of regressors across specifications is based on results presented in recent published quantitative 
research on the Iraq conflict (Berman et al. 2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011).119  
  
                                                          
118 This also means that the main effect associated with the change in voter turnout is not identified, though it is controlled for. Because the primary 
regressor of interest is the interaction of this term with the surge period, which does vary over time, identification is possible with this research 
design.  
119 All estimates were conducted using STATA version 13.1.  
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Table 6-3: Summary of Variables      
 Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
        
Dependent 
Variable SIGACTS Per 1,000 1040 0.671 1.810 0 22.754 
 SOI Spending Per Capita 1040 0.044 0.463 0 14.181 
        
Synergy Turnout Difference - Log  1040 2.055 1.594 0 4.430 
 Turnout Rank (Inverse) - Log 1040 2.182 0.698 0 2.890 
 Surge Years 2007 & 2008     
        
Sectarian ID120 Sunni (Baseline)      
 Shiite       
 Mixed       
 Kurdish       
        
Coalition Forces Troop Strength 1040 0.667 1.315 0 14.5 
 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 1040 0.108 0.310 0 1 
        
Spending CERP Per Capita 1040 10.807 31.133 0 552.812 
 CERP Per Capita < $50K 1040 1.446 4.372 0 69.214 
 CERP Per Capita > $50K 1040 9.361 28.716 0 527.450 
        
 Non CERP Per Capita < $50K 1040 0.540 2.017 0 45.729 
 Non CERP Per Capita > $50K 1040 43.047 342.793 0 10819.780 
                                                          
120 There is no missing data associated with these variables. Descriptive statistics are omitted from the table because this term is categorical and they 
are accordingly not particularly meaningful. Two alternative data sources for sectarian identity are also included in the chapter’s appendix as a 
robustness check.  
 
 
232 
        
 CSP Per Capita 1040 0.503 3.964 0 81.060 
 CAP Per Capita 1040 0.228 1.341 0 28.622 
 USAid Per Capita 1040 16.402 336.730 0 10840.630 
        
Natural Resources Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted by Price  1040 0.001 0.002 0 0.017 
 Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted by Price  1040 11.712 26.326 0 220.765 
        
Economy Unemployment Rate  1040 0.093 0.072 0 0.509 
 % Households in Bottom 40% Income  1008 43.575 15.645 -2.089 85.680 
 Income Quintile Change, 2002-2004 1000 -0.036 0.496 -1.6 1.925 
 Distance to Public Services (Index)  1000 0.148 0.029 0.073 0.211 
        
Reconstruction Education Per Capita  1040 1.384 4.375 0 100.025 
 Electricity Per Capita  1040 1.050 3.413 0 59.098 
 Healthcare Per Capita  1040 1.235 3.494 0 45.914 
 Transportation Per Capita  1040 2.278 10.780 0 295.367 
 Water & Sanitation Per Capita  1040 16.435 336.088 0 10830.380 
        
 Non CERP Education Per Capita  1040 0.314 1.792 0 33.107 
 Non CERP Electricity Per capita  1040 0.015 0.329 0 9.944 
 Non CERP Healthcare Per Capita 1040 0.796 2.993 0 45.795 
 Non CERP Transportation Per Capita 1040 0.929 3.995 0 89.415 
 
Non CERP Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita 1040 14.488 336.006 0 10830.380 
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Empirical Results: Correlates of SIGACTS & SOI Spending  
 
 The regression results in table 6-4 report the first set of estimates testing the synergy hypothesis against the count of SIGACTS 
occurring within Iraqi districts during the 2004-2008 period of the conflict. Covariates are examined in groups across the specifications, 
with several core controls included systematically throughout. And across all of the tests the year of the conflict and a lag of the 
dependent variable are included. The primary prediction of Endogenous Mobilization Theory, in the context of the synergy hypothesis, is 
that the 2005 elections and transition from rule under the Coalition Provisional Authority, transformed the structure of status quo 
political opportunities in Iraq. The principle implication of this transformation was to break the community of purpose which had 
previously aligned the strategic interests of nationalistic Sunni insurgent groups with those of more Islamist organizations, particularly 
that of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  
 To reiterate, the extent to which the shift in the structure of domestic political opportunities was capitalized upon is proxied by 
the change in popular voter turnout between the January 2005 constitutional assembly elections and those held in December 2005 for 
the first national parliament. Sunnis had overwhelming boycotted the January elections, but after failing to defeat the resulting 
constitution in October at the polls, regional elites recalculated their prospects and opted to break with the violent revisionist 
aspirations of AQI and seek to secure as much power as they could within the new status quo regime. As previously discussed, districts 
and governates which had produced the greatest numbers of insurgent attacks were now also at the top of the list ranking governate 
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level change in electoral participation. This governate-level rank is inverted simply for ease of interpretation in the regression output.121 
As well, its log value is assessed to normalize the otherwise arbitrary scale of the variable.  
 Over the course of the entire war, the main effect associated with the log of the inverse turnout rank is significantly related to an 
increase in the number of SIGACTS produced by a district. This is not very surprising. It simply signifies that areas which experienced a 
reorientation of their political interests produced the greatest number of insurgent events over the course of the war, relative to those 
districts that were consistently in support of the status quo political process. The principle test of Endogenous Mobilization Theory is 
captured in the interactive covariate between the log of the inverse turnout rank and the surge (2007 & 2008). The synergy hypothesis 
has articulated that the dramatic decline in violence witnessed during the surge was a product of a change in both strategy and tactics 
on the part of coalition forces which capitalized on the emergent rift which had developed between nationalist and Islamist insurgents 
(Biddle 2008a, 2008b; Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Hagan et al. 2013; Petraeus 2007). Controlling as well for the main effect 
associated with the surge period, the interactive term is intended to capture the essence of the synergy argument.  
 While the surge period itself has no clear relationship with the number of SIGACTS per capita, the interactive term is both highly 
statistically and substantively significant across a wide range of specifications. The mean value of the dependent variable is 
                                                          
121 The governate with the highest rank (Anbar) is rescaled to have a value of eighteen. This is simply so that a larger change in the popular turnout 
corresponds to a higher value of the predictor variable, rather than the reverse.   
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approximately 0.67, and has a standard deviation of 1.81 with a maximum value of 22.7. The interactive term, associated with the 
synergy hypothesis, estimates that for every one percent increase in the turnout rank of a given district, there was an estimated 
reduction in the number of SIGACTS produced there of around .3 per capita. This result considerably undergirds the argument that 
capitalizing on the political realignment of nationalist Sunnis was at least one of the decisive factors associated with the reduction of 
violence in Iraq.  
 All of the specifications control for sectarian identity, with Shiite, Kurdish, and Mixed populations all predictably contributing 
much lower levels of violence to the war relative to predominantly Sunni areas. Nearly all of the specifications also control for two 
different measures of coalition force presence in an area. Troop Strength records the number of coalition maneuver battalions on 
average in a district month (during a half-year unit of analysis) and PRT’s (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) simply record the presence 
of absence of such an element with an indicator. While PRT’s do seem to be negatively correlated with insurgent attacks, this result is 
not statistically significant in any specification. And though while the Lag of Troop Strength isn’t significant either, it’s main effect is 
consistency positively related to SIGACTS. This is of course most likely due to coalition personnel selecting into areas of operation 
expecting to be contested, as well as attracting insurgents to engage them by providing a target of opportunity.  
 The results related to CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) spending, as well as several other funds, largely 
confirm the findings of extant research (Berman et al. 2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). On the whole, CERP spending does not 
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seem to have a significant relationship to the production of violent insurgency in Iraq. Disaggregation however confirms the previous 
finding that smaller value programs were far more effective than larger ones, hypothesized due to their being initiated and managed by 
lower level commanders with better intelligence and working relationships with local indigenous interlocutors. The considerable 
amounts of non-CERP spending were not significantly related to the number of SIGACTS; while spending from the CSP (Community 
Stabilization Program) and USAid programs was so, at least to a modest extent. When viewing these estimated relationships, it’s worth 
keeping in mind the considerable disparity in the costs associated with each of the programs. The mean cost of large CERP spending per 
capita was nearly ten times that of small, and the disparity compared to non-CERP spending was much greater still. While the mean 
value of small CERP spending per capita was only $1,500, the equivalent with respect to large non-CERP program expenditures was over 
$55,000; and with a maximum value of $10 million.  
 Notwithstanding the substantial literature on the relationship between natural resources and armed conflict (Ross 2004a, 
2004b), at least in the case of Iraq there appears to be no statistically significant effect.122 Oddly enough, but mostly in line with prior 
published work (Berman et al. 2011), higher rates of unemployment do not correlate with increases in insurgent attacks. Surprisingly, 
higher rates of unemployment here actually are associated with a considerable reduction in the number of SIGACTS per capita. But this 
                                                          
122 Oil theft was still however a considerable aspect of the conflict (Ricks 2009, 264 & 278), as well as a target for insurgents (Crude oil spills into Tigris 
after Iraq bomb - USATODAY.com).  
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result is somewhat questionable in light of the insignificant coefficients with respect to the other economic measures. In the final set of 
controls both CERP and non-CERP spending are disaggregated by functional area of each reconstruction effort. Both CERP and non-CERP 
spending on water & sanitation, along with non-CERP spending on education, are associated with reductions in insurgent attacks. But by 
and large most lines of funding do not appear to have any relationship to the frequency of SIGACTS.  
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Table 6-4 (Main Results I): Linear Regression 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy           
Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  0.146*** 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.103*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0458) (0.0414) (0.0327) (0.0465) (0.0329) (0.0460) (0.0501) (0.0468) (0.0493) 
Surge  0.328 0.356 0.387* 0.326* 0.354 0.269 0.362 0.332 0.379 0.364 
 (0.216) (0.227) (0.218) (0.170) (0.225) (0.169) (0.228) (0.224) (0.229) (0.226) 
Surge x Inv. Turnout Rank - Log -0.297*** -0.294*** -0.280*** -0.258*** -0.292*** -0.245*** -0.293*** -0.266*** -0.305*** -0.309*** 
 (0.105) (0.101) (0.0875) (0.0719) (0.101) (0.0754) (0.101) (0.0936) (0.0984) (0.101) 
Sectarian ID           
Shiite  -0.325*** -0.323*** -0.367*** -0.547*** -0.325*** -0.431*** -0.318*** -0.288*** -0.309*** -0.282*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0910) (0.0966) (0.155) (0.0926) (0.130) (0.0960) (0.103) (0.0907) (0.0905) 
Mixed -0.185** -0.160* -0.202** -0.379** -0.162* -0.247** -0.158* -0.157* -0.154* -0.111 
 (0.0775) (0.0876) (0.0864) (0.146) (0.0893) (0.122) (0.0898) (0.0863) (0.0905) (0.0965) 
Kurdish  -0.336*** -0.328*** -0.391*** -0.560*** -0.328*** -0.423*** -0.331*** -0.361*** -0.312*** -0.273*** 
 (0.0802) (0.102) (0.108) (0.153) (0.100) (0.132) (0.108) (0.116) (0.102) (0.103) 
Coalition Forces           
Troop Strength   0.0699** 0.0727** 0.0560** 0.0698** 0.0643** 0.0714** 0.0628** 0.0708** 0.0682** 
  (0.0282) (0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0283) (0.0262) (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0285) 
Lagged Troop Strength   -0.0550 -0.0388 -0.00160 -0.0562 -0.0267 -0.0557 -0.0468 -0.0353 -0.0408 
  (0.0365) (0.0389) (0.0406) (0.0378) (0.0384) (0.0366) (0.0403) (0.0422) (0.0397) 
PRT    -0.0654 -0.0722 -0.0879 -0.0626 -0.0168 -0.0678 -0.0720 -0.0658 -0.0679 
  (0.0645) (0.0638) (0.0583) (0.0679) (0.0439) (0.0657) (0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0639) 
Spending           
CERP Per Capita   -0.00789        
   (0.00496)        
CERP Per Capita < $50K     -0.0636***       
    (0.0242)       
CERP Per Capita > $50K     -0.00203       
    (0.00449)       
Non CERP Per Capita < $50K      -0.00343      
     (0.0167)      
Non CERP Per Capita > $50K      0.000153      
     (0.000663)      
CSP Per Capita       -0.0665**     
      (0.0321)     
CAP Per Capita       -0.0102     
      (0.0241)     
USAid Per Capita       -0.00105***     
      (0.000306)     
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Natural Resources           
Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted by Price        -2.373    
       (4.627)    
Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted by Price        -0.000356    
       (0.000336)    
Economy            
Unemployment Rate         -1.037**   
        (0.500)   
% Households in Bottom 40% Income         0.00133   
        (0.00104)   
Income Quintile Change, 2002-2004        -0.0213   
        (0.0438)   
Distance to Public Services (Index)         0.649   
        (0.596)   
Reconstruction           
Education Per Capita          -0.0144  
         (0.0120)  
Electricity Per Capita          -0.0210  
         (0.0154)  
Healthcare Per Capita          0.00593  
         (0.00590)  
Transportation Per Capita          0.00339  
         (0.00798)  
Water & Sanitation Per Capita          -0.00272**  
         (0.00118)  
Non CERP Education Per Capita           -0.0152** 
          (0.00706) 
Non CERP Electricity Per capita           0.188 
          (0.140) 
Non CERP Healthcare Per Capita          0.00159 
          (0.00402) 
Non CERP Transportation Per Capita          0.0127 
          (0.0110) 
Non CERP Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita          -0.00352** 
          (0.00140) 
Lag of D.V.  0.824*** 0.821*** 0.847*** 0.858*** 0.821*** 0.811*** 0.820*** 0.814*** 0.822*** 0.814*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0279) (0.0300) (0.0268) (0.0279) (0.0297) (0.0278) (0.0285) (0.0275) (0.0287) 
Constant 0.125 0.111 0.175 0.393** 0.113 0.262** 0.106 -0.0311 0.101 0.0544 
 (0.119) (0.137) (0.128) (0.152) (0.132) (0.131) (0.142) (0.182) (0.135) (0.150) 
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Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 891 927 927 
R-squared 0.753 0.754 0.762 0.772 0.754 0.764 0.754 0.757 0.758 0.757 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 The second table replicates the same tests reported in the first, but now in first differences and with district level fixed effects. 
Differencing tests the relationship between changes in the dependent and independent variables across panels, and in so doing 
attempts to control for some of the distorting influence of omitted variables. One implication of doing so however is that time invariant 
variables cannot be evaluated given that they do not admit to any cross panel variation. Accordingly, these results do not report 
estimated coefficients for Sectarian affiliation, but do control for this factor. As before, all of the specifications include controls for year 
effects as well as for a lag of the dependent variable, though again here this variable is now differenced.  
 Once again the Surge as a whole, which contrasts the pre and post 2007 periods, does not exhibit any significant relationship. 
The interactive effect of the inverse turnout rank (logged) in the post surge period is again strongly negatively associated with changes in 
the number of SIGACTS per capita. Changes in the dependent variable ranged from as high as an increase of nearly ten (the Tarmia 
district of Baghdad in the second half of 2006) to as low as a decline of over fourteen (also in the Tarmia district of Baghdad, but in the 
second half of 2007), from one half year period to the next. Again the synergy variable reflects a considerable change, as the mean 
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difference in districts experiencing a decline in the level of violence was just shy of a reduction of .4 significant acts per capita. And 
across the various sets of control variables this substantive result remains consistent.  
 The increase in force posture is again controlled for looking at changes in Coalition Troop Strength, it’s lagged value, and the per 
period differences in the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. None of these variables returns a statistically significant result in 
any of the specifications. And though both PRTs and Troop Strength are positively correlated with the Surge period, their respective 
bivariate correlations are relatively low, ameliorating potential concerns of variance inflation. Changes in CERP spending remain an 
important part of the story, with the results based on first differencing again supporting the primary finding of the association between 
smaller CERP projects and a reduction in the number of SIGACTS. In contrast to the prior estimates, larger CERP projects now also display 
some weak evidence of association with declines in insurgent violence, as does the Community Stabilization Program. But there is no 
evidence to support the lion’s share of spending not part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program or that administered by 
CAP (Community Action Program) or USAid. Natural resources again don’t receive any support and neither do measures of economic 
health. While the Unemployment Rate overall had a curious relation, changes in this rate do no co-vary with insurgent attacks in any 
systematic way. And in general, CERP and non-CERP spending across various functional categories do not support a consistent story.  
 
  
 
 
242 
Table 6-5 (Main Results II): Linear Regression with District Fixed Effects - First Differences 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy           
Inv. Turnout Rank - Log - - - - - - - - - - 
           
Surge 0.282 0.301 0.257 0.228 0.298 0.256 0.301 0.293 0.291 0.287 
 (0.210) (0.207) (0.194) (0.179) (0.206) (0.186) (0.207) (0.206) (0.204) (0.212) 
Surge x Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  -0.292*** -0.296*** -0.299*** -0.290*** -0.300*** -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.292*** -0.294*** -0.294*** 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0969) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) 
Coalition Forces           
D. Troop Strength   0.0260 0.0425 0.0551 0.0311 0.0443 0.0263 0.0221 0.0295 0.0315 
  (0.0325) (0.0378) (0.0435) (0.0308) (0.0300) (0.0329) (0.0319) (0.0353) (0.0315) 
Lagged D. Troop Strength   -0.0457 -0.0265 0.0215 -0.0440 -0.0177 -0.0456 -0.0445 -0.0466 -0.0483 
  (0.0740) (0.0659) (0.0586) (0.0738) (0.0708) (0.0742) (0.0750) (0.0768) (0.0757) 
D. PRT   -0.0141 -0.0175 1.05e-05 -0.0211 0.00504 -0.0139 -0.0404 -0.00866 0.00256 
  (0.0755) (0.0789) (0.0905) (0.0787) (0.0856) (0.0794) (0.0776) (0.0759) (0.0867) 
Spending           
D. CERP Per Capita    -0.0124**        
   (0.00616)        
D. CERP Per Capita < $50K     -0.0604***       
    (0.0186)       
D. CERP Per Capita > $50K     -0.00779*       
    (0.00461)       
D. Non CERP Per Capita < $50K      0.00136      
     (0.0241)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita > $50K      0.00129      
     (0.000844)      
D. CSP Per Capita       -0.0531*     
      (0.0305)     
D. CAP Per Capita       0.00134     
      (0.0275)     
D. USAid Per Capita       0.000120     
      (0.00226)     
Natural Resources           
D. Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted by Price        -5.279    
       (47.23)    
D. Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted by Price        -0.000170    
       (0.00344)    
Economy           
D. Unemployment Rate         -0.780   
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        (0.556)   
D. % Households in Bottom 40% Income         -0.00692   
        (0.00598)   
D. Income Quintile Change, 2002-2004        -   
        -   
D. Distance to Public Services (Index)         -   
        -   
Reconstruction           
D. Education Per Capita          -0.0148  
         (0.0196)  
D. Electricity Per Capita          -0.0158  
         (0.0142)  
D. Healthcare Per Capita          0.00918  
         (0.0249)  
D. Transportation Per Capita          -0.000430  
         (0.00627)  
D. Water & Sanitation Per Capita          -5.03e-05  
         (0.00432)  
D. Non CERP Education Per Capita           0.0206 
          (0.0216) 
D. Non CERP Electricity Per capita           -0.891*** 
          (0.228) 
D. Non CERP Healthcare Per Capita          0.00413 
          (0.0249) 
D. Non CERP Transportation Per Capita          0.00629 
          (0.0101) 
D. Non CERP Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita          -0.00202 
          (0.00282) 
Lagged D. of D.V. 0.191** 0.191** 0.197** 0.205** 0.193** 0.181** 0.191** 0.199** 0.193** 0.194** 
 (0.0882) (0.0898) (0.0838) (0.0871) (0.0913) (0.0889) (0.0899) (0.0901) (0.0913) (0.0959) 
Constant 0.199*** 0.195*** 0.204*** 0.197*** 0.209*** 0.201*** 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.198*** 0.195*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0535) (0.0563) (0.0547) (0.0562) (0.0584) (0.0537) (0.0531) (0.0529) (0.0524) 
           
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 792 824 824 
R-squared 0.125 0.127 0.165 0.192 0.129 0.147 0.127 0.133 0.132 0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-6 (Full Interactions): Linear Regression with District Fixed Effects - First Differences 
D. V.: Significant Incidents 
Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Synergy        
Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  - - - - - - 
       
Surge 0.170 0.0832 0.0611 0.129 0.0524 0.129 
 (0.171) (0.159) (0.151) (0.155) (0.163) (0.154) 
Surge x Inv. Turnout Rank 
- Log -0.230*** -0.219*** -0.214*** -0.231*** -0.198** -0.229*** 
 (0.0844) (0.0824) (0.0797) (0.0837) (0.0818) (0.0822) 
Coalition Forces       
D. Troop Strength 0.134* 0.122* 0.113* 0.134* 0.125* 0.129* 
 (0.0750) (0.0644) (0.0634) (0.0774) (0.0752) (0.0695) 
Surge x D. Troop Strength  -0.184 -0.113 -0.0489 -0.154 -0.176 -0.183 
 (0.139) (0.118) (0.119) (0.131) (0.141) (0.131) 
Lagged D. Troop Strength  -0.0102 -0.0339 -0.0227 -0.0136 -0.0169 -0.0217 
 (0.105) (0.0976) (0.0907) (0.104) (0.105) (0.101) 
Surge x Lagged D. Troop 
Strength -0.128 -0.0566 -0.0192 -0.0856 -0.137 -0.120 
 (0.147) (0.109) (0.104) (0.140) (0.148) (0.140) 
D. PRT 0.0836 0.0890 0.0935 0.0907 0.0970 0.117 
 (0.135) (0.128) (0.127) (0.137) (0.134) (0.144) 
Surge x D. PRT  -0.0849 -0.0486 -0.0238 -0.0733 -0.199 -0.103 
 (0.185) (0.164) (0.159) (0.184) (0.211) (0.182) 
Spending       
D. CERP Per Capita  0.00755     
  (0.00710)     
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita  -0.0258**     
  (0.0105)     
D. CERP Per Capita < $50K    -0.00363    
   (0.0214)    
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K    -0.0660**    
   (0.0287)    
D. CERP Per Capita > $50K    0.00808    
   (0.00830)    
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K    -0.0208*    
   (0.0124)    
D. CSP Per Capita    -0.0355   
    (0.0284)   
Surge x D. CSP Per Capita    -   
    -   
D. CAP Per Capita    -1.463*   
    (0.867)   
Surge x D. CAP Per Capita    1.471*   
    (0.859)   
D. USAid Per Capita    0.000509   
    (0.00288)   
Surge x D. USAid Per 
Capita    -0.0130*   
    (0.00773)   
Economy       
D. Unemployment Rate      -0.0801  
     (0.515)  
Surge x D. Unemployment 
Rate     -5.291**  
     (2.195)  
D. % Households in 
Bottom 40% Income      -0.00843  
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     (0.0115)  
Surge x D. % Households 
in Bottom 40% Income      7.47e-05  
     (0.0115)  
Reconstruction       
D. Education Per Capita       0.00972 
      (0.0135) 
Surge x D. Education Per 
Capita       -0.0442 
      (0.0316) 
D. Electricity Per Capita       0.0188** 
      (0.00762) 
Surge x D. Electricity Per 
Capita       -0.0485** 
      (0.0230) 
D. Healthcare Per Capita       -0.00246 
      (0.0268) 
Surge x D. Healthcare Per 
Capita       0.0619 
      (0.0653) 
D. Transportation Per 
Capita       0.00593 
      (0.0122) 
Surge x D. Transportation 
Per Capita       -0.0120 
      (0.0114) 
D. Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita       0.0111 
      (0.00675) 
Surge x D. Water & 
Sanitation Per Capita       -0.0228** 
      (0.0100) 
Lag of D.V.  0.686** 0.652** 0.637** 0.679** 0.719** 0.687** 
 (0.289) (0.278) (0.273) (0.286) (0.295) (0.284) 
Surge x Lag of D.V. -0.613** -0.571** -0.547** -0.615** -0.648** -0.615** 
 (0.271) (0.271) (0.261) (0.271) (0.278) (0.269) 
Constant 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.155*** 0.145*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0486) (0.0487) (0.0560) (0.0543) (0.0510) 
       
Observations 824 824 824 824 792 824 
R-squared 0.178 0.242 0.263 0.197 0.200 0.213 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications 
include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The primary test of the Synergy hypothesis is based on an interaction effect between a 
proxy for Sunni political reorientation (the Inverse Turnout Rank-Logged) and a shift in coalition 
force strategy and tactics corresponding with the Surge period of the war.  It stands to reason 
that other covariates may also demonstrate a similar relationship in the context of the surge. 
Troop strength for example may not have mattered much prior to the surge, during which time 
coalition personnel were widely characterized as living on super FOBs (Forward Operating 
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Bases) remotely located apart from Iraqi population centers. And reconstruction spending might 
very well have mattered more, or even exclusively, in the context of the surge, when in 
conjunction with enhanced population security measures. Considerable evidence of a general 
interactive effect of other covariates with the surge would also challenge the uniqueness of 
Sunni political realignment (proxied by the logged inverse turnout rank) as having contributed to 
the marked decline in violence.  
 The ‘full interactions’ results (table 6-6) do not however support such a skeptical view. 
Once again they include controls for year of the war as well as a lag of the dependent variable in 
every specification. And as in table two, the tests are all conducted in first differences, which 
controls for all time invariant aspects of a district. As before, the interactive term associated 
with the Synergy hypothesis is consistently significant and negative across the range of controls. 
The difference in Troop Strength seems to be positively correlated with SIGACTS, but again this 
is likely due to a selection effect and/or their presenting a greater target of opportunity to the 
insurgency. None of the other measures of coalition force presence demonstrates any clear 
relationship to changes in insurgent activity.  
 The previous findings with respect to CERP spending do however suggest that such 
efforts may very well have been wasted prior to the implementation of the surge. Differences in 
aggregate CERP spending, as well as both small and large CERP, were significant only in the 
Surge period. USAid spending was so as well, but the positive benefits of CAP spending seem to 
have reversed during the surge; though this unlikely relationship is probably due to selection 
into problematic areas, similar to the unusual relation exhibited by troop levels. The curious 
relationship with the Unemployment Rate returns, but is also evident only during the Surge 
period. A few functional areas of reconstruction spending return estimates that may differ from 
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zero, but in general these disaggregated categories have not demonstrated any clear consistent 
results. And the lagged value of SIGACTS per capita predictably positively correlates with the 
current period’s value prior to the surge, and does so negatively during the policy’s 
implementation.  
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Table 6-7 (Controlling for SOI): Linear Regression & District Fixed Effects - First Differences 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy            
Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  0.132*** 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.0931*** 0.123*** - - - - - 
 (0.0470) (0.0435) (0.0405) (0.0305) (0.0441)      
Surge  0.322 0.356 0.377* 0.311* 0.367* 0.274 0.290 0.255 0.219 0.294 
 (0.210) (0.222) (0.220) (0.166) (0.221) (0.206) (0.204) (0.192) (0.175) (0.202) 
Surge x Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  -0.267*** -0.263*** -0.259*** -0.234*** -0.264*** -0.284*** -0.288*** -0.292*** -0.279*** -0.295*** 
 (0.0989) (0.0943) (0.0872) (0.0681) (0.0947) (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.0955) (0.102) 
Sectarian ID           
Shiite  -0.313*** -0.315*** -0.345*** -0.534*** -0.313***      
 (0.0736) (0.0944) (0.101) (0.156) (0.0975)      
Mixed  -0.165** -0.133 -0.165* -0.350** -0.130      
 (0.0807) (0.0954) (0.0943) (0.150) (0.0992)      
Kurdish  -0.327*** -0.324*** -0.367*** -0.544*** -0.317***      
 (0.0739) (0.109) (0.116) (0.156) (0.109)      
Coalition Forces           
Troop Strength  0.0666** 0.0690** 0.0510* 0.0667**      
  (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0271) (0.0275)      
Lagged Troop Strength  -0.0537 -0.0432 -0.00417 -0.0542      
  (0.0374) (0.0380) (0.0404) (0.0392)      
D. Troop Strength       0.0255 0.0394 0.0541 0.0311 
       (0.0323) (0.0364) (0.0443) (0.0306) 
D. Lagged Troop Strength        -0.0390 -0.0243 0.0359 -0.0372 
       (0.0753) (0.0671) (0.0593) (0.0750) 
PRT  -0.0816 -0.0834 -0.101* -0.0790      
  (0.0670) (0.0657) (0.0607) (0.0710)      
D. PRT       -0.0115 -0.0149 0.00761 -0.0228 
       (0.0750) (0.0776) (0.0910) (0.0790) 
Spending           
SOI Spending Per Capita  -0.584*** -0.586*** -0.486*** -0.528*** -0.590***      
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.168) (0.170) (0.202)      
D. SOI Spending Per Capita       -0.407** -0.404** -0.323*** -0.426*** -0.414** 
      (0.167) (0.167) (0.119) (0.116) (0.168) 
CERP Per Capita   -0.00522        
   (0.00434)        
D. CERP Per Capita         -0.0104*   
        (0.00594)   
CERP Per Capita < $50K     -0.0641**       
    (0.0245)       
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D. CERP Per Capita < $50K          -0.0692***  
         (0.0161)  
CERP Per Capita > $50K     0.00123       
    (0.00287)       
D. CERP Per Capita > $50K          -0.00408  
         (0.00318)  
Non CERP Per Capita < $50K      0.0130      
     (0.0159)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita < $50K           -0.0223 
          (0.0165) 
Non CERP Per Capita > $50K      0.000139      
     (0.000655)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita > $50K           0.00137 
          (0.000834) 
Lag of D.V.  0.852*** 0.849*** 0.862*** 0.875*** 0.850***      
 (0.0303) (0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0267) (0.0289)      
D. Lag of D.V.       0.205** 0.204** 0.206** 0.219** 0.203** 
      (0.0885) (0.0902) (0.0847) (0.0887) (0.0912) 
Constant 0.138 0.126 0.166 0.397** 0.109 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.194*** 0.209*** 
 (0.113) (0.138) (0.132) (0.152) (0.137) (0.0523) (0.0535) (0.0559) (0.0541) (0.0563) 
           
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 824 824 824 824 824 
R-squared 0.765 0.766 0.769 0.781 0.766 0.157 0.158 0.184 0.224 0.162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 The role of the Sons of Iraq program (SOI) has been a considerable point of contention in the debate over the rapid decline in 
insurgent violence Iraq experienced, which occurred predominantly during the implementation of the surge policy (Hagan et al. 2013). In 
the fourth set of results (table 6-7) the amount of per capita spending disbursed as a component of the SOI program is explicitly tested; 
with the first five specifications estimating each covariate in its current period and the second five doing so once again in first 
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differences. As usual, controls for the year of the war and a lag (or differenced lag) are included throughout. The results again strongly 
confirm the positive effects the Surge had on the change in domestic political opportunity structures in Iraq; principally among those 
areas dominated by Sunnis. Troop Strength in the current period again returns the same estimate as before, but none of the other 
assessors of coalition force presence warrants mention.  
 The Sons of Iraq spending per capita, and its per period difference return a substantively large and significant estimate 
associated with a reduction in the volume of SIGACTS experienced by a district. General CERP and non-CERP spending by contrast only 
supports small CERP spending as having had any effect. So while the preponderance of funds disbursed as part of the SOI program came 
from CERP accounts (Furbish et al. 2011), there does seem to be evidence of a separate additional positive effect resulting from CERP 
activities independent of their use to pay the salaries of local militias. Nonetheless, the difference in estimated magnitudes between 
small CERP and SOI spending is dramatic, with the estimated reduction in SIGACTS per capita being 800% greater for SOI spending in a 
current period and 600% greater when looking at first differences. While the Sons of Iraq were clearly not the only factor associated with 
the decline in violence, it is evident that the program was assuredly one of the most important.  
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Table 6-8 (Predicting SOI): Linear Regression 
D.V.: SOI Spending Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                        
Synergy            
Inv. Turnout Rank - Log  -0.0224** -0.0243** -0.0201** -0.0194** -0.0237** -0.0234** -0.0233* -0.0215** -0.0215** -0.0223** -0.0235** 
 (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.00956) (0.00943) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.00997) (0.0102) (0.0109) 
Surge -0.0209 -0.00883 -0.0330 -0.0322 -0.00926 -0.00447 -0.0219 -0.00319 -0.000291 -0.0173 -0.0140 
 (0.0217) (0.0254) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0255) (0.0270) (0.0343) (0.0241) (0.0265) (0.0277) (0.0266) 
Surge x Inv. Turnout Rank - 
Log 0.0522*** 0.0524*** 0.0472*** 0.0464*** 0.0527*** 0.0516*** 0.0528** 0.0531*** 0.0551*** 0.0540*** 0.0534*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0190) 
Sectarian ID            
Shiite -0.0615 -0.0551 -0.0273 -0.0191 -0.0505 -0.0533 -0.0543 -0.0468 -0.0397 -0.0387 -0.0521 
 (0.0390) (0.0492) (0.0435) (0.0317) (0.0494) (0.0500) (0.0503) (0.0555) (0.0456) (0.0568) (0.0526) 
Mixed -0.0217 -0.00512 0.0199 0.0278 -0.000944 -0.00274 -0.000625 -0.00143 -0.00182 0.00478 -0.00478 
 (0.0393) (0.0426) (0.0396) (0.0300) (0.0431) (0.0438) (0.0434) (0.0470) (0.0408) (0.0480) (0.0450) 
Kurdish -0.0698* -0.0603 -0.0256 -0.0176 -0.0556 -0.0582 -0.0627 -0.0585 -0.0771 -0.0461 -0.0572 
 (0.0385) (0.0554) (0.0496) (0.0376) (0.0557) (0.0565) (0.0549) (0.0630) (0.0597) (0.0632) (0.0596) 
Coalition Forces            
Troop Strength  0.00145 0.00380 0.00520 0.000869 0.00153 8.57e-05 0.00320 -0.00121 0.00368 0.00235 
  (0.00778) (0.00949) (0.00830) (0.00768) (0.00774) (0.00690) (0.00859) (0.00808) (0.00877) (0.00806) 
Lagged Troop Strength  0.00451 -0.00416 -0.00606 0.00418 0.00514 0.00477 0.00388 0.00595 0.00222 0.00521 
  (0.00819) (0.0107) (0.0120) (0.00813) (0.00832) (0.00866) (0.00801) (0.00848) (0.00733) (0.00870) 
PRT  -0.0284 -0.0275 -0.0274 -0.0279 -0.0293 -0.0287 -0.0300 -0.0377* -0.0270 -0.0290 
  (0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0200) (0.0188) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0192) 
Spending            
Lagged CERP Per Capita   0.00279         
   (0.00174)         
Lagged CERP Per Capita < 
$50K     0.00515        
    (0.00625)        
Lagged CERP Per Capita > 
$50K     0.00251        
    (0.00186)        
CERP Per Capita Not SOI      0.00705       
     (0.00715)       
Non CERP Per Capita < $50K       0.00600      
      (0.00541)      
Non CERP Per Capita > $50K       -4.58e-05      
      (8.63e-05)      
CSP Per Capita       0.00212     
       (0.00458)     
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CAP Per Capita       0.0203     
       (0.0193)     
USAid Per Capita       -0.000136*     
       (7.02e-05)     
Natural Resources            
Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted 
by Price         -3.117    
        (4.147)    
Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted 
by Price         -0.000215    
        (0.000270)    
Economy            
Unemployment Rate          -0.237**   
         (0.114)   
% Households in Bottom 40% 
Income          -0.000619   
         (0.000632)   
Income Quintile Change, 
2002-2004         -0.0120   
         (0.0227)   
Distance to Public Services 
(Index)          -0.0274   
         (0.287)   
Reconstruction            
Education Per Capita           0.00654  
          (0.00588)  
Electricity Per Capita           0.000289  
          (0.00265)  
Healthcare Per Capita           -0.00101  
          (0.00112)  
Transportation Per Capita           0.00167  
          (0.00154)  
Water & Sanitation Per Capita           -0.000426  
          (0.000438)  
Non CERP Education Per 
Capita            0.00364 
           (0.00335) 
Non CERP Electricity Per 
capita            -0.0278 
           (0.0293) 
Non CERP Healthcare Per 
Capita           -0.000626 
           (0.00104) 
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Non CERP Transportation Per 
Capita           -0.00102 
           (0.00109) 
Non CERP Water & Sanitation 
Per Capita           -0.000456 
           (0.000437) 
Lag of D.V.  0.244** 0.242** 0.191** 0.193** 0.242** 0.236** 0.241** 0.240** 0.237** 0.233** 0.240** 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.0892) (0.0872) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0938) (0.101) 
Constant 0.0925* 0.0796 0.0517 0.0431 0.0734 0.0730 0.0803 0.0711 0.110* 0.0574 0.0772 
 (0.0497) (0.0607) (0.0543) (0.0428) (0.0608) (0.0644) (0.0628) (0.0679) (0.0571) (0.0699) (0.0650) 
            
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 891 927 927 
R-squared 0.111 0.113 0.135 0.136 0.114 0.113 0.117 0.114 0.118 0.119 0.114 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1            
 
 But the SOI program did not take off until well after the 2005 elections and nationalist Sunni realignment. Because of this 
temporal ordering it is also possible that the overwhelmingly localized grassroots inception of ‘concerned local citizens’ groups, which 
would eventually come to be known as the Sons of Iraq, was also at least in some measure a reflection of the general political 
reorientation which had occurred in conjunction with the establishment of an electoral state. In the final table of results, the dependent 
variable SIGACTS is replaced with SOI Spending Per Capita, and the same battery of covariates is used to estimate the magnitude of the 
program in each district.123 Recall that the program was not designed to raise new personnel, but rather legitimize those who were 
already in place and attempt to bind their interests to those of the coalition (Furbish et al. 2011). The overwhelming majority of SOI 
                                                          
123 With expenditures used as a proxy for size as the principal source of cost was the militias’ salaries.  
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spending occurred during the Surge, with an average spent per district half year of nearly $109 per capita, and a maximum of just over 
$14,000. By contrast in the years prior to the Surge, mean spending on SOI was a far more modest $1.26 per capita on average, and a 
much lower maximum of only $412. Given that the overwhelming majority of the program’s spending and implementation occurred in 
conjunction with the Surge, and in light of the considerable contribution that SOI spending had on reducing the volume of insurgent 
violence, any explanation for the sea change in popular sentiment that motivated these forces to ‘stand up’ in the first place would be 
indirectly a critical component of accounting for the precipitous decline in insurgent violence.  
 As per the previous results, all specifications include controls for the conflict’s year as well as a lag of the dependent variable. 
Examining the covariates associated with the Synergy hypothesis, the main effect of the Surge once again does not return any 
statistically significant estimates. That said, the interactive effect of the logged Inverse Turnout Rank, in conjunction with the Surge, is 
consistently a positive and significant predictor of SOI spending. None of the controls for the Sectarian affiliation of a district’s populace 
has any evidence in support of a relationship with the program. And for that matter neither does any of the proxy measures for the 
presence of Coalition Forces. Because virtually all of the funds disbursed as part of SOI payments fell under the heading of the CERP 
program, the lagged value is used here as well as a separate measure for CERP spending that was not affiliated with the SOI program (in 
the current period). 
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 Disappointingly, none of the spending measures provides any evidence of having motivated Iraqis to form local defense militias, 
and ultimately to participate in the SOI program. While CERP spending did seem to provide a direct benefit in the reduction of SIGACTS, 
even when controlling for the SOI program (see results in table 6-7), in contrast to the synergy hypothesis (with respect to political 
reorientation) there appears to be no evidence of an additional indirect effect of CERP through the SOI. Natural resource wealth might 
be expected to reduce participation by providing an alternative means of funding, but there is no evidence in support of such a concern. 
Most metrics of the economy return null findings too. The negative estimate associated with higher unemployment is most unusual. A 
larger surplus labor population would be expected to gravitate towards any means of income, which participation in the Sons of Iraq 
could have provided. And finally reconstruction spending is disaggregated by area of functional expense. Similar to CERP spending, the 
hope would be that improvements made towards public service provision might promote a shift in popular sentiment, and indirectly 
encourage greater participation in local efforts to combat the insurgency. Unfortunately, once again their does not appear to be any 
evidence in support of this popular expectation.  
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Endogeneity Bias & Multicollinearity?  
 
 In the prior econometric tests, examining both the covariates of war outcomes and 
duration, comparisons were made between cases of insurgency war and an incumbent regime’s 
status as an Electoral State, GWF, or Competitive Electoral State was recorded based on the 
ruling political institutions in place at the time of each war’s conclusion. Structuring those tests 
in this manner legitimately raises a serious concern of potential endogeneity bias, namely that 
political elites would condition the observed values of their regime types on the latent 
difficulties of the conflicts they found themselves having to fight. In making this type of 
judgement, they would have to take into consideration a myriad host of systematic and 
idiosyncratic structural factors which promote/impede the war efforts of the respective 
combatant parties, as the basis of formulating an estimation of their own prospects.  
 To produce unbiased estimates does not require that a regressor is fully exogenous, but 
only that it meet the less demanding requisite of conditional exogeneity, specifically upon 
additional control variables being included in the regression. A discussion of the risks and 
challenges associated with this problem more generally, and the methodological approaches 
available for attempting to resolve it, can be found in the previous chapter (4) in the research 
design section. Crucially however, in the case of the Iraq War and the subnational regressions 
used to assess the synergy hypothesis, this type of concern is not particularly applicable. This is 
principally due to the temporal disaggregation of the data, with respect to both outcomes 
measures, and the timing of the elections.  
Because this change in political institutions occurred at a discrete point in the war, and 
prior to both the decline in SIGACTS and stand up of the Sons of Iraq, a comparable charge of 
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self-selection into treatment status is largely irrelevant. Such a concern is however warranted 
with many of the other control variables. Troop Strength and CERP spending, for example, may 
very well change as a response to movement in the dependent variable, either that in a prior 
period or simultaneously within a current one. For example, increasing SIGACTS might 
encourage greater deployments of coalition forces to meet the threat, whereas increases in SOI 
personnel might encourage a reduction, as local commanders yield some aspects of providing 
population security to the militias. CERP spending, as well, might have increased during the 
period in which violence began to decline at least in part to concomitant improvements in local 
conditions which made implementation of the various programs easier, or even possible. 
Controlling for the lagged value of the dependent variable is one means of trying to address this 
concern, as is doing so for lagged values of certain predictors. And a first differences estimation 
strategy assists in controlling out confounding effects of invariant unobservables. But given that 
the transition to an elected government occurred well prior to the periods of inflection in both 
dependent variable series, the potential concern of an endogeneity bias is far less pronounced.  
Highly correlated regressors may not bias estimated coefficients124, but can inflate 
standard errors and increase the chances of making a type II error (false negative). And one of 
the contexts in which this issue is prone to occur is between interaction and main effect terms, 
such as in the present context between the main terms for the Inverse Turnout Rank (Log) and 
the Surge with their interaction (the principle predictor of the synergy hypothesis). The 
magnitude of the problem depends on both the collinearity between the regressors, as well as 
                                                           
124 Although tipping effects can occur. These can produce wild swings in the values, even signs, of 
coefficients based on small changes to the sample or inclusion/exclusion of other covariates in the 
specification. This is essentially due to the small number of values in the dependent variable that are 
associated with non-collinear values in the suspected problem regressors.  
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the size of the sample. Calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) is one means of diagnosing 
the presence of such an issue. While there is no hard and fast cutoff, values above ten are 
generally considered a cause for concern. And in fact the VIF values associated with the 
interaction and main effects associated with the synergy hypothesis are between twelve and 
fourteen, depending on specification.  
Ridge regression offers a possible methodological solution, which inserts a degree of 
bias into coefficient estimates in exchange for reducing the inflated standard errors (Hoerl and 
Kennard 1970a, 1970b; Ridge Regression - Ridge_Regression.pdf). Resorting to such a measure 
however would seem unwarranted in the present case, as the costs associated with such a 
‘solution’ seem to outweigh the benefits. To begin with, inflated standard errors would reduce 
the prospect of detecting a significant effect, but the interaction term associated with the 
synergy prediction was found to be highly significant over numerous regressions covering a wide 
range of control variables. And secondly, the alternative proxy measure of political realignment, 
based on the raw difference in voter turnout rather than the governate rank, returns estimates 
that are substantively identical, and are not associated with any sort of variance inflation issues 
(VIF scores generally around 5).125 Given that both independent variables are constructed from 
the same underlying data126, this largely obviates any potential concern regarding a problem of 
multicollinearity between the interaction and main effects associated with the synergy 
                                                           
125 Furthermore, amongst the other covariates across the various specifications, there is little evidence of 
a multicollinearity problem. By and large this holds true as well for table three, with the full set of surge 
interactions. At any rate, problems of variance inflation only effect the variables that are collinear with 
each other, not the entire specification. Given the purpose of the controls, and in particular table three, is 
to test the resilience of the synergy hypothesis, any issue of collinearity between them would not 
undermine the principal objective of the tests.   
126 The inverse turnout rank being an ordinal conversion of the turnout difference.  
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hypothesis. Identical tables of regression results using this alternative predictor variable 
(Difference in Turnout-Logged) can be found in the appendix to the chapter.  
 
Discussion of Findings  
 
 The primary hypothesis generated by Endogenous Mobilization Theory is that 
Competitive Electoral States, and more generally those regimes with broader more 
encompassing ruling institutions, are far better equipped to defend themselves against the 
threat of an aspiring insurgent movement. The principle mechanism as to why, was tested in this 
chapter subnationally in the Iraq War of 2003. Specifically, it was argued that the reintroduction 
of electoral politics in 2005 promoted a shift in domestic political opportunity structures, and 
created access points within the new status quo regime for more moderate 
members/supporters of the Sunni based insurgency. This isn’t to argue that Sunnis were 
enamored with their future political prospects within the new Iraqi state, but simply that the 
policy distance between their ideal preference and the new status quo was now shorter than 
that with respect to AQI.  
 This prediction was situated within the context of the 2003 Iraq War via the lens of the 
synergy hypothesis, the argument that the inflection in violence across the country was due to 
the combined effects of the Awakening Movement and the Sons of Iraq in combination with the 
increase in coalition troop strength and shift in operating doctrine associated with the Surge. 
The argument was operationalized as an interactive effect, combining the change in popular 
voter turnout across governates with the surge time period, and tested quantitatively. Across a 
number of specifications including a wide variety of control variables the interactive prediction 
 
 
260 
associated with the synergy hypothesis was shown to be consistently negatively correlated with 
the production of insurgent violence and positively so with the expansion of the Sons of Iraq 
program. And substantively, the results strongly confirm the principle prediction articulated in 
the primary hypothesis, and complement those of the previous empirical chapter.  
 While this chapter has focused exclusively on evaluating the primary hypothesis (A), a 
brief engagement with the supplementary and alternative predictions is in order. Hypothesis (D) 
argued that elected governments should also be more likely to end their counterinsurgency 
wars with negotiated settlements. Taking commitment problems as the principle impediment to 
reaching sustainable terms, elected governments were theorized to possess distinct advantages 
in providing a pathway for moderate opposition elements to pursue their agendas within the 
confines of status quo political institutions. In the previous cross case testing some evidence was 
indeed found to support this prediction, specifically the multinomial logistic regression results.  
The association between political reorientation and Sons of Iraq spending during the 
Surge would appear to support this theorized mechanism as well. And further anecdotal 
evidence concurs with this view too. “The most public overture the new government has made 
so far was the call for amnesty for insurgents by the Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, who 
issued a statement saying, ‘Those who believe that what they have done is a manifestation of 
resisting the [US-led] occupation, I call upon them to come and join the democratic process” 
(Hashim 2005, 56). Accepting former insurgents into the process was the very basis of levying 
personnel for the SOI program. And of course the most prominent example would be the 
ceasefire negotiated with Moqtada Al-Sadr in 2007, whose Sadrist Movement had competed in 
the elections as part of the United Iraqi Alliance list and won 29 seats in parliament.  
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These observations however must be considered anecdotal at present, as there is little 
definitive evidence to support that similar events could not have equally occurred in a non-
electoral state. It is not evident either that a subnational research design is the most suitable 
choice for evaluating this supplementary prediction. A comparative historical examination, with 
variation on the incumbent regime’s electoral status, is likely a more fruitful avenue for further 
testing this hypothesis. However, the implications of the Iraq War for the other supplementary 
hypothesis, that electoral political institutions are associated with shorter duration conflicts, is 
far more clear. And like the evidence presented in the cross case econometric tests, the Iraq 
War experience roundly rejects this prediction.  
A rationalist accounting might anticipate a more expedient resolution to the war after 
the large scale public defection of nationalist Sunnis in direct contradiction to AQI’s demands to 
the contrary. But rather than recognizing this change, and Bayesian updating their ultimate war 
prospects accordingly, the response undertaken by AQI was precisely the opposite. The 
February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra is widely cited as precipitating the 
sectarian civil war that took place between Sunni and Shiite militia groups. And 2006 witnessed 
a massive increase in the number of civilian deaths, the highest levels of the war before tapering 
off and declining the following year.127 And though the cross case and subnational evidence 
belies this supplementary prediction, with respect to war duration, this puzzle offers a potential 
direction for extending Endogenous Mobilization Theory.  
Rather than resign themselves to defeat, AQI might be characterized as having doubled 
down and ‘gambled for resurrecting’ their ultimate war ambitions.128 This higher variance 
                                                           
127 When measured by total civilian deaths from violence by quarter (Iraq Body Count).  
128 A reference to Goeman’s argument regarding ‘gambling for resurrection’ behavior by certain leaders in 
the context of interstate wars (2000).  
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strategy has been characterized as attempting to spark a sectarian civil war as a basis of 
motivating US withdrawal, and preventing the formation of a reconciled domestic political order 
in Iraq. Furthermore, this dynamic is reminiscent of the experience in at least three other cases 
which were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the ISF in 
Algeria, and the Sikhs in Punjab; all of which saw insurgents targeting non-combatants and all of 
which occurred in Competitive Electoral States. The formal theory argued that incumbent 
governments are able to outcompete insurgents for popular loyalty at the margins given the 
inherent transaction cost associated with revisionist violence. Marginalized extremist insurgent 
factions, with polarized ideal policy positions and inelastic attachments to them, may rationally 
pursue a strategy of non-combatant victimization as a last resort when they find their labor 
supply choked off by the accommodating institutional stance of a Competitive Electoral State.   
Finally, while the primary hypothesis clearly trumps that of the alternative, in both the 
between and within case analyses, this does not mean that the alternative is not also operative, 
albeit to a much lesser extent. Assuming that the Rebels Dilemma, the challenge of overcoming 
collective action and motivating self-interested individuals to bear considerable personal cost & 
risk pursuing the attainment of a collective public good, is a principle impediment that any 
aspiring insurrection must overcome, it was argued that electoral politics can generate negative 
externalities for an embattled incumbent state. Election events might create focal points around 
which opposition elements can coalesce and political party wings of violent organizations can be 
used to facilitate recruitment, provide cover for the insurgency, and even undermine the 
mechanics of state business from within.  
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“There were reports that the mujahideen themselves were trying to form a political wing. Talib 
Saha, a member of the local insurgents, seemed to be enamored with the Irish Republican Army: 
‘We like the way the IRA was able to enter in politics and have ministers in charge of 
government, like Martin McGuinness’” (Hashim 2005, 42).  
 
Moqtada Al-Sadr’s militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, for example was very effective at infiltrating Iraqi 
forces. “We did a counterintelligence assessment of an Iraqi army battalion in central Baghdad 
and found that every senior commander and staff were either JAM, doing criminal activity with 
JAM, or intimated by JAM (Ricks 2009, 173). Intelligence leaks by elements within the Iraqi 
government to the insurgency were a considerable source of concern (Ricks 2009, 158). And of 
course election day itself created prime targets of opportunity for aspiring spoilers. But on 
balance, the empirical evidence unambiguously supports that the net effect of electoral politics, 
in this case, was pacific.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 What role do elections play, if any, during counterinsurgency wars? Prompted by the 
recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, two broad empirical trends also underlay the posing of 
this research question. In the modern era, the number of electoral regimes in the international 
system has expanded dramatically. And in this same period, the fortunes of governments 
combatting asymmetric internal threats has reversed, with incumbents being defeated by their 
‘weaker’ opponents one third of the time, and securing outright victory for themselves only to 
an equal extent. Contemporary explanations for this puzzle have included that strong actors 
may have a limited interest in successfully prosecuting these conflicts, suffer tactical constraints 
on their ability to do so, and that their military capabilities may be capital intensive, which is 
suitable for addressing symmetric threats, but not ideal for the nature of conducting 
counterinsurgency war.129  
 To provide a satisfying theoretical argument to reconcile these two descriptive trends 
requires being able to account for both the puzzle of strong actor defeat and the temporal trend 
of its increasing prevalence in the modern era. As a candidate explanation, the primary and 
alternative hypotheses each ventured to establish a theoretical rationale predicated chiefly on 
the expansion of electoral regimes in the international system, that has coincided with the 
increasing prevalence of state defeat. With its emphasis on the Collective Action tradition, the 
alternative hypothesis aimed squarely at positioning a regime’s greater propensity of being an 
electoral state as an explanation for the modern era reversal in incumbent fortunes. And by 
contrast, the primary hypothesis drew inspiration from the Institutionalization literature, with 
                                                           
129 The specific authors and their arguments associated with each school are detailed in chapter 2.  
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the inference that states may be increasingly turning towards the adoption of elections, as a 
component of their political regimes, precisely as a response to the ascendant challenge of 
insurgency.  
 The balance of evidence which has been presented, and the primary empirical 
prediction generated by Endogenous Mobilization Theory, is unequivocally in favor of the latter 
perspective. And while both the between and within case statistical tests presented highly 
supportive evidence in favor of this view, many important questions remained unanswered. In 
these concluding remarks, several of these issues are acknowledged and briefly discussed, with 
the focus being on providing directions for future research. These topics include the question of 
what determines a given state’s electoral (or competitive) status, the rationality of insurgent 
organizations in opposing elected governments, and the rise of ISIS and the implications of 
electoral governance for the future of Iraq. The chapter concludes with a reexamination of the 
role electoral proliferation has played within the context of the original puzzle which motivated 
the study, and opines on the future prospect of continued insurgent success.  
  
Voting for Victory-Who Decides to Be an Electoral State?  
 
 One of the most voluminous literatures in the sub-field of comparative politics, is 
certainly that associated with understanding democratic transition and consolidation (Linz and 
Stepan 1996; O’Donnell et al. 2013; Przeworski et al. 2000; Tilly 2007). And the contemporary 
body of work on hybrid regimes and autocratic subtypes, has itself expanded considerably in 
recent years (Gandhi 2008; Greene 2007; Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006). In contrast to some 
of these works, Endogenous Mobilization Theory as presented in this project, was bounded both 
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theoretically and empirically to engage only with the electoral status of states whom 
experienced observed insurgency wars. And though insurgency has presented itself as a major 
cause of extra-institutional regime change, it is assuredly not the only such threat facing 
incumbent governments, or even necessarily the principle one in any given case.  
 By itself, the presence or absence of elected institutions in a country is not necessarily 
an overly compelling object of explanation. The interest in accounting for such a characteristic is 
of course owing to its association with incumbents’ considerably heightened prospects of 
survival, at least against an active insurgent threat. In chapter 5, results from several tests were 
presented attempting to estimate the direction and magnitude of potential endogeneity bias. 
The concern was that regimes were updating their governance characteristics in response to 
evolving wartime conditions, and that therefore the observed values of each state’s electoral 
status might be corrupted owing to self-section into treatment status bias. In contrast, 
Endogenous Mobilization Theory argued that electoral risks and concessions both present 
sources of considerable cost to incumbent regimes, and as such only the cases facing more 
difficult insurgent threats would be expected to opt into holding elections.  
 The identification strategy, adopted to address this legitimate concern, strongly 
supported the theoretical account proposed by the theory; the endogeneity corrected estimates 
suggested that the beneficial association of being a competitive electoral state is even greater 
than that produced by the baseline tests. The surprising result, was the relatively modest 
estimated magnitude of the endogeneity bias. Not only was a regime’s status at the onset of the 
war a better predictor of its terminal value than the war’s outcome, which was used as a perfect 
proxy for latent conflict difficulty, but the aggregate residual of unexplained variation was even 
more substantial further still.  
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This then raises the following question: if incumbents are not selecting themselves into 
our out of electoral status due to the severity of the insurgent threats they are combatting, then 
upon what other basis are they making this decision? A more developed answer would need to 
incorporate the competing risks facing states from both within and beyond their borders. As 
well, the rationale provided for why some incumbent’s opt not to pursue elections, while others 
go even further and establish more competitive regimes, was based on a combination of risk 
and opportunity cost, namely the hazard of losing one’s base of support and the diminished 
future value of incumbency. And one of the principle objectives of the theory’s formalization 
was indeed to establish the frontier of rational play. But this still leaves unanswered why some 
states choose to pursue higher variance strategy profiles than others. And while the theory and 
empirical results support that this may be owing to their facing relatively ‘weaker’ insurgent 
threats, it strains credulity to defend as rational a strategic decision not to pursue adopting an 
electoral hedge if you end up ultimately losing the war. Why do some incumbents, or their 
bases, choose to gamble on the future of their sovereignty? Answering this question, and 
incorporating additional threat sources into an incumbent’s calculus, may aide in progress 
towards developing a general theory of asymmetric civil wars.  
Regarding the general question of why, and how, electoral political institutions have 
proliferated, a few possible mechanisms for further consideration can be fruitfully borrowed 
from the literature on state formation. This body of work rightfully acknowledges that the 
principle constituent unit of the modern international states system, namely the sovereign-
state, is itself a relatively recent innovation amongst the historical milieu of political entities. 
And in particular, the contemporary homogeneity of a single constituent unit is very much an 
exception peculiar to the modern age. Declining empires had resulted in the creation of 
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competing forms of political organization, including trading leagues and city states, before the 
sovereign state ascended to its now predominate position. 
Leading accounts of this process have proposed three mechanisms which may be 
leveraged in modified form to account for the expansion of electoral political institutions. 
Perhaps the most iconic of which is evolutionary selection, by which political systems more 
ideally suited to conducting warfare where able to attrite their less ‘fit’ neighbors out of 
existence. “War made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly 1975, 42). But mutual 
empowerment from like units and mimicry have also been proposed (Spruyt 1994, 63). These 
explanations in contrast highlight the cooperative gains which states enjoyed owing to the 
mutually affinity of their internal organizing logics and the demonstration effects this signaled to 
third parties. Whereas evolutionary selection accounts focus on war as a mechanism for 
removing less successful polity types from the international system, these alternative views 
have drawn attention to the collaborative benefits owing to like systems predicated upon 
territorial sovereignty, with success in war seen as an intervening variable.130  
One can imagine how these mechanisms might usefully be applied to the question of 
electoral diffusion in the modern era. A focus on evolutionary selection might examine the 
political regimes established by victorious insurgencies in the wake of incumbent defeats. Of the 
forty-six conflicts131 which ended in an incumbent regime’s ouster, the proportion of insurgent 
organizations which in turn installed electoral institutions in their newly founded governments 
                                                           
130 A prominent piece of evidence cited is the exclusion of the Hansa League from major participation in 
negotiating the treaty of Westphalia. “…the Hansa did not fit well within a system of sovereign states. This 
clarifies the precarious position at the Peace of Westphalia where the league sought 
representation…Because its non-territorial logic of organization did not mesh with that of the state 
system, and because the league could not bind all its members to the agreements, the Hansa was not 
acceptable as a player in international politics” (Spruyt 1994, 170). 
131 Furthermore, this number represents a non-trivial proportion of the states in the international system.  
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would provide a means for empirically assessing this mechanism. Prominent examples of less 
‘inclusive’ incumbents being overthrown and more ‘inclusive’ regimes in turn being founded 
upon their ashes abound. For example, the Kuomintang, an electoral state, was defeated and 
replaced by the People’s Republic of China, a competitive electoral state. The victorious FLN 
instituted a more inclusive system in Algeria following the defeat of the French, as did the post-
Apartheid regime in South Africa as well as the Sandinistas after the ouster of Somoza in 
Nicaragua.132  
In addition, the collaborative and emulation mechanisms may better account for the 
electoral nature of cases which ended their wars in settlements and incumbent victories. 
Mimicry would argue that states have altered the character of their domestic institutions in 
response to the demonstration effects produced by the ascendant threat insurgents have posed 
since the end of World War II. Possible evidence in favor of such a view might look for a 
heightened propensity of regime transition in countries neighboring those suffering from active 
insurgent challenges, and in particular those in which incumbents were overthrown. The logic 
here being that demonstration effects may be most resonant when there are proximate, as 
unobservable structural factors are more likely to be common.  
By contrast an account focusing on mutual cooperation might anticipate a more diffuse 
transmission mechanism. Superpower patronage during the Cold War may also be associated 
with external pressure on regimes to alter their ruling coalitions to more adequately hedge 
against potential or actual insurgent challenges. In the case of the FMLN in El Salvador for 
                                                           
132 Though there are exceptions as well. For example, in Cuba the electoral system under Fulgencio Batista 
was defeated by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara, but was not replaced by a more inclusive electoral 
system thereafter. Furthermore, even in instances where such an evolutionary selection mechanism is 
present, the installment of said institutions is not always immediate nor permanent, as elected 
governments can be subsequently ousted via coups, as occurred in the case of Algeria (1965).  
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example, the United States provided considerable military and economic assistance to the 
incumbent government, but also diplomatic pressure on the regime to alter its ruling institutions 
as a basis for resolving the underlying political grievances which were fueling support for the 
insurgency.  
“Rather than embracing the Salvadoran right, within weeks of taking office Reagan 
approved a proposal to provide covert financial support to the Christian Democrats and 
the remaining reform minded officers in the Junta. ‘Prompt, free, and open’ elections 
were the administration’s solution for broadening the Salvadoran government’s base of 
support and enticing both the left and the right to compete for power politically instead 
of through force” (Ladwig 2016, 119).  
 
 Though while these possible mechanisms of electoral proliferation aspire to address the 
question of who decides to become an electoral state, they admittedly offer less guidance on 
the converse puzzle, namely why some incumbents have refused to broaden the inclusivity of 
their regimes in the face of clear existential threats, and been catastrophically defeated as a 
result. The formal theory explored the estimated statics of compromising on one’s ideal policy 
position to capture the adherence of larger segments of the population, but for a ‘typical’ state. 
Such an abstraction of an incumbent regime’s starting position is certainly a simplification, and 
perhaps overly so. The competitive electoral state measure for example nearly perfectly 
bifurcates the observed sample of cases.  
Modeling the mean incumbent may not pose a problem for theoretically adjudicating 
between the primary and alternative hypotheses. But introducing the differential characters of 
incumbents’ initial policy positions into an expanded model, may provide a solution to 
unravelling this puzzle. As an illustration, the Naga Rebellion began in India in 1955 and ended 
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nine years later with a negotiated settlement, the terms of which created a new state133 of India, 
Nagaland, separating its local government from the state of Assam in which it had been 
previously embedded. The creation of a new state within the country of India, a democratic 
incumbent who regularly holds competitive elections and which governs the country via a 
multitude of such subnational districts, is a relatively modest concession.  
The policy distance by contrast that a fully closed non-electoral state would have to 
travel to match the same terms as the Government of India would accordingly be far greater. 
And in the language of Endogenous Mobilization Theory this would accordingly carry a far 
greater cost, both in terms of having to compromise on one’s own ideal preference as well as 
heightening the risk of a regime losing its own base of support. Returning again to the case of El 
Salvador, the civilian government of the Christian Democrats faced competing incentives to both 
expand the appeal of political participation to the moderate left while facing the risk of 
overthrow in a coup from rightist hardliners within the military (Ladwig 2016). And empirically, 
the lagged value of a regime’s electoral or competitive status at the start of the war was indeed 
found to be highly predictive of its status at the end. This suggests that while incumbent regimes 
may be cognizant of the need to broaden their appeal to survive, the relative value and 
concomitant risks associated with attempting to do so may very well be highly structurally 
constrained by the character of extant political institutions in place at the outset of a war.  
“…there are good reasons why actors do not redesign institutions unless conditions force them 
to do so. Transaction costs, set belief systems, and standard operating procedures mitigate 
against frequent overhaul. Moreover, given the fact that institutions reflect a particular 
distribution of power, such changes are unlikely to occur without fundamental shifts in that 
distribution…There is a certain path dependency in institutional design” (Spruyt 1994, 25)  
                                                           
133 Use of the term state here refers to a subnational unit of governance within the country of India.  
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Insurgent Agency-How is it Rational to Fight a Losing War?  
 
 By contrast, the more challenging behavior to account for may very well be that of 
insurgents. Because governments command the largess of the state, and the escalatory ability of 
an insurgency is constrained by the scope their popular support134, it was argued that the role of 
their agency could be usefully discounted in developing the present theory. As was mentioned 
however, this was not intended to imply that more generally speaking insurgents should be 
rejected as strategic players. Rather, given their limited resource base with which to oppose the 
electoral process, the asymmetry of which is inherent to the phenomena of insurgency, they 
simply don’t possess the means with which to challenge this decision, either from outside the 
system or working within it.  
 The empirical results however, suggested an interesting potential contradiction, in that 
elections were associated with increased war prospects for incumbents, in conflicts that 
ultimately took longer to resolve (or where not statistically significantly shorter to do so). Why is 
it then that insurgents struggle on, only to end up falling short of attaining their ultimate 
aspirations? The argument given was that if incumbents are selecting into electoral status in 
more difficult conflicts, those in which the insurgency is stronger and therefore otherwise 
presents as a more credible threat, then insurgents may reasonably be reluctant to concede. But 
admittedly it is challenging to offer a rational choice based explanation for a decision to 
continue expending resources to pay for the transaction cost of violence by a party, when they 
only end up losing anyway.  
                                                           
134 At least given all other facets being held equal.  
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Another potentially pertinent puzzle relates not only to the decision on whether or not 
to fight, but also the choice of the manner in which to do so. In the discussion of the Iraq War, 
the strategic decision made by AQI to bomb the Al-Askari shrine was interpreted as an attempt 
to derail the establishment of a secular Iraqi state after the 2005 elections, by fomenting a 
sectarian civil war. And though this policy was successful in the short run, in terms of having 
achieved its desired result, it was not productive in influencing the longer term direction of the 
conflict. Anecdotally, cases in Peru, Algeria, and India seem to support a similar pattern, of 
insurgents resorting to wide-spread victimization of non-combatants in response to elections. 
And the suggestion was offered that this pattern may be indicative of an intention to pursue a 
higher variance strategy profile in response to losing the prospect of building out a movement’s 
moderate base of support, given their defection towards the state in response to electoral 
concessions. Indeed, this argument has been offered in the case of Sendero Luminoso’s violent 
reprisals against politicians of legal leftist parties in Peru (Ron 2001).  
Because the correlation between the lagged and terminal measures of the election 
variables were quite high, it implies that the choice to fight, and manner in which to do so, are 
made by insurgent organizations who are fully informed at the outset of a war that they are 
facing an elected state. Both the tactical choice to target non-combatants and the decision to 
continue fighting itself, or to begin so, in light of the overwhelming likelihood of failure, presents 
interesting prospects for further study and contribution to the literatures examining rebel 
groups’ use of terrorism during civil wars (Findley and Young 2015; Fortna 2015; Staniland 2014; 
Stanton 2013; Thomas 2014) as well as war onset more generally (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 
2010; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; 
Maves and Braithwaite 2013; Sobek and Payne 2010).   
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 Like the unitary actor assumption, with respect to the starting policy positions of 
incumbent regimes, discussed in the prior section, the introduction of insurgent agency and 
acknowledgment of different ideal types of rebel organizations may present one solution to the 
apparent puzzle of insurgencies fighting seemingly hopeless wars. Akin to incumbent regimes, 
the starting positions of insurgent organizations may account for a great deal of the variation in 
their responses to the particular challenges of competing against an elected state for popular 
support. Empirically, it is rarely the case that an insurgency is able to achieve its total war aims 
when facing a competitive electoral incumbent.  
However, none of the core explanatory variables proposed in this study was able to 
statistically differentiate between cases terminating in negotiated settlements from those 
ending in outright victory for states. It remains possible then, that some insurgencies were able 
to pivot to the center, moderating their own war objectives, and seek a position of influence 
within the electoral arena, while others opted instead to ‘double down’ on pursuing their ideal 
policy positions. For states, it was suggested that their electoral character at the outset of a war 
may explain to a considerable extent the magnitude of concessions they are able to sustain 
throughout it.  
In a similar fashion, the nature of insurgent organizations may hold the answer to 
accounting for why some groups were able to maintain their internal unity and force a 
settlement while in other contexts insurgencies were left abandoned and isolated from the 
masses they so desperately require, owing to their cooptation into the mainstream. The cases of 
Peru and El Salvador offer an illustration of this distinction. In Peru Sendero was left without a 
credible pathway to power when more moderate leftist leaders abandoned the pursuit of armed 
revolution in favor of elected office. By contrast the FMLN in El Salvador, over time, came 
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around to accepting the need to pursue a more modest set of ambitions through the regular 
political process. One characteristic which differentiated these two groups is their internal 
organizational structure. While the FMLN was formed from the agglomeration of five previously 
distinct organizations, the Shining Path was operated under the tutelage of Abimael Guzman. 
The degree of personalism then, or extent of institutionalized power-sharing within the 
management structure of an insurgent group, may present a direction for further consideration 
as to how different insurgencies have responded to the heightened challenges of conducting 
wars in an electoral political environment.  
Once again, and similar to the incumbent regimes they are challenging, the initial 
organizational structures of insurgent groups and the very nature of the war aims they are 
attempting to pursue, may very well constrain their ability to moderate their ideal policy 
positions and compete against the state for more moderate segments of the population within 
the electoral arena. In the case of Iraq (2003) for example, it is difficult to imagine how an 
organization such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq could have ever realistically been expected to enter the 
routine political process in light of their ideological justification for undertaking a Jihad in the 
first place. Internal documents captured during the war indeed reveal that members of the 
group viewed the electoral process as a considerable threat to their base of public support, but 
also that the group struggled with how best to dissuade the Sunni population from abandoning 
their messianic ambitions.  
“…The Sheiks started teaching people about these ideas, this conspiracy is led by two 
sides, the first is the heads of the tribes, the second is the leaders of the Islamic Party 
and mosques speakers, so they announced their war on the Mujahidin, it increased 
during the elections for the new constitution, their danger was so great, that hundreds 
of people volunteered in the police and the army, and thousands of people participated 
in the elections, renouncing their religion, and listening [sic] to the erratics. After we 
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took a look at the situation, we found that the best solutions to stop thousands of 
people from renouncing their religion, is to cut the heads of the Sheiks of infidelity and 
erratic” (Harmony Program | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)  
 
The legitimating ideology of a group, as well, may serve as a constraint on effective participation 
within an electoral environment. And for a rebel organization, whose base membership is 
founded on such adherents, the expected utility of outright prevailing against an elected 
incumbent may indeed accurately be perceived as being extremely low. But a low expected 
utility nevertheless exceeds the non-existent probability of success associated with complacency 
towards the status quo, and for a base membership comprised of zealots such slim prospects 
may still prove a sufficient inducement to fight.  
 
The Rise of ISIS, The Future of Iraq 
 
 The emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, both elected governments, exemplifies prime 
aspects of the two issues discussed in the immediately preceding sections. On December 15, 
2011 the US mission in Iraq was ceremonially concluded (Panetta marks end of Iraq war - 
POLITICO, US flag ceremony marks formal end of Iraq war role - BBC News). Taken as a proxy for 
the overall climate of violence, the number of documented civilian deaths in that year was fewer 
than 5,000, representing a more than 80% reduction from their peak level of nearly 30,000 in 
2006 (Iraq Body Count). The advent of ISIS is reflected by a resurgence in civilian deaths, peaking 
once again in 2014 with an estimated 20,000 casualties. And subsequent to the 2005 elections, 
examined in this project, further competitive contests were held in Iraq, at the national level, in 
both 2010 and 2014.  
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 With the caveat that this is an ongoing case, the recent history of ISIS to date, highlights 
both the theoretical and empirical strengths and weaknesses of this project. In contrast to the 
widespread claims of imminent regime collapse, with respect to both Iraq and Syria, neither 
elected government has fallen. In 2014 in particular the fall of Baghdad was widely heralded, 
and mistakenly so, in the aftermath of ISIS’s lighting advance into the country (Baghdad’s Sunni 
fighters: we are ready for zero hour | World news | The Guardian, Iraq chases Baghdad sleeper 
cells as “Zero Hour” looms over capital | Reuters). And broadly speaking, while the organization 
enjoyed shocking success early on, it’s fortunes appear to have steadily declined, as indicated by 
their ceding back of recently captured territory and the general reduction in civilian casualties.  
 Foreign recruitment and forcible conscription were both cited as scope limitations of the 
theory, and ISIS has relied heavily upon both manners of supplying fighters for their cause. But 
as was also discussed in the presentation of the theory, the need to rely upon external and 
involuntary labor supplies extensively may signal a dearth of indigenous support, an ill omen for 
any aspiring insurgency’s ultimate prospects. And while the group appeared to be practicing 
population centric COIN in reverse initially, directing traffic and reestablishing civic 
administration in recently captured cities (ISIS targets evolution in Iraqi schools | MSNBC), it 
rapidly returned to widespread continuous use of violence against non-combatants. 
 The core predictions of Endogenous Mobilization Theory, appear validated by the 
example of ISIS. The organization’s ideal policy position is clearly more extreme than that 
adopted by the electoral states they oppose. And it doesn’t appear likely that ISIS will prevail 
against either of the incumbent governments its currently contesting. But it also doesn’t seem 
probable that they will concede defeat either. And their seemingly anomalous decision to target 
the very civilians, whose support they require to prevail, is as inexplicable as the similar 
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approach adopted by their predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group has initiated and continued 
to fight against opponents whom they will not likely defeat, and opted to do so pursuing tactics 
seemingly in direct contradiction to the doctrines of People’s War and Focoism. Thus, while the 
example of ISIS validates the veracity of Endogenous Mobilization Theory’s primary empirical 
predictions, it also exposes several of its most prominent shortcomings, the rectification of 
which is a task for future research.  
 As for the case of Iraq after the end of the surge, subsequent political events have also 
both undermined and undergirded the theorized mechanisms proposed by Endogenous 
Mobilization Theory. In 2009 in particular the GOI (Government of Iraq), dominated by majority 
Shiite politicians, reinitiated a sustained campaign of de-baathifaction. Nearly five-hundred 
Sunni political leaders were banned from holding official government positions owing to their 
historical ties to Sadam’s regime (Chulov 2010; Iraq election officials confirm Sunni candidate 
ban | Reuters). Prominent Sahwa leaders (the Awakening Movement), were arrested and even 
allegedly targeted for assassination by elements within the Iraqi Security Forces (Iraq’s Tribal 
“Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall | Middle East Policy Council, The Global Intelligence Files - IRAQ/CT - 
Sahwa leader escaped death, 19 arrested in Diala | WikiLeaks). For instance, Abu Abed, a 
prominent figure in the Sunni turn against Al-Qaeda and leader of the Awakening Movement in 
Amiriyah Baghdad, claims to have been ambushed by an IED while attending a meeting with GOI 
representatives regarding integration of his soldiers into the Iraqi state security apparatus 
(Transcript | This American Life).  
 In stark contrast however, the renewed threats against the regime’s very survival raised 
by the Sunni protests in 2013 and invasion of ISIS in 2014 precipitated a near textbook response 
as Endogenous Mobilization Theory would predict. Despite having garnered a greater popular 
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vote share for himself than any other candidate in the 2014 elections, Nouri Al-Maliki was 
pressured to resign his Prime Minister-ship by not only Sunni and U.S. leaders, but by members 
of his own Dawa party and even Ayatollah Al-Sistani himself. His replacement, Haider Al-Abadi, 
took office in September 2015 at a time when the country’s sovereignty was considerably 
imperiled, and promptly set about instituting a series of political concessions aimed squarely at 
placating the Sunni population.  
 Under his short tenure the number of Sunni ministerial posts was increased, with Khaled 
al-Obeidi, a Sunni general who had served under Sadam Hussein, as the minister of defense. He 
intervened to suspend a death sentence issued against a Sunni tribal leader who was assisting 
the government in its fight against ISIS, and critically has reopened discussion on the formation 
of a legitimized locally recruited National Guard which would allow Sunni’s to hold official state 
security positions within their communities in greater numbers (Almaliky 2015). In the year since 
this change in national leadership Iraq has regained considerable portions of the territory 
captured by ISIS at the outset of the conflict. And yet in advance of the imminent attempt to 
retake Mosul, Khaled al-Obeidi, the Minister of Defense appointed by Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi, was removed from his position by a bare majority of parliament in a secret vote of no 
confidence on alleged charges of corruption (The Sacking of Iraq’s Defense Minister | Stratfor).  
 The ebb and flow of Iraqi politics following the 2003 war examined in chapter 6 draws 
attention to the need for further research into the post war political trajectories of elected 
governments. At a general level, both the 2003 and 2014 (to date) conflicts validate the 
principle argument advanced by the primary hypothesis in this study. Elections and their 
associated institutions, and the policy concessions they represent and facilitate, have played 
pivotal roles in undermining popular support for insurgents in both wars. Though the sustained 
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attempt by the GOI to renege on promises made during the height of the 2003 conflict, once it 
had abated, clearly challenges the theorized role elections were expected to play in making 
credible sustained policy compromises into the future. And further still, the re-escalation of the 
war in 2014, along similar fronts as those of 2003, reaffirms the puzzles identified throughout 
this chapter, and particularly so given the relatively similar trajectory of the war.  
More generally, most countries experiencing insurgency wars have tended not to suffer 
a recurrent onset thereafter. And in several, subsequent wars have occurred only decades later 
and around entirely distinct cleavages, such as the FLN’s war against the French in the 1950’s 
and their own subsequent conflict against the GIA in the 1990’s. However coincidentally, Iraq 
stands as one of the exceptions to the general rule, along with Iran, India, China, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. While regimes can and do change between episodes of war 
onset, the repeated challenges issued against the same incumbents and in the same countries 
presents both an anomaly and opportunity, as any insight into these exceptional cases may 
further our understanding of the mechanisms operative in the majority of wars.  
 
Closing Remarks  
 
 To reiterate the contemporary puzzle of insurgency, since the advent of the modern era 
(post 1945) the success rate of insurgencies has increased dramatically, and at the expense of 
their ostensibly stronger incumbent opponents, relative to structurally comparable conflicts 
fought in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. And concurrently in this era, 
the prevalence of sovereign states which maintain electoral political institutions as a feature of 
their regimes has expanded dramatically. The evidence presented throughout this study roundly 
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rejects the position articulated by the alternative hypothesis, and accordingly the prospect that 
the marked decline in the fortunes of states conducting asymmetric internal wars has been the 
result of the proliferation of electoral regimes.  
 Instead the findings point to the expansion of electoral states as a reaction to the 
increasingly virulent threat incumbents now face from within their borders, with the need to 
buy off the loyalty of ever greater segments of their populations seen as a begrudging 
concession required to support their tenure.135 Of course even if this claimed relationship is 
accepted as valid, it does not directly resolve the original puzzle motivating the contemporary 
research program on insurgency. Namely, the declining fortunes of incumbent states in 
combatting insurgents in the modern era. Aside from the extant arguments which have already 
been offered in the literature, examination of exogenous changes in the technology of small 
arms warfare, tools and doctrine, appears as one promising direction for future consideration. It 
is difficult to imagine, for instance, how the insurgency in Iraq could have ever attained the 
impact on coalition forces which it did absent the employment of improvised explosive devices, 
a technology of warfare without a clear nineteenth century analog.  
 But the modern success enjoyed by insurgencies way very well be coming to an end. In 
light of the strong negative relationship between an incumbent government’s electoral status 
and the prospects of an insurgent organization’s military success, coupled with the growing 
prevalence of such states in the international system, the window of opportunity that weak 
actors have exploited in overcoming the material advantages of the strong may very well be 
closing. If true, this changing nature in domestic political opportunity structures available to 
                                                           
135 In the first subsection of this chapter several suggestions for future research are presented as a 
direction for further evaluating this claimed relation.  
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aggrieved interest groups will have profound implications for the evolving nature of contentious 
political action.  
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Formal Theory: Extension 
Appendix A 
 
Items Include- 
1. Further notes on standard normal truncation  
2. “Z” table for the standard logit normal distribution  
3. Discussion of alternative ‘Spatial Voting’ style setup of the game  
4. Supporting computations (see associated pdf file)  
 
1. Truncating the Normal Distribution 
~Xϵ, 	, 
∞      ∞  
PDF: ; , , , 	 
1
 
 
 
 
  
 	 
 
 
 	

 
 
  
Truncation at four intervals, -4/4, -3/3, -2/2, -1/1 (top left to bottom right). Standard normal in 
beige with truncated normal overlaid in blue.  
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2. “Z” Scores for the ‘Standard’ Logit-Normal Distribution  
Values 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 
0 -0.500 -0.500 -0.499 -0.497 -0.493 
0.1 -0.486 -0.477 -0.465 -0.451 -0.435 
0.2 -0.417 -0.397 -0.375 -0.352 -0.328 
0.3 -0.302 -0.275 -0.246 -0.217 -0.188 
0.4 -0.157 -0.127 -0.095 -0.064 -0.032 
0.5 0.000 0.032 0.064 0.095 0.127 
0.6 0.157 0.188 0.217 0.246 0.275 
0.7 0.302 0.328 0.352 0.375 0.397 
0.8 0.417 0.435 0.451 0.465 0.477 
0.9 0.486 0.493 0.497 0.499 0.500 
1 0.500         
 
3. Alternate Game: Spatial Voting inspired  
In contrast to the rules of the primary game, neither of the strategic players needs to 
meet the ‘Civilian Pivot’s’ reservation price to win, only bid more closely than their opponent. If 
both were to play their ideal preference, each would capture the density from their own 
position to the mean (1/2). Value is captured by acquiring segments from the opponent’s half of 
the distribution, at the cost of moving away from one’s own ideal policy. As a player moves 
away from their own preferred position towards that of their opponent, the median point of the 
new interval delimits the new boundary of their attractiveness towards the expected value of 
the ‘Civilian Pivot’. The value of the benefits (half the distribution) is rescaled to 1 proportionally 
so as to be on the same unit interval as both cost measures.   
Risk Averse Player  Selectorate Expansion (Main)  Spatial Voting (Alternate) 
Cost x 94% 92% 
Cost x^e 96% 96% 
 
Risk Acceptant Player  Selectorate Expansion (Main)  Spatial Voting (Alternate) 
Cost x 91% 81% 
Cost x^e 77% 80% 
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Overall the differences in the resulting predictions of the two different versions of the game are 
minimal. The spatial voting based approach was rejected by the author in favor of the main 
model on theoretical grounds.   
 
 
286 
Formal Theory: Proofs 
Appendix B 
 
*Proofs begin on the following page.   
***Setting Up the Game***
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 Expy , y  NormalDistribution0, 1, y

1
2
Log y1
y 
2
2 Π yy2 0  y  1
0 True
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Plot 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, 0  y  1, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Maximize 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y	
2 2Π , y 
1
2

Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1	
1
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1  2
1
2
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 1  2, 1
1
2
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y
1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2

288
Maximize 1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
, y	
Maximize::wksol :
Warning: there is no maximum in the region in which the objective function is defined and the
constraints are satisfied; a result on the boundary will be returned. 
 1
2
, y  1
Minimize 1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
, y	
 1
2
, y  0
***Selectorate Expansion Game***
MBenefit1  
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 12 Log y1y 2
2 Π y  y2
CBenefit1  .5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  1
0.5 
 1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2

Cost1  y^1
y
Cost2  y^
y
***The Game***
***MRS-Constant Costs***
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Plot 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
PlotAbs 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
FindMinimumAbs 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y, y, .8	
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
3.4159  108, y  0.825882
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 0.825882	
0.940231
***MRS-Continous Growth Costs*** 290
***MRS-Continous Growth Costs***
Plot 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y^, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
PlotAbs 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y^, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
FindMinimumAbs 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
 y^, y, .8	
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
1.60637  108, y  0.85672
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 0.85672	
0.963137
291
***CRS-Constant Costs***
Plot 0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  y, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.10
0.05
0.05
0.10
D 0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  y, y
1 
  12 Log y1y2 1  y 1
1  y 

y
1  y2   2 Π y
Simplify1   12 Log y1y
2
1  y 1
1  y 
y
1  y2
  2 Π y
Plot1  
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
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PlotAbs1  
 1
2
Log y
1y
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
FindMinimumAbs1  
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, .25	
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
2.9624  108, y  0.210063
FindMinimumAbs1  
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, .75	
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
2.63943  108, y  0.789937
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, .789937	
0.907339
***CRS-Continous Growth Costs***
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Plot 0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  y^, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
D 0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  y^, y
 y1
 
  12 Log y1y2 1  y 1
1  y 

y
1  y2   2 Π y
Simplify y1   12 Log y1y 
2
1  y 1
1  y 
y
1  y2
  2 Π y
Plot y1  
 1
2
Log y
1y
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
2
1
1
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PlotAbs y1  
 1
2
Log y
1y
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
FindMinimumAbs y1  
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0.65	
4.44658  108, y  0.676467
Integrate 
 1
2
Log y
1y 
2
2 Π y  y2
, y, 0, .676467	
0.769616
***Graphs and Tables***
GridTabley, CBenefit1  Cost1, y, 0, 1, .05	
Power::infy : Infinite expression 
1
0.
 encountered. 
0. Indeterminate
0.05 0.0483823
0.1 0.0859978
0.15 0.108594
0.2 0.117171
0.25 0.114031
0.3 0.101585
0.35 0.0820547
0.4 0.0574322
0.45 0.029522
0.5 0.
0.55 0.029522
0.6 0.0574322
0.65 0.0820547
0.7 0.101585
0.75 0.114031
0.8 0.117171
0.85 0.108594
0.9 0.0859978
0.95 0.0483823
1. 0.
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GridTabley, CBenefit1  Cost2, y, 0, 1, .05	
Power::infy : Infinite expression 
1
0.
 encountered. 
0. Indeterminate
0.05 0.00132701
0.1 0.0120892
0.15 0.0356463
0.2 0.0702392
0.25 0.112878
0.3 0.160512
0.35 0.210315
0.4 0.259719
0.45 0.306365
0.5 0.348045
0.55 0.382628
0.6 0.408
0.65 0.421995
0.7 0.422329
0.75 0.406542
0.8 0.371952
0.85 0.315698
0.9 0.235035
0.95 0.128528
1. 0.
pMBenefit1  PlotMBenefit1, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
pCBenefit1  PlotCBenefit1, y, 0, 1	
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
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pCost1  PlotCost1, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Red
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pCost2  PlotCost2, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Orange
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pMRS1  PlotMBenefit1  Cost1, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Green
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
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pMRS2  PlotMBenefit1  Cost2, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Purple
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
pCRS1  PlotCBenefit1  Cost1, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Green
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.10
0.05
0.05
0.10
pCRS2  PlotCBenefit1  Cost2, y, 0, 1	, PlotStyle  Purple
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
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ShowpMBenefit1, pCost1, pCost2, PlotRange  All
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
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***Appendix-Spatial Voting Game***
OriginalPDF  
 1
2
Log y
1y

2
2 Π y  y^2
 12 Log y1y 2
2 Π y  y2
OriginalCDF  0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2
  1
0.5  1
2
Erf
Log y
1y 
2

MBenefit2  
 1
2
Log
.5y2
1 .5y2

2
2 Π .5  y  2  .5  y  2^2

 1
2
Log
0.5 y
2
0.5 y
2

2
2 Π 0.5  0.5  y
2
2  y
2

CBenefit2  Erf
Log .5y21.5y2 
2

Erf
Log 0.5
y
2
0.5 y
2

2

Cost3  y
y
Cost4  y^
y
***General Overview***
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PlotOriginalPDF, y, 1  2, 1
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
PlotMBenefit2, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
PlotOriginalCDF, y, 1  2, 1
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
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PlotCBenefit2, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
***The Game***
***MRS-Constant Costs***
PlotMBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
PlotAbsMBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
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FindMinimumAbsMBenefit2  y, y, .60
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
2.83116  108, y  0.698713
NIntegrateMBenefit2, y, 0, 0.698713
0.916292
***MRS-Continous Growth Costs***
PlotMBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
PlotAbsMBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
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FindMinimumAbsMBenefit2  y^, y, .60
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
1.78879  108, y  0.769424
NIntegrateMBenefit2, y, 0, 0.769424
0.958433
***CRS-Constant Costs***
PlotCBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
DCBenefit2  y, y
Plot1  1
0.5`  y
2

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5`  y
2


0.5`  y
2
2 0.5`  y
2
2
0.5`  y
2
, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
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PlotAbs1  1
0.5`  y
2

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5`  y
2


0.5`  y
2
2 0.5`  y
2
2
0.5`  y
2
, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
FindMinimumAbs1  1
0.5`  y
2

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5`  y
2


0.5`  y
2
2 0.5`  y
2
2
0.5`  y
2
, y, 0.6
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
4.391  109, y  0.579874
NIntegrateMBenefit2, y, 0, 0.579874
0.814678
***CRS-Continous Growth Costs***
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PlotCBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
DCBenefit2  y^, y
Plot

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5` y
2

 0.5`
y
2
2 0.5` y
2

2
0.5`  y
2

0.5`  y
2
  y1, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
2
1
1
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PlotAbs 1
0.5`  y
2

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5`  y
2


0.5`  y
2
2 0.5`  y
2
2
0.5`  y
2
  y1, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
FindMinimum
Abs 1
0.5`  y
2

 1
2
Log
0.5` y
2
0.5` y
2

2
2
Π
1
2 0.5`  y
2


0.5`  y
2
2 0.5`  y
2
2
0.5`  y
2

 y1, y, 0.6
FindMinimum::lstol :
The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need
more than MachinePrecision digits of working precision to meet these tolerances. 
1.15727  108, y  0.567587
NIntegrateMBenefit2, y, 0, 0.567587
0.802223
***Graphs and Tables***
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GridTabley, CBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1, 0.05
Power::infy : Infinite expression 
1
0.
 encountered. 
0. 0.
0.05 0.0297219
0.1 0.0590439
0.15 0.087562
0.2 0.114864
0.25 0.140527
0.3 0.164109
0.35 0.185152
0.4 0.203171
0.45 0.217655
0.5 0.228063
0.55 0.233825
0.6 0.234343
0.65 0.229002
0.7 0.217189
0.75 0.198334
0.8 0.171996
0.85 0.138005
0.9 0.0967646
0.95 0.0497513
1. 0.
GridTabley, CBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1, 0.05
Power::infy : Infinite expression 
1
0.
 encountered. 
0. 0.
0.05 0.0794312
0.1 0.157131
0.15 0.231803
0.2 0.302275
0.25 0.367436
0.3 0.426207
0.35 0.477522
0.4 0.520322
0.45 0.553542
0.5 0.576108
0.55 0.586931
0.6 0.584911
0.65 0.568942
0.7 0.537932
0.75 0.490845
0.8 0.426776
0.85 0.345109
0.9 0.245802
0.95 0.129897
1. 0.
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pOriginalDensity  PlotOriginalPDF, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Black
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
pOriginalDistribution  PlotOriginalCDF, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Black
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pMBenefit2  PlotMBenefit2, y, 0, 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
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pCBenefit2  PlotCBenefit2, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Dashed
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ShowpOriginalDensity, pMBenefit2, PlotRange  All
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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1.0
1.5
ShowpOriginalDistribution, pCBenefit2, PlotRange  All
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pMargins21  PlotMBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Green
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
pMargins22  PlotMBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Purple
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
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1.0
1.5
pMargins23  PlotCBenefit2  y, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Green
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0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
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pMargins24  PlotCBenefit2  y^, y, 0, 1, PlotStyle  Purple
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
ShowpMargins21, pMargins22, PlotRange  All
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
ShowpMargins23, pMargins24, PlotRange  All
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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Empirics I: War Outcomes and Duration Statistical Tests 
Appendix C 
*In all models fixed intercepts were estimated. The estimates for these constants are omitted 
from the tables for clarity of presentation.  
1. Correlation Matrix 
2. Variance Inflation Factors – OLS Approximation (for regression model)  
3. War Outcomes: Ordered Logit Bivariate Specifications  
4. War Outcomes: Ordered Logit Specific Country Controls  
5. War Outcomes: Ordered Probit Replication 
6. War Duration: Cox Loss Hazard, Outlier Robustness Check  
7. War Duration: Cox Tie Hazard  
8. War Duration: Cox Win Hazard  
9. War Duration: Competing Risks Loss  
10. War Duration: Competing Risks Tie  
11. War Duration: Competing Risks Win  
12. Selection into Treatment: Observable Covariates  
13. 2sls with Electoral State predictor & lagged instrument  
14. 2sls with GWF predictor & lagged instrument  
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1. Correlation Matrix 
 W/D/L Loss/Not 
Electoral 
State 
Competitive 
Electoral State GWF 
Colonial 
War Helicopters Mechanization Occupation 
External 
Support 
W/D/L 1          
Loss/Not 0.8693 1         
Electoral State 0.3276 0.3659 1        
Competitive 
Electoral State 0.4668 0.5263 0.5931 1       
GWF 0.3355 0.4117 0.4754 0.6871 1      
Colonial War -0.2423 -0.2947 -0.4295 -0.3557 -0.4124 1     
Helicopters -0.1845 -0.0751 0.0981 0.0138 0.0587 -0.1138 1    
Mechanization -0.1373 -0.0506 -0.0791 -0.078 -0.0921 0.0354 0.2888 1   
Occupation -0.2746 -0.3537 -0.3559 -0.3628 -0.4361 0.6936 0.0597 0.1909 1  
External 
Support -0.2998 -0.313 -0.0411 -0.0919 -0.1641 -0.0884 -0.0528 0.0152 0.0542 1 
Polity -0.1803 -0.1402 -0.1798 -0.0807 -0.1706 0.3287 0.0512 0.0551 0.3504 -0.2276 
Democracy -0.0952 -0.0484 -0.1959 -0.0923 -0.1308 0.445 0.0687 0.0239 0.4078 -0.281 
Cold War 0.0888 0.0789 -0.1314 -0.0079 -0.0138 0.1081 0.0297 -0.2213 -0.0208 -0.0868 
Power 0.0109 -0.0339 -0.0941 -0.0984 -0.0972 0.3518 0.2985 0.107 0.4733 -0.2248 
Great Power -0.0934 -0.1659 -0.2409 -0.1208 -0.1538 0.5123 0.0421 0.1925 0.54 -0.1818 
# Languages -0.1312 -0.1026 -0.0391 -0.0725 -0.026 0.0395 0.0074 -0.0793 -0.0598 0.0903 
New State -0.0913 -0.191 0.0306 0.0237 -0.1021 0.1303 -0.1604 -0.0876 0.2784 0.1624 
% Energy Per 
Capita -0.1196 -0.0568 -0.1624 -0.0771 -0.0121 0.2889 0.2435 0.4967 0.3716 -0.1132 
% Trade / GDP -0.0299 0.0735 -0.0699 -0.0881 -0.1145 -0.0118 -0.0783 -0.0172 -0.1313 0.0567 
Rough Terrain 0.0423 -0.0305 -0.276 -0.1124 -0.149 -0.023 0.013 0.1127 -0.0615 0.0382 
% Distance -0.0508 -0.0782 -0.2376 -0.1325 -0.1619 0.4683 0.1563 0.0995 0.5487 -0.1893 
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 Polity Democracy Cold War Power 
Great 
Power 
# 
Languages 
New 
State 
% Energy 
Per Capita 
% Trade / 
GDP 
Rough 
Terrain 
% 
Distance 
W/D/L             
Loss/Not             
Electoral State             
Competitive 
Electoral State             
GWF             
Colonial War             
Helicopters             
Mechanization             
Occupation             
External 
Support             
Polity 1            
Democracy 0.8043 1           
Cold War 0.0277 0.1279 1          
Power 0.316 0.4523 -0.0287 1         
Great Power 0.356 0.4532 -0.0266 0.6676 1        
# Languages -0.0009 -0.087 0.0109 -0.016 -0.1358 1       
New State 0.0769 -0.0331 -0.1012 -0.0768 -0.085 0.0612 1      
% Energy Per 
Capita 0.2953 0.3087 -0.1724 0.4597 0.3915 -0.117 -0.0147 1     
% Trade / GDP 0.0639 0 0.2524 -0.5052 -0.3439 0.0889 0.0156 -0.0659 1    
Rough Terrain 0.0178 -0.0229 -0.0296 -0.0175 0.0304 0.0504 0.012 -0.016 -0.0453 1   
% Distance 0.2281 0.3214 0.0128 0.5825 0.4903 0.1195 0.1774 0.2791 -0.2468 -0.0456 1 
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2. Variance Inflation Factors – OLS Approximation (for regression model)  
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF 
       
Power 2.96 0.3378  
Competitive Electoral 
State 1.38 0.7227 
Occupation 2.94 0.3402  Colonial War 3.25 0.3075 
Colonial War 2.28 0.4394  Helicopters 1.48 0.6760 
% Distance 2.03 0.4919  Occupation 3.36 0.2976 
% Trade / GDP 1.74 0.5732  External Support 1.41 0.7093 
% Energy Per Capita 1.57 0.6354  Polity 1.71 0.5858 
Polity 1.34 0.7472  Cold War  2.95 0.3394 
Competitive Electoral 
State 1.31 0.7625  Power 4.78 0.2093 
New State 1.29 0.7779  # Languages 1.5 0.6651 
Helicopters 1.26 0.7962  New State 1.55 0.6472 
External Support 1.23 0.8113  % Energy Per Capita 3.34 0.2994 
Cold War  1.22 0.8223  % Trade / GDP 2.29 0.4373 
# Languages 1.13 0.8885  % Distance 2.35 0.4258 
Rough Terrain 1.04 0.9596  % Elevation 1.14 0.8799 
Mean VIF 1.67    Region    
    Eastern Europe 5.74 0.1742 
    Latin America 5.44 0.1837 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 13.27 0.0754 
    Asia 11.03 0.0907 
    North Africa 9.94 0.1006 
    Decade Began    
    1955 2.24 0.4454 
    1965 2.71 0.3687 
    1975 4.43 0.2258 
    1985 4.49 0.2228 
    1995 3.21 0.3114 
    Mean VIF 3.96   
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3. Ordered Logistic Regression: Bivariate Specifications       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                          
Competitive 
Electoral State 1.815*** 1.977*** 1.909*** 1.743*** 1.989*** 1.955*** 1.940*** 1.945*** 1.984*** 1.933*** 1.968*** 1.957*** 
 (0.389) (0.350) (0.356) (0.403) (0.362) (0.354) (0.349) (0.347) (0.359) (0.350) (0.355) (0.338) 
Colonial War  -0.635            
 (0.724)            
Helicopters  -0.793**           
  (0.351)           
Mechanization   -0.138          
   (0.170)          
Occupation    -0.662         
    (0.532)         
External 
Support     -0.686***        
     (0.209)        
Polity       -0.0463*       
      (0.0246)       
Democracy       -0.270      
       (0.351)      
Cold War         0.369     
        (0.364)     
Power          0.0676    
         (0.0845)    
Great Power           -0.224   
          (0.415)   
# Languages            -0.0352  
           (0.0291)  
New State             -0.546 
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            (0.495) 
             
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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4. Ordered Logistic Regression: Specific Country Controls       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                    
Competitive Electoral 
State 1.958*** 1.869*** 1.959*** 1.899*** 1.977*** 1.970*** 2.148*** 1.951*** 2.086*** 
 (0.356) (0.359) (0.354) (0.347) (0.356) (0.351) (0.397) (0.348) (0.446) 
UK 0.143        0.234 
 (0.231)        (0.267) 
France  -1.217***       -1.011*** 
  (0.306)       (0.360) 
Russia   -0.154      -0.109 
   (0.427)      (0.437) 
USA    -13.10***     -13.68*** 
    (1.051)     (1.068) 
China     1.887***    1.958*** 
     (0.237)    (0.304) 
Turkey      -0.821***   -0.784*** 
      (0.199)   (0.213) 
Iraq       1.445***  1.404*** 
       (0.332)  (0.382) 
Germany        - - 
          
          
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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5. Ordered Probit Regression      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
War Outcomes W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L W/D/L 
                    
Competitive Electoral 
State 1.149*** 1.043*** 1.005*** 1.127*** 1.069*** 1.121*** 1.289*** 1.360*** 1.493*** 
 (0.194) (0.224) (0.224) (0.241) (0.234) (0.236) (0.276) (0.280) (0.290) 
Colonial War   -0.589 -0.438 -0.454 -0.490 -0.707 -0.764 -0.894 -1.133* 
  (0.479) (0.503) (0.540) (0.516) (0.515) (0.545) (0.632) (0.680) 
Helicopters  -0.672***  -0.680*** -0.654*** -0.959*** -1.060*** -1.049*** -1.034*** 
  (0.234)  (0.226) (0.232) (0.246) (0.273) (0.273) (0.311) 
Mechanization   -0.116       
   (0.0874)       
Occupation  -0.136 -0.176 0.0221 -0.0838 -0.184 -0.150 -0.216 -0.375 
  (0.382) (0.400) (0.426) (0.400) (0.500) (0.490) (0.474) (0.503) 
External Support  -0.471*** -0.438*** -0.564*** -0.506*** -0.488*** -0.515*** -0.520*** -0.485*** 
  (0.127) (0.122) (0.127) (0.135) (0.123) (0.134) (0.147) (0.152) 
Polity     -0.0406**  -0.0477*** -0.0572*** -0.0506*** -0.0620*** 
    (0.0159)  (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0183) (0.0230) 
Democracy     -0.248     
     (0.263)     
Cold War       0.376* 0.276 0.382* 0.302 
      (0.202) (0.212) (0.199) (0.393) 
Power       0.170*** 0.266*** 0.312*** 0.249* 
      (0.0624) (0.0840) (0.0976) (0.130) 
# Languages      -0.0158 -0.0234 -0.0250 -0.0250 
      (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0196) 
New State       -0.104 -0.124 -0.113 -0.323 
      (0.310) (0.297) (0.328) (0.369) 
% Energy Per Capita        -0.0565 -0.0806 0.00347 
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       (0.0566) (0.0651) (0.0909) 
% Trade / GDP        0.208* 0.183 0.267** 
       (0.125) (0.129) (0.124) 
% Distance       0.0169 0.00255 0.00979 
       (0.0428) (0.0462) (0.0481) 
Rough Terrain       0.185** 0.153 0.171* 
       (0.0927) (0.101) (0.0962) 
Region FE        Yes Yes 
Decade FE         Yes 
          
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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6. Cox Proportional Hazard Regression - Dropping Outlier Cases      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Loss Hazard: Drop if-> >35 years >25 years > 15 years >35 years >25 years > 15 years >35 years >25 years > 15 years 
                   
Competitive Electoral 
State 0.129*** 0.166*** 0.267*** 0.119*** 0.181*** 0.221*** 0.0698*** 0.0890*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0703) (0.104) (0.0648) (0.0937) (0.0996) (0.0457) (0.0552) (0.0362) 
Colonial War    1.093 1.244 1.053 0.542 0.907 0.377 
    (0.469) (0.594) (0.436) (0.437) (0.800) (0.327) 
Helicopters    0.878 0.846 2.455** 0.798 0.857 2.721 
    (0.380) (0.384) (0.911) (0.410) (0.432) (1.715) 
Occupation    2.602** 2.451* 3.329* 2.825 2.247 3.833* 
    (1.189) (1.212) (2.392) (2.035) (1.610) (3.071) 
External Support    1.101 1.128 1.148 1.041 1.057 0.786 
    (0.230) (0.267) (0.214) (0.256) (0.267) (0.236) 
Polity    1.062** 1.074** 1.062* 1.075* 1.077 1.080 
    (0.0278) (0.0333) (0.0360) (0.0412) (0.0544) (0.0548) 
Cold War    0.361*** 0.372*** 0.443** 0.944 0.764 1.093 
    (0.133) (0.140) (0.160) (0.704) (0.667) (0.940) 
Power    0.748* 0.742* 0.776* 0.771 0.809 0.867 
    (0.119) (0.122) (0.114) (0.179) (0.205) (0.226) 
# Languages    1.019 1.017 1.003 1.031 1.038 0.984 
    (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0250) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
New State     1.075 1.001 1.321 0.923 0.841 2.519 
    (0.420) (0.408) (0.575) (0.595) (0.572) (1.582) 
% Energy Per Capita    1.075 1.061 0.982 1.130 1.088 0.983 
    (0.0890) (0.0856) (0.0734) (0.156) (0.141) (0.183) 
% Trade / GDP    0.695** 0.700** 0.714** 0.818 0.856 0.814 
    (0.103) (0.106) (0.122) (0.124) (0.154) (0.178) 
% Distance    0.902* 0.899* 0.860** 0.916 0.909 0.831*** 
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    (0.0489) (0.0513) (0.0510) (0.0718) (0.0736) (0.0566) 
Rough Terrain    0.767 0.786 0.806 0.865 0.851 0.858 
    (0.168) (0.163) (0.235) (0.270) (0.262) (0.289) 
Region FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Decade FE       Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 131 125 106 131 125 106 131 125 106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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7. Cox Proportional Hazard Regression 
Tie Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Competitive Electoral 
State 1.242 0.913 1.054 0.939 0.994 1.200 1.050 1.378 1.103 
 (0.544) (0.405) (0.458) (0.391) (0.434) (0.491) (0.397) (0.636) (0.491) 
Colonial War   0.722 1.018 0.732 0.842 1.020 0.867 1.224 1.615 
  (0.836) (1.156) (0.863) (1.094) (1.211) (0.988) (1.486) (2.232) 
Helicopters  0.852  0.813 0.794 1.023 1.280 1.165 1.356 
  (0.264)  (0.267) (0.258) (0.398) (0.576) (0.489) (0.728) 
Mechanization   1.343*       
   (0.223)       
Occupation  0.602 0.439 0.649 0.658 1.466 1.544 0.850 0.691 
  (0.584) (0.426) (0.603) (0.631) (1.386) (1.219) (0.662) (0.604) 
External Support  0.682** 0.738 0.655* 0.623** 0.617* 0.715 0.631 0.632 
  (0.129) (0.138) (0.146) (0.145) (0.180) (0.231) (0.232) (0.269) 
Polity    0.987  1.010 1.021 1.040 1.019 
    (0.0297)  (0.0407) (0.0441) (0.0498) (0.0528) 
Democracy     0.651     
     (0.357)     
Cold War      0.377*** 0.364*** 0.430** 1.428 
      (0.134) (0.133) (0.166) (1.100) 
Power      0.707** 0.669* 0.834 0.969 
      (0.112) (0.141) (0.194) (0.235) 
# Languages      0.987 0.995 0.983 0.988 
      (0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0354) (0.0335) 
New State      0.136* 0.167* 0.153* 0.226 
      (0.141) (0.175) (0.163) (0.285) 
% Energy Per Capita       1.145 1.059 1.026 
       (0.119) (0.125) (0.164) 
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% Trade / GDP       1.127 1.280 1.066 
       (0.202) (0.352) (0.267) 
% Distance       0.974 0.923 0.942 
       (0.0570) (0.0670) (0.0794) 
Rough Terrain       0.806** 0.771* 0.822 
       (0.0870) (0.106) (0.118) 
Region FE        Yes Yes 
Decade FE         Yes 
          
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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8. Cox Proportional Hazards Regression      
Win Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Competitive Electoral 
State 2.011** 1.496 1.651 1.426 1.569 1.280 1.483 1.689 2.163 
 (0.612) (0.514) (0.537) (0.497) (0.541) (0.496) (0.648) (0.782) (1.121) 
Colonial War   0.341** 0.447 0.478 0.559 0.451 0.561 1.057 0.490 
  (0.185) (0.258) (0.335) (0.382) (0.328) (0.439) (0.846) (0.469) 
Helicopters  0.168***  0.145*** 0.143*** 0.151*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 
  (0.0842)  (0.0764) (0.0739) (0.0843) (0.0769) (0.0667) (0.0571) 
Mechanization   0.794       
   (0.125)       
Occupation  1.622 1.710 1.688 1.868 1.435 1.963 1.179 1.127 
  (0.726) (0.908) (0.821) (0.836) (0.786) (1.249) (0.717) (0.746) 
External Support  0.591** 0.625** 0.462*** 0.455*** 0.489*** 0.494*** 0.467*** 0.425*** 
  (0.125) (0.118) (0.107) (0.109) (0.116) (0.111) (0.105) (0.106) 
Polity    0.934***  0.935*** 0.926*** 0.937*** 0.916*** 
    (0.0211)  (0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0277) 
Democracy     0.305***     
     (0.139)     
Cold War       1.156 0.893 1.039 1.036 
      (0.384) (0.364) (0.459) (0.571) 
Power      1.067 1.238* 1.324* 1.187 
      (0.0895) (0.140) (0.192) (0.238) 
# Languages       0.988 0.984 0.983 0.989 
      (0.0256) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0366) 
New State       1.346 1.175 1.053 0.783 
      (0.446) (0.463) (0.385) (0.347) 
% Energy Per Capita       0.896 0.890 1.068 
       (0.0608) (0.0701) (0.125) 
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% Trade / GDP       1.147 1.281 1.595** 
       (0.138) (0.198) (0.310) 
% Distance       0.939 0.881 0.854* 
       (0.0635) (0.0681) (0.0736) 
Rough Terrain       1.192* 1.244* 1.320* 
       (0.124) (0.143) (0.202) 
Region FE        Yes Yes 
Decade FE         Yes 
          
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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9. Competing Risks Regression 
Loss Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Competitive Electoral 
State 0.125*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.139*** 0.105*** 0.0788*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0722) (0.0699) (0.0734) (0.0731) (0.0667) (0.0520) (0.0428) 
Colonial War  1.154 1.107 1.204 1.148 1.557 1.662 1.659 
  (0.583) (0.471) (0.610) (0.592) (0.699) (0.766) (1.446) 
Helicopters  1.092  1.030 1.088 1.529 1.657 1.658 
  (0.343)  (0.324) (0.344) (0.524) (0.563) (0.721) 
Mechanization   1.013      
   (0.151)      
Occupation  1.629 1.667 1.298 1.610 1.259 2.042 2.839 
  (0.742) (0.778) (0.657) (0.756) (0.669) (1.060) (1.979) 
External Support  1.617*** 1.614*** 1.736*** 1.624*** 1.590** 1.566*** 1.319 
  (0.227) (0.229) (0.256) (0.248) (0.295) (0.257) (0.235) 
Polity    1.033  1.044 1.060** 1.052 
    (0.0223)  (0.0275) (0.0297) (0.0432) 
Democracy     1.033    
     (0.421)    
Cold War      0.441*** 0.533* 0.595 
      (0.130) (0.178) (0.485) 
Power      0.868 0.731** 0.751 
      (0.101) (0.102) (0.183) 
# Languages      1.006 1.023 1.032 
      (0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0229) 
New State      1.454 1.561 1.291 
      (0.502) (0.545) (0.856) 
% Energy Per Capita       1.071 1.102 
       (0.0816) (0.143) 
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% Trade / GDP       0.637*** 0.767 
       (0.0968) (0.128) 
% Distance       0.904* 0.863* 
       (0.0502) (0.0684) 
Rough Terrain       0.796 0.868 
       (0.172) (0.250) 
Region FE        Yes 
Decade FE        Yes 
         
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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10. Competing Risks Regression 
Tie Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Competitive Electoral 
State 2.338* 1.689 1.716 1.642 1.577 1.989 1.854 1.664 
 (1.075) (0.845) (0.858) (0.826) (0.803) (1.065) (0.925) (0.815) 
Colonial War  1.173 1.090 1.005 0.900 0.782 0.660 2.095 
  (1.559) (1.338) (1.379) (1.277) (1.076) (0.908) (3.164) 
Helicopters  1.920**  1.935** 1.906** 1.792* 1.760 2.138** 
  (0.520)  (0.515) (0.493) (0.597) (0.631) (0.736) 
Mechanization   1.366**      
   (0.190)      
Occupation  0.320 0.296 0.294 0.296 0.639 0.449 0.365 
  (0.338) (0.301) (0.304) (0.304) (0.736) (0.581) (0.500) 
External Support  0.839 0.827 0.872 0.895 0.782 0.869 1.029 
  (0.160) (0.154) (0.177) (0.182) (0.183) (0.204) (0.367) 
Polity    1.026  1.027 1.026 1.048 
    (0.0260)  (0.0282) (0.0267) (0.0426) 
Democracy     1.612    
     (0.674)    
Cold War       0.723 0.697 1.291 
      (0.299) (0.300) (0.964) 
Power       0.859 0.868 0.989 
      (0.0893) (0.107) (0.197) 
# Languages      1.016 1.002 1.006 
      (0.0244) (0.0315) (0.0346) 
New State      0.204** 0.221* 0.440 
      (0.161) (0.192) (0.411) 
% Energy Per Capita       1.106 0.905 
       (0.0877) (0.114) 
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% Trade / GDP       1.417** 1.238 
       (0.244) (0.275) 
% Distance       1.079 1.113 
       (0.0693) (0.0843) 
Rough Terrain       0.825** 0.808* 
       (0.0713) (0.0903) 
Region FE        Yes 
Decade FE        Yes 
         
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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11. Competing Risks Regression 
Win Hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Competitive Electoral 
State 2.750*** 2.463** 2.250** 2.679** 2.633** 2.140* 2.537* 4.184** 
 (0.872) (0.964) (0.847) (1.095) (1.041) (0.884) (1.232) (2.437) 
Colonial War  0.434 0.507 0.621 0.608 0.438 0.517 0.419 
  (0.251) (0.338) (0.441) (0.408) (0.325) (0.409) (0.365) 
Helicopters  0.220***  0.221*** 0.225*** 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.188*** 
  (0.112)  (0.108) (0.111) (0.0947) (0.105) (0.0841) 
Mechanization   0.755**      
   (0.106)      
Occupation  1.352 1.394 1.398 1.459 1.061 1.456 1.094 
  (0.666) (0.741) (0.687) (0.688) (0.572) (0.892) (0.734) 
External Support  0.609** 0.630** 0.521*** 0.548*** 0.572** 0.581** 0.560** 
  (0.130) (0.126) (0.114) (0.124) (0.130) (0.128) (0.131) 
Polity    0.939***  0.938*** 0.939*** 0.929*** 
    (0.0191)  (0.0186) (0.0217) (0.0250) 
Democracy     0.489*    
     (0.201)    
Cold War      1.707* 1.393 1.210 
      (0.538) (0.567) (0.671) 
Power      1.188** 1.304** 1.215 
      (0.0827) (0.146) (0.258) 
# Languages      0.984 0.979 0.984 
      (0.0272) (0.0316) (0.0384) 
New State      1.607 1.456 0.953 
      (0.512) (0.526) (0.412) 
% Energy Per Capita       0.905 1.042 
       (0.0699) (0.141) 
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% Trade / GDP       1.088 1.453* 
       (0.136) (0.292) 
% Distance       0.944 0.885 
       (0.0663) (0.0775) 
Rough Terrain       1.176* 1.328* 
       (0.108) (0.197) 
Region FE        Yes 
Decade FE        Yes 
         
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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12. Logit/Ordered Logit: Selection Into Treatment Status-Known Covariates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
D.V. W/D/L W/D/L 
Electoral 
State 
Electoral 
State GWF GWF 
Comp. Electoral 
State 
Comp. Electoral 
State 
                  
Colonial War -1.689* -1.233 -1.491 -2.176 -1.207 -1.400 1.529 1.034 
 (0.975) (0.904) (1.747) (1.663) (1.161) (1.224) (1.533) (1.763) 
Helicopters -1.538***  1.098  -0.347  0.0510  
 (0.409)  (0.833)  (0.445)  (0.618)  
Mechanization  -0.221  -0.00385  -0.0416  0.00975 
  (0.162)  (0.261)  (0.214)  (0.318) 
Occupation -1.141 -0.946 -0.515 -0.166 -0.372 -0.833 -2.422** -3.268*** 
 (0.743) (0.707) (0.950) (1.081) (0.629) (0.705) (0.989) (1.015) 
External Support -0.781*** -0.726*** 0.0535 0.0109 -0.153 -0.101 0.524 0.529 
 (0.207) (0.186) (0.318) (0.294) (0.210) (0.229) (0.347) (0.370) 
Polity -0.0688***  -0.0506  -0.0457  -0.0278  
 (0.0255)  (0.0415)  (0.0365)  (0.0422)  
Democracy  -0.512  -0.525  -0.283  -0.0664 
  (0.383)  (0.643)  (0.838)  (0.738) 
Cold War 0.572 0.489 -0.178 0.0716 -0.0487 -0.0587 0.0322 -0.0502 
 (0.386) (0.402) (0.697) (0.629) (0.463) (0.443) (0.679) (0.664) 
Power 0.380**  0.406**  -0.00433  0.211  
 (0.153)  (0.191)  (0.147)  (0.160)  
Great Power  0.317  0.872  1.155*  2.719** 
  (0.520)  (0.597)  (0.696)  (1.102) 
# Languages -0.0352 -0.0346 -0.00933 -0.00331 0.0189 0.0194 -0.00463 0.00949 
 (0.0299) (0.0281) (0.0294) (0.0346) (0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0365) (0.0380) 
New State 0.187 0.0845 1.465* 0.795 -0.112 0.0810 0.938 1.310** 
 (0.564) (0.583) (0.763) (0.713) (0.486) (0.489) (0.635) (0.578) 
% Energy Per Capita -0.0497 -0.0118 -0.289** -0.164 0.0620 0.0256 -0.145 -0.135 
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 (0.0863) (0.0954) (0.140) (0.148) (0.125) (0.138) (0.188) (0.214) 
% Trade / GDP 0.147 -0.0575 -0.253 -0.556** -0.143 -0.0941 -0.0611 -0.0356 
 (0.231) (0.217) (0.244) (0.272) (0.191) (0.161) (0.236) (0.208) 
% Distance  0.0251 0.0479 -0.168* -0.0805 0.0360 0.00482 -0.0485 -0.0618 
 (0.0727) (0.0594) (0.0950) (0.0832) (0.0626) (0.0654) (0.103) (0.109) 
Rough Terrain 0.152 0.120 -1.014*** -1.009*** -0.296*** -0.323*** -0.511*** -0.605*** 
 (0.135) (0.118) (0.257) (0.280) (0.0922) (0.104) (0.152) (0.177) 
Lag Electoral State   2.925*** 2.781***     
   (0.689) (0.705)     
Lag GWF     2.490*** 2.431***   
     (0.569) (0.546)   
Lag Comp. Electoral 
State       4.445*** 4.503*** 
       (0.892) (0.875) 
         
Observations 132 132 132 132 131 131 132 132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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13. Instrumental Variables Linear Regression: Two Staged Least Squares (2sls)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D.V. War 
Outcome LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
                      
Electoral State 0.561*** 0.565*** 0.529*** 0.704*** 0.700*** 0.852*** 0.972*** 0.873*** 1.264*** 1.161*** 
 (0.154) (0.157) (0.181) (0.164) (0.183) (0.206) (0.273) (0.288) (0.332) (0.331) 
Colonial War  -0.354 -0.165 -0.586* -0.510  -0.226 -0.0235 -0.571* -0.420 
  (0.250) (0.262) (0.317) (0.320)  (0.225) (0.253) (0.294) (0.271) 
Helicopters  -0.597***  -0.552***   -0.652***  -0.615***  
  (0.142)  (0.146)   (0.169)  (0.168)  
Mechanization   -0.0842  -0.0935   -0.0874  -0.0978 
   (0.0616)  (0.0703)   (0.0589)  (0.0676) 
Occupation  -0.240 -0.243 -0.296 -0.277  -0.120 -0.154 -0.118 -0.161 
  (0.251) (0.273) (0.261) (0.264)  (0.264) (0.277) (0.281) (0.270) 
External Support  -0.242*** -0.247*** -0.217*** -0.203***  -0.226*** -0.234*** -0.193*** -0.185*** 
  (0.0653) (0.0664) (0.0756) (0.0731)  (0.0638) (0.0673) (0.0723) (0.0710) 
Polity  -0.0199**  -0.0226*   -0.0189**  -0.0215**  
  (0.00874)  (0.0115)   (0.00836)  (0.0104)  
Democracy   -0.179  -0.244   -0.194  -0.283* 
   (0.143)  (0.172)   (0.139)  (0.168) 
Cold War  0.241** 0.193 0.301 0.292  0.286** 0.219* 0.316 0.336 
  (0.118) (0.131) (0.215) (0.237)  (0.111) (0.120) (0.206) (0.236) 
Power  0.0952*  0.0503   0.0753  -0.00732  
  (0.0555)  (0.0741)   (0.0554)  (0.0857)  
Great Power   0.0403  -0.335   0.0241  -0.426* 
   (0.190)  (0.220)   (0.188)  (0.224) 
# Languages  -0.0133 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0198*  -0.0127 -0.0151 -0.0164* -0.0225** 
  (0.00926) (0.0103) (0.00976) (0.0109)  (0.00876) (0.00970) (0.00968) (0.0108) 
New State  -0.0599 -0.0702 -0.154 -0.244  -0.168 -0.143 -0.322 -0.357** 
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  (0.159) (0.177) (0.190) (0.197)  (0.156) (0.160) (0.196) (0.181) 
% Energy Per 
Capita  -0.00253 0.00419 0.0558 0.0793*  0.00643 0.00749 0.0985 0.101* 
  (0.0321) (0.0370) (0.0480) (0.0472)  (0.0361) (0.0372) (0.0678) (0.0545) 
% Trade / GDP  0.0655 0.0101 0.0833 0.0256  0.0709 0.0261 0.0828 0.0452 
  (0.0716) (0.0793) (0.0713) (0.0724)  (0.0657) (0.0744) (0.0586) (0.0670) 
% Distance  0.0287 0.0322 0.0247 0.0310  0.0378 0.0364* 0.0357 0.0356 
  (0.0250) (0.0228) (0.0278) (0.0251)  (0.0250) (0.0219) (0.0268) (0.0236) 
Rough Terrain  0.0990** 0.0951* 0.106** 0.101**  0.144*** 0.134*** 0.165*** 0.150*** 
  (0.0466) (0.0515) (0.0467) (0.0502)  (0.0471) (0.0492) (0.0504) (0.0529) 
Region FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Decade FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
           
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R-squared 0.112 0.370 0.283 0.422 0.374 0.082 0.331 0.254 0.358 0.328 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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14. Instrumental Variables Linear Regression: Two Staged Least Squares (2sls)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D.V. War 
Outcome LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
                      
GWF 0.330*** 0.234*** 0.225** 0.245*** 0.248** 0.443*** 0.339*** 0.276* 0.379*** 0.383** 
 (0.0704) (0.0868) (0.0927) (0.0850) (0.0966) (0.101) (0.131) (0.143) (0.131) (0.149) 
Colonial War  -0.508* -0.290 -0.498 -0.509  -0.448* -0.256 -0.411 -0.417 
  (0.256) (0.278) (0.320) (0.345)  (0.238) (0.262) (0.285) (0.301) 
Helicopters  -0.557***  -0.530***   -0.559***  -0.540***  
  (0.141)  (0.148)   (0.134)  (0.138)  
Mechanization   -0.0656  -0.0629   -0.0624  -0.0538 
   (0.0642)  (0.0734)   (0.0608)  (0.0657) 
Occupation  -0.0984 -0.103 -0.238 -0.198  -0.0220 -0.0626 -0.156 -0.108 
  (0.256) (0.316) (0.285) (0.314)  (0.265) (0.319) (0.283) (0.318) 
External Support  -0.258*** -0.262*** -0.243*** -0.218***  -0.243*** -0.256*** -0.218*** -0.198*** 
  (0.0655) (0.0696) (0.0802) (0.0805)  (0.0605) (0.0639) (0.0752) (0.0748) 
Polity  -0.0232**  -0.0252*   -0.0228**  -0.0235*  
  (0.00936)  (0.0130)   (0.00890)  (0.0121)  
Democracy   -0.189  -0.220   -0.190  -0.230 
   (0.150)  (0.190)   (0.143)  (0.179) 
Cold War  0.112 0.107 0.151 0.111  0.0979 0.102 0.0941 0.0583 
  (0.133) (0.148) (0.219) (0.224)  (0.126) (0.140) (0.213) (0.217) 
Power  0.132**  0.142*   0.136***  0.146**  
  (0.0548)  (0.0734)   (0.0515)  (0.0668)  
Great Power   0.00399  -0.264   -0.00313  -0.273 
   (0.186)  (0.219)   (0.182)  (0.208) 
# Languages  -0.0139 -0.0155 -0.0121 -0.0148  -0.0141* -0.0156 -0.0117 -0.0143 
  (0.00903) (0.0105) (0.00945) (0.0114)  (0.00830) (0.00981) (0.00839) (0.0103) 
New State  0.0213 -0.0252 -0.0487 -0.166  0.00775 -0.0332 -0.0588 -0.177 
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  (0.176) (0.199) (0.211) (0.230)  (0.164) (0.188) (0.189) (0.207) 
% Energy Per 
Capita  -0.0308 -0.0169 -0.0223 0.0289  -0.0385 -0.0207 -0.0337 0.0197 
  (0.0292) (0.0358) (0.0472) (0.0474)  (0.0266) (0.0339) (0.0442) (0.0430) 
% Trade / GDP  0.109 0.0183 0.156* 0.0466  0.124* 0.0236 0.166** 0.0588 
  (0.0745) (0.0794) (0.0854) (0.0821)  (0.0700) (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.0692) 
% Distance  0.0123 0.0245 0.00717 0.0237  0.0110 0.0243 0.00784 0.0246 
  (0.0250) (0.0238) (0.0293) (0.0266)  (0.0234) (0.0223) (0.0261) (0.0237) 
Rough Terrain  0.0662 0.0623 0.0648 0.0575  0.0775 0.0677 0.0758* 0.0699 
  (0.0507) (0.0525) (0.0499) (0.0508)  (0.0506) (0.0504) (0.0459) (0.0463) 
Region FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Decade FE    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
           
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R-squared 0.113 0.346 0.251 0.377 0.311 0.099 0.338 0.250 0.365 0.300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on country.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Empirics II: Quantitative Case Study – 2003 War in Iraq 
Appendix D 
1. Replication of Table 6-4 with alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log).  
2. Replication of Table 6-5 with alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log). 
3. Replication of Table 6-6 with alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log). 
4. Replication of Table 6-7 with alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log). 
5. Replication of Table 6-8 with alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log). 
6. Replication of Table 6-8 test for predictors of SOI spending, in first differences.  
7. Replication of Table 6-8 test for predictors of SOI spending, in first differences & with 
alternative independent variable (Turnout Difference-Log).  
8. Berman et al 2013 – Interaction of CERP Spending with Troop Strength and PRT 
presence.  
9. Alternative tests for ethnic/sectarian identity – CIA and Landscan Demographic Data.  
10. Replication of Table 6-7 with not logged predictor (Inverse Turnout Rank).  
11. Replication of Table 6-8 with not logged predictor (Inverse Turnout Rank).  
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1. Linear Regression-Alternative Independent Variable 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Synergy           
Turnout Difference - Log  0.0920*** 0.0902*** 0.0836*** 0.0860*** 0.0907*** 0.0651** 0.0904*** 0.0902*** 0.0891*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0286) (0.0275) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0252) (0.0284) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0302) 
Surge 0.0520 0.0732 0.129 0.0741 0.0750 0.0394 0.0822 0.0846 0.0800 0.0512 
 (0.126) (0.139) (0.143) (0.104) (0.137) (0.106) (0.139) (0.145) (0.140) (0.134) 
Surge x Turnout Difference - Log -0.180*** -0.178*** -0.174*** -0.155*** -0.177*** -0.151*** -0.178*** -0.169*** -0.181*** -0.178*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0593) (0.0518) (0.0398) (0.0594) (0.0438) (0.0593) (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0583) 
Sectarian ID           
Shiite  -0.293*** -0.286*** -0.342*** -0.457*** -0.284*** -0.425*** -0.280** -0.268** -0.290** -0.264** 
 (0.0982) (0.106) (0.115) (0.147) (0.104) (0.141) (0.108) (0.107) (0.113) (0.108) 
Mixed -0.170** -0.155* -0.201** -0.355** -0.156* -0.244** -0.151* -0.151* -0.157* -0.113 
 (0.0783) (0.0894) (0.0886) (0.140) (0.0897) (0.121) (0.0910) (0.0872) (0.0937) (0.0975) 
Kurdish -0.302*** -0.290** -0.365*** -0.484*** -0.286*** -0.413*** -0.290** -0.320*** -0.292** -0.252** 
 (0.0945) (0.110) (0.119) (0.145) (0.107) (0.138) (0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.115) 
Coalition Forces           
Troop Strength  0.0684** 0.0708** 0.0552* 0.0682** 0.0628** 0.0709** 0.0625** 0.0689** 0.0667** 
  (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0294) (0.0288) (0.0292) 
Lagged Troop Strength  -0.0545 -0.0382 -0.00314 -0.0559 -0.0284 -0.0552 -0.0474 -0.0349 -0.0416 
  (0.0383) (0.0412) (0.0424) (0.0394) (0.0407) (0.0384) (0.0425) (0.0443) (0.0412) 
PRT  -0.0431 -0.0508 -0.0654 -0.0396 -0.00254 -0.0455 -0.0494 -0.0454 -0.0469 
  (0.0559) (0.0561) (0.0527) (0.0597) (0.0403) (0.0573) (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0560) 
Spending           
CERP Per Capita   -0.00795        
   (0.00484)        
CERP Per Capita < $50K     -0.0605**       
    (0.0234)       
CERP Per Capita > $50K     -0.00240       
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    (0.00446)       
Non CERP Per Capita < $50K      -0.00197      
     (0.0170)      
Non CERP Per Capita > $50K      0.000185      
     (0.000647)      
CSP Per Capita       -0.0613**     
      (0.0303)     
CAP Per Capita       -0.0184     
      (0.0253)     
USAid Per Capita       -0.00105***     
      (0.000306)     
Natural Resources           
Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted by Price        -4.119    
       (4.447)    
Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted by Price        -0.000269    
       (0.000296)    
Economy           
Unemployment Rate         -0.922*   
        (0.469)   
% Households in Bottom 40% Income         0.00132   
        (0.000969)   
Income Quintile Change, 2002-2004        -0.0159   
        (0.0409)   
Distance to Public Services (Index)         0.686   
        (0.623)   
Reconstruction           
Education Per Capita          -0.0143  
         (0.0118)  
Electricity Per Capita          -0.0218  
         (0.0149)  
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Healthcare Per Capita          0.00401  
         (0.00586)  
Transportation Per Capita          0.00215  
         (0.00783)  
Water & Sanitation Per Capita          -0.00236**  
         (0.00113)  
Non CERP Education Per Capita           -0.0147** 
          (0.00644) 
Non CERP Electricity Per capita           0.160 
          (0.142) 
Non CERP Healthcare Per Capita          -0.000396 
          (0.00393) 
Non CERP Transportation Per Capita          0.0115 
          (0.0102) 
Non CERP Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita          -0.00304** 
          (0.00134) 
Lag of D.V. 0.829*** 0.826*** 0.853*** 0.862*** 0.826*** 0.816*** 0.825*** 0.821*** 0.828*** 0.819*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0267) (0.0292) (0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0263) (0.0274) 
Constant 0.229** 0.204 0.265** 0.385** 0.196 0.363** 0.203 0.0814 0.230* 0.198 
 (0.111) (0.127) (0.132) (0.147) (0.119) (0.139) (0.128) (0.178) (0.129) (0.133) 
           
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 891 927 927 
R-squared 0.757 0.758 0.766 0.776 0.759 0.767 0.759 0.761 0.762 0.761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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2. Linear Regression with District Fixed Effects - First Differences & Alternative Independent Variable 
D.V. Significant 
Incidents Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy           
Turnout 
Difference - 
Log - - - - - - - - - - 
           
Surge 0.0158 0.0316 -0.0143 -0.0368 0.0224 -0.0155 0.0316 0.0305 0.0232 0.0169 
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.112) (0.104) (0.117) (0.0970) (0.122) (0.122) (0.117) (0.123) 
Surge x 
Turnout 
Difference - 
Log -0.178*** -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.183*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.181*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0634) (0.0631) (0.0628) (0.0597) (0.0633) (0.0626) (0.0632) (0.0638) (0.0636) (0.0643) 
Coalition 
Forces           
D. Troop 
Strength  0.0258 0.0424 0.0548 0.0310 0.0444 0.0260 0.0220 0.0290 0.0318 
  (0.0358) (0.0415) (0.0445) (0.0341) (0.0325) (0.0361) (0.0353) (0.0389) (0.0343) 
Lagged D. 
Troop Strength  -0.0449 -0.0256 0.0213 -0.0431 -0.0173 -0.0448 -0.0437 -0.0459 -0.0485 
  (0.0745) (0.0658) (0.0578) (0.0743) (0.0705) (0.0747) (0.0755) (0.0772) (0.0765) 
D. PRT  -0.0368 -0.0410 -0.0224 -0.0438 -0.0181 -0.0369 -0.0650 -0.0308 -0.0157 
  (0.0740) (0.0761) (0.0852) (0.0779) (0.0817) (0.0777) (0.0774) (0.0742) (0.0830) 
Spending           
D. CERP Per 
Capita   -0.0125**        
   (0.00613)        
D. CERP Per 
Capita < $50K     -0.0594***       
    (0.0185)       
D. CERP Per 
Capita > $50K     -0.00799*       
    (0.00461)       
D. Non CERP 
Per Capita < 
$50K      0.00173      
     (0.0240)      
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D. Non CERP 
Per Capita > 
$50K      0.00133      
     (0.000806)      
D. CSP Per 
Capita       -0.0530*     
      (0.0305)     
D. CAP Per 
Capita       -0.00621     
      (0.0265)     
D. USAid Per 
Capita       0.000226     
      (0.00229)     
Natural 
Resources           
D. Oil & Gas 
Reserves 
Weighted by 
Price        -6.323    
       (47.00)    
D. Oil Pipeline 
Volume 
Weighted by 
Price        -8.34e-05    
       (0.00341)    
Economy           
D. 
Unemployment 
Rate         -0.784   
        (0.560)   
D. % 
Households in 
Bottom 40% 
Income         -0.00674   
        (0.00591)   
D. Income 
Quintile 
Change, 2002-
2004        -   
        -   
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D. Distance to 
Public Services 
(Index)         -   
        -   
Reconstruction           
D. Education 
Per Capita          -0.0138  
         (0.0193)  
D. Electricity 
Per Capita          -0.0166  
         (0.0144)  
D. Healthcare 
Per Capita          0.00931  
         (0.0246)  
D. 
Transportation 
Per Capita          -0.000739  
         (0.00618)  
D. Water & 
Sanitation Per 
Capita          0.000273  
         (0.00415)  
D. Non CERP 
Education Per 
Capita           0.0243 
          (0.0207) 
D. Non CERP 
Electricity Per 
capita           -0.819*** 
          (0.213) 
D. Non CERP 
Healthcare Per 
Capita          0.00639 
          (0.0248) 
D. Non CERP 
Transportation 
Per Capita          0.00687 
          (0.0100) 
D. Non CERP 
Water & 
Sanitation Per 
Capita          -0.00124 
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          (0.00275) 
Lagged D. of 
D.V. 0.181** 0.181** 0.187** 0.195** 0.182* 0.170* 0.181** 0.188** 0.182** 0.185* 
 (0.0889) (0.0906) (0.0841) (0.0868) (0.0921) (0.0905) (0.0906) (0.0909) (0.0918) (0.0966) 
Constant 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.211*** 0.203*** 0.197*** 0.190*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0538) (0.0564) (0.0550) (0.0562) (0.0580) (0.0541) (0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0531) 
           
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 792 824 824 
R-squared 0.139 0.141 0.179 0.206 0.144 0.161 0.141 0.147 0.146 0.145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the 
dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3. Linear Regression with District Fixed Effects - First Differences & Alternative Independent Variable 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Synergy       
Turnout Difference - Log  - - - - - - 
       
Surge  -0.0328 -0.103 -0.123 -0.0785 -0.108 -0.0805 
 (0.109) (0.101) (0.0970) (0.0913) (0.108) (0.0992) 
Surge x Turnout Difference - Log  -0.145*** -0.141*** -0.137*** -0.145*** -0.132** -0.140** 
 (0.0551) (0.0537) (0.0514) (0.0544) (0.0557) (0.0540) 
Coalition Forces       
D. Troop Strength 0.134* 0.122* 0.114* 0.135* 0.126* 0.129* 
 (0.0739) (0.0638) (0.0620) (0.0765) (0.0741) (0.0681) 
Surge x D. Troop Strength  -0.186 -0.115 -0.0520 -0.156 -0.178 -0.185 
 (0.140) (0.118) (0.119) (0.131) (0.141) (0.131) 
Lagged D. Troop Strength  -0.00581 -0.0294 -0.0188 -0.00950 -0.0124 -0.0175 
 (0.104) (0.0955) (0.0897) (0.102) (0.103) (0.100) 
Surge x Lagged D. Troop Strength -0.131 -0.0603 -0.0232 -0.0887 -0.141 -0.123 
 (0.145) (0.106) (0.102) (0.138) (0.145) (0.140) 
D. PRT 0.0505 0.0549 0.0611 0.0588 0.0615 0.0865 
 (0.133) (0.126) (0.125) (0.136) (0.133) (0.143) 
Surge x D. PRT  -0.0437 -0.00911 0.0144 -0.0337 -0.157 -0.0615 
 (0.178) (0.159) (0.155) (0.178) (0.205) (0.175) 
Spending       
D. CERP Per Capita  0.00729     
  (0.00694)     
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita  -0.0256**     
  (0.0103)     
D. CERP Per Capita < $50K    -0.00343    
   (0.0214)    
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita < $50K    -0.0653**    
   (0.0288)    
D. CERP Per Capita > $50K    0.00781    
   (0.00808)    
Surge x D. CERP Per Capita > $50K    -0.0207*    
   (0.0121)    
D. CSP Per Capita    -0.0365   
    (0.0285)   
Surge x D. CSP Per Capita    -   
    -   
D. CAP Per Capita    -0.897   
    (0.873)   
Surge x D. CAP Per Capita    0.899   
    (0.862)   
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D. USAid Per Capita    0.000618   
    (0.00291)   
Surge x D. USAid Per Capita    -0.0120   
    (0.00736)   
Economy       
D. Unemployment Rate      -0.112  
     (0.517)  
Surge x D. Unemployment Rate     -5.088**  
     (2.173)  
D. % Households in Bottom 40% Income      -0.00846  
     (0.0117)  
Surge x D. % Households in Bottom 40% 
Income      0.000581  
     (0.0124)  
Reconstruction       
D. Education Per Capita       0.00944 
      (0.0137) 
Surge x D. Education Per Capita       -0.0421 
      (0.0312) 
D. Electricity Per Capita       0.0178** 
      (0.00736) 
Surge x D. Electricity Per Capita       -0.0482** 
      (0.0229) 
D. Healthcare Per Capita       -0.00198 
      (0.0268) 
Surge x D. Healthcare Per Capita       0.0604 
      (0.0652) 
D. Transportation Per Capita       0.00576 
      (0.0121) 
Surge x D. Transportation Per Capita       -0.0122 
      (0.0114) 
D. Water & Sanitation Per Capita       0.0109 
      (0.00658) 
Surge x D. Water & Sanitation Per Capita       -0.0221** 
      (0.00997) 
Lag of D.V.  0.651** 0.617** 0.604** 0.644** 0.684** 0.654** 
 (0.285) (0.274) (0.269) (0.282) (0.291) (0.280) 
Surge x Lag of D.V. -0.579** -0.538** -0.516** -0.582** -0.615** -0.584** 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.257) (0.265) (0.272) (0.263) 
Constant 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.160*** 0.150*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0493) (0.0492) (0.0562) (0.0553) (0.0519) 
       
Observations 824 824 824 824 792 824 
R-squared 0.188 0.251 0.272 0.206 0.209 0.221 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include 
controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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4. Linear Regression & District Fixed Effects - First Differences & Alternative Independent Variable 
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy            
Turnout Difference - Log 0.0814** 0.0782*** 0.0759*** 0.0778*** 0.0799*** - - - - - 
 (0.0324) (0.0286) (0.0280) (0.0258) (0.0285)      
Surge 0.0781 0.106 0.137 0.0800 0.116 0.0147 0.0286 -0.00953 -0.0359 0.0226 
 (0.127) (0.141) (0.147) (0.106) (0.138) (0.116) (0.121) (0.110) (0.102) (0.116) 
Surge x Turnout Difference - Log -0.164*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.140*** -0.162*** -0.174*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.170*** -0.179*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0576) (0.0534) (0.0391) (0.0577) (0.0629) (0.0626) (0.0629) (0.0594) (0.0625) 
Sectarian ID           
Shiite -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.331*** -0.453*** -0.286***      
 (0.0910) (0.106) (0.116) (0.148) (0.104)      
Mixed -0.154* -0.133 -0.168* -0.330** -0.129      
 (0.0785) (0.0948) (0.0948) (0.144) (0.0967)      
Kurdish -0.303*** -0.301*** -0.350*** -0.476*** -0.289***      
 (0.0857) (0.114) (0.124) (0.148) (0.110)      
Coalition Forces           
Troop Strength  0.0652** 0.0674** 0.0504* 0.0653**      
  (0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0276)      
Lagged Troop Strength  -0.0534 -0.0425 -0.00548 -0.0539      
  (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.0419) (0.0405)      
D. Troop Strength       0.0253 0.0394 0.0538 0.0310 
       (0.0355) (0.0400) (0.0446) (0.0339) 
D. Lagged Troop Strength       -0.0383 -0.0234 0.0355 -0.0364 
       (0.0757) (0.0669) (0.0587) (0.0754) 
PRT  -0.0615 -0.0633 -0.0801 -0.0581      
  (0.0588) (0.0578) (0.0549) (0.0631)      
D. PRT       -0.0340 -0.0380 -0.0141 -0.0449 
       (0.0734) (0.0750) (0.0858) (0.0780) 
Spending           
SOI Spending Per Capita -0.568*** -0.569*** -0.466*** -0.509*** -0.573***      
 (0.196) (0.197) (0.161) (0.164) (0.198)      
D. SOI Spending Per Capita      -0.403** -0.401** -0.318*** -0.419*** -0.411** 
      (0.167) (0.166) (0.118) (0.115) (0.168) 
CERP Per Capita   -0.00539        
   (0.00424)        
D. CERP Per Capita        -0.0105*   
        (0.00591)   
CERP Per Capita < $50K     -0.0613**       
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    (0.0236)       
D. CERP Per Capita < $50K          -0.0681***  
         (0.0159)  
CERP Per Capita > $50K     0.000780       
    (0.00288)       
D. CERP Per Capita > $50K          -0.00433  
         (0.00320)  
Non CERP Per Capita < $50K      0.0137      
     (0.0160)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita < $50K           -0.0217 
          (0.0162) 
Non CERP Per Capita > $50K      0.000167      
     (0.000642)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita > $50K           0.00140* 
          (0.000796) 
Lag of D.V.  0.856*** 0.854*** 0.867*** 0.878*** 0.854***      
 (0.0294) (0.0279) (0.0287) (0.0264) (0.0279)      
D. Lag of D.V.       0.194** 0.194** 0.196** 0.209** 0.193** 
      (0.0893) (0.0910) (0.0852) (0.0887) (0.0921) 
Constant 0.242** 0.224* 0.262* 0.390** 0.197 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.211*** 
 (0.108) (0.132) (0.136) (0.150) (0.121) (0.0522) (0.0537) (0.0560) (0.0544) (0.0563) 
           
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 824 824 824 824 824 
R-squared 0.769 0.770 0.773 0.784 0.770 0.170 0.172 0.198 0.237 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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5. Linear Regression – Alternative Independent Variable  
D.V.: SOI Spending Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Synergy            
Turnout Difference - Log -0.0173* -0.0186** -0.0167** -0.0169** -0.0186** -0.0184* -0.0183* -0.0188** -0.0179* -0.0184** -0.0152** 
 (0.00939) (0.00915) (0.00812) (0.00821) (0.00913) (0.00945) (0.00995) (0.00910) (0.00911) (0.00901) (0.00663) 
Surge 0.0340** 0.0465*** 0.0147 0.0153 0.0463*** 0.0494*** 0.0310* 0.0386** 0.0424** 0.0530*** 0.0566*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0165) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0183) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0187) (0.0204) 
Surge x Turnout 
Difference - Log 0.0287*** 0.0296*** 0.0277*** 0.0271*** 0.0299*** 0.0294*** 0.0311** 0.0308*** 0.0300*** 0.0297*** 0.0319*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.00990) (0.00913) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Sectarian ID            
Shiite -0.0783 -0.0731 -0.0441 -0.0392 -0.0690 -0.0716 -0.0720 -0.0578 -0.0676 -0.0685 -0.0465 
 (0.0494) (0.0594) (0.0508) (0.0441) (0.0591) (0.0606) (0.0620) (0.0637) (0.0626) (0.0618) (0.0440) 
Mixed -0.0264 -0.00859 0.0170 0.0229 -0.00431 -0.00612 -0.00469 0.00227 -0.00673 -0.00574 -0.00124 
 (0.0394) (0.0434) (0.0395) (0.0310) (0.0437) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0484) (0.0460) (0.0470) (0.0384) 
Kurdish -0.0838* -0.0764 -0.0399 -0.0348 -0.0717 -0.0744 -0.0783 -0.0615 -0.0703 -0.0768 -0.0831 
 (0.0462) (0.0620) (0.0535) (0.0454) (0.0619) (0.0635) (0.0636) (0.0682) (0.0665) (0.0674) (0.0557) 
Coalition Forces            
Troop Strength  0.00152 0.00395 0.00509 0.000956 0.00163 0.000117 0.00390 0.00249 0.00313 -0.00109 
  (0.00799) (0.00968) (0.00843) (0.00791) (0.00796) (0.00718) (0.00895) (0.00825) (0.00886) (0.00834) 
Lagged Troop Strength  0.00433 -0.00431 -0.00585 0.00399 0.00501 0.00500 0.00202 0.00519 0.00375 0.00590 
  (0.00828) (0.0107) (0.0119) (0.00823) (0.00843) (0.00866) (0.00745) (0.00886) (0.00810) (0.00859) 
PRT  -0.0326 -0.0314 -0.0314 -0.0321 -0.0336* -0.0323 -0.0312 -0.0331* -0.0344* -0.0423** 
  (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0205) 
Spending            
Lagged CERP Per Capita   0.00278         
   (0.00173)         
Lagged CERP Per Capita 
< $50K     0.00470        
    (0.00619)        
Lagged CERP Per Capita 
> $50K     0.00256        
    (0.00186)        
CERP Per Capita Not SOI      0.00723       
     (0.00706)       
Non CERP Per Capita < 
$50K       0.00596      
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      (0.00542)      
Non CERP Per Capita > 
$50K       -5.32e-05      
      (8.78e-05)      
CSP Per Capita       0.00108     
       (0.00487)     
CAP Per Capita       0.0216     
       (0.0197)     
USAid Per Capita       -0.000147*     
       (7.54e-05)     
Natural Resources            
Oil & Gas Reserves 
Weighted by Price           -2.672  
          (4.099)  
Oil Pipeline Volume 
Weighted by Price           -0.000225  
          (0.000267)  
Economy            
Unemployment Rate            -0.243** 
           (0.114) 
% Households in Bottom 
40% Income            -0.000672 
           (0.000647) 
Income Quintile Change, 
2002-2004           -0.0102 
           (0.0228) 
Distance to Public 
Services (Index)            -0.0559 
           (0.298) 
Reconstruction            
Education Per Capita         0.00644    
        (0.00584)    
Electricity Per Capita         0.000405    
        (0.00265)    
Healthcare Per Capita         -0.000736    
        (0.00101)    
Transportation Per 
Capita         0.00188    
        (0.00158)    
Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita         -0.000462    
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        (0.000436)    
Non CERP Education Per 
Capita          0.00343   
         (0.00320)   
Non CERP Electricity Per 
capita          -0.0220   
         (0.0275)   
Non CERP Healthcare 
Per Capita         -0.000319   
         (0.000947)   
Non CERP 
Transportation Per 
Capita         -0.000818   
         (0.00101)   
Non CERP Water & 
Sanitation Per Capita         -0.000508   
         (0.000440)   
Lag of D.V.  0.241** 0.239** 0.188** 0.189** 0.239** 0.233** 0.237** 0.229** 0.237** 0.237** 0.233** 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.0889) (0.0868) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0938) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
Constant 0.0899 0.0756 0.0521 0.0478 0.0710 0.0710 0.0778 0.0584 0.0716 0.0750 0.104** 
 (0.0542) (0.0682) (0.0611) (0.0548) (0.0681) (0.0721) (0.0706) (0.0736) (0.0716) (0.0713) (0.0512) 
            
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 891 
R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.138 0.138 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.122 0.117 0.117 0.121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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6. Linear Regression with District Fixed Effects - First Differences 
D.V.: SOI Spending Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Synergy            
Inverse Turnout Rank - Log - - - - - - - - - - - 
            
Surge -0.0225 -0.0245 -0.0251 -0.0296 -0.0260 -0.0254 -0.0207 -0.0241 -0.0269 -0.0269 -0.0285 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0243) (0.0237) (0.0254) (0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0274) 
Surge x Inverse Turnout 
Rank - Log 0.0529*** 0.0525** 0.0527*** 0.0527*** 0.0529** 0.0508*** 0.0542** 0.0523** 0.0539** 0.0527** 0.0534** 
 (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0205) (0.0210) 
Coalition Forces            
D. Troop Strength  -0.00524 0.00246 0.00235 -0.00421 -0.00330 -0.00767 -0.00633 -0.00596 -0.00528 -0.00576 
  (0.00925) (0.00913) (0.00913) (0.00951) (0.00999) (0.00933) (0.00920) (0.00945) (0.00982) (0.00918) 
Lagged D. Troop Strength  0.0144* 0.00874 0.00686 0.0146* 0.0151* 0.0132* 0.0143* 0.0148* 0.0145 0.0155* 
  (0.00821) (0.00533) (0.00537) (0.00837) (0.00835) (0.00755) (0.00814) (0.00845) (0.00874) (0.00901) 
D. PRT  -0.00706 -0.00210 0.000143 -0.00693 -0.00981 -0.00612 -0.00813 -0.00313 -0.00704 -0.00778 
  (0.0182) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.0165) 
Spending            
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita   0.00435*         
   (0.00228)         
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K    0.0115        
    (0.00742)        
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K    0.00351*        
    (0.00207)        
D. CERP Per Capita Not SOI     -0.00763       
     (0.0102)       
D. Non CERP Per Capita < 
$50K       -5.77e-05      
      (0.00487)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita > 
$50K       0.000484      
      (0.000504)      
D. CSP Per Capita       0.00467     
       (0.00584)     
D. CAP Per Capita       0.0236     
       (0.0264)     
D. USAid Per Capita       -0.000325     
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       (0.000246)     
Natural Resources            
D. Oil & Gas Reserves 
Weighted by Price         24.26*    
        (13.85)    
D. Oil Pipeline Volume 
Weighted by Price         0.000829    
        (0.000838)    
Economy            
D. Unemployment Rate          -0.00735   
         (0.104)   
D. % Households in Bottom 
40% Income          -0.00316   
         (0.00229)   
D. Income Quintile Change, 
2002-2004         0   
         (0)   
D. Distance to Public 
Services (Index)          0   
         (0)   
Reconstruction            
D. Education Per Capita           0.00102  
          (0.00356)  
D. Electricity Per Capita           -0.00264  
          (0.00254)  
D. Healthcare Per Capita           -0.00130  
          (0.00277)  
D. Transportation Per 
Capita           0.000187  
          (0.000469)  
D. Water & Sanitation Per 
Capita           -1.45e-05  
          (0.000819)  
D. Non CERP Education Per 
Capita            0.00349 
           (0.00907) 
D. Non CERP Electricity Per 
capita            -0.0503 
           (0.0440) 
D. Non CERP Healthcare 
Per Capita           -0.00319 
           (0.00363) 
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D. Non CERP 
Transportation Per Capita           -0.000715 
           (0.000942) 
D. Non CERP Water & 
Sanitation Per Capita           -0.000103 
           (0.000544) 
Lagged D. of D.V. -1.012*** -1.012*** -1.052*** -1.045*** -1.013*** -1.016*** -1.009*** -1.010*** -1.011*** -1.009*** -1.012*** 
 (0.0832) (0.0830) (0.0691) (0.0648) (0.0822) (0.0850) (0.0866) (0.0836) (0.0824) (0.0798) (0.0803) 
Constant 0.00244 0.00408 0.00161 0.00488 0.00383 0.00945 0.00158 0.00208 0.00450 0.00435 0.00399 
 (0.00946) (0.00977) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.00981) (0.00927) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.00959) (0.00852) (0.00926) 
            
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 792 824 824 
R-squared 0.449 0.450 0.470 0.473 0.450 0.452 0.453 0.452 0.451 0.450 0.450 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Linear Regression-First Differences & Alternative Independent Variable    
D.V.: SOI Spending Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Synergy            
Turnout Difference - Log - - - - - - - - - - - 
            
Surge 0.0312** 0.0286* 0.0255* 0.0223 0.0277* 0.0255* 0.0334** 0.0272* 0.0262* 0.0288* 0.0274* 
 (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0151) (0.0147) 
Surge x Turnout Difference - Log 0.0296** 0.0295** 0.0309** 0.0303** 0.0296** 0.0287*** 0.0307** 0.0293** 0.0300** 0.0294** 0.0304** 
 (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0123) 
Coalition Forces            
D. Troop Strength  -0.00496 0.00282 0.00271 -0.00394 -0.00304 -0.00739 -0.00495 -0.00558 -0.00605 -0.00568 
  (0.00928) (0.00945) (0.00951) (0.00952) (0.00999) (0.00929) (0.00973) (0.00914) (0.00929) (0.00946) 
Lagged D. Troop Strength  0.0144 0.00864 0.00681 0.0146 0.0150* 0.0133 0.0144 0.0156 0.0142 0.0148 
  (0.00874) (0.00579) (0.00560) (0.00888) (0.00886) (0.00802) (0.00923) (0.00945) (0.00863) (0.00899) 
D. PRT  -0.00467 0.00117 0.00299 -0.00459 -0.00734 -0.00331 -0.00492 -0.00617 -0.00572 -0.000395 
  (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0184) (0.0179) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0188) 
Spending            
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita   0.00439*         
   (0.00229)         
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita < $50K    0.0113        
    (0.00738)        
Lagged D. CERP Per Capita > $50K    0.00357*        
    (0.00209)        
D. CERP Per Capita Not SOI     -0.00757       
     (0.0102)       
D. Non CERP Per Capita < $50K       -0.000122      
      (0.00486)      
D. Non CERP Per Capita > $50K       0.000479      
      (0.000501)      
D. CSP Per Capita       0.00459     
       (0.00581)     
D. CAP Per Capita       0.0248     
       (0.0263)     
D. USAid Per Capita       -0.000328     
       (0.000248)     
            
Natural Resources            
D. Oil & Gas Reserves Weighted by 
Price           24.27*  
          (13.81)  
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D. Oil Pipeline Volume Weighted 
by Price           0.000820  
          (0.000842)  
Economy            
D. Unemployment Rate            -0.00554 
           (0.104) 
D. % Households in Bottom 40% 
Income            -0.00318 
           (0.00229) 
D. Income Quintile Change, 2002-
2004           0 
           (0) 
D. Distance to Public Services 
(Index)            0 
           (0) 
Reconstruction            
D. Education Per Capita         0.000845    
        (0.00353)    
D. Electricity Per Capita         -0.00246    
        (0.00247)    
D. Healthcare Per Capita         -0.00124    
        (0.00271)    
D. Transportation Per Capita         0.000230    
        (0.000470)    
D. Water & Sanitation Per Capita         -7.85e-05    
        (0.000807)    
D. Non CERP Education Per Capita          0.00267   
         (0.00898)   
D. Non CERP Electricity Per capita          -0.0623   
         (0.0509)   
D. Non CERP Healthcare Per Capita         -0.00352   
         (0.00367)   
D. Non CERP Transportation Per 
Capita         -0.000790   
         (0.000917)   
D. Non CERP Water & Sanitation 
Per Capita         -0.000240   
         (0.000514)   
Lagged D. of D.V. -1.014*** -1.014*** -1.055*** -1.048*** -1.015*** -1.018*** -1.012*** -1.012*** -1.013*** -1.012*** -1.014*** 
 (0.0832) (0.0831) (0.0688) (0.0646) (0.0823) (0.0851) (0.0866) (0.0801) (0.0803) (0.0837) (0.0824) 
Constant 0.00243 0.00401 0.00150 0.00469 0.00377 0.00933 0.00149 0.00411 0.00342 0.00202 0.00446 
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 (0.00958) (0.00991) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.00996) (0.00937) (0.0108) (0.00868) (0.00950) (0.0103) (0.00975) 
            
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 792 
R-squared 0.450 0.451 0.472 0.475 0.452 0.453 0.454 0.452 0.452 0.453 0.452 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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8. Berman et al 2013: Interaction of CERP Spending with Troop Strength and PRT Presence 
D.V.: Significant 
Incidents Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                          
Surge  -0.0239 -0.0607 -0.00736 -0.0120 -0.0262 0.00225 0.239 0.177 0.259 0.262 0.231 0.277 
 (0.120) (0.0877) (0.125) (0.113) (0.0980) (0.119) (0.204) (0.153) (0.211) (0.193) (0.175) (0.201) 
Surge x Turnout 
Difference - Log  -0.179*** -0.152*** -0.181*** -0.183*** -0.173*** -0.184***       
 (0.0658) (0.0494) (0.0664) (0.0629) (0.0590) (0.0635)       
Surge x Inverse 
Turnout Rank - 
Log       -0.290*** -0.254*** -0.294*** -0.300*** -0.283*** -0.301*** 
       (0.106) (0.0821) (0.107) (0.102) (0.0954) (0.103) 
D. CERP Per Capita -0.0125**   -0.0126**   -0.0123*   -0.0125**   
 (0.00622)   (0.00617)   (0.00634)   (0.00620)   
D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K  -0.0893**   -0.0674***   -0.0925**   -0.0682***  
  (0.0372)   (0.0204)   (0.0385)   (0.0205)  
D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K   -0.0106*   -0.0107*   -0.0102*   -0.0106* 
   (0.00570)   (0.00592)   (0.00571)   (0.00593) 
D. Troop Strength 0.0431 0.0500 0.0374 0.0440 0.0502 0.0371 0.0416 0.0498 0.0360 0.0442 0.0507 0.0374 
 (0.0417) (0.0347) (0.0417) (0.0418) (0.0399) (0.0415) (0.0383) (0.0327) (0.0381) (0.0383) (0.0400) (0.0376) 
D. PRT    -0.0558 0.0110 -0.0545    -0.0344 0.0326 -0.0337 
    (0.0748) (0.0810) (0.0738)    (0.0761) (0.0862) (0.0750) 
D. CERP Per Capita 
x D. Troop 
Strength -0.00127      -0.00245      
 (0.00485)      (0.00490)      
D. CERP Per Capita 
x D. PRT    0.0257      0.0284   
    (0.0265)      (0.0270)   
D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K x D. Troop 
Strength  -0.0276**      -0.0306**     
  (0.0130)      (0.0135)     
D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K x D. PRT     0.272*      0.267*  
     (0.148)      (0.154)  
D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K x D. Troop 
Strength   -0.000840      -0.00220    
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   (0.00661)      (0.00669)    
D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K x D. PRT      0.0158      0.0195 
      (0.0250)      (0.0260) 
Lagged D. Troop 
Strength  -0.0261 0.0347 -0.0392 -0.0279 0.0228 -0.0409 -0.0286 0.0354 -0.0412 -0.0291 0.0230 -0.0421 
 (0.0663) (0.0604) (0.0702) (0.0651) (0.0576) (0.0699) (0.0671) (0.0619) (0.0707) (0.0651) (0.0583) (0.0697) 
Lagged D. of D.V. 0.186** 0.175** 0.184** 0.187** 0.193** 0.184** 0.195** 0.181** 0.194** 0.197** 0.203** 0.194** 
 (0.0850) (0.0882) (0.0848) (0.0841) (0.0901) (0.0849) (0.0848) (0.0868) (0.0845) (0.0837) (0.0901) (0.0844) 
Constant 0.206*** 0.193*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.197*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.192*** 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0519) (0.0566) (0.0571) (0.0536) (0.0568) (0.0569) (0.0517) (0.0569) (0.0571) (0.0533) (0.0567) 
             
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
R-squared 0.180 0.206 0.165 0.180 0.197 0.166 0.166 0.197 0.151 0.166 0.185 0.151 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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9. Linear Regression-Alternative Tests for Ethnic/Sectarian Identity  
D.V.: Significant Incidents Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Turnout Difference - Log 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.113***    
 (0.0374) (0.0343) (0.0340)    
Inverse Turnout Rank - Log    0.161*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 
    (0.0591) (0.0539) (0.0538) 
Surge  0.0494 0.0505 0.0514 0.328 0.331 0.331 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) 
Surge x Turnout Difference - Log  -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.182***    
 (0.0626) (0.0624) (0.0625)    
Surge x Inverse Turnout Rank - Log    -0.299*** -0.301*** -0.300*** 
    (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
% Sunni - CIA 2003 0.255**   0.329***   
 (0.124)   (0.111)   
% Shiite - CIA 2003 0.0326   0.0314   
 (0.0449)   (0.0484)   
% Sunni - LANDScan  0.183 0.188*  0.250*** 0.262*** 
  (0.116) (0.104)  (0.0926) (0.0811) 
% Shiite - LANDScan  -0.00829 -0.00527  -0.0184 -0.00694 
  (0.0266) (0.0215)  (0.0317) (0.0230) 
% Mixed - LANDScan  0.0471 0.0509  0.0777 0.0908 
  (0.0873) (0.0804)  (0.0852) (0.0801) 
Lag of D.V. 0.833*** 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.830*** 0.831*** 0.830*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0252) 
Constant -0.113 -0.0686 -0.0723 -0.259* -0.215* -0.225* 
 (0.0823) (0.0649) (0.0644) (0.138) (0.117) (0.116) 
       
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.752 0.752 0.752 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for 
year and a lag of the dependent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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10. Linear Regression & District Fixed Effects - First Differences with Not Logged Predictor 
D.V.: Significant 
Incidents Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Synergy           
Inv. Turnout Rank 0.0251*** 0.0235*** 0.0225*** 0.0196*** 0.0238*** - - - - - 
 (0.00888) (0.00816) (0.00773) (0.00637) (0.00817)      
Surge 0.294 0.321 0.347* 0.271* 0.333 0.238 0.261 0.226 0.191 0.259 
 (0.195) (0.205) (0.205) (0.149) (0.203) (0.184) (0.187) (0.172) (0.157) (0.182) 
Surge x Inv. 
Turnout Rank -0.0521*** -0.0512*** -0.0509*** -0.0447*** -0.0513*** -0.0548*** -0.0561*** -0.0570*** -0.0543*** -0.0570*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0163) (0.0121) (0.0176) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0178) (0.0189) 
Sectarian ID           
Shiite -0.303*** -0.310*** -0.347*** -0.513*** -0.305*** - - - - - 
 (0.0798) (0.0953) (0.105) (0.153) (0.0968)      
Mixed -0.158** -0.135 -0.169* -0.343** -0.131 - - - - - 
 (0.0788) (0.0929) (0.0926) (0.146) (0.0964)      
Kurdish -0.313*** -0.315*** -0.363*** -0.526*** -0.306*** - - - - - 
 (0.0770) (0.106) (0.116) (0.152) (0.105)      
Coalition Forces           
Troop Strength  0.0648** 0.0672** 0.0499* 0.0649**      
  (0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0276)      
Lagged Troop 
Strength  -0.0528 -0.0422 -0.00530 -0.0532      
  (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.0421) (0.0406)      
D. Troop Strength       0.0262 0.0402 0.0547 0.0320 
       (0.0352) (0.0395) (0.0445) (0.0334) 
D. Lagged Troop 
Strength       -0.0387 -0.0238 0.0353 -0.0368 
       (0.0759) (0.0669) (0.0584) (0.0756) 
PRT  -0.0676 -0.0696 -0.0873 -0.0648      
  (0.0606) (0.0596) (0.0567) (0.0648)      
D. PRT       -0.0501 -0.0543 -0.0302 -0.0616 
       (0.0716) (0.0730) (0.0838) (0.0765) 
Spending           
SOI Spending Per 
Capita -0.568*** -0.570*** -0.470*** -0.512*** -0.574***      
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.161) (0.164) (0.196)      
D. SOI Spending 
Per Capita      -0.403** -0.401** -0.318*** -0.420*** -0.411** 
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      (0.167) (0.166) (0.118) (0.115) (0.167) 
CERP Per Capita   -0.00525        
   (0.00419)        
D. CERP Per Capita        -0.0105*   
        (0.00590)   
CERP Per Capita < 
$50K     -0.0614**       
    (0.0235)       
D. CERP Per Capita 
< $50K          -0.0683***  
         (0.0159)  
CERP Per Capita > 
$50K     0.000911       
    (0.00284)       
D. CERP Per Capita 
> $50K          -0.00429  
         (0.00317)  
Non CERP Per 
Capita < $50K      0.0145      
     (0.0158)      
D. Non CERP Per 
Capita < $50K           -0.0223 
          (0.0163) 
Non CERP Per 
Capita > $50K      0.000145      
     (0.000648)      
D. Non CERP Per 
Capita > $50K           0.00142* 
          (0.000811) 
Lag of D.V.  0.856*** 0.853*** 0.866*** 0.878*** 0.854***      
 (0.0295) (0.0281) (0.0288) (0.0264) (0.0281)      
D. Lag of D.V.       0.194** 0.193** 0.195** 0.208** 0.192** 
      (0.0886) (0.0904) (0.0846) (0.0882) (0.0915) 
Constant 0.149 0.143 0.187 0.378** 0.119 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.211*** 
 (0.114) (0.133) (0.132) (0.149) (0.126) (0.0520) (0.0535) (0.0557) (0.0540) (0.0561) 
           
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 824 824 824 824 824 
R-squared 0.769 0.770 0.773 0.784 0.770 0.171 0.173 0.199 0.237 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent 
variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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11. Linear Regression with Not Logged Predictor 
D.V.: SOI 
Spending Per 
Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Synergy            
Inv. Turnout 
Rank -0.00498** -0.00549** -0.00470** -0.00464** -0.00541** -0.00536** -0.00533* -0.00524** -0.00531** -0.00523** -0.00452** 
 (0.00240) (0.00245) (0.00215) (0.00213) (0.00243) (0.00249) (0.00271) (0.00237) (0.00244) (0.00237) (0.00196) 
Surge -0.00103 0.0108 -0.0161 -0.0150 0.0104 0.0142 -0.00461 0.00226 0.00597 0.0169 0.0194 
 (0.0150) (0.0184) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0186) (0.0203) (0.0262) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0183) (0.0192) 
Surge x Inv. 
Turnout Rank 0.00885*** 0.00904*** 0.00823*** 0.00805*** 0.00910*** 0.00895*** 0.00935** 0.00935*** 0.00920*** 0.00909*** 0.00960*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00320) (0.00290) (0.00273) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00384) (0.00323) (0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00319) 
Sectarian ID            
Shiite -0.0737 -0.0696 -0.0396 -0.0334 -0.0647 -0.0676 -0.0683 -0.0518 -0.0649 -0.0625 -0.0461 
 (0.0454) (0.0542) (0.0466) (0.0373) (0.0541) (0.0553) (0.0564) (0.0610) (0.0580) (0.0589) (0.0437) 
Mixed -0.0248 -0.00771 0.0179 0.0244 -0.00331 -0.00521 -0.00406 0.00327 -0.00652 -0.00422 -0.00169 
 (0.0398) (0.0427) (0.0392) (0.0300) (0.0431) (0.0440) (0.0439) (0.0483) (0.0454) (0.0470) (0.0391) 
Kurdish -0.0791* -0.0720 -0.0351 -0.0288 -0.0668 -0.0695 -0.0739 -0.0557 -0.0670 -0.0705 -0.0815 
 (0.0428) (0.0578) (0.0506) (0.0400) (0.0579) (0.0592) (0.0587) (0.0660) (0.0627) (0.0651) (0.0564) 
Coalition 
Forces            
Troop Strength  0.00177 0.00410 0.00528 0.00119 0.00185 0.000394 0.00406 0.00273 0.00336 -0.000984 
  (0.00801) (0.00971) (0.00846) (0.00793) (0.00798) (0.00717) (0.00900) (0.00828) (0.00889) (0.00836) 
Lagged Troop 
Strength  0.00439 -0.00421 -0.00578 0.00406 0.00502 0.00495 0.00206 0.00512 0.00380 0.00584 
  (0.00833) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.00828) (0.00847) (0.00870) (0.00752) (0.00890) (0.00816) (0.00864) 
PRT  -0.0313 -0.0301 -0.0300 -0.0308 -0.0322* -0.0311 -0.0299 -0.0319 -0.0330* -0.0405** 
  (0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0201) 
Spending            
Lagged CERP 
Per Capita   0.00276         
   (0.00172)         
Lagged CERP 
Per Capita < 
$50K     0.00474        
    (0.00621)        
Lagged CERP 
Per Capita > 
$50K     0.00254        
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    (0.00185)        
CERP Per 
Capita Not SOI      0.00710       
     (0.00697)       
Non CERP Per 
Capita < $50K       0.00585      
      (0.00543)      
Non CERP Per 
Capita > $50K       -4.67e-05      
      (8.59e-05)      
CSP Per Capita       0.00113     
       (0.00490)     
CAP Per Capita       0.0212     
       (0.0196)     
USAid Per 
Capita       -0.000135*     
       (6.97e-05)     
Natural 
Resources            
Oil & Gas 
Reserves 
Weighted by 
Price           -2.712  
          (4.088)  
Oil Pipeline 
Volume 
Weighted by 
Price           -0.000221  
          (0.000269)  
Economy            
Unemployment 
Rate            -0.242** 
           (0.116) 
% Households 
in Bottom 40% 
Income            -0.000621 
           (0.000627) 
Income 
Quintile 
Change, 2002-
2004           -0.00993 
           (0.0228) 
370 
Distance to 
Public Services 
(Index)            -0.0449 
           (0.297) 
Reconstruction            
Education Per 
Capita         0.00648    
        (0.00581)    
Electricity Per 
Capita         0.000347    
        (0.00267)    
Healthcare Per 
Capita         -0.000921    
        (0.00108)    
Transportation 
Per Capita         0.00177    
        (0.00156)    
Water & 
Sanitation Per 
Capita         -0.000433    
        (0.000432)    
Non CERP 
Education Per 
Capita          0.00369   
         (0.00325)   
Non CERP 
Electricity Per 
capita          -0.0222   
         (0.0278)   
Non CERP 
Healthcare Per 
Capita         -0.000466   
         (0.00100)   
Non CERP 
Transportation 
Per Capita         -0.000949   
         (0.00106)   
Non CERP 
Water & 
Sanitation Per 
Capita         -0.000482   
         (0.000437)   
371 
Lag of D.V.  0.241** 0.239** 0.189** 0.190** 0.239** 0.234** 0.238** 0.230** 0.237** 0.238** 0.234** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.0888) (0.0867) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.0935) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Constant 0.104* 0.0931 0.0646 0.0585 0.0872 0.0871 0.0939 0.0715 0.0892 0.0884 0.117** 
 (0.0577) (0.0681) (0.0603) (0.0514) (0.0680) (0.0722) (0.0713) (0.0758) (0.0723) (0.0733) (0.0571) 
            
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 927 891 
R-squared 0.113 0.115 0.137 0.137 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.121 0.116 0.116 0.120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on district. Unit of analysis is a district half year. All specifications include controls for year and a lag of the dependent variable.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Replication Materials 
Appendix E 
 
Replication Materials are available upon request from the author: krishanm@sas.upenn.edu 
Materials include: 
• CodeBooks 
o Electoral States  
o ‘Lag’ Electoral States  
• STATA Datasets  
o Cross Case Data-COIN War Outcomes from 1945-2005 (Chapter 5) 
o Single Case Data-Iraq War SIGACTS & SOI Spending from 2004-2008 (Chapter 6) 
• STATA Do Files  
o Replication Commands for Chapter 5-Main Results 
o Replication Commands for Chapter 5-Endogeneity Corrected Results  
o Replication Commands for Chapter 6-Iraq War  
• Monte Carlo Simulation (Chapter 5)  
o General Instructions on How to Set Up and Run  
o Program Code-STATA ADO File   
o Initial Starting Dataset-STATA DTA File  
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